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Volume XII Fall 1968 Number 3

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

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Reflections on the Quarter

The Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia

ON August 21 Soviet troops, trailed by token forces from Poland, East Germany and Hungary, crossed the Czech frontier and, within a few hours, occupied all of Czechoslovakia. The invasion climaxed mounting Soviet displeasure with events in Czechoslovakia since the coming to power of the Dubcek regime early in 1968. Between July 27 and August 3, Czechoslovak leaders had met with the Soviet leadership in Bratislava. As a result of this meeting the Soviets had agreed to withdraw Soviet troops who had remained in Czechoslovakia after the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact maneuvers on June 30. Dubcek, although agreeing that the Communist Party would retain the "leading role" in the Czechoslovak political system, saw the Bratislava agreement as providing for cooperation among communist countries on the basis of "equality, sovereignty, and national independence."

In the short period between the Bratislava accord and the invasion, the Soviets sought to pressure the Dubcek government into further concessions. On several occasions during these weeks *Pravda* warned that "rightist reactionary" forces in Prague were attempting to undermine the position of the Communist Party, and criticized anti-Soviet tendencies in the Czech press. At the same time, the Soviets massed troops along the Czech frontier.

In Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek government, in an apparent effort to appease Soviet official opinion, sought to slow the momentum toward liberalization. On August 16, Dubcek declared: "We need order in our country so that we can be given freedom of action in our democratization process." He maintained that "the alpha and omega of our foreign policy must be unity and alliance with the Soviet Union." In addition, the government ousted Lieutenant General Voclair Pochlik by abolishing his post in the Communist Party as defense and security chief of the Central Committee. Pochlik had complained that the Warsaw Pact was dominated by the Soviet Union and had called for the reorganization of the alliance on the basis of equality among members. The Czech Communist Party Presidium urged restraint on the press in criticizing the Soviet Union and condemned the "irresponsible way" in which public discussions of politics had been conducted and petitions for change drawn up. On August 14, in a further effort to dampen the trend toward liberalization, the Dubcek regime ordered the removal of soapbox orators from central Prague to a remote site. Before this action was taken, speakers had harangued crowds in

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central Prague with demands for the abolition of the People's Militia.

Finally, in the weeks before the invasion, the Czech leadership had received visits from President Tito and East German communist leader Ulbricht. A cool welcome was given Ulbricht. Tito discussed the possibility of new economic ties between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and hailed the Czech liberalization program as a "positive development." A further indication that Prague was inclined toward less dependence on the Soviet Union came on August 17, when Premier Cernik announced that Czechoslovakia was "considering World Bank credits as well as credits from firms in the Western world—for example, France, Italy, Belgium, and Austria—so that our firms can buy goods in the Western countries to improve their efficiency in this way."

The Soviets, apparently concluding that the Dubcek regime might not be able to halt the movement toward change, decided upon military intervention. Undoubtedly, the Dubcek reforms did not go far enough to satisfy the great mass of the Czechoslovak people. When public debate began to center on guarantees for a free press and the restoration of a multiparty system, the limits of Moscow's tolerance were reached. Demands for liberalization threatened not only the existence of the communist system in Czechoslovakia, but the stability of communist regimes elsewhere in Eastern Europe; they might have spread to other communist states, including the Soviet Union itself. Geographically, Czechoslovakia, sharing a western frontier with the German Federal Republic and an eastern boundary with the USSR, separates the northern and southern parts of the communist bloc, providing a "corridor" from the West to the Soviet Union. Potential strategic consequences from the liberalizing tendencies in Czechoslovakia were thus alarming.

In intervening militarily, the Soviets damaged the prospects for success of other policies high on their agenda: apparently they deemed crushing the Czech reform movement more important than the pursuit of East-West détente and ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Moreover, they must have anticipated that their intervention would contribute to dissension within the world communist movement. The invasion brought forth harsh criticism of the Soviet Union from the Chinese, Yugoslav, Rumanian, Italian, French and Japanese communist parties, and prompted the Soviets to call off the Moscow meeting of eighty-four communist parties scheduled for November.

In the weeks following the invasion, the Soviets sought justification for their action. In a statement issued on September 25, they declared that a "socialist state, in a system of other states composing the socialist community, cannot be free from the common interests of the community," and that "the weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries which cannot look indifferently on this." The Czech govern-

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ment, they suggested, could not pursue a program of liberalization without assessing its implications for the international communist movement—the inference being that the Soviets were the acknowledged interpreters of the implications of changes in one communist country for other members of the system.

When the Soviets finally decided to intervene, they took action decisively and with massive power—but they failed to reckon with the Czech people's undisguised hostility. Conceivably, the Kremlin's willingness to permit Dubcek to remain in power, after having arrested him on August 21, may have been due to its inability to find a substitute who would be more acceptable to it politically and, at the same time, capable of commanding widespread support in Czechoslovakia. That the Dubcek government was united in its stand was evinced by a September 15 proclamation signed by such leaders as President Svoboda, Premier Cernik and Mr. Husak, First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, which reaffirmed the inviolability of Czechoslovak law, guaranteed the legal security of Czechoslovak citizens, and promised to proceed along the post-January path toward "socialism with a democratic and humanistic element."

Notwithstanding such statements, the Soviet Union has gained Czechoslovak consent to several important measures designed to reverse liberalizing trends. These include the proscription of non-communist political parties and organizations; limitations on the right of assembly; the departure or resignation of reformers, including Dr. Sik, the architect of Czechoslovakia's program of economic reform, and Foreign Minister Hajek; the imposition of effective press censorship; the inclusion of Soviet advisers in ministries and key industrial organizations; the reduction in membership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 1.7 million to less than 500,000; and the conclusion, on October 16, of a treaty authorizing the stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory.

The presence of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia will not only contribute to the preservation of communist rule and the reversal of reformist trends, but will reduce the maneuverability of the Dubcek government in foreign relations. It will also make possible, should the need arise, the removal of Dubcek and his followers in favor of a more pliable government.

But whether the presence of Soviet armies can prevent the re-emergence of forces making for change in Czechoslovakia remains a question. Will the ferment apparent in Czechoslovakia manifest itself elsewhere in Eastern Europe? A repetition of the Czech pattern in other East European countries could force the Soviets once again to intervene. Such a prospect would have a further destabilizing effect upon Europe and upon relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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The Czech Crisis and NATO

THE immediate effect of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was to revive West European, and especially West German, fears that the Soviet Union might be tempted to use military power not only elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but also in Western Europe. Furthermore, it cast doubt on the assumptions that have guided West European governments, as well as the United States, in policies designed to promote détente with the Soviet Union and the loosening of communist-bloc ties by increased trade and political contacts with East European countries. But it was also fraught with positive consequences: it gave new urgency to a reassessment of the adequacy of NATO's force levels, strategic doctrine and organizational structure.

As a result of the Czech crisis there is a newfound consensus among NATO countries that reductions in troop strength planned before the Soviet invasion should be abandoned. In the United States, Congressional advocates of large-scale withdrawals of U.S. forces from the Federal Republic laid aside their proposals. Unlike the reaction to the Berlin crisis of 1961, however, when the United States undertook a major military buildup in Western Europe, the response of the Administration was to call for greater European efforts to meet established NATO conventional force goals as a prerequisite to strengthening U.S. military units. An increased U.S. military commitment to NATO was made contingent upon action by West European countries to provide a greater contribution to their defense. In an address to the Western European Union Assembly on October 16, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach called on West European countries not only to assume a greater share of the "burden of common defense," but to achieve a "Western European unity of will and purpose to allocate those resources in a more efficient manner."

Militarily, the Czech crisis altered the East-West balance of conventional forces in Europe. Before this the Warsaw Pact, with 960,000 troops, enjoyed only a slight edge in manpower over NATO, which fielded 900,000 troops. With the arrival in Czechoslovakia of communist-bloc forces, primarily from the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact increased its troop strength to about 1.3 million. The Soviet Union stationed major military forces on the Czech-West German frontier, thus heightening apprehension within the Federal Republic about both the adequacy of NATO capabilities and Soviet intentions. The efficiency with which the Kremlin deployed several hundred thousand troops to battle positions for the occupation of Czechoslovakia was alarming. Although the invading force consisted of regular army units, Moscow quickly moved reserves and home-guard units into support positions. If the performance in Czechoslovakia is indicative of Soviet progress in logistical capabilities, then NATO has been put on notice that the USSR can swiftly deploy

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major forces into Central Europe from reserves stationed on Soviet territory.

In the absence of large-scale reductions in Soviet troop levels in Czechoslovakia or a major strengthening of NATO, the Warsaw Pact forces will remain quantitatively superior to those of the Atlantic Alliance. In order to counter such increases, the NATO countries, in addition to rescinding decisions to cut back troop levels, should bring to full strength the divisions already assigned to NATO. A portion of the British forces scheduled for redeployment in Britain from posts "east of Suez" might be sent instead to the Federal Republic to reinforce the undermanned British Army of the Rhine. Qualitatively, the strength of NATO forces might be improved by re-equipping them with more modern weapons for conventional warfare and improving their mobility of action.

The stationing in Czechoslovakia of Soviet divisions equipped with nuclear capabilities has reinforced European concern about the adequacy of prevailing NATO strategic concepts. The strategic doctrine of "flexible response," which NATO adopted in November 1967, calls for the use, initially at least, of conventional forces in the event of a communist attack in Europe. France has opposed such a strategy since it might tempt the Soviet Union to attack Western Europe without having to fear that NATO would respond with nuclear weapons against the USSR. Indeed, French withdrawal from the military organization of the Western alliance made the wisdom of the "flexible response" strategy doubtful, for NATO was deprived of the defense-in-depth once afforded by supply depots and bases in France. Reportedly, the NATO Military Committee has now discussed the revision of alliance strategy to provide for the early use of tactical nuclear weapons. In a speech on October 15 to the North Atlantic Treaty Association meeting in Lisbon, General Lemnitzer, the commander of allied forces in Europe, declared that, as a result of Soviet action, the allies "would be forced to commit reserves—to include nuclear weapons—at an earlier point in the conflict." He insisted that NATO should make clear its "will and determination to use" its nuclear superiority, should the need arise. Conceivably, the divergence between U.S. and French strategic concepts concerning the defense of Europe may be narrowed as a result of the Czech crisis.

In addition, the Soviet invasion has led to a reassessment of the adequacy of NATO mechanisms for consultation and decision-making. On August 25, Chancellor Kiesinger called for a summit meeting of NATO leaders. Subsequently, the British government proposed the development within NATO of a European caucus, or grouping, which would provide a greater "European identity" within the alliance. Such a grouping might foster more significant defense collaboration among principal European powers, and give Western Europe a voice in the alliance equal to that of the United States. Beyond the discussion of such pro-

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posals, the Czech crisis is likely to contribute to more concerted efforts within the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to provide detailed plans concerning both strategy and the use of nuclear weapons, at least at the tactical level, in alternative contingencies in Europe.

Yet another effect of the crisis has been the delay in ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Whatever its merits, the NPT would have been likely to accelerate the disintegrative tendencies plaguing NATO. Neither the German Federal Republic nor France was committed to the treaty. Both French and German leaders, as well as the Italian government, had expressed reservations about it. France was unwilling to sign, and both Italy and the Federal Republic had questioned the adequacy of nuclear guarantees for nonnuclear powers, the effects of the treaty on peacetime nuclear development, and the absence from the final document of the so-called European clause which, in earlier versions, would have permitted the development of a European nuclear force. By ratifying the treaty, the United States would limit severely its ability to contribute to the building of an Atlantic or European nuclear force. Britain would face increased obstacles to her entry into the European Community, and the prospects for British participation in a West European defense organization would be diminished. In the Federal Republic, the treaty had heightened fears about the adequacy of NATO for German security; in all likelihood, prompt ratification would have added weight to the arguments of those who call for greater German reliance on national solutions to defense problems.

Besides the strain of the Nonproliferation Treaty on the Federal Republic's links with NATO, the Soviet Union, in the period since the Czech invasion, has attempted to increase German apprehension about the reliability of Western defense guarantees. On several occasions, the Soviet Union has suggested that Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter permit Soviet intervention in Germany "against renewal of aggressive policy by a former enemy state." The Soviets have repeated their long-held contention that the Federal Republic has not been "de-Nazified" and that extreme rightist groups are seeking once again to reassert themselves. Adopting such logic, however, the Western allies might claim, with even greater justification, the right to intervene in East Germany, where the communist regime has made considerable use of former Nazi officials in administrative and party positions.

Whatever its effect upon NATO, the Soviet campaign against the Federal Republic appears to have been designed to halt West German efforts to establish commercial and political contacts with East European countries and to prevent the spread of "liberalizing" tendencies to other communist states, including East Germany. Alternatively, the Soviets may have embarked on their latest anti-German campaign in an effort to justify the Czech invasion by reviving fears of German "revanchism"—a long-

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standing theme in Soviet propaganda.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia provides a new rationale for the preservation and strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. If the Soviet leadership faces challenges to communist-bloc unity elsewhere in Eastern Europe, it may be tempted to intervene militarily again. NATO provides the framework not only for the development of a common Western defense, but for the coordination of Western policies in response to Soviet policy in Eastern Europe as well.

Events of the third quarter of 1968 have presented the United States with unique opportunities to reassess relationships with its West European allies. It was the Czech communist coup of 1948 which led to the development of the Brussels Pact and ultimately to the formation of NATO. The latest Czech crisis has given new urgency to a reassessment as NATO approaches its twentieth anniversary. With the coming to office of a new Administration in Washington, the United States is likely to reappraise its foreign policy goals and priorities for the 1970's. Certainly, Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia contradicted some of the crucial assumptions that for several years have supported the U.S. quest for a détente and meaningful security agreements with the Soviet Union.

The Mexican Student Revolt

IN recent months, students in several countries have attempted to seize control of university buildings in order to force change upon authorities both at the university and governmental levels. The student demands have ranged from reforms in curriculum and increased participation in university administration to reform of the political, social and economic systems in countries as different as France, Italy, the United States and Mexico.

The most recent large-scale manifestation of student unrest occurred in Mexico in the weeks preceding the Olympic Games which began on October 12. A seemingly trivial fight between students on July 23 triggered the outbreak of rioting in which students staged a strike, seized and burned buses, erected barricades, and took control of university buildings. The uprising spread to secondary schools in Mexico City and then to educational institutions in several other cities. For the first time in nearly forty years, the government sent military forces to occupy the University of Mexico. By the second week of October, at least forty-nine persons had been killed, more than 500 wounded, and 1,500 arrested. In one night alone, the "Night of Sorrow" on October 2, twenty-eight people were killed and 200 injured, when students clashed with military forces during a rally in the Plaza of Three Cultures in Mexico City. The violence erupted when the army responded to sniper fire from apartment buildings near the site of the rally.

As the conflict escalated, students began to use firearms, including automatic weapons, on a major scale. By September, student activ-

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ist organizations espousing loyalties to Chinese communism, Castro's revolution and the ideas of Trotsky, respectively, had become participants. Slogans representative of these movements appeared on walls, and student-occupied buildings were renamed for such leaders as Ho Chi Minh, Lenin and Che Guevara.

According to a report published on October 7 in *Intercontinental Press,* whose masthead states that its editorial policy "expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism," the uprisings were led by a vanguard which for tactical reasons was restrained in its espousal of Castroite slogans. "By agreeing not to carry Che's picture or red flags, the students did something that any real vanguard must do—avoid getting too far ahead of the people's level of understanding in order not to run the risk of facing capitalist repression alone." The article went on to say that the revolutionary vanguard must gather to its side large numbers of people in a coalition against the ruling elite. "Up to now, despite the extreme radicalism of the student movement in practice and all its success in uniting thousands and thousands of new students, only a vanguard, the political teams, have begun to understand the necessity of a Marxist program, of a strategy going beyond the present demands."

The demands put forth by the students were unrelated to the incident that sparked the revolt. The list presented to the government included freedom for all political prisoners in Mexico; elimination of special riot police; dismissal of the chief of police in Mexico City; indemnities for those injured by governmental security forces; abrogation of Article 145 of the Penal Code which provides punishment for acts of treason, subversion and public disorder; and the fixing of responsibility for governmental "aggression" against the university. Students voiced opposition to the allegedly "anti-democratic" methods of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, which has governed Mexico for nearly forty years.

Unlike student eruptions in other countries, including the United States and France, the Mexican revolt was not directed against the educational system. To a greater extent than in most other countries, Mexican students participate in university administration, and at the University of Mexico they occupy modern and spacious academic facilities.

The question arises, what propelled the students toward their bloody confrontation with the military? According to official government statements, communists or professional agitators captured leadership of the student movement. The rapid escalation of the conflict, and the lack of a direct relationship between the incident which set off the violence and the demands presented to the government, lend credence to the proposition that outside forces manipulated the uprising. During the rebellion, moreover, a self-styled "liberation army" emerged. On September 28, the so-called Constitutionalist Army of Liberation distributed a statement declaring

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that its members would wage a guerrilla campaign against "the criminal government of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz." Referring to the Olympic Games, the group disclaimed responsibility "for what happens to those who come to a country that, in fact, finds itself in plain civil war."

According to the Mexican Defense Ministry, guerrillas trained in Cuba have begun operations in Chihuahua State, where they clashed with government forces. The Constitutionalist Army of Liberation has announced that its activities "will be, of necessity, military ones and will include urban and guerrilla groups like those already functioning in the states of Guerrero, Sonora, Chihuahua, etc."

For several decades, Mexico's political system has provided great stability. It possessed the capacity to articulate its programs, respond effectively to popular demands, and unify the nation. Mexico has had a noncommunist trade union movement that has captured the loyalties of the vast majority of workers. Although the Mexican Communist Party has been small in numbers and generally ineffectual in its program, a "Movement for National Liberation" was founded in 1961 to bring together Mexico's "democratic and patriotic forces." According to an article in *Pravda* on February 1, 1963: "In a single year 330 Committees of the Movement were formed in the country. Hundreds of peasant, student, worker and other committees and organizations have joined the movement." The Mexican Communist Party is said to have given priority attention to the strengthening of support within academic institutions.

The extent to which there is a direct linkage between the student unrest and activity directed by agitators of Castroite, Maoist or Soviet persuasion, is difficult to establish. If, however, as reported in *Intercontinental Press,* "a new revolutionary epic of the Mexican people looms on the horizon," the events of recent months could have been but the prelude to a more serious challenge to the Mexican political system.

Middle East Syndrome: Attack and Reprisal

FOUR days after its October 26 rocket and artillery strike against Israeli positions, the United Arab Republic announced its intention to pursue a strategy of "protective attack" against Israeli forces deployed along the 108-mile length of the Suez Canal. Thus the pattern of attack and reprisal that has marked twenty years of increasing violence in the Middle East, cresting into three bouts of massive fighting, remains unchanged. While optimistic reports from New York, Washington and some Arab capitals during September and October suggested a possible break in this pattern, there now appears to be little justification for such hopes.

Ominous trends within the Arab world are intensifying Israel's sense of insecurity. Arab statements since the June 1967 war have been focused increasingly on chauvinistic rationalization. To many Arabs, the June war was merely the latest turn

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in the disastrous course of Muslim history in conflict with the West. The humiliation of defeat has been made psychologically tolerable by attitudes of hostility and revenge that can only strengthen Arab intransigence.

At the root of this position is the inability of the Arabs to reconcile themselves to Jewish Statehood in what they regard as their homeland. The irrational and obsessive quality of this feeling has been underrated in the West. Moreover, Israel, a successfully modernizing society, stands in sharp contrast to the Arab world. So intense is their rejection of Israel that only rarely can Arabs even bring themselves to diplomatic *pro forma* renunciations of aggressive intent. There is much talk of the "duty of sacrifice of blood in the jihad" and, in the mosques, ulemas preach that the conditions required by the Koran for a holy war are now being met. The statement of October 30, announcing the policy of "protective attack," seems to indicate that Nasser, politically weaker than he has ever been, is unable to prevail over his more militant officers.

One hopeful development, however, is the joining of direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Like Israel, Jordan looks westward and is suspicious of the Soviets. More important, Jordan, with its richest agricultural lands occupied, tourism smashed, and villages flooded with refugees, desperately needs a settlement and a period of peaceful reconstruction. Israel is apparently prepared to offer to return most of the West Bank including the cities of Hebron, Nablus and Jenin, as well as special rights in East Jerusalem (which would remain Israeli). But the question remains whether King Hussein can negotiate alone with Israel without incurring opposition from other Arabs. Syria has condemned the negotiations and demanded rejection of "submissive political solutions and international bargains," and Egypt has sounded warnings against a separate peace.

The UAR is less anxious for settlement since the Sinai Peninsula is not considered vital to her continued existence. Cairo's attitude depends heavily upon Soviet interest in a settlement. With their growing naval and merchant marine fleets and increasing interest in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the Soviets would like to see the Suez Canal reopened. The use of Soviet Luna rockets by Egyptian forces on October 30 indicates that Moscow intends to keep the pot boiling. From a pre-June 1967 level of 500, the number of Soviet advisers and pilots in Egypt rose to 3,000 in November 1968. Soviet army officers now fill billets down to the battalion level, and Soviet pilots fly missions with every Egyptian squadron. There are now over 200 MIG-21's in the Arab bloc, with 150 more MIG's and Sukhoi-7's on order. Soviet aid to the Arab states since June 1967 is estimated at over $2.5 billion.

Israel has benefited less from the proliferation of arms to the Middle East. She has been unable to replace the forty to fifty supersonic interceptors lost in the June war. Although Israel has paid for fifty Mirage V's, France has refused

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shipment. While negotiations for the purchase of fifty-eight Phantom jets from the United States have been concluded, it will be at least eighteen months before the first is delivered. In the meantime Israel must be content with sixty-five Mirage III-C's, and thirty out of eighty subsonic Skyhawks on order from the United States.

At the formal level, the Arabs continue to importune for Israel's acceptance and implementation of the November 22, 1967 General Assembly resolution, which called for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders as a prerequisite for peace negotiations. Israel formally countered on October 8, 1968 with a nine-point peace plan setting forth three minimum requirements for withdrawal from territory occupied in June 1967: (1) agreed and secure frontiers; (2) the right of all area states to independence and territorial integrity; (3) free passage through the Suez Canal for ships of all nations.

The UN representative in the Middle East, Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, has pressed for prior withdrawal and has threatened to return to his Embassy in Moscow if Israel does not yield. Israel seems determined not to withdraw from the cease-fire line until a treaty with the Arab states has been concluded. The official Israeli position remains, nevertheless, that "the worst thing would be to withdraw Jarring's mission."

For several reasons the machinery of the UN is less than ideally suited to settling the Middle East crisis. From the Israeli standpoint, utilizing the UN is a problem because of the systematic pro-Arab bias of the international organization. The Arabs muster sufficient strength in the General Assembly to defeat recommendations they dislike—with or without Soviet-bloc help. In the Security Council, where the Muslim world is permanently represented and Israel permanently excluded, the Soviets usually represent Arab interests.

Thus, Israel instinctively regards UN actions as posing a threat to her security, and the more vigorously the UN champions a proposal, such as the General Assembly resolution of November 22, 1967, the more intransigent her attitude becomes. Paradoxically, the "weight of the world community," as represented by the UN in the Middle East, tilts the balance not for, but against, peace. The involvement of the UN in the conflict, except for providing "good offices," may only harden the antagonism. Equally destabilizing are the actions of some governments urging "equitable" compromise settlements. In a confrontation where survival is the issue to both sides, such counsel appears inappropriate.

In sum, the prospects for peace in the Middle East are dim. An alarming syndrome has evolved: the very prevention of massive warfare intensifies the sense of injustice within the Arab world, and increases the compulsion to total war.

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FUTURE SMALL WARS: MUST THE UNITED STATES INTERVENE?*

by Lincoln P. Bloomfield

FORECASTERS should always be sobered by the warnings of Sir Lewis Namier about the kind of historian who remembers the future and imagines the past. After enough such exercises, one begins to believe that he is an authority on the future, having been there so often. When people ask what is going to happen, one is tempted to tell them. And yet the predictive technology of the political analyst is really no better than that of his forebear who sat in the palace courtyard consulting the entrails of a chicken, or the Delphic priestess who got high on escaping earth gases. He has no assurance that his well-chosen variables belong to any system that exists outside his head. He cannot extrapolate curves of charisma, hubris or alienation. Political wisdom turns out not to correlate with Gross National Product, and Belly Communism seems to have gone the way of Rice Christianity. All he can do is make guesses that combine, in ways that ring true, such accumulated data as the past and present offer, plus his own sense of enduring reality, all of it spiced with a fudge factor reflecting the role of contingency, of the random, and of what the Romans worshipped as *Fortuna*. Projections about local conflict are by no means exempt from these strictures.

A decade ago we had one picture of what the general lines of U.S. policy in our epoch were and would likely continue to be. Instability in the developing world had a kind of fixed significance for both Moscow and Washington. Each seemed destined to play a foreordained role, one fomenting conflict, the other counterattacking. U.S. interests appeared to be relatively unchanging, with European concerns in the accustomed catbird seat, and counterinsurgency the new magic by which nuisance wars would be disposed of. Inspiring the whole scene was a sense that the United States of America was fulfilling its God-given mandate to show the way, if necessary with a billy-club—a mandate celebrated

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by Americans from Jonathan Edwards ("Providence intended America to be the renovator of the world") to John F. Kennedy ("We in this country, in this generation are—by destiny rather than choice—the watchmen on the walls of freedom"). American omnipotence, in other words, was satisfactorily accompanied by omniscience, and there was no reason to believe that the 1960's would be all that different from the 1940's and 1950's.

The picture has changed with dazzling rapidity. Much of the following discussion reflects newer beliefs about what the past in fact meant and what the future might bring. But the final sobering thought is that our new perspectives, too, are transitory and subject to profound alteration as the 1960's give way to the 1970's.

II

Fifty-four local conflicts have taken place since World War II—small wars or near-wars, involving no direct U.S.-Soviet military confrontation. Some are still going on, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and those in Kashmir and Cyprus. The rate is not necessarily high: the only new ones during the last two years were the renewed Arab-Israeli fighting in 1967 and the civil war in Nigeria. Over 90 per cent of them occurred in the developing areas. Less than half were characterized by a prime communist element, even in insurgency situations. Yet U.S. military power was involved, directly and indirectly, in almost one-fourth of these small wars.

Already changes are discernible in the patterns of local conflict. It used to be that the easiest cases to predict were the inevitable decolonizations, some peaceful, some violent. But now only the Portuguese African territories remain a pressure point, and even here history could make liars out of some of us by arranging for Angola and Mozambique not to explode, i.e., to become happily biracial, or perhaps to be protected for twenty-five years by white South African power.

Neither is the old category of automatic Soviet mischief-making, countered by automatic U.S. opposition, necessarily valid for the 1970's. Note the word automatic—not adventitious or serendipitous, which accounts for the Soviet position in such places as Cuba, the UAR, Algeria, Nigeria and Somalia. In all of these cases other people made their own revolutions and then looked around for outside support. (The United States did the same after *its*

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revolution, and found it in Jacobin France, to the disgust of the conservative European powers. This analogy is pregnant with possible meaning for Americans.) An increasingly valid distinction can be made between local conflicts in which the Soviets meddle for quick profit and cheap influence, such as those now disturbing various parts of the Moslem world, and conflicts in which communist regimes, established of, for and by communists, are at stake, such as Hungary in 1956, Korea in 1950-1953, and currently North Viet Nam and Czechoslovakia.

The sources of deliberate insurgency-fomenting will more likely be Peking, Hanoi and Cuba. Of these only China has or is likely in the 1970's to have nuclear weapons. Conflicts fomented by Hanoi or Cuba have so far been unable to trigger direct Soviet or Chinese involvement, and thus do not raise the same danger of escalation one fears in those threatening a U.S.-Soviet collision. But whether or not touched off by communist arsonists, "wars of liberation" will be in the forefront in the 1970's, as colonial problems were previously. This leads to the second change in the local conflict picture.

This second change is an outgrowth of the virtual end of decolonialization. The Congo collapse in 1960 was its harbinger. A second generation of leaders and ideas is already making its appearance in the less developed countries. The "morning after" phenomenon is becoming institutionalized, with less and less hope that promised growth rates and modernization effects will soon, if ever, be achieved. This revolution of risen expectations will be continuously fueled by growing literacy, radio, television, UNCTAD conferences, and technical assistance operations. It is ironic that a form of stability has manifested itself in inherently unstable situations such as that in the southern half of Africa or the eastern half of Germany. Paradoxically, the reverse may also be true. Inherently hopeful situations characterized by national independence, aid programs, growing school populations, and concerned citizens, may well be the ones most likely to generate violence in the period ahead. In this sense West Africa, Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf are not much different from Detroit, the Chicago South Side, Bedford-Stuyvesant, or Roxbury: they all illustrate Kropotkin's aphorism that the hopeless do not revolt (but once hope is born, watch out!).

Anyone requiring persuasion that change and turmoil will be the order of the day should study the ages of men who rule im-

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portant parts of the world, often where there is no tradition of peaceful transmission of power. The science of gerontology will not save them from a certain fate (and might give us important clues to their behavior in the meantime): Chiang Kai-shek is 81, Salazar (recently incapacitated and removed from power) is 77, Charles de Gaulle 76, Franco 75, Ho Chi Minh 75, Tito 75, Jomo Kenyatta 74, Mao Tse-tung 74, and Ulbricht 74.

It seems inevitable that a decade of turmoil, revolution, small wars and attempted takeovers lies ahead. The failure of overnight modernization will create more fertile soil for "wars of liberation," and the latter, while often arising out of genuine revolutions, will also be fomented or egged on by Peking, Hanoi or Havana, and rather nervously supported by an increasingly stability-favoring USSR.

The United States, for its part, is not going to be able to drop out, and is not going to wish to expend its treasure and reputation in an endless succession of unilateral interventions. How can a policy be found that mediates between the imperatives? The past supplies a number of clues—but some of them are misleading.

On the evidence of the postwar local conflicts, the United States has acted according to a clear and even predictable pattern. Before the Viet Nam war became massive and eventually intolerable, several linked propositions could be asserted with confidence, notably that U.S. interests as a general rule favor stability and are opposed to violent conflict.

U.S. interests toward local *interstate* wars outside Europe have usually converged with international norms in favoring conflict control. But this has not been the case where vital interests appeared to be endangered by direct Soviet or Chinese advantages.

With respect to most *internal* wars, U.S. interests have derived from strategic concerns, e.g., regional security, U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, and modernization. Rather than invariably being subordinate to conflict-control policy, they have tended to depend on pragmatic assessments of probability of success, accessibility of the area, and the actual need for U.S. intervention. Wherever communist takeover was not a prime issue, the United States did not have a primary interest as to which faction won.

Both where the United States was relatively indifferent to the outcome, and where it was committed to victory for a given side, the crucial independent variable inhibiting this country's willingness to manipulate rather than suppress internal and interstate

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conflicts has often been a perceived danger of great-power escalation.[1]

Will this pattern continue? What, if anything, is changing? And where will such changes leave U.S. interests with respect to the local conflict process?

Most students of the problem would probably agree that, as of the late 1960's, at least one thing has changed: there is no longer a virtually unanimous consensus among American leaders that the United States has an automatic role as policeman to a refractory and unruly world in default of collective security and collective peacekeeping.

We can dismiss as *démodé,* at least for this planning period, the recent intoxication of some Americans by the heady wine of *imperium* (with or without the actual empire). There was an archaic, if not lunatic, ring to the revelation in February 1968 of the Army-sponsored study by Douglas Aircraft entitled *Pax Americana,* supposed to deal with "world power configurations to be used as a basis for the United States to maintain world hegemony in the future. . . ."[2]

But even after dismissing the mysticism and the neurotic Herrenvolk-ism of the latter-day Beveridges and Mahans, there remains a vital question of the extent to which the United States has a responsibility to intervene in local conflicts for unneurotic reasons: to prevent a larger war, or to oppose injustice, or to preserve friends from defeat or extinction. There is also the issue of what it *must* do in order to get the international community to meet its responsibilities, or to see that the various world power balances are not dangerously overturning, to the point they were by 1529 when the Turks were at the gates of Vienna, or 1806 when Napoleon had conquered most of Europe, or 1939 when Hitler seemed invincible. According to policy planner Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. involvement is a historic given on grounds of both fate and responsibility: "Our global involvement and our preponderance of power is such that our disinvolvement would create international chaos of enormous proportions. Our involvement is a historic fact—there is no way of ending it."[3]

[1]See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *The Control of Local Conflict* (Washington: GPO, 1967), II, Chapter II, which will appear in revised form in the forthcoming *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's* (New York: Knopf, 1969).

[2]*New York Times,* February 17, 1968.

[3]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Implications of Change for United States Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin,* July 3, 1967, p. 4.

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It was entirely consistent with this belief that President Johnson at the rollout ceremony for the gigantic new C-5A Lockheed Galaxy, capable of ferrying 844 men, viewed this achievement as a "signal that we shall not abandon the road of responsibility. We shall march it proudly."[4]

The rhetoric of responsibility is a direct result of America's determination not to repeat the dismal history of the 1930's. But it is also a lineal descendant of Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in which the U.S. right to exercise an *international police power* was first officially enunciated. Roosevelt's Annual Message to the Congress of December 6, 1904 is worth quoting at length, in the effort to see the American world role of the 1960's and 1970's in perspective:

> All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, *to the exercise of an international police power.* (Emphasis added.)

Secretary of State Rusk denied that we are a "world policeman," backing his denial with a citation of U.S. involvement in only six of "375 post-war crises." As he put it, "We don't go around looking for business."[5] But his critics did not believe him. Some see the contemporary U.S. goal to be as extensive as "the containment of disorder, national or social discord, or even the essential bloodymindedness of the world."[6] There is no dearth of Fulbrights and Eugene McCarthys and Stillmans and Pfaffs who rejoice to see the United States turning inward and away from its old liberalism-become-militaristic. But cogent warnings come from the State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research: Thomas Hughes argues that our overseas policy must not "suppress the pent-up revolutions which the century's politics require"; that "over time our national interest has been com-

[4] *New York Times,* March 3, 1968.

[5] Interview with college editors, *Department of State Bulletin,* March 11, 1968, p. 354.

[6] Edmund Stillman, " 'Containment' has won, but . . . ," *New York Times Magazine,* May 28, 1967, p. 76.

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patible with insurgencies more often than with counter-insurgencies"; and that "depriving people for the first time in history of the option to use force for social change is a serious and in many ways presumptuous effort."[7]

Perhaps the United States does find itself on the wrong side of the revolutions of the twentieth century, forced by some ghastly accident of history to play the role of Holy Alliance, while the most notable enemies of political freedom—the communists—somehow get away with parading as liberals. If this is an exaggeration, it is an exaggeration of a home truth that worries a multitude of Americans. The election campaign of 1968 signaled that many interpretations of the American role were up for re-examination. To define the interests of the United States in the local conflicts of the decade ahead, some pointed questions have to be asked anew. Some are astonishingly fundamental, such as: What keeps the peace of the world? All but the most egregious doves know that maintenance of the balance of power is one of the eternal verities of international life, and that failure to live by that verity brings on calamitous wars. But what balance of power? or balances? Do we mean only the balance between worldwide communists and worldwide noncommunists? What about balances between North Viet Nam and Communist China? Mainland Asia and offshore Asia? Arab Moslems versus non-Arab Moslems plus Israelis? Western Europe versus Eastern Europe? Or Europe versus the USSR? *Or*—Europe versus North America?

The point of these questions is self-evident, and unless one can answer them lucidly, there can be no policy for this country that represents rational judgments about intervention or nonintervention, caring or not caring, Asia or Europe, unilateral or multilateral undertakings.

It seems obvious that there are multiple balances, as well as an overall superpower balance that, once tipped, slides everything and everyone downhill toward World War III or, if we manage to avoid that, toward World War IV in the developing regions. Having accepted this situation, there then exists a clear responsibility to prevent the overturn of those balances and that balance. But whose responsibility? And if we assume the responsibility as in part ours—as American liberals earlier embraced it—can we live with it shorn of the once valid inflammatory and misleading rhetoric of a worldwide ideological battle?

[7]Thomas L. Hughes, remarks entitled "The Odyssey of Counter-Insurgency" to Foreign Service Institute, July 3, 1967, p. 25.

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Finally, if we do accept continuing responsibility commensurate with our size and wealth (though not necessarily our wisdom and understanding), how do we tell when a local conflict is truly a perturbation of the balance of power structure, requiring to be met and rectified? What, in 1968-1978 reference, is "aggression," and how can we always distinguish it from bush-league neighborhood feuds we hear about only because of Huntley-Brinkley's news stethoscope, not because they are important. Given that (as Thomas Hughes pointed out in the same remarkable speech) "internal violence is normal for most countries," how do we distinguish "aggression" from other unpleasant and even frightening events: peasant revolts, slum riots, student glandularity, and other manifestations of not-necessarily-communist oppression, misery, discontent, racial resentment and nationalist spirit? How do we arrange to keep remembering John F. Kennedy's axiom that "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."?

In operational terms, even if we become wiser and more sophisticated about relaxing while watching tribal blood flow or any other shaking of the comfortable status quo, where should the line be drawn? How "quietist" can the United States be in a turbulent world without encouraging incipient turmoil and destabilizing thrusts by the enemies of freedom into the soft mass of discontent? To accept as policy guides the predictions of those who say "No more Viet Nams" could be immoral and, even worse, stupid. We would do well to remember what John Stuart Mill said more than a hundred years ago on the subject of nonintervention:

> The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free states.
>
> Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right.
>
> Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, almost moral, if not always prudent.
>
> Though it be a mistake to give freedom to a people who do not value the boon, it cannot but be right to insist that if they do value it, they shall not be hindered from the pursuit of it by foreign coercion.

Isolationism is not necessarily bound to follow Viet Nam. For one thing, we have an alliance system we cannot undo quickly even if we wanted to. For another, as a nation we have a generally better understanding of the need to maintain balances of power

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than we have had since the early nineteenth century. And even when the United States has looked away from Europe, it has invariably found Asia and the Pacific in its field of vision.

A modulated American approach to local conflict would still leave a wide range of policy options for the United States. Washington can regard some local conflicts as not likely to upset a balance significant to the peace, and ignore them. It can view others in the light of increasing awareness that, on the record so far, neocolonialism is hard to impose. Why not let the Russians (or Chinese or French or Egyptians) fall on their faces instead of us? Perhaps we can "win" sometimes without even competing, just as the Soviet Union (France, Cuba, *et al.*) have scored points with people around the world despite our bigger gifts, our nobler attitude, and our genuine commitment to the good life.

Against this must be balanced the cases where the United States *must* act. Unilateral military intervention may still be the only way to cope with local conflict situations where the vital security interests of the United States are genuinely in jeopardy. But what still must be answered is whether, if intervention is required at times, it must be by the United States alone or virtually alone; whether adequate nonmilitary intervention early in the conflict would obviate the need for later military intervention; and whether multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking should not have a more significant role in the decade ahead in confronting this range of issues.

III

The national interest in respect to local conflicts may be seen as a function of several tangible considerations: whether a direct treaty commitment binds us to another; whether sworn enemies of the United States are bound to benefit directly from a given outcome; whether ready reaction forces are available. Another potential "involver" is the solemn pledge entered into under Article I, Chapter I of the United Nations Charter, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. . . ." But it is uncommonly hard in this century to organize a genuinely collective effort along these lines, even in the face of blatant aggression, probably because most aggression nowadays is not blatant, and may not even be aggression in any traditional sense of people in different uniforms, or from

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distinctly separate territorial entities, or even, in moral terms, wearing black and white hats.

Experts are currently debating whether new technology that drastically cuts the ton-mile cost of distant interventions does not cancel out the old rule that interests vary in inverse ratio to the distance from one's shores. But somehow an explosion in Central America or Canada seems more likely on the face of it to alert U.S. planners than one in Botswana.

In addition there is the matter of vital economic interests abroad. But it is difficult to think of items on which this country is so directly dependent as to allow the need for them to overcome vital political-security considerations.

If we construct a scale that weights potential conflicts in terms of these criteria for U.S. interests—explicit treaty obligations, communist profit with its presumed bandwagon effect, available U.S. forces, and distance—we could predict that, for example, the United States would have approximately three times more "interest" in what happened in Korea than Ethiopia. On *prima facie* grounds Washington would have a greater reason for intervening if Haiti or Guatemala "went communist" than if the Federation of South Yemen did so. One could assume that the United States would be likelier to act unilaterally to keep Panama from collapsing than the Sudan or Somalia. It would become enmeshed sooner in ethnic-religious warfare in Palestine than in racial-tribal warfare in Southern Africa.

Conversely, U.S. interest in tranquilizing measures, pacification, UN diplomacy, even arbitration and adjudication would be greatest at the low end of the scale, remote from places where a box-score with Moscow or Peking is kept and where the bandwagon and the dominoes are found—say, the Horn of Africa, the Congo, Nigeria, Zambia, Burma, or Algeria vs. Morocco.

But are these calculations eternally true? Can we predict today what U.S. interests will be a decade hence? And if we do, does not that lead us to a self-fulfilling prophecy? Note that the weighting of cases can be changed significantly by changes in two of the variables, and eventually three. Geography cannot be changed. But U.S. forces can be readily redeployed. The likelihood of distinct, direct Soviet or Chinese gains that are "zero-sum" for this country can change. Even more importantly, American *perceptions* of the degree of likely gain by Moscow or Peking from a given outcome of a conflict in Africa, Asia or the Middle East—or

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by Hanoi in Southeast Asia or Castro in Latin America—can alter. Finally, over time U.S. treaty commitments can be modified.

Moreover, U.S. interests can, in effect, be created by the initial decision to become involved. It has become increasingly clear that definition of vital interests and subsequent intervention have sometimes taken place as a *result* of arms or expertise transfers to the developing countries, rather than vice versa. Who in 1948 would have predicted an American interest in Viet Nam vital enough to warrant sending half a million U.S. soldiers to defend that country? And who that same year would have predicted that U.S. interests in the defense of Israel would become so shaky in the face of changing times that Washington's first instinct in the third round of fighting in 1967 would be to announce its neutrality?

Even Zambia could become a *place d'armes* for large numbers of American troops. Under a not implausible scenario things might go badly enough in Rhodesia, South West Africa, the UN, London, Paris, Moscow, Detroit, Watts, Peking and Washington to produce an ostensibly vital U.S. interest in Zambia sufficient to override all the other considerations that right reason seems to dictate in 1968. Conversely, Korea might find the United States seeking to evade its obligations despite the high score of ostensible interest (and that particular test of U.S. obligations might occur far sooner than any possible escalation in Zambia).

A final corrective to the sliding scale version of Washington's critical list of local conflicts is that such a list is not by any means a mirror-image of the probable target list maintained in Moscow, Peking, Hanoi or Havana. General Maxwell Taylor was historically correct in suggesting that American priorities regarding such involvement are "based on geography among the vulnerable emerging countries, concentrating our attention on those soft areas which can be reached most readily by the forces of these expansive governments [the USSR, China, North Viet Nam, and Cuba]."[8] But by the logic of the political rather than the strategic, the Cambodias, Irans, Finlands, Afghanistans, Japans and Austrias may make their own arrangements to coexist without "going communist," while the Zambias and South Yemens, the Nigerias and Southwest Africas might pose the juiciest temptations to external communist supporters, and consequently the most agonizing choices for the United States.

[8]Maxwell D. Taylor, *Responsibility and Response* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 13.

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IV

In this epoch U.S. interests in local hostilities arise first of all out of a concern that the most powerful of America's self-identified adversaries is in conflict with us in the developing regions.

In the late 1960's one is entitled to wonder how the Soviet Union is playing its role. It looks increasingly as though Moscow does not run risks threatening the collision of strategic nuclear forces. It seems true also that the USSR, in contrast with China, supports bourgeois nationalist leadership and movements in the less developed countries, in many places scorning the local communists who are often outlawed and/or in jail. The Soviets are known to disapprove of Castro's militant and violence-provoking tactics in fomenting Latin American revolution.

Perhaps Moscow actually *is* operating a conflict control strategy, as it claims. Premier Kosygin spoke of this to the UN General Assembly in 1967:

> A seemingly small event, or so-called "local wars," may grow into big military conflicts. This means that every state and government should not only refrain from bringing about new complications by its actions—it must undertake every effort to prevent any aggravation of the situation and, moreover, the emergence of hotbeds of war, that should be quenched whenever they appear.[9]

But something else is happening too. The same week Kosygin spoke, *The Economist,* in an editorial trenchantly entitled "Bears Can't Fly," predicted that Soviet abstention from trouble in the developing areas would be signaled by failure to prepare for it logistically:

> The combination of an offensive ideology with a defensive strategy is apt to produce . . . diplomatic defeats. To avoid more Cubas and Sinais the Russians will have either to resist the temptation to take on commitments in the Third World (which includes encouraging 'wars of liberation'), or else to acquire the military capacity this sort of policy calls for. This means building aircraft-carriers and acquiring staging posts for airborne troops. It will be a bad omen for East-West relations if there are signs that they have chosen the second way out of their dilemma.[10]

Today there are such signs. Soviet amphibious and airlift capabilities have improved. Landing forces are being trained. Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean has increased substantially since the Middle East war of 1967.

As with most Soviet phenomena, at least two explanations can be found for this one. Perhaps Moscow is mounting a new drive

[9] *New York Times,* June 19, 1967.
[10] June 24, 1967.

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for dominance around the world, this time under the umbrella of mutual nuclear deterrence. We seem, as a Yugoslav commentator recently wrote, to be witnessing "the increasingly obvious effort of the USSR to break out of the bounds of the continental Eurasian geostrategic shell without relying directly on nuclear missiles of intercontinental calibre." But as others have warned us in recent years—notably Marshall Shulman—the Soviet shift may well be a result of Moscow's calculations that the *United States* has adopted a basic strategy of intervention in any and all "small wars" in the developing regions to enhance American influence and control. "This," says the Yugoslav writer,

> also makes it clear why the Soviet Union is endeavoring to develop naval power, certain branches of the air force, etc. Unless all the logical assumptions deceive, *this is an effort to counter the imperialist strategy of local and restricted wars with its own weapons, the weapons of that selfsame local and restricted war.*[11]

Precisely the same set of questions must be addressed to this development as to, say, the recent Soviet buildup in strategic weaponry. Does it represent a new and malevolent thrust toward victory in the Cold War? A catching-up with American military doctrines after the usual three-to-five-year lag? An effort to stem the "mad" Americans in *their* drive for world domination? Or a bureaucratic victory for one or another organizational unit in the Soviet internal power struggle?

There is some evidence to support the belief that, while all four questions could be answered affirmatively, the dominant argument rests in the second and third. The Soviets, that is, are trying to do what the Americans have succeeded in doing, and thus to counter them. The world will not be easily persuaded to settle for the first explanation. Few outside Washington accept as foreordained that the "Nostrum" in *Mare Nostrum* necessarily means American. Few other countries are therefore likely to react to Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean as a sign of unacceptable cheating, or to regard it as an intolerable strategic overturn comparable to the emplacement of missiles in Cuba. But from this evidence one can conclude that the Soviets will probably bring more influence to bear in local conflicts where their power is available. On the same evidence, they will not invariably use their power to help the Syrians or Algerians or Cubans or Vietnamese to

[11]Andro Gabelic, "New Accent in Soviet Strategy," *Review of International Affairs,* reprinted in *Survival,* February 1968, pp. 45-46. (Emphasis added.)

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escalate local fighting to the potentially thermonuclear level. On the contrary, they are likely to use their power as they habitually use power—to accomplish desired political results. In the case of the Middle East this probably includes deterring the Israelis, giving the Arabs tangible expressions of Soviet support, deterring the United States from seeming to threaten the Arabs, and aiding de-escalatory policies when things get too threatening for Soviet comfort. Still, the presence of Soviet vessels, transport aircraft, and above all paratroopers would give an entirely new and portentous dimension to local conflict, and this development must be watched closely.

When it comes to internal struggles, "wars of liberation" will retain their sacred place in the Soviet litany—so long as nuclear escalation does not threaten, and preferably under terms with which increasingly pragmatic Soviet trade and aid policies can continue to live comfortably. The likelihood of Soviet volunteers may grow with increased "red beret" logistical capability. But so far the Soviets, unlike the Americans, have been careful to keep their fighting men out of local conflicts, perhaps because proxies usually seem to be available to them but not to us. Moreover, Cuban or Vietnamese guerrilla trainers and advisers may be of greater use to revolutionaries in Latin America, Africa or Asia than Soviet tankmen.

V

Even if one of the communist states is actively engaged in a local conflict, must the United States necessarily intervene? The United States tends to react sharply in this type of situation, and is not likely to prefer conflict control measures such as peacekeeping. There will continue to be instances where unilateral U.S. intervention may be imperative to keep the balance of power from being dangerously overturned. This is what responsibility has to mean, and this is why, regardless of the congeries of failures with respect to policy execution, it was right for the United States not to turn away when the Hanoi-directed operations in South Viet Nam became a serious threat of forceful takeover by terror.

But having said that, we should add that the most important single component of policymaking in Washington in the years ahead may be the degree of sophistication and objectivity molding the *perceptions* of those who decide what shall be done in regard to local conflicts. Perhaps no one continues to believe in monolithic communism (except possibly Senator Thomas Dodd,

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who spoke of it in the Rusk hearings of early 1968). Many have come to agree with Thomas Hughes, who warned: "Let us also beware of the tendency to exaggerate the genuine communist influence on internal violence when that influence itself is no longer cohesive, is often divisive, and is frequently only one element among many others."[12]

It will no longer serve American interests to react in blind opposition to revolutions wherever significant communist involvement or potential gain is perceived. In Viet Nam, for instance, a shrewd American strategy for "victory" would equally require that we do everything possible to set Hanoi against Peking, to the point of making this one of our prime objectives. If it worked, the postwar situation would favor broad American interests, above all in preventing a coalescing of hostile power on the Asian mainland which could encourage dangerous alterations in the regional power balance.

The battles are by no means over. Communism as a doctrine continues to rely on anti-Americanism; in practice it quenches political freedom, and it still has remnants of international cohesion. It might be a decade too soon to act on Senator Fulbright's belief that

> . . . American interests are better served by supporting nationalism than by opposing communism, and when the two are encountered in close association it is in our interest to accept a communist government rather than to undertake the cruel and all but impossible task of suppressing a genuinely national movement.[13]

But the counterstrategy is not to let the communists pose as the supporters of nationalism and the United States as the enemy, nor to let them posture as the advocates of genuine political reform. The United States must help to advance revolutionary processes in ways that steal the thunder from the extremists; this should *always* be the aim of reformers. Both in American ghettos and in local conflicts, we did not realize until recently that our winning strategy was reform rather than simply containment. The meaning of reform has become better understood; only its implementation continues to evade us.

U.S. interests are going to require a whole series of new policies in the economic and social, psychological and political spheres. U.S. political interests require us to find and support acceptable

[12]Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
[13]William J. Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 78.

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local leadership. Lee Kuan Yew, Eduardo Frei, Kenneth Kaunda—these are the types with which to "win"; note that they were at one time or another jailed by the white "reformer," or opposed by white Westerners as "too radical." Batista was disliked by most Americans, but the world believed he was our man. Diem was efficient, but when he embarrassed us we dumped him. We support the Portuguese regime in Angola because it is there, and because "we have to work with the people in power" who eventually become our "friends." The CIA long ago learned that this was not necessarily true. Activist politicians up to and including de Gaulle have balanced temporary embarrassment against national interest and swallowed transient unpopularity when necessary.

In dealing with local conflicts, U.S. interests require that we adopt as moral Canning's aphorism that a nation has no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests. Agonizing choices will continue to confront us in internal conflict situations. As a nation that sensibly avoids a tragic view of history, the United States tends to believe that in revolutionary situations there must be a third force, between the extremes, that is congenial to our values. Perhaps there are in fact no Kerenskys to be found in modern-day revolutions. But that does not force us to support either the Tsar or the Bolsheviks.

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TITO'S ACENTRIC COMMUNISM AND SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE THIRD WORLD*

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

YUGOSLAVIA has preserved its independence since 1948 despite periodic pressures from the Soviet Union. The course it staked for itself in the Third World brought contumely from Moscow, particularly prior to 1962—and more recently emulation. Yet among many in the West the view persists, though it is diminishing, that Yugoslavia has, sometimes consciously and sometimes inadvertently, served Moscow's purpose by undermining Western influence in developing countries and promoting communism and Soviet interests.[1]

In foreign policy, Yugoslavia is a nonaligned country with a security interest in keeping Balkan tensions minimal; internally, it is a communist country, ruled by an oligarchy shaped by a Marxist-Leninist mode of viewing and analyzing reality and a propensity for friendship with "socialist" countries. Unlike the other nonaligned states, Yugoslavia is bound by geography, ideology and political ambition to the socialist camp. Its internal liberalization and its policy of nonalignment create barriers that Yugoslav leaders try to minimize by seeking agreement with their Soviet counterparts on other international issues, although these efforts have been virtually shelved since the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Evidence of intimacy and, inferentially, of conniving is neither lacking nor unimposing. Yugoslav leaders condemn NATO but are sparing in admonishment of the Warsaw Pact. They lean

*This article is based on material from a chapter in the author's forthcoming book, tentatively entitled *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World.*

[1]Examples of the collusion concept abound in Western writings. The more sophisticated versions, however, generally contain qualifications. Thus, one eminent specialist wrote that "Soviet and Yugoslav policies in Africa (as elsewhere) are likely to be increasingly coordinated. For the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs can be most useful in Africa as intermediaries in such countries as Guinea, where Moscow . . . met with humiliation." However, he prudently noted that "Soviet-Yugoslav alignment toward Africa is unlikely to be either total or permanent," and that "the Yugoslavs are likely to insist on retaining some capacity for independent action." William E. Griffith, "Yugoslavia," in Zbigniew Brzezinski, editor, *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 141.

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heavily toward the Soviet position on such issues as German unification, Berlin, Cuba, Viet Nam, nuclear testing and disarmament. In stressing their commitment to oppose colonialism and imperialism, they betray an unmistakable presumption that culpability is solely Western. Thus, they considered heinous the embargo on Cuba by the Organization of American States, but lauded the one adopted by the Organization of African Unity against the Congo as exemplary regional cooperation. They were annoyed at Sukarno for pressing the confrontation with Malaysia, especially after Singapore was forced out of the Federation, but would not criticize Indonesia because Britain was involved on the other side. Despite insisting that they judge issues dispassionately and support the party whose objective is peace, they did not fault Soviet policy during the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, though both were precipitated by Soviet actions that could have upset a precarious status quo. Tito refused to condemn Moscow's unilateral resumption of nuclear testing on the eve of the 1961 Belgrade Conference, and he backed the Afro-Asian resolution calling for the removal of the U.S. naval quarantine against Cuba before any indication was forthcoming of a withdrawal of Soviet missiles.

These biases are tangible and upsetting to Westerners, reflecting as they do deep-rooted Yugoslav suspicion of Western policies and motives. However, they also exist in the policies and attitudes of many noncommunist nonaligned countries, which suggests that the criteria for determining the allegedly surrogate role of Yugoslavia in Soviet diplomacy in the Third World need to be examined in greater depth.

The only act that can unequivocally be ascribed to the communist character of the Yugoslav leadership was recognition of East Germany in October 1957. Tito paid this price to keep his status as a communist in good repute in Moscow; it had no relation to nonalignment. Possibly Moscow thought Yugoslav recognition would make it easier for East Germany to obtain diplomatic recognition from the nonaligned. But there is no evidence—and this is corroborated by extensive interviews with diplomats from nonaligned countries—to indicate that the Yugoslavs ever attempted to persuade any of them to extend such recognition. To have pressed this issue would have ingratiated Belgrade to Moscow and Pankow, but it would only have raised doubts among the nonaligned nations as to how independent Yugoslavia really was.

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Belgrade would have had much to lose from it, and little to gain.

Yugoslavia fully understands that its unique position among the new nations rests on the belief that it is pursuing *national* interests which are consonant with their national interests. Though Belgrade may have been tantalized in the mid-1950's by the prospect of acting as a bridge between the socialist camp and the nonaligned countries, there is no evidence that—with the possible exception of the recognition of East Germany—it tailored its policies to fill such a function or pursued policies for reasons other than the furtherance of national interests. Sinister though it may be to Westerners, and much as it may titillate some Yugoslavs, the notion that Yugoslavia acts as Moscow's interpreter of developments in the Third World has to be treated with utmost skepticism: Moscow has its own views of what is occurring and does not take kindly to Yugoslav interpretations, though it may on occasion be persuaded on some minor matter.

On a number of issues vital to Belgrade, the Yugoslav and Soviet positions diverge. In the United Nations, they differ on peacekeeping, finances, the role of the Secretary-General, assistance to developing countries, and the fundamentals of international economic policy as formulated at the UNCTAD conferences. They disagree on the purposes of international communist conferences and international trade unions. Belgrade and Moscow differ significantly in their conceptions of nonalignment and its role in international affairs. And Yugoslav leaders go their own way in policies toward Western Europe, tourism, foreign private capital and the building of socialism. In de Gaulle's words, "ideology is transcended by facts."

The commitment of Yugoslav leaders to communist ideology, which drives them to international activism, makes them interesting to developing countries. In response to the question, how does being a communist country influence Yugoslav policy, one French diplomat in Belgrade replied:

> If Yugoslavia were not a Communist country, it would have a less ambitious foreign policy. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia is important not because of the fact of its policy, but because other countries are interested in it—and this subjective and conspicuous interest stems from the fact that it is a Communist country.

In the Yugoslav case, being communist no more predicates functioning as a proxy for Moscow in the Third World than it does

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subservience to the Soviet Union. The assertion of collusion or cooperation in this area between Belgrade and Moscow cannot be substantiated by the known facts. Indeed, the opposite may more readily be demonstrated by an examination of the Sino-Soviet dispute as it involved Yugoslavia and the nonaligned nations.

Estrangement: 1956-1961

Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia from 1956 to 1961 was shaped by developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and by the Kremlin's Sisyphean effort to find a basis for accommodation with China. Yugoslav-Soviet relations did not result in a second schism, but they were discordant and acrimonious.

In May 1955, when a reconciliation was effected at Moscow's initiative, Belgrade again drew close, but warily. Then the Soviet intervention in Hungary in October-November 1956—the consequence of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the attendant acceleration of de-Stalinization—opened old sores and created new difficulties. In his Pula speech on November 11, 1956, Tito criticized the Hungarian leaders for calling in the Red Army to quell the demonstration in Hungary and counseled the Soviet leaders against reverting to Stalinism in preference to continuing the relaxation within intrabloc relationships. The Chinese, given over to second thoughts about de-Stalinization after experiencing some upsetting domestic disturbances, began to attack revisionism. In November 1957, at the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, they induced Moscow to take a stiffer stand than it had initially intended against revisionism and Yugoslavia, which became the symbol for heresy in the bloc. Tito's refusal to sign the Declaration of Unity strengthened China's hand and coincided generally with Peking's advocacy of renewed militancy in foreign policy.[2] Soviet criticism

[2]Zagoria writes: "It is not accidental that Yugoslavia became the major target of Peking's venom. In periods of international calm, when the strategy of the Right allows cooperation with socialists, neutralists, and moderates, Bloc relations with Yugoslavia tend to improve. At such times there is no great need for iron discipline within the ranks. Conversely, in periods of international tension, when Left foreign policy is in the ascendant and cooperation with socialists, neutralists and moderates yields to revolutionary and direct-action tactics, the errant Yugoslavs are the first to feel the burden of the change. At such times, it is necessary for the Bloc to close ranks and unify policy-making. Hence, in the spring of 1958, the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict manifested itself in divergent attitudes toward Yugoslavia. The Russians wanted to increase pressure on Tito, but not to the point where the strategy of the Right would be jeopardized. The Chinese, on the other hand, were calling for an abandonment of the strategy of the Right and, consistent with this, for an all-out assault on Yugoslav revisionism. The connections between intra-bloc relations, external revolutionary strategy, and foreign policy are direct." Donald S.

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of Yugoslavia intensified, especially after the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC) adopted a new program in March 1958. The program formalized a decade of heretical rebukes of Soviet policy and society. Yugoslavia reiterated its adherence to nonalignment and openly proclaimed that socialism could be brought about in developing countries by parties other than communist parties. Belgrade thus served notice on Moscow and Peking that it would go its own way in defining a different formula for realizing peace and socialism in the Third World.

Moscow reacted promptly. At the Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in June 1958, Khrushchev derided Yugoslavia for "the alms" it sought from "imperialist countries" and implied that it was a Trojan horse in the socialist camp. At the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU in February 1959, the "Yugoslav revisionists" were accused of betraying "proletarian internationalism" and, "in their narrow national and chauvinistic interests," of assisting "the imperialists in their subversive activity in the countries of Asia and Africa":

> The revisionists, hoping to disorient individual political leaders in the young republics of the East, seek to instill in them a mistrust of Soviet policy and the policy of other socialist countries. The actions of the revisionists are harming the real interests of the peoples of Asia and Africa.[3]

Khrushchev sought to tarnish Yugoslavia's prestige in the Third World, but his abuse rarely reached the Chinese level of vituperation. In the period between congresses these attacks persisted, though more on a party than state level.

Yugoslav analysts countered Soviet efforts to discredit Belgrade in the nonaligned world. One commentator denounced the attempts "to persuade the Arab countries that Yugoslavia is in 'imperialist service' and that it consequently represents a threat to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist aspirations of the Arab peoples,"[4] citing Yugoslavia's past support of the Arab states, though skirting mention of the Palestine problem. In answer to epithets hurled at Tito during his Afro-Asian trip (December 1958-February 1959) to the effect that he was a "stooge of imperialism," the Secretary of the Federal Assembly's Political Com-

Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 151.

[3]Quoted in Leo Gruliow, editor, *Current Soviet Policies: III* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 107.

[4]Dragan Stojiljkovic, "A Foredoomed Venture: The Attempt to Discredit the Yugoslav Attitude Towards the Arab Peoples," *Review of International Affairs,* October 16, 1958, p. 5.

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mittee for Foreign Affairs castigated Soviet leaders for myopically continuing to implement "the dictum that who is not with them is against them."[5] He argued that their defamation of Yugoslavia for supposedly serving Western interests and undermining Soviet influence in the Near and Far East was a measure of "the magnitude of their blindness and lack of understanding of this world."[6] Unlike the USSR, he said, Yugoslavia does not recognize the division of the world into two military-political camps, nor does it seek to bring countries into the Soviet camp.

Another writer comments on the attempts made by the "Eastern countries" to compromise Yugoslavia's cooperation with the new nations: he sees them as evidence of a spurious commitment to the policy of active coexistence, the product of momentary interests only; and an expression of the fundamental hostility to Yugoslav support for nonalignment instead of loyalty to the socialist bloc.[7]

A leading party theoretician asserted that divergent points of view are inevitable even among socialist countries and cannot be papered over by invoking the principle of "proletarian internationalism," and that "the conception of the camp is nothing but a political formula for ignoring the national contradictions inherent in socialism."[8] He noted that Yugoslavia had national interests "in the outside world" which it pursued independent of any consensus manufactured in Moscow. He also linked Yugoslavia's championing of equal rights and independence for countries abroad to the promotion of free and equal decision-making among all the nationalities in Yugoslavia, and implied that one reinforced the other.

One publicist, generally sympathetic to the socialist camp, upbraided Moscow for disparaging Tito's meetings with nonaligned leaders and for failing to realize "the importance and role of the nonaligned countries and the progressive forces outside the socialist camp," pointing out that it is precisely these countries that, "with Yugoslavia, support the numerous initiatives of the Soviet Government for the liquidation of the Cold War."[9] In a major speech at Titovo Uzice in July 1961, Tito said that Soviet

[5]Maks Bace, "Tito's Trip and Its Critics," *ibid.*, March 1, 1959, p. 2.
[6]*Ibid.*
[7]R. Kozarac, "The Fiction About a 'Third Bloc'," *Review of International Affairs,* April 1, 1959, p. 4.
[8]Kiro Hadzi Vasilev, "Internationalism and the Unity of Socialist Forces," *Socijalizam,* May 1960, p. 56.
[9]Mladen Ivekovic, "Inconsistency in Policy of Co-existence," *Review of International Affairs,* July 1, 1960, p. 4.

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vilification of Yugoslavia harmed the cause of socialism in developing countries:

> People in countries who know the truth about us ask why such an attitude is taken toward us, what intentions are concealed behind it. This then creates doubt and mistrust, not only toward individual socialist countries but toward socialist States and social relations in general.[10]

Especially galling to the Yugoslavs were Soviet charges that Belgrade was a handmaiden of the Western powers. But by 1961, Belgrade could tolerate even these with mingled impunity and sadness; it had established itself as a prominent member of the nonaligned grouping and hosted the first Conference of Nonaligned States.

Yugoslav policy toward the nonaligned nations during this period shows no signs of Yugoslavia's being a proxy, much less evidence of a strategy planned in cooperation with Moscow. The Soviet accusations and insinuations, and their failure to find a receptive audience in the nonaligned countries; the Yugoslav refutations that inevitably cast doubt on the disinterestedness of Soviet aid to developing countries; and the absence of statements critical of the Yugoslavs by officials in those countries—all suggest that Belgrade's policy was carried on without advice, assistance or encouragement from Moscow. Indeed, in time, Moscow faced the same dilemmas as Belgrade, and approached them in remarkably similar fashion.

The origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute have been documented with Talmudic scrupulousness and need no recounting here. For our purposes a few observations may add perspective to the autonomous nature of Yugoslav and Soviet policy toward nonaligned countries. After Khrushchev's effort to heal the deepening rift with the Chinese at the November 1960 Conference of Communist Parties failed, he devoted more attention to the extension of Soviet influence among the developing countries which had become a key area of competition with the Chinese. As Tito's prestige rose, Khrushchev hoped to use a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement to demonstrate that his "socialist commonwealth" was being placed on a new basis. The open split with the Chinese by the time of the Twenty-second Congress in October 1961 was to dispose him more kindly to the Yugoslavs and lead him to observe that "on the question of the struggle for peace, our position and that of Yugoslavia coincide in many ways." The serious differences

[10] *Yugoslav Facts and Views*, July 10, 1961, p. 7.

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that remained over internal policies were overlooked as foreign policy positions coalesced.

Tito was attracted by the prospect of increased Soviet trade and assistance to offset the losses suffered as a result of domestic difficulties and the threat posed by the exclusivity of the Common Market. Other advantages have been succinctly described by one authority as follows:

> It [rapprochement] would provide the more orthodox Yugoslav Communist *apparatchiki* with a renewed sense of ideological assurance and "fraternal solidarity," and Rankovic and the Serb Communists with a perhaps necessary source of support to counter the probable increase in Croat and Slovene hostility toward Serb Communist hegemony after Tito's death. Furthermore, Tito and his associates viewed the Sino-Soviet dispute as a great opportunity for Yugoslavia to renew and expand its influence within the Communist world while at the same time maintaining its activity in nonaligned areas.[11]

Though Yugoslav-Soviet relations generally improved during the 1962-1968 period, fluctuations between mere correctness and cordiality were frequent. These were determined by internal developments in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and by events in Eastern Europe rather than by changes in the Sino-Soviet dispute, on which positions had hardened to intransigence. As China intensified its diplomatic activity in the Third World, it challenged the policies of Belgrade and Moscow. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were confronted by dilemmas in their relations with nonaligned countries because the policies they offered were not as militant as those advocated by China. Moscow's problem may have been greater, in proportion to its power, material commitments, and hypersensitivity to Peking's ideological challenge in the international communist movement. Yugoslavia followed its own course, wanting to maintain its ties to the socialist camp, but mainly struggling to keep nonalignment from being fragmented by the Sino-Soviet dispute and manipulated for bloc purposes. At times, as will be evident, Belgrade and Moscow took similar paths, though their reasons for doing so differed. The complex relationship between them, and between each of them and the nonaligned world, can be best illustrated by reference to specific developments on the international scene.

The Sino-Indian Border War: 1962

Serious fighting, precipitated by the Chinese, broke out on Oc-

[11]William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 45-46.

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tober 20, 1962 between China and India, along India's northeastern border areas and in the province of Ladakh. For the first time, Yugoslav (and Soviet) leaders had to make a choice in a major political crisis between a socialist and a nonaligned country. For more than two weeks the Yugoslav party daily, *Borba,* straddled the issue. On October 24, in a speech delivered on the occasion of UN Day, Tito expressed concern over unresolved international disputes that lead to armed conflict and cited the Sino-Indian border problem as an example.[12] The following day, obviously immersed in the Soviet-American crisis over Cuba, he called for a meeting of the General Assembly to bring about a peaceful solution of the Cuban crisis, but was silent on the fighting in the Himalayas. The first reaction that appeared in the Soviet press on the Sino-Indian fighting, on October 25, was mildly pro-Chinese. *Borba* published reports from Moscow indicating that the Soviet government supported China's proposal for a solution of the dispute; it gave accounts of the fighting, and also reported the accusation of aggression leveled against China by the Communist Party of India.[13]

But not until November 6 did the first criticisms of the Chinese as the instigators appear in the Yugoslav press. (A Soviet editorial in *Pravda* the previous day had adhered to a position of neutrality.) V. Teslic editorialized that the evidence "clearly points to the side which crossed the demarcation line," noting that "the Chinese themselves recognized that they crossed the MacMahon Line because they never acknowledged that they did not."[14] He then

[12]*Borba,* October 24, 1962.

[13]*Ibid.,* November 2, 1962. On November 3, *Borba* quoted the resolution passed by the CPI, to wit, "the incorrect attitude of the Chinese Government strengthens the Rightwing reactionary parties in India and all the opponents of the policy of nonalignment."

Yugoslav party officials were optimistic over Titoist possibilities for the CPI, which had split as a consequence of the Chinese attack. One analyst at the Institute for the Study of the Worker's Movement, which is subsidized by the Central Committee, wrote: "An evolution in the attitude of the CPI from a blind copying of the 'Russian' and 'Chinese' road to socialism and a sectarian trend to overthrow the government, to the adoption of a position of peaceful transition to socialism and to a fixing and adjusting of its policy to Indian conditions (constructive opposition to the Congress government and cooperation with the progressive elements outside the CPI to effect social changes and to build an independent and economically strong India), and to the urgent task of working out a new CPI programme" may develop as a result of recent events. Ksenija Dragisic, "The Evolution in the Attitudes of the Communist Party of India on International Problems as an Aspect of its Independent Course," published in *Drustvene Snage i Savremena Politicka Kretanja u Nerazvijenim Zemljama* (Beograd: Institut Za Izucavanje Radnickog Pokret, 1963), pp. 430-431.

[14]*Borba,* November 6, 1962.

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placed the Chinese action in the framework of Sino-Yugoslav relations:

> And still something else—as a comment. We must look at the action of China and beyond to that aspect of Chinese policy toward our country. Opposed to all the principles of peaceful coexistence, Chinese policy toward Yugoslavia throws doubt on the motives of Chinese actions as a whole. Exactly on the example of Yugoslavia the leaders of China clearly showed not only their lack of understanding but also a quite specific policy of intolerance toward the idea and practice of nonalignment. . . .

On the following day, the Sino-Indian fighting was featured on the front page of *Borba,* though not until early December did the influential *Review of International Affairs* carry an article on the subject. Belgrade had resolved its dilemma. Moscow hesitated a while longer, no doubt because of a lingering hope for a settlement with Peking.

Yugoslav indecision, relatively short-lived though it had been, was not greeted kindly in New Delhi. The Indian government was disappointed by the failure of the leading nonaligned nations (and the Soviet Union) to condemn the Chinese attack, and pressure for a re-evaluation of its commitment to nonalignment mounted from its right-wing parties.[15] The United Arab Republic, for example, had informed New Delhi of its intention to remain benevolently neutral in the hope that by keeping open channels of communication to China (with which it enjoyed good relations) it might help to end the conflict and in this manner aid India more effectively than by taking a partisan stand. On October 28, Nasser sent a note to Chou En-lai offering the services of the Afro-Asian countries in settling the issue. Six nonaligned countries met in Colombo in February 1963, but failed in their attempt to arrange direct talks between India and China. (Irate though India was with the nonaligned countries in 1962, it welcomed the reluctance of the nonaligned Moslem states to take sides in its war with Pakistan three years later: these countries would not oppose Pakistan on religious grounds, but were sympathetic toward India as a fellow nonaligned country.)

Whether Yugoslav party and governmental circles were divided over the issue of openly denouncing another socialist country is a

[15]For a careful examination of the effect of October 1962 on Indian thinking see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "The Testing of Nonalignment," *The Western Political Quarterly,* September 1964, pp. 517-542. Another writer has observed that India's voting pattern on Cold War issues in the UN General Assembly underwent an almost complete reversal during the three years after the Chinese attack—from alignment with the Soviet Union to alignment with the West. Theodore L. Shay, "Nonalignment Si, Neutralism No," *The Review of Politics,* April 1968, p. 236.

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matter of opinion. In off-the-record discussions, most officials deny that there was any dilemma. One member of Tito's "Kitchen Cabinet" noted that Yugoslavia had been critical of China even when Indian-Chinese relations were cordial, and that Belgrade had no illusions about Peking's foreign policy: "As we know from our experience with the Soviet Union in 1948, a socialist country is not automatically free from all chauvinistic elements. We did not receive the impression from *official* Indian sources that there was disappointment that Yugoslavia had not come out more openly in support of India in October 1962, though such views did and do exist." (Emphasis added.) A bureau chief in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs also stressed the absence of illusions about the Chinese and contended that the Yugoslav government had not seen itself as having to choose between a nonaligned and a socialist country. Yugoslavia had not been uncritical of India at a time when the Nehru government had been friendly to China and had shown "not too great" attention to nonalignment. During the 1956-1962 period, he remarked, India had been playing "games with the Great Powers" instead of promoting nonalignment, and this had redounded to its detriment when the military showdown with China came. He said that, contrary to the Indian view of Yugoslav equivocation, Yugoslavia had been far more explicit in supporting India than had many of the other nonaligned countries.[16]

Nevertheless, some officials own to the dilemma and to ideological doubts within the leadership about the wisdom of condemning China. An official in the Office of the President said there had been a prevailing reluctance to criticize a socialist country. Furthermore, he admitted, the Yugoslavs had been unwilling to provoke a polemic with the Chinese, in part because it would be useless, and in part because it would not be politic to engage in acrimony with China while some of their nonaligned friends remained well-disposed toward China. Fearing that condemnation might complicate their relations with the nonaligned nations, the Yugoslavs proceeded cautiously, although President Tito did express his firm support for Nehru in private messages. When asked why Tito aligned himself immediately with the UAR in June

[16]Different officials, including one who had been stationed in New Delhi at the time, speculated that Belgrade's seeming hesitancy had stemmed from a bureaucratic oversight in New Delhi, resulting in Belgrade's not being informed promptly of the gravity of the situation and initially thinking that the fighting was another in a long series of minor skirmishes. This view was, however, denied by colleagues who had then been in Belgrade.

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1967 but had delayed for two weeks in the case of India in 1962, a high-ranking member of the LYC said, "There were some conflicts of interest; between Yugoslavia's position in Europe and its policy in Asia there is a difference, since the closer a development is to one's home base, the more one must think in day-to-day terms."

In late December 1962, Edvard Kardelj went to India for discussions, at approximately the same time that Tito went to Moscow "to confirm and publicize the already extensive Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement and to discuss with Khrushchev its future intensification."[17] Belgrade was concerned over the rising pressure from Nehru's right-wing parliamentary critics to ally India with the West and the Indian government's apparent reappraisal of the utility of nonalignment. Though it is unlikely that Kardelj had to convince Nehru of the long-term advantages of nonalignment, he did, from all reports, help to allay Nehru's anxiety over the intentions of the Soviet Union, which had not yet come out forthrightly against the Chinese. Kardelj satisfied Nehru that the conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and China was inevitable and irreconcilable, that India need not fear that the Soviet Union would join China against India, and that China could not carry out a major war against India while isolated from the Soviet camp and from the rest of Asia. If these reports are correct, Kardelj's visit may have encouraged Nehru to withstand his critics and adhere to nonalignment, despite his momentary need for military assistance from the West.[18]

In short, during the Sino-Indian crisis Yugoslav leaders formulated a policy that suited their interests. Though based on certain expectations concerning Sino-Soviet relations, it did not emerge from prior consultations with Moscow. Soon afterward, the Soviets emulated the Yugoslav position. They decided, after Cuba, that their interests, at least for the moment, lay in détente with the United States, and, after the border war, that their stake

[17]Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[18]A Yugoslav diplomat, long resident in India, said that both the Soviet Union and the United States were guilty of trying to interfere in the political affairs of India: the Soviets, by relying too heavily on the advice and assessments of the pro-Moscow wing of the Communist Party of India; the Americans, by lecturing the Indians too often on what they should and should not do. He said that after the Chinese attack, John Kenneth Galbraith, who was then American Ambassador, went around stating that nonalignment was now clearly impossible and that India should discard it and align more closely with the West. "In this," he mused, "Galbraith was more a professor than a diplomat."

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in India took precedence over reconciliation with China, which demanded too much for what it offered in return.

The Cairo Conference of Nonaligned States: 1964

The Second Conference of Nonaligned States was held in Cairo from October 5 to 10, 1964, in an international environment of relative calm. The United States and the Soviet Union had surmounted the Cuban missile crisis and negotiated a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963, lessening the immediate danger of nuclear war and creating a favorable political climate for further agreements. Not only were East-West relations changing, but within NATO and the Soviet bloc there were indications that formal adherence to a military-political alliance system need no longer determine a nation's foreign policy: France and China were calling into question old assumptions about bloc cohesion. Decolonization proceeded in Africa. UNCTAD had been held, and though the results disappointed the developing countries, hopes were still strong for economic concessions. Viet Nam was a cloud that had not yet become ominous. The Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement continued apace, the Yugoslavs hoping that it would strengthen Khrushchev and his policies and help the "more up-to-date tendencies" prevail in the socialist world.[19] At a Plenum of the LYC Central Committee on May 18, 1963, Tito exuded optimism: he spoke with obvious elation of fraternal ties with the Soviet Union, and stressed that these were not inconsonant with Yugoslavia's desire to maintain good relations with the Western countries; he also castigated Peking, asserting that because Yugoslavia "enjoys great prestige in the Asian and African countries, especially in the nonaligned and developing countries, and because of its peaceful policy," the Chinese cast unwarranted aspersions on the socialist nature of Yugoslav society and the anti-imperialism underlying its foreign policy.[20]

The initiative for the Cairo Conference had come from Tito, in particular, and Nasser. The increased number of new nations, the uncertainty expressed in various quarters over the functions of nonalignment in a period of incipient détente, and the challenge

[19]Dj. Jerkovic, "Widening of the Zone of Peace," *Review of International Affairs*, January 5, 1963, p. 4.

[20]*Peti Plenum Tsentralnog Komiteta Savezna Komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1963), pp. 20-27. Of Khrushchev, Tito said: "Thanks to Comrade Khrushchev and the rest of his collaborators, we have slowly and steadily succeeded in improving our relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. That improvement in relations to the USSR and the other socialist countries has

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raised by militant Chinese propositions were motivating factors. During the preparatory phases, the Indonesians questioned the opportuneness of a new nonaligned conference, preferring instead a second Bandung, i.e., Afro-Asian gathering.[21] According to a leading Yugoslav diplomat, "there were frequent attempts to impose upon the constructive and principled policy of the nonaligned countries artificially contrived dilemmas."[22] Yugoslav-Indonesian relations, once friendly, deteriorated noticeably prior to the conference, accelerating a trend that had set in after Sukarno's shift to a pro-Peking position in late 1961.[23] Yugoslav-Cuban relations also took a turn for the worse because Tito sponsored an invitation for Venezuela, Castro's bitterest enemy in Latin America. Castro, meanwhile, dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance but resentful over Khrushchev's settlement with Kennedy, vented his ire by adopting a Maoist line on the feasibility of exporting revolution by violent means. This set him in direct opposition to Tito (and Khrushchev), who advocated a policy of peaceful coexistence.

The widening of the Sino-Soviet rift that resulted from the Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian border war brought Moscow closer to Belgrade's position on nonalignment. Moscow's opening to the West and to the nonaligned countries further infuriated the Chinese. Sino-Soviet hostility spilled over into the Third World. Peking tried to prevent Soviet participation in the militant and marginalist Afro-Asian forums, where the Chinese were influential—e.g., the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference at Moshi (Tanzania) in February 1963—on the ground that the Soviet Union was a European not an Asian country. Moscow, in contrast to its reserved attitude toward the Belgrade Conference

enormous positive significance not only for Yugoslavia and for these socialist countries but also for the revolutionary worker's and progressive movement in general. It strengthens the unity not only of the socialist countries but also of all the progressive forces in the struggle for peace and for constructive active and peaceful coexistence."

[21]Josip Djerdja, "New Stage in the Evolution of Nonalignment Policies," *Medjunarodni Problemi,* Vol. XVI, No. 3 (1964), pp. 9-24.

[22]Miso Pavicevic, "The Second Conference of Nonaligned Countries," *Socijalizam,* May 1964, p. 672.

[23]By late 1961, Sukarno had moved sharply to the left in his domestic policies. He established informal but intimate ties with the pro-Peking Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), in part out of frustration with the resistance he encountered from the mélange of conservative, often corrupt, political parties that ostensibly supported him, and in part out of admiration for the organizational talent and drive of Aidit's PKI, which he hoped to manipulate for his own purposes. Also, the greater Sukarno's appetite for foreign expansionism became, the more he looked to Peking for backing.

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three years earlier, fully backed Yugoslav efforts to promote a Conference of Nonaligned States, which it believed would better serve its own interests in the Third World than another Bandung Conference dominated by Peking's views. In February 1964 it enthusiastically endorsed the convening of a Nonaligned Conference. Animosity toward Peking had moved Moscow toward Belgrade's corner.

The main antagonists at Cairo were Tito and Sukarno: the first championed nonalignment, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation through the United Nations as the main political organization of the international community; the other, exclusivity predicated on racial and ethnic ties among Afro-Asian states, unremitting struggle against "reactionaries" and the West, and the creation of a new militant organization of Afro-Asians outside the framework of the UN.

Tito held that adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence as the "norms governing the life of the international community" implied no lessening of the struggle against imperialism or colonialism. The policy of nonalignment had never been, nor could it ever be, construed as "a policy of passive resistance to the division of the world, or a policy of equidistance"; it was always "principled and universal in its approach, committed when the preservation of peace and the protection of the fundamental rights of peoples and States were involved."[24] He impatiently condemned those who "accept peace and coexistence in one area" [between the superpowers], while invoking ideological or racial motifs and Cold War methods in another [the Third World], for playing into the hands of the imperialists and others who favor aggravating tensions and adventurist policies, "not even precluding the possibility of a general conflagration."

Sukarno, on the other hand, denied the universality or desirability of "peaceful coexistence": the principle could be applicable only "between powers of equal strength," not in cases where one country or group of countries was strong and the other weak. Only through solidarity, struggle and confrontation with the West could the Afro-Asian countries overcome their position of weakness in the world. As if to emphasize the truculent and irreconcilable premises of his thinking, Sukarno made his area of

[24]NAC-II/Heads/PV.2 (Provisional Verbatim Record of the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of State of Nonaligned Countries), p. 44.

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conflict so broad as to encompass virtually all of international politics:

> . . . since all kinds of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid are forms of domination, peaceful coexistence cannot be fully practiced the whole world over until these evils have been finally eradicated.[25]

Belgrade interpreted Sukarno's extremism as being linked to Peking's aims of isolating Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union from the nonaligned Afro-Asian countries and polarizing relations between developing and developed nations, to the detriment of efforts such as UNCTAD, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and other steps designed to loosen bloc ties and ease Cold War tensions. Yugoslav officials denounced Sukarno's formulation in "pseudo-revolutionary phraseology" of a conflict between decolonization and coexistence, arguing that these objectives were not incompatible and focusing on the positive achievements of nonalignment.[26]

To assert, as Western commentators did, that Tito was "essentially taking a Soviet view of the Cold War situation"[27] was not inaccurate but it was misleading. Tito was upholding a position he had been associated with for almost a decade; it was the Soviet leaders, newcomers to lauding nonalignment, who were now advocating views that accorded with Tito's.

The Cairo Conference ended on October 10, 1964. Four days later Nikita S. Khrushchev was deposed, and the following day Peking detonated its first atomic bomb. Thereupon the Sino-Soviet dispute and rivalry in the Third World entered a new phase.

The Failure of the Militants: Algiers and Havana

Prior to the Cairo Conference, Sukarno had induced a group of Afro-Asian nations to discuss the convening of a "second Bandung." At the preparatory meeting in April 1964 in Djakarta, the Indonesians maneuvered not only to prevent the Second Conference of Nonaligned States, but also to discredit Yugoslavia for proposing it. They attacked India, too, for suggesting that, should a second Afro-Asian conference be held, the Soviet Union be invited as an Asian country and a supporter of national liberation

[25]NAC-II/MIN/R.3/Addendum 2, p. 2.
[26]Miso Pavicevic, "The Policy of Nonalignment in the World at the Cairo Conference," *Socijalizam,* November-December 1964, pp. 1527-1531.
[27]*New York Times,* October 7, 1964.

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movements, contentions which Peking disputed through its Indonesian proxy. After considerable wrangling, the preparatory meeting agreed to convene a second Bandung in June 1965, but in Algiers, which was a keen disappointment to Sukarno who wanted the prestige of acting as host. Yugoslavia was excluded because it had no geographical basis for claiming, as did the USSR, to be an Asian country. However, this did not stop Yugoslav commentators from flailing China for its "cheap, demagogic, and quasi-revolutionary" proposals which clearly revealed ambitions for primacy and hegemony over Afro-Asian states.[28]

Peking's efforts to ensnare Algeria's Ben Bella had not succeeded, but Tito was sufficiently concerned in April 1964 to visit Algeria to reinforce Yugoslav-Algerian ties and thus keep Ben Bella's growing militancy concentrated within a nonaligned rather than an Afro-Asian framework. He was successful, at least to the extent of encouraging Ben Bella to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet rivalry during the sessions of the Afro-Asian Preparatory Committee for the Algiers Conference. The ouster of Ben Bella on the eve of the conference, forcing its postponement to November 5, 1965, was a sharp setback for the Chinese. During the intervening months, many invitees began to harbor grave doubts about a second Bandung and Chinese intentions. The abortive coup by the Indonesian Communist Party on September 30, tacitly encouraged by Sukarno himself, gave them pause to reconsider the implications of Chinese radicalism. As a result of developments in Indonesia and the air of uncertainty surrounding the Boumedienne government in Algeria, the Second Bandung Conference, scheduled for Algiers, was postponed indefinitely.

In Indonesia the noncommunist military leaders suppressed the coup and dealt harshly with communists throughout the country. They skillfully isolated Sukarno from his bases of political power and within a year ended his two decades of rule. He faded swiftly from the international scene, his vainglorious design for leadership of the Afro-Asian nations shattered by the turnabout in Indonesia's domestic politics. The father of his country and a genuine national hero, he unleashed forces he could not control and became another historical memento of showy grandeur. Since 1965-1966, Indonesia's leaders have rejoined the moderates of nonalignment, inclining toward cordiality with the Western countries more than with the socialist camp.

[28]M. Miric, "Consolidation of the Anti-Colonial Movement," *Review of International Affairs*, May 5, 1964, p. 8.

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Yugoslav leaders were delighted with the humbling of Sukarno, but upset by what they judged to be the pronouncedly pro-Western, albeit officially nonaligned, bent of the new Indonesian government. A pointed example of ambivalence in Yugoslav officialdom appeared in the spring of 1966. On April 18, *Borba* published the substance of an interview its correspondent, D. Simic, had just obtained in Djakarta with Adam Malik, the new Foreign Minister, to the effect that the Indonesian government reaffirmed its commitment to nonalignment and its desire to improve relations "with other nonaligned countries, especially Yugoslavia." However, the following day, a *Borba* editorial written by V. Teslic, a party spokesman, suggested that in attempting to extirpate the communists "Indonesia has resorted to a by no means less harmful extreme position than the one taken in recent years." Teslic acknowledged that energetic measures were necessary against "the errors or treason committed by *individual people* from progressive parties" but expressed dismay at their widening scope which seemed geared to liquidating "all progressive forces in Indonesia." (Emphasis added.) Disturbed by the overthrow of Nkrumah in February and Ghana's shift toward the West, Belgrade feared that Indonesia would exchange Sukarno's pro-Peking loyalties for equally pro-Western ones, thereby further weakening nonalignment. In the subsequent period, Indonesia has maintained its nonaligned status, but its leaders have concentrated on domestic difficulties and established friendly relations with the Western powers, choosing in the process to remain relatively inactive in nonaligned councils.

To salve their disappointment over Algiers, the Chinese backed Cuba's move to hold a conference of the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization, a potpourri of representatives from about sixty parties and movements who did not officially represent their respective governments. This Tri-Continental Conference, convened in Havana in January 1966, refused to admit observers from Yugoslavia. Both Havana and Peking denounced Yugoslavia for kowtowing to the United States, abjuring armed revolutionary struggle, and advocating a mealy brand of coexistence. Havana parroted Peking's anti-Yugoslav invective.

Belgrade blamed Peking for the failure of the conference to invite observers from the Yugoslav League for Peace, Independence, and Equality of Peoples, which had been represented at previous

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Afro-Asian nongovernmental gatherings, attributing this hostility to attempts by "dogmatic and pseudo-ultra-radical forces" to discriminate against the policy of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence.[29] Officially, the Yugoslavs feigned surprise and disappointment at being barred. Actually, their being blackballed had advantages. According to Western diplomats resident in Belgrade at the time, the Yugoslavs privately expressed relief at being excluded since it would have been difficult for them to have stayed under conditions of Chinese domination, with its baiting and denunciation of Belgrade; further, it would have compromised them in the eyes of the Latin American governments with which they were trying to improve economic and political relations, e.g., Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil. As it turned out, Soviet participation in the conference and acquiescence in the resolution calling for armed support of revolutionary forces seeking to overthrow existing governments in Latin America set back Moscow's efforts to expand its ties with countries in the region.

Observations

The Sino-Soviet rift has had the effect of edging the Soviet Union closer to Yugoslavia's position on nonalignment, and not of bringing Yugoslavia back to the Soviet fold. Moscow, not Belgrade, accommodated in order to enhance its respectability and persuasiveness among the nonaligned. Thus, it was Moscow that embraced (and indeed went beyond) the Yugoslav view of Chinese "adventurism" and "pseudo-radicalism" in meetings of the nonaligned nations; it was Moscow that, at least in its dealings with the nonaligned countries, shifted to a position of lauding active and peaceful coexistence (i.e., the Yugoslav variant), the international importance of nonalignment, and the "progressive" character of noncommunist nationalist leaders in the Third World. By contrast, on no major issue involving nonalignment has Belgrade abandoned or altered a previously held position out of deference to Soviet wishes. (The nearest approach to such a reversal occurred at the 1961 Belgrade Conference when Tito avoided criticizing Moscow for its unilateral resumption of nuclear testing.)

When we recall that, prior to 1961, the Soviet government showed little understanding of nonalignment, and even less approval of Yugoslav policy in the Third World, the extent to which

[29] *Borba*, January 3, 1966.

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Moscow's attitude has leavened as a consequence of Chinese demands becomes amply evident. However, Moscow has not permitted apprehension over the challenge from Peking to blind it to pitfalls inherent in some of the views advanced by the Yugoslavs. It resists equating the nonaligned and the socialist countries ideologically in terms of their "progressiveness"; it avoids discussions with nonaligned countries of the disutility of blocs, since it does not favor the abolition in the foreseeable future of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, one of the last institutional levers it retains for exercising control over Eastern Europe; and it does not agree with the Yugoslav proposition that socialism can be built in the nonaligned world by noncommunist parties.

Most Afro-Asian countries view the Sino-Soviet dispute with mingled annoyance and bewilderment, as a limitation on their ability to maneuver freely between East and West. When Yugoslavia alone bore the brunt of Chinese denunciations, they generally refrained from sympathizing with Belgrade because they did not fully understand the broader issues involved. Indeed, for a short period (1962-1965), the "verbal radicalism" of the Chinese made Yugoslav proposals seem tame and unattractive by comparison. After China's smashing defeat of India, which was enthusiastically acclaimed in Indonesia where anti-Indian feeling was then strong, Peking made some inroads among the militants of nonalignment, through Sukarno. But by 1965-1966 a reaction set in and Chinese influence waned. Just as in India there had not been much understanding of or attention paid to the rift before 1962, so now among the African militants there is only minimal awareness of its issues and stakes. They desire Sino-Soviet unity to be re-established so they can rely on support from the East in their bickering with the West, which they continue to regard as their principal threat.

Reviewing the confusion wrought in the ranks of the Third World by the dispute, the difficulties experienced by Yugoslavia in trying to explain the issues and its reasons for upholding the Soviet position, and the persistence of illusions about Chinese policy in a number of nonaligned countries, one Yugoslav, who had served for years at the United Nations and in one of the nonaligned states, ruefully commented on the character of international relations:

> Perhaps after all in international relations, as in personal development, one must actually experience the difficulties. Before one can mature, one

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must go through the experience of dealing with these issues, of dealing with the Soviet Union and China. The vote of India in 1951 in support of the Yugoslav resolution regarding the Soviet danger to Yugoslavia was quite a victory for Yugoslavia because the Indians did not really understand why and about what the Yugoslavs were concerned; they did not understand the Cominform dispute at all. Today many nations may have to go through a similarly direct confrontation with China to understand the concrete issues involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute and what they signify for them. Certainly the Indians understood little before adversity forced them to face facts.

Yugoslavia has benefited from the Sino-Soviet rift. Moscow's diminished authority within the communist world has resulted in decreased Soviet pressure on Belgrade, and the development generally in Eastern Europe of an environment more conducive to liberalization and national (not Muscovite) communism. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that Yugoslavia does not want the Soviet Union or the idea of communism discredited in the Third World, since this would minimize its uniqueness as a communist state and its importance among the nonaligned.

There is no reason to believe that Yugoslavia has been compromised in the eyes of the leading nonaligned countries by openly defending the Soviet position in the dispute between Moscow and Peking. Since the Yugoslav attitude toward nonalignment has not changed, the nonaligned nations have no cause to question it. After working closely with the Yugoslavs for more than a decade, they have made a differentiation which is felicitous to the Yugoslavs: they view them as a breed of communist quite different from the Soviet or Chinese, and respect them for their pragmatism, their abstinence from attempts to disseminate their brand of Marxism-Leninism, and their avoidance of interference in the domestic affairs of nonaligned countries. Yugoslavia will not sacrifice its vested interest in its achievements by becoming Moscow's proxy. It has earned a role and a status in the nonaligned world out of all proportion to its size and power, and it is not apt to jeopardize them to service Soviet diplomacy.

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THE UNITY MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

by Arthur P. Whitaker

"SO far as militant nationalist spirit can make a nation," wrote James Bryce in 1912, "these [Latin American] republics have it to overflowing. Their common Hispano-American nationality no more checks aggressive displays of enmity than a common Tuscan origin mitigated the strife of Florence and Siena, or a common Boeotian origin the hatred of Thebes and Plataea."

In view of the prevalence of this "militant nationalism" in Latin America, Bryce went on to question whether even the Spanish American countries alone could be treated "as one whole, either intellectually or sentimentally." After weighing the pros and cons carefully, he reached the negative conclusion that "the spirit of Hispano-American brotherhood is weak."

These passages occur in Bryce's book, *South America, Observations and Impressions,* published nearly a quarter of a century after his classic study of the United States, *The American Commonwealth*. Though Bryce proved himself a keen observer of Latin America as well as the United States, like all of us he had his blind spots, and his later book was not only based on a briefer acquaintance than the first but was also written during an ebb-tide of the fluctuating Pan-Latin American movement, which had begun a century earlier.

Today that movement has reached high tide again, with economic integration as its prime objective. The following sketch of its checkered history since its origin in the early nineteenth century will, it is hoped, not only contribute to an understanding of the current integration movement in Latin America, but also suggest points of comparison with more or less similar movements in other areas of the world, for the trend toward the grouping of nations in continental blocs is worldwide.

Bearing in mind the usual caveat about all periodization, it may be helpful to treat this slice of history as falling into five periods: (1) from 1810 to 1870, a period called Bolivarian for the Liberator Simón Bolívar, since it was characterized by repeated efforts to achieve Hispanic-American unity, primarily for

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military defense, as planned at the outset by Bolívar; (2) from 1870 to World War I, fragmentation of Latin America along national lines and decline of the unity movement; (3) from World War I to World War II, resurgence and reorientation of the movement; (4) from World War II to about 1960, another decline, resulting from the competition of alternative forms of international cooperation, global and hemispheric; and (5) since 1960, disillusionment with the alternatives and another resurgence of Pan-Latin Americanism, this time with economic integration as its primary objective.

I

In the first, or Bolivarian, period, three congresses aimed at promoting Hispanic-American (not Pan-American) unity were held, one at Panama in 1826 and two at Lima in 1846 and 1864. Though they had various purposes, in all three meetings the agenda was headed by union for military defense against real or imagined threats from abroad, mainly from Europe. As for the ideological bases of Hispanic-Americanism at this time, a representative statement, formulated by a Chilean leader, Juan Egaña, summed them up early as the Spanish Americans' common ties of "blood, language, interrelations, laws, customs, and religion." Except as regards blood, substantially the same concept has formed the core of Hispanic-Americanism ever since, though it has been reinforced by other considerations from time to time—particularly, in the present century, by new ideas about economics and the defense and international role of Latin America.

Economic factors were not ignored in the first period, but they played a minor role. A noteworthy illustration of this fact was provided near the close of the period by the Colombian publicist José María Torres Caicedo, who has been accurately described as "an enthusiastic apostle of Latin American union" and inspired by Bolívar. Torres Caicedo's first apostolic labor was a book, *Unión Latina Americana,* published at Paris in 1865. He summed up his mature thought on the subject in a memorandum of 1879 addressed to the members of the Latin American colony in Paris. The memorandum contained eighteen specific proposals for promoting Latin American union, one of which was that the Latin American governments join together in setting up "an American Zollverein, more liberal than the German Zollverein." This marked him as a precursor of the present movement for economic

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integration; but his proposal stood in lonely isolation, for it was the only one that was of an economic nature. Unfortunately for Torres Caicedo, he undertook his apostolate just as his cause was beset by hostile forces that prevailed for several decades.

II

This brings us to our second period, from about 1870 to World War I. Despite its negative character for our theme, this period will repay our attention, for during its course interests and attitudes developed that are still impeding the integration movement today. They were mainly the product of two interrelated developments: the adoption of liberal economic policies, domestic and foreign, by the principal Latin American countries, and the beginning of the heavy impact upon these countries of foreign capital investment, business enterprise and modern technology. As a result, their economic growth was greatly accelerated, but along lines that evolved into what came to be called by its critics a colonial economy, specializing in the production of foodstuffs and raw materials for export to the more advanced countries. The sectors of Latin American society attached to this colonial economy, especially those at the top, the so-called *vendepatria* or "country-selling" oligarchy, have been a bar to the efforts to reform it structurally that have culminated in the current movement for economic integration.

An immediate result of the accelerated economic growth after 1870, and perhaps the most important result for our theme, was to pull the Latin American countries apart and retard, if not reverse, the movement for Latin American union. For some forty years, the ties of these countries with each other were progressively weakened while their ties with Europe (and later the United States) grew stronger. This centrifugal effect was, of course, primarily economic, but it extended to the political and cultural spheres as well, at least among the ruling classes. In Argentina, for example, there has never been a time when its rulers set less store by the rest of Latin America, or more by Europe, than from 1880 to 1916, when Argentina was governed by an oligarchy oriented economically toward England and culturally toward France.

It was late in this ebb-tide period of Pan-Latin Americanism that James Bryce made the observation quoted at the beginning of this article. He based it on a survey which, though rapid and

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incomplete, commands respect as a perceptive and judicious appraisal.

In the perspective of the nearly sixty years since his book was published, it seems that, for our theme, the two most noteworthy features of his appraisal are his recognition of the great force of nationalism in the Latin American countries and his complete silence about economic factors. What he had to say on the first subject should help to correct the view, recently stated by some historians, that nationalism was only feebly developed in those countries before 1930. He conceded that only six of them—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay—could "be deemed to be nations in the European sense of the word"; but in all the other countries as well as these six he found "a profusion of militant nationalist spirit."

Why was Bryce not equally perceptive about the vital role of economic factors in the development of both nationalism and the unity movement in Latin America? It was perhaps because he was a product of the politically-minded nineteenth century, but more probably because in the Latin Americans' own discussions of both subjects the economic motif was still a novelty when he wrote. It did not become a major concern until the 1950's, when the current integration movement took shape. At the time of Bryce's tour most Latin American publicists shared his bias toward politics, and that fact is reflected in his book.

Three other features of Bryce's treatment of our theme should be mentioned because the situation today is substantially different from the one he described. First, he lumped Spain and the Spanish heritage together and pictured both as negative factors in the unity movement, whereas today it is clear that they should be differentiated and that both are on the whole positive factors. Second, he saw the role of the United States as the simple one of a rather mild threat calling forth some, but not enough, effort on the part of the Latin Americans to unite for mutual protection, whereas today anti-Americanism or Yankeephobia is widely exploited in Latin America as a major incitement to unity. Moreover, the United States has recently assumed the benign role, unforeseen by Bryce, of backing the unity movement by aiding in the economic integration of Latin America. Third, Bryce failed to sense the incipient revival of the unity movement. However, he is not to be blamed for this failure. The first signs of the revival were just beginning to appear when he wrote, and it would have required a longer and deeper study than the one he made,

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plus great clairvoyance, to detect the signs and correctly appraise their significance.

III

The third period in the history of the Latin American unity movement began in the World War I decade and lasted to about 1940. It was marked by a revival of the movement based on a growing sense of the Latin American peoples' common bonds of culture, interests, history and geography, their apartness from the rest of the world, and their need to work together for mutual defense in peace as well as war time,[1] although the revival was largely the work of intellectuals and lacked both effective political leadership and a generally agreed upon program of action.

The numerous centennial celebrations of the Latin Americans' independence in or soon after 1910, recalling the Bolivarian tradition of Hispanic-American solidarity which was one of the glories of the struggle for independence, gave a stimulus to the resurgence of the unity movement as well as to nationalism. As an Argentinophil, I naturally illustrate the turning tide by two of its earliest and most influential exponents in Argentina, Ricardo Rojas and Manuel Ugarte. Beginning with his first book in 1909, Rojas was primarily an exponent of nationalism, but he based his comparatively moderate variety of it on a thesis which, by extension to other Latin American countries, became one of the unity movement's strongest bonds. This was the thesis that true national independence could be achieved and the nation's potentialities for development realized only if foreign cultural and economic domination were thrown off.

The linkage between nationalism and Pan-Latin Americanism was made explicit by Manuel Ugarte about the same time. It was he who gave currency to the term *Patria Grande* ("Great Fatherland"), which connotes the membership of all the Latin American nations in one great *Patria*. It was also Ugarte who, by his books and continental speaking tours, led in alerting his fellow Latin Americans to the peril of Yankee imperialism and making defense against it an article of Pan-Latin American faith.

World War I gave a strong impulse to these ideas. By shaking the Latin Americans' once firm faith in Europe as the leader and model of civilization, it threw them back on their own resources.

[1]Those who have read my book *The Western Hemisphere Idea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965) will recognize here a Latin American version of that idea with the United States left out.

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By opening the way for the extension of the United States' economic power and naval supremacy throughout the hemisphere, the war gave their need for defensive union an immediacy and a focus that it had not had since France terminated its six-year invasion of Mexico in 1867.

To be sure, matters appeared in this guise mainly in the long-range view of intellectuals; with rare exceptions, the political leaders of the Latin American establishments showed no great concern. But the intellectuals were increasingly perturbed in the 1920's, and their long-range influence has always been considerable. In Argentina, then the leading Latin American nation, Ugarte continued his Paul Revere excursions unflaggingly, and José Ingenieros, then the most widely read of all writers in the Spanish language, took the lead in founding the Unión Latino Americana for the political, economic and cultural defense of the area. The University Reform Movement, which began in Argentina in 1919 and spread over much of Latin America in the 1920's and 1930's, was aimed not only at academic reform but also at the union of Latin America. Also in the 1920's the Peruvian Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre incorporated the *Patria Grande* idea in his American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA)—the most significant intellectual-political movement that has ever come out of Latin America—and is still preaching it to this day. In the 1930's a left-wing youth movement called FORJA, stemming from Argentina's biggest political party, the so-called Radical Party, developed a program that combined nationalism with Pan-Latin Americanism; in 1945 this group joined rising dictator Juan Perón's following, and in subsequent years Perón propagated its ideas of Latin American union through diplomatic channels and a Latin American labor union buttressed by Argentine labor attachés in that country's embassies and legations throughout Latin America.

If the foregoing has given the impression that Pan-Latin Americanism had become exclusively identified with the left wing, the error can be corrected by citing an example of the opposite kind. Between Hitler's lightning conquest of Norway, the Low Countries and France in March-June 1940, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, great dissatisfaction developed in various sectors of Latin American society as the United States tacitly abandoned the neutrality it had joined the Latin Americans in declaring in 1939, and moved along the road to war. This dissatisfaction found its most striking

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expression in a book published a few weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack under the interrogative title *Hispano América en guerra?*, meaning, shall Hispanic America let the United States drag it into the war? The author, Felipe Barreda Laos, was the conservative ambassador of the conservative government of Peru to the conservative government of Argentina. Yet, besides answering the title's question with a thundering "No!" he went on to excoriate Yankee imperialism as bitterly as any left-wing radical could have done and to urge that the Latin American governments pull out of the Inter-American System, which was only a Yankee device for exploiting them, and form an exclusively Latin American union for their mutual protection and welfare.

IV

The Pearl Harbor attack and its aftermath open our fourth period. They dissipated the pipe dream, and in the rest of this decade and most of the next, little was heard of the Latin American unity movement except for the efforts of Juan Perón just mentioned, which in the end came to nothing. This time the recession was temporary. The reasons for it, having never been thoroughly analyzed, are largely conjectural. We can only be reasonably sure that it was due to a combination of political and economic factors. One plausible hypothesis could run as follows: Politically the Latin Americans were fully occupied with the new United Nations and the refurbished Inter-American System, in both of which they then had such high hopes of obtaining satisfaction for their needs and aspirations that the formation of a regional association of their own seemed superfluous. Economically, though apprehensive about the future, they were temporarily relieved of the pressure to innovate by such factors as the great demand for their products from belligerents during the war and from devastated Europe during its postwar reconstruction with Marshall Plan aid, some of which seeped out to them.

It is hardly surprising that in this situation the Latin American unification movement lost its momentum in the 1940's and nationalism flourished as never before in the individual states of the area. Perhaps the most outstanding illustration is provided by the contrast between the approaches then and now to the problem that has obsessed Latin Americans ever since World War II, namely, the problem of development and modernization. Now, the approach has become partly multilateral; then, it was almost

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exclusively unilateral, and it was simplified to the point that, one gathered, the needs and aspirations of Latin America would be satisfied if each of its countries could only get a big steel mill of its own—much as, today, it seems that our own Republic will be saved if every man, woman and child can have his or her own psychotherapist.

In the Latin America of the 1940's there were only a few rather minor departures from the divisive trend. Chief among these were Latin American bloc voting in international organizations and the establishment of two Latin American bodies: a consultative group of delegates to the United Nations, and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), an offshoot of the UN Economic and Social Council. The significance of all three exceptions was limited. Careful studies have shown that the Latin American bloc then, as now, was far from monolithic, that its composition changed according to the issues before it, and that other blocs were more effective. As for the Latin American group in the UN, it has always been merely consultative, without power to bind its members. And although ECLA was to play an important role in reinvigorating Latin American regionalism in the late 1950's, it did not begin to operate until 1949, and for several years thereafter it encountered serious opposition among the Latin Americans themselves to its policies on such issues as statism, industrialization, and the relation of regionalism to nationalism in the programming of economic development.

How matters stood with the unity movement in the late 1940's was described at that time by an outstanding Mexican intellectual and publicist, Daniel Cosío Villegas. His observations were recorded in an article published in 1948 and now available in English translation in his book *American Extremes*.[2] An advocate of unity, Cosío reported with regret that "there does not exist among the Latin American peoples any consciousness of the ideal or the convenience of unity," and that "the sentiment and even the idea of union is found in but few men in each country," adding that among these few there was not a single president or political leader of any Latin American country to champion what he called "the Latin American cause." To make matters still worse, he complained, the inexplicable inability of the Latin Americans to build on experience and sustain an effort is so complete that the task of unification has to be renewed each day

[2](Austin: University of Texas, 1964).

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at zero point and the progress so far made by its supporters is "contemptible."

Though Cosío's report was discouraging, he was not discouraged. On the contrary, he asserted that "the union of the Latin American countries is in a way fated." "Fortunately," he explained, "there are historic factors more powerful than the ideas and sentiments of men, which are working in favor of such a union and which in the end will impose it in spite of the Latin American people and their rulers." Among the unifying historic factors he included a common origin and way of life; the fact that no Latin American country was strong enough to stand on its own or to be as effective alone as in concert with the rest; the current international tendency toward the grouping of nations in great blocs; the economic affinity among the Latin Americans; the impulse given to unification by the association of their delegates in international conferences; and, finally, the "geographical accident" that Latin America occupies the same continent with "a foreign people, the most powerful and most gifted in history" (do we recognize here a reference to the United States?).

A major obstacle to unification, in Cosío's opinion, would be opposition from the United States. Though such opposition would be a mistake from its own point of view, he said, Washington would probably interpose it in line with "the traditional divide-and-rule policy of great powers towards their colonies," for the United States has shown no ability to employ in international relations "that wonderful pragmatic spirit of continuous experimentation and innovation which in technology has led [it] to marvelous inventions." Yet, so great was his faith in the predestined unification of Latin America that he was confident it could be achieved in spite of the United States.

Today, twenty years later, Cosío's confidence seems somewhat better justified. One of the most discouraging factors in the situation as he described it has been almost completely reversed. Whereas, according to him, not a single Latin American president or political leader then championed unification, today nearly all of them champion it, at least in the form of economic integration. Indeed, in this form it won unanimous Latin American endorsement at the Inter-American summit meeting at Punta del Este early in 1967. The Punta del Este meeting also witnessed the reversal of another unfavorable factor in Cosío's bleak report, for President Johnson joined not only in that endorsement but also

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in giving Latin America's economic integration top priority in the Alliance for Progress.

V

The fifth and final phase to date of the unity movement has economic integration as its chief aim. I leave the analysis of economic factors to the experts and, as a historian, merely venture to list the "historic factors" (Cosío's term) which in my opinion have contributed most to the unfolding of this part of a long and checkered history.

First, in the interest of brevity, I would include by reference all the historic factors enumerated by Cosío, stressing the particular relevance of three: (1) Economic affinity among the Latin American peoples is even greater than when he wrote, and all of them now give high if not highest priority to development and modernization. (2) They are more painfully aware than ever before that none of them is strong enough to stand alone. This has been brought home to them by the increasing threat from competitive products of Africa and Asia, such as coffee, copper and oil. (3) Accordingly, the conviction has grown among them that they must fall in with the current international tendency toward the grouping of nations in great blocs.

Two added factors explain why they began to fall in with this tendency when they did (in the late 1950's) and why the group or bloc of nations they seek to form is exclusively Latin American. The first of these factors was the formation of the European Common Market and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the quick success of the former. Their combined effect was to spur the Latin Americans to action by facing them with a potentially serious economic threat (which came mainly from the European Common Market) and by providing them with a model (which came mainly from EFTA). The result was the establishment in 1960-1961 of the Latin American Free Trade Association, commonly called LAFTA. The new association still includes less than half of the twenty Latin American states and has so far met with limited success in its modest objectives. Yet its nine members include the Big Three (Mexico, Brazil and Argentina), which alone account for more than half the population of Latin America and some two-thirds of its production and commerce. Moreover, LAFTA received a great impulse when last year's hemisphere summit meeting unanimously decided to go on from a free trade zone to a Latin American customs union

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and economic integration, and to make this the first order of business in the Alliance for Progress.

The other added factor cannot be pinpointed with equal precision, for it was the result of a complex historical process by which the Latin Americans' growing sense of economic affinity for one another was complemented by increasing awareness of their common economic differentiation from the rest of the world —from the United States, Western Europe and the British Commonwealth nations as far more advanced, from most of Africa and Asia as far less developed, and from the Soviet bloc as living under a system which, except in Castro's Cuba, is unacceptable to most Latin Americans. For our purpose, it is sufficient to say that the historical process by which this sense of alienation was engendered was partly the result of U.S. policy and that the breach has only been narrowed, not closed, by changes in that policy during the past decade, changes that began under the Eisenhower Administration, that continued under the Kennedy Administration in the Alliance for Progress, and that culminated in the commitments made by President Johnson at Punta del Este in 1967.

VI

How greatly things have changed since the close of World War II is indicated by the fact that in those days Latin American spokesmen such as Mexico's then noted Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, called for an economic union of the Americas, including the United States as well as Latin America. Today, no such call is heard; the Latin Americans want an economic union of their own, with the United States helping but not belonging to it.

That the United States is happy to be left out can be easily understood, but that it has committed itself to help develop an exclusively Latin American customs union is surprising to not a few observers and disturbing to some. They are especially disturbed because some of Latin America's leading spokesmen, for example, Chile's Christian Democrat President, Eduardo Frei Montalva, are openly predicting and praying that the economic union of Latin America will lead to its political union, thus realizing Bolívar's dream of a century and a half ago.

Why the United States made this commitment, and whether it will have dire consequences for this country's relations with Latin America, and for the whole Inter-American System, as some ob-

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servers apprehend, are fascinating questions. But that is another story. Our story stops here, at the point where the unity long aspired to by many Latin Americans besides Bolívar seems at last within their reach. Whether they will be able to grasp it remains to be seen. The chief obstacle they must overcome is nationalism, which is even stronger—much stronger—now than in Bryce's day. Since then, national institutions as well as national spirit have been greatly strengthened, whereas regional institutions are still few and weak.

In his new book, *Nacionalismo latinoamericano,*[3] Felipe Herrera, head of the Inter-American Development Bank, argues persuasively that in Latin America nationalism and regional integration ("continental nationalism," he calls it) can strengthen each other. For regional integration, he declares, must be based upon accelerated national development, and national action in turn requires the external stimulus that Latin American unity—e.g., in a common market—can provide. Yet even Herrera admits that today the Latin Americans' "nationalist orientations" are being intensified and their faith in regional integration as a means of achieving economic growth and social justice is declining. As if to prove the point, the most recent reports from that area indicate the growth of opposition to a Latin American common market on the ground that this would expedite the already alarming growth of enterprises in Latin America owned or controlled by U.S. interests. One such report, in the *New York Times* for September 17, 1968, described the rise of a "new nationalist spirit" in Latin America and, in this connection, named as the political book of the year Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber's *The American Challenge*[4] which it said had had an even greater impact than Che Guevara's guerrilla diary.

Nevertheless, the Latin American unity movement may be expected to go forward, though slowly and on a modest scale, since its compatibility with nationalism in the short run is favored by the kind of nationalism preferred by many Latin Americans for their region, which is similar to that advocated by Charles de Gaulle for Europe. As General de Gaulle wants a united Europe of the *patries,* so they want a united Latin America of the *patrias.* In the first stage of integration, which is likely to be a long one, that is what they are most likely to get.

[3](Santiago, Chile, 1968).
[4](New York: Atheneum, 1968).

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SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TWO DECADES OF NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION

by Amos Perlmutter

DURING the past twenty years the Middle East has been the scene of three serious wars, numerous coup d'états, guerrilla operations, political intrigues, hate propaganda, and many other forms of aggression and violence. In an attempt to illuminate the causes and ramifications of this continued turbulence, we will examine four propositions in this article.

First, instability in the Middle East stems from the following sources of conflict: the failure of Arab nationalist and ideological movements between 1945 and 1967, inter-Arab rivalry, the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and East-West rivalry. Second, these interrelated factors combine to intensify the instability. Third, while the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most serious problem and is blocking the road to peace, it is not the only source of instability. If Israel did not exist, Arab internecine conflicts, Arab nationalist messianism and the East-West struggle would disturb the area. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not the demiurge of inter-Arab rivalry, nor is it responsible for strident Arab nationalism. However, after the collapse of the first wave of Arab nationalism (1919-1945), the Arab-Israeli confrontation became a major contributing cause of the new wave. The Israeli factor is important when inter-Arab rivalries and hegemonial schemes, which spring from Arab nationalism, cannot be fulfilled. It is our last proposition that the East-West rivalry has successively institutionalized Middle Eastern conflict, especially that between the Arabs and Israelis.

Arab Nationalism: Ambition and Attrition

Two Generations of Arab Nationalists

Several historians of Arab nationalism point to Muhammad 'Ali's rule in Egypt as the period in which the Arabs, reacting to their cultural and intellectual encounters with Europe, first

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developed a sense of nationalism.[1] But it was not until the twentieth century that nationalism emerged as an ideology.

Although the eighteenth-century Ottoman domain was totally isolated from the West, the nineteenth-century empire was considerably influenced by Western imperialism and various intercultural meetings. But only limited groups of the upper class were exposed directly to Western culture. In Egypt these groups encompassed a few intellectuals, the business elite and influential ethnic groups; in Syria and Lebanon a small number of Christian Arab intellectuals were educated and exposed to Western culture in French and Jesuit colleges of the Middle East and in the American Protestant College in Beirut, later to become the American University of Beirut. When the West after 1882 physically invaded the Middle East and Egypt became a part of the British Empire, these select groups grew decidedly hostile to the West. Since it was from their ranks that the creators of an Arab nationalist ideology later arose, the cultural engagements that influenced their thinking might be called the driving force of twentieth-century Arab nationalism. Professor Sylvia G. Haim writes:

> Arab nationalism *as an ideology* and as a factor in Middle Eastern politics is a recent development. It was hardly known before the beginning of the 20th Century, and it was only after the First World War (that is, after the setting up of Iraq, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon as mandated territories under British and French rule) that a comprehensive doctrine of Arab nationhood was elaborated. Thereupon, politicians in Iraq and Syria, enjoying a measure of independent action and able to exploit the rivalries of the Great Powers in the Middle East, began to attempt the creation of a state which would embrace the whole of the "Arab Nation."[2] (Emphasis added.)

In the twentieth century two generations of Egyptian and Arab nationalists can be distinguished by their differing attitudes toward the West and Islam. Members of the first generation were upper-middle-class writers, eminent lawyers, successful engineers and scholars of Western science and Islamic studies. Because they were trained in the West or in European schools located in the Middle East at the height of the era of the Wilsonian ideal of the nation-state, they advocated self-determination for Arabs. They attributed Western success to Western political processes and be-

[1]See J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London: Luzac, 1939); Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, *Arab Rediscovery of Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[2]Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

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lieved that by grafting these same processes onto their societies, they would eventually duplicate that success. These optimistic and liberal intellectuals of the Arab East and Egypt were the forerunners of today's Arab nationalists.

Although Egyptian nationalists of the first generation were emotionally committed to Egypt, intellectually they were Western. They diminished the cultural role of the Arab East and Islam and emphasized cultural ties to the West. Taha Hussein, one of the most distinguished of Egypt's belle-lettrists and nationalists, wrote:

> The Egyptian mind had no serious contact with the Far Eastern mind; nor did it live harmoniously with the Persian mind. The Egyptian mind has had regular, peaceful, and mutually beneficial relations only with the Near East and Greece. In short, it has been influenced from earliest times by the Mediterranean Sea and the various peoples living around it.[3]

Their writings expressed the cravings of the intelligentsia, of which they were an important part, for a renaissance of Egypt's powerful pharaonic past, which they believed could be brought about by modernizing Egypt's culture and adopting Western political processes. They attempted to integrate nationalism with liberalism, to reconcile reason with fate and liberal ideas with reformist Islamic ethical concepts. At the same time they tried to divorce Egyptian nationalism from Arabism and Islam and create a distinct Egyptian national consciousness. They consequently isolated Egypt from potential ideological allies in the general Arab movement.

The pleas of the first-generation nationalists of the Arab East were quite different from those of their Egyptian colleagues. While the Egyptians tried to separate their movement from Islam and Arabism, the nationalists of Beirut and Damascus spoke of an *Arab* liberation, an *Arab* state, an *Arab* national consciousness, and an *Arab* renaissance. Qustantin Zurayq, a member of this group and author of perhaps the first book to deal with this type of Arab nationalism, wrote:

> If we want this Arab national revival to fulfill what is demanded of it, the first and energetic step that we must take is to build an *ideological foundation* on which this national revival must rise. This can be achieved by considering carefully the means and ends involved, by defining the meaning of nationalism, establishing special traits and characteristics of

[3]Taha Hussein, *The Future of Culture in Egypt* (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1964). See also Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), and Jamal M. Ahmad, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

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an Arab nation, and making manifest its special place among the nations and the role which it has fulfilled in the past and which it is desired that it should continue to fulfill in the future, in advancing the culture and civilization of mankind.[4] (Emphasis added.)

Through the creation of an Arab nationalist philosophy, these men paved the road for the second generation of Arab *and* Egyptian nationalists.

The second generation emerged after Arab nationalism had already become an ideology. Although Arab ideology at first met with no success in Egypt, it was eventually assimilated by second-generation Egyptian nationalists. The men of this generation spring from a different subculture and different classes; they are more primitive, more pragmatic, more ideologically inclined, and more militant. Yet, in seeming opposition to these qualities, this generation is more romantic than the first. They speak of the "Spirit of the Arab Nation" or what Hamilton Gibb calls "the philosophical vision of the great mover of the universe and the sense of human destiny beyond the visible and tangible, the spirit, the psyche."[5] While the first generation accepted the Wilsonian interpretation of the nation-state, the second generation seeks a united Arab socialist world.

The nationalists of the second generation, from scribes to desperadoes, organized a variety of groups in the Arab world. Probably the most articulate and representative is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1930's the Brotherhood and other radical rightist organizations were more successful than the liberal nationalist parties of the first generation had been in recruiting into their ranks the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, the army, the civil service and the clergy. Many of the bureaucrats, officers and leaders of Nasserist Egypt undoubtedly deny their debt to the Brotherhood and do not accept its principles of an Islamic theocracy and other Sufist and fundamentalist concepts of Muslim nationalism. Yet intellectually and politically the ideas of Nasserism evolved from the Brotherhood's concept of a conservative pan-Islamic theocracy *dominated by Egypt.*[6] Nasser

[4]Qustantin Zurayq, *al-Wa'y al-quami* (*National Consciousness*) (2nd edition; Beirut, 1940), quoted in Shimon Shamir, "The Question of a 'National Philosophy' in Contemporary Arab Thought," *Asian and African Studies,* Vol. 1965 (Jerusalem: Annual of Israel Oriental Society, 1965), pp. 1-48.

[5]Hamilton A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 103.

[6]Richard P. Mitchell, "The Society of the Muslim Brothers," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Princeton University, 1960. See also J. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington, 1950; published by the author).

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modified this concept to give greater momentum to his drive to establish a "progressive" Egyptian hegemony in a pan-Arab empire.

Ideological Cleavages among the Second Generation: Expectations and Demise

The Nasserist Ideology. The increased urbanization of the 1930's made obvious the disparity of living standards between rich and poor and foreigner and native. These disparities helped to transform Egyptian nationalism from gradualism to fervent anti-Westernism, from a movement involving a limited sector of the urban professional class to one embracing the rural middle class and its urban offshoots in the bureaucracy, the army and the press. The influential Muslim Brotherhood drew its power from the Egyptian middle class (urban and lower), the bureaucracy, the army (especially the junior ranks), and status-deprived individuals. In this decade the first generation's movement toward liberalism succumbed to violence, anti-liberalism and anti-Western fundamentalism. Although the premises of the Nasserist ideology are derived from the doctrines of several ultra-nationalist groups of the second generation, Nasser and his scribes are the true heirs of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Nasser's philosophy of revolution inspired the new wave of Arab nationalism which began in the decade beginning with the Second World War. According to Nasser the days are past when barbed wires marked frontiers separating and isolating one country from another:

> As I survey the conditions of our environment I find that we are in a group of circles which should be the theater of activity in which we should try to move as much as we can. We cannot ignore the Arab circle, we cannot ignore the continent of Africa, and we cannot ignore the Muslim world.[7]

In his scheme Egypt occupies the center, Arabism and Islam the middle, and the African nations the outer circle. While moving from one circle to another, Egypt is always the central theater of Nasser's Arab and social revolutions.

Egyptianhood, the doctrine of an Egyptian hegemony in the Arab world, was developed and institutionalized by Nasser's

[7]Jamal Abd an-Nasir, *Falsafat al Tawrah* (*The Philosophy of the Revolution*), *Ikhtarna Lak*, No. 3 (Cairo, 1953-1954[?]). Excerpts are quoted from the "doctored" English version put out by the original Arab publishers. It was published in 1955 by the American Friends of the Middle East, with an introduction by Dorothy Thompson, and distributed by Bailey Brothers and Swinson, London. The American publisher is Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C.

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regime as an integrating national myth. It is romantic, messianic and universal, more similar to the concept of *Deutschtum* than to any other political or nationalist philosophy. Its essence can be seen in the following statement by Nasser:

> From Egypt came the belief of the unity of God, the unified magnificent God, and with this Egypt shook the ground of every aspect of atheistic beliefs. She liberated humanity from worshipping the stones.
>
> In Egypt medicine and surgery were developed to help relieve the sickness and pain of human beings. . . . Egypt was the ingenious nation which developed the art of geometry and building construction. Egypt's fleets crossed the seas carrying knowledge far out to her neighbors north, south, east, and west. . . . In Egypt different arts and fields of knowledge flourished. Literature thrived and sculpture and painting reached their peak. . . . Egypt protected Christianity from its birth and has preserved its features and characteristics. Egypt chose Islam as a religion—she protected it, kept it, and fostered Islamic scholars who developed new ideas and interpretations. . . . Because Egypt sustained the Islamic civilization when it was exposed to crusaders' threats, the Islamic world should express its gratitude to Egypt and consider her the leader of the Islamic nations. This is Egypt . . . the African Egypt which lies on the Mediterranean and is the focal point of many civilizations. . . . Egypt's glories in ancient history merit recognition by the world. . . . Egypt has kept the individual personality and unique temper of liberal attitudes alive throughout the world. . . . She is the magnificent nation which firmly stood up to the power of the colonizing stream, kept her spirit, personality and structure. . . .[8]

This emotional and intellectual commitment to Egypt, her past, and her glorious future destiny was made by Nasser early in his political career. He writes: "It was apparent to me from the beginning that our success would depend entirely on our full understanding of the conditions we live by today and our relations to our nation's past history."[9]

Egypt's identification with the Arab world is somewhat more problematic. Egypt refused to join the Arab League until 1945 and for a long time did not consider herself an Arab country. When Sa'd Zaghlul, the leader of the liberal nationalists and head of the first nationalist government in Egypt, was approached by Abdul Rahman al-Azam in 1924 and asked why Egypt refused to join the Arab unity movement, he answered: "If you add one zero to another zero, then you add another zero, what will be the

[8]Hussein Mu'nis, *Misr Wa-Risaltuah* (*Egypt's Mission*), *Ikhtarna Lak*, No. 55 (Cairo, 1956[?]). See also Abd as Star Kamal, *Misr al-'Uzmah* (*Mighty Egypt*) (Cairo: Government Printing House, 1954[?]); Introduction by Minister of National Education, Kamal al-Din Hussein.

[9]*Falsafat, op. cit.*, p. 12.

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sum?"[10] However, under Nasser a drive to absorb the Arab circle began. Egyptian-Arab writings clearly show that the present rulers of Egypt, who grew up in an atmosphere of fundamentalist Egyptian nationalism and intense anti-foreignism, were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and similar Egyptian nationalist groups. Thus Arab unity and Arab nationalism are instruments of Egyptian hegemonial ambitions rather than real identifications with the Arab East.

Egypt's leading role in Islamic history is not Nasser's invention but was earlier well articulated by the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Brotherhood, Egyptian civilization is mankind's oldest; it is the logical and historically just place for Islam to base itself. Because Islam has penetrated deeply into the consciousness and emotions of Egyptians and has given Egypt the Arabic language and civilization, Egypt is fated to play a unique role in the resurgence of Islam.

Today Egypt is making her greatest world impact through her radical affiliation with the Islamic circle. The Islamic identification of Nasser's ultra-nationalism has brought into play an important religio-political concept which evolved from the Muslim Brotherhood's equation of capitalism and foreign economic domination with *al-Isti'mar* (the Devil). *Al-Isti'mar* is imperialism and all its real or imagined manifestations; the devils are Westerners ranging from Americans to Russians and, above all, to Zionists. Although they have destroyed all the dreams of the Arab world, Islam will eventually triumph over these devils who are even now in decline. As interpreted by Nasser, *al-Isti'mar* and Islamic social justice are the most important unifiers of all Arab nationalist ideologues.

The theory of *al-Isti'mar* proposes that foreign economic domination creates a situation conducive to many evils, internally hampering social justice, externally constraining nationalist forces: it paralyzes the strength of the nation in work and production; destroys human dignity and rights; corrupts the character and the conscience; denies individual security; pushes people into the arms of the communists; and violates the spirit of religion. This situation cannot last because it rejects all principles of humanity and of the age, the nature of things, and the simplest economic principles.[11]

[10]Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes toward Pan-Arabism," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1957, p. 253.
[11]Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

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On September 26, 1967, in a speech discussing the U.S. role in the Middle East crisis, the chief editor of *Al-Ahram,* Muhammad Hasanyan Haykal, a graduate of the London School of Economics and Nasser's *porte-parole,* used language reminiscent of the Muslim Brotherhood's *al-Isti'mar*:

> U.S. capital is interested in dividing or inheriting the spoils left behind after the collapse of the European empire. The influence of U.S. military leaders increases the chance of a nuclear war with its frightening dangers and demands constant vigilance. Capital cooperates with military leaders and intelligence services to drag down such centers of free thinking as universities; the propaganda and intelligence services, which achieved great success in the war against Nazism and Fascism, are being dangerously used at home in America. With few exceptions they conceal more than they reveal the truth. All these conditions and their interreactions have put the United States society in the situation we see in 1967—a society disintegrating, a society in which more voices of indignation than of satisfaction are raised, and a society in which a terrifying number of youths are resorting to narcotics and movements like the "hippie" movement, which cannot be cured except by a strong shock.[12]

Many other statements made by Nasserist proponents of "social justice" today replicate those made by the Brotherhood in the 1930's. A basic tenet was, and is, that Christian imperialism, one of whose offshoots is Zionism, is waging a crusading war against Islam. *Al-Isti'mar* has a two-edged sword of oppression—cultural and social. A Muslim Brotherhood author wrote:

> The West surely seeks to humiliate us, to occupy our lands and begin destroying Islam by annulling its laws and abolishing its traditions. . . . In doing this, the West acts under the guidance of the church. . . . The power of the church is operative in orienting the internal and foreign policies of the Western Bloc, led by England and America. . . . A hundred years ago the situation was one of enmity between state and Christianity. Today, however, the relationship is obviously a cordial alliance.[13]

Nasser's ideology insists that *al-Isti'mar,* which is both Jewish and Christian, is plotting the destruction of Islam and the Islamic (i.e., Arabic) people. At the same time it insists that *al-Isti'mar* is decaying and will soon collapse. The spirit underlying this type of thinking has been officially espoused and nurtured in Egypt since 1953.[14]

[12]Muhammad Hasanyan Haykal, *Al-Ahram,* September 26, 1967.
[13]Mitchell, *op. cit.,* p. 379.
[14]On the Muslim Brotherhood-Egyptian army relationship, see *ibid.,* pp. 61-250; Ishak Musa Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren* (Beirut: Khayat's, 1956), pp. 125-130; Eliezer Beeri, "On the History of the Free Officers," *The New East (Hamizrah Hehadash)*, Vol. 13, No. 51 (1963), pp. 247-268; Kamal Isma'il al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Harb-Filastin (The Muslim Brotherhood in*

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The Ba'th Ideology as the Task Force of Secular Arab Social Justice.[15] In contrast to Nasser's fundamentalist and pragmatic ideology based on Egyptianhood and the foreign devils is the Ba'thist messianic ideology which extols Arabism as the avenue for Arab solidarity and social justice. Although derived from the premises and principles of the first-generation nationalists of Beirut and Damascus, Ba'thism is a distinct activist philosophy. Like Nasserism, it fights against both the real and imagined forces of division within the Arab world: imperialism, traditionalism, kinship groups, religious schisms, and social and regional divisions. Since the feudal and capitalist classes are identified as the perpetrators of these divisions, unity demands a total revolution to overthrow them even though they were the founders of Arab nationalism. But in contrast to Nasserism, the Ba'th is ambivalent concerning the role of radical Islam as an instrument of social justice.

The chief philosopher of the Ba'th movement is an intense Christian Arab from Damascus, Michel 'Aflaq. 'Aflaq flirted with communism while studying in Paris but soon dropped this experiment. Upon his return to Syria in the middle 1930's he began pamphleteering. *Fi Sabil Ba'th* (*The Road to Renaissance*), a collection of pamphlets and articles written by him in that period, has become the Ba'th's chief doctrinal source. While these writings reflect much of the mystical thinking emanating from the early nationalist philosophers of Beirut and Damascus, they espouse additional concepts. 'Aflaq talks of *al'Urubah* (Arabism) as did the first-generation nationalists, but he adds to this *Insaniya* (humanitarian socialism) and *Sha'biyah* (peoplehood). Both are vaguely defined. *Al'Urubah* remains the party's major appeal even though several radical nationalist intellectuals in the Arab East consider *Insaniya* and *Sha'biyah* the key rallying cries of the Arab renaissance.

Palestine in the Palestine War) (Cairo, 1951); Jean and Simonne Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* (New York: Criterion, 1958), p. 131 ff; and Lukasz Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 229-249, who discusses the relationship between the Free Officers, Young Egypt, and the Axis during the Second World War. See also Beeri, *Ha-Ktsunah Veha-Shilton Ba-Olam Ha-Aravi* (*The Officer Class in Politics and Society of the Arab East*) (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1966), pp. 63-64, 84-85, 88-90.

[15]On Ba'th history, philosophy and politics, see Michel 'Aflaq, *Fi Sabil Ba'th* (*The Road to Renaissance*) (Beirut, 1940). This is a collection of essays on the official doctrine of the Ba'th. See also Kamel Saleh Abu Jaber, "The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1965; I. Oron, "The History and Ideas of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party," *The New East,* Vol. 9, No. 4 (1959), pp. 241-263 (English summary, pp. i-vii).

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Sha'biyah, while as romantic a notion as that of Brotherhood, is a radical concept shorn of Islamic commitments. The party spews forth many romantic and mystical aphorisms to describe *Sha'biyah* but offers no program of political action based upon it. The party is equally vague in its espousal of *Insaniya.*

In an interview 'Aflaq said:

> If I were asked why I am tending and inclining toward socialism, I would say that I'm not expecting any particular things from socialism, but the concept of equality of citizens and that each man can develop his own individuality. Therefore, in my view . . . socialism is another synonym for nationalism.
>
> We, Arabs, will not be awakened and will not feel that our nationalism promises justice, equality for all and pride for all if we nationalists are not also socialists.[16]

'Aflaq's Ba'th has been in decline since the UAR's debacle at the end of 1961. Beginning in 1963 the party underwent radical transformations; it has been torn asunder and fratricidally divided. 'Aflaq's faction, the mainstream, has been ousted and exiled; the influence of Christian and Sunni civilian and military politicians has declined; the relatively moderate party of teachers and Damascene Sunni-Arab intelligentsia has been transformed into a radical party dominated by Druze and now mainly extremist 'Alawi officers who espouse a mélange of radicalism bordering on Castroism. The 'Aflaq's ideological metaphysics was replaced by crude and positive Marxism written by a mediocre intellectual, Yassin al-Hafiz, who enjoyed some notoriety in Ba'th military circles in the years 1963-1964 but was ousted by the party in 1964. The Marxists were dismissed from the party mainly for failing to advocate the "integrating" and "revolutionary" role of the army in Syria.

The Military Committee, established in 1963, is controlled by 'Alawis and now dominates the party, the army and Syria. It has arrogated to itself a Castro image, preferring the role of radical praetorians leading a so-called revolutionary movement to the one proposed by al-Hafiz. The military is not *organically* affiliated with the party.[17]

[16]Michel 'Aflaq, "Signposts on Arab Socialism," *al-Ba'th,* June 10, 1950.

[17]On the development of the Ba'th since 1961, especially the ascendancy of the 'Alawi military, its radicalization and its neo-Marxism, see Avraham Ben-Tzur, "The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria," *The Journal of Contemporary History,* July 1968, pp. 161-182, and Amos Perlmutter, "From Opposition to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba'th Party," *Western Political Quarterly,* forthcoming, March 1969.

The above make use of documents captured in Qunaitra, the Golan ridges, the former headquarters for the Syrian Army for the Liberation of Palestine now occupied by Israel.

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Messianic Arab Nationalism: The Case of the United Arab Republic. The debacle of the United Arab Republic revealed how Egypt's imperialistic and hegemonial aims were concealed under the guise of a united Arab state and provided evidence of the political strength of Ba'th messianism.

Since the collapse of the UAR many interpretations of its inception, development and failure have been offered.[18] They vary from capital to capital: in Cairo, the Ba'th party was responsible for the demise of the UAR; in Damascus, Egypt's power-grab policy brought on the collapse; in Beirut, it was due to the intensity of Arab ideological clashes; and in Tel Aviv, it was the consequence of Egypt's Arab policy and praetorian rule.

Egypt's Arab yearnings and Syrian messianics gave birth to the UAR. The two most significant aspects of the 1956 Egyptian Constitution were an article showing Egypt's new Arab identification and several sections pointing out the transitional nature of Egypt. "We, the Arab people" was substituted for "We, the Egyptian people." For the first time a public document proclaimed Egypt's future policy. In Chapter 6 of the Constitution, entitled "Transitional and Final Provisions," Article 92 reads: "The people of Egypt shall form a national union to accomplish the aims of the revolution and to encourage all means to give the nation a solid foundation in the political, social, and economic realms." The formal decree containing this article was issued in mid-1957 and in the summer of the same year the National Union Party, created to promote Egypt's Arab empire, participated for the first time in elections. With the additional constitutional proclamation of "the sovereign independent Arab nation" whose borders were not defined, Egypt was ready to pursue her hegemonial ambitions within the Arab circle.

From all evidence it seems that Syria, led by the Ba'th party and Ba'th-inclined officers, originally proposed the union although Egypt did not hesitate to accept. The Egyptian search for hegemony in an Arab nation together with the Ba'th quest for an ally to institutionalize the party and its ideology were instrumental in the formation of the alliance. But in the end Arab nationalism suffered its most serious defeat in this vain effort to

[18]See, for instance, Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967* (2nd edition; London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); I. Oron, editor, *Middle East Record 1961* (Tel-Aviv: Israel Oriental Society, 1967). Also, an excellent essay by Leonard Binder, "The Tragedy of Syria," *World Politics,* April 1967, pp. 521, 549; Perlmutter, *op. cit.*

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form a united Arab state. In an age when imperialism, the supposed divisive force, had almost completely withdrawn from the Middle East, the Arab union, the "inevitable" destiny of Arabs, collapsed because the expectations fired by Arab nationalist messianism were grander than the capabilities of Syria and especially Egypt to fulfill them.

Expectations of a common Egyptian and Syrian anti-colonialist front encouraged the creation of a united Arab state. Anti-colonialism and *al-Isti'mar,* anchored in a new socialist vocabulary, served as an ideological common ground for the Ba'th, Ba'th-inclined officers and Nasserists. But the differences between Egyptians and Ba'thists were deep and went beyond "socialist" verbiage. To the Ba'thists socialism meant the fulfillment of *al'Urubah*; to the Nasserists it meant social justice under the guise of Egyptianhood. Thus, anti-colonialist slogans clothed with Arab socialist language did not bridge the real gap between Syrian and Egyptian antagonistic nationalisms. Egypt's hegemonial claims (the guise for Egyptian nationalism) and the Ba'th's ambiguous messianic zeal (underneath which *al'Urubah* reigned supreme) together created the circumstances for this union *and* for its downfall.

Egypt's failure in Syria was not purely administrative—the inability to impose an Egyptian-dominated bureaucracy over Syria. Syrians could probably have been emotionally and politically recruited to serve a central government which they saw as their own, although actually dominated from Cairo. But Nasser's Egyptianized Arabism brutally imposed on Syria and couched in socialist slogans found no response in a country long associated with *al'Urubah*. This brought to an end the Ba'th's first political ascendancy, based on Egyptian support.

The more the Syrians resisted, the more stubborn and oppressive the Egyptians became. Rather than modifying traditional Egyptian-Syrian rivalries, the experiment in union which turned out to be a political nightmare only intensified their antagonisms. The bitterness between the two still runs high, notwithstanding the 1967 disaster. The UAR wounds inflicted a death blow upon 'Aflaq's Ba'th but not upon Nasser's hegemonial pretensions which were redirected toward the Yemen. In fact, the naked confrontation between Egyptian proconsuls in Syria and Syrian elites ended just short of a blood bath.

The tragedy of the Ba'th is its eschatology, lack of realism, ambivalence toward Islam, and the incompetence of its political

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leaders. The party has never been independent, always coming to power through alliances with other stronger groups that eventually usurped the Ba'th position. The story of the Ba'th misfortunes within the UAR is a familiar one. In the June 1959 elections to the National Union Congress of the Egyptian-Syrian union government, not more than 200 out of 9,445 elected representatives were Ba'th members. The party that had engineered the union was reduced from 15 to 2 per cent of the electorate. The Ba'th had once again allied itself with another party, this time with Nasser, to gain power. And again, the other group proved more powerful than the Ba'th and eventually became its worst enemy.

The Ba'th had expected a partnership while Nasser wanted an overlordship. When the inevitable clash occurred, it shook the party's precarious alliance with the Syrian army. In the end, anti-unionist Syrian army officers, who resented Egyptian rule, initiated a successful coup d'état (September 28, 1961) and destroyed the Egyptian-Syrian political union.

In trying to amalgamate the people of Syria and Egypt into a union, Egypt acted from political opportunism. After the project blew up, the crusaders for Arab unity returned to Cairo to concentrate on Egypt. The regime set up a new government party, the Arab Socialist Union Party, and gave it control over a new model, the Socialist Union, which was designed to launch the social revolution and foster economic modernization. The failure of the UAR made the socialist trend in Egypt inevitable. Because external territorial and ideological efforts had failed, the new socialist doctrine was managerially oriented to buttress internal "progressive" forces. Social justice was now identified with etatist practices.[19]

So Egypt began a drive to establish a classless, scientific utopia administered by large bureaucracies. The vagueness of the regime's socialism stems from its commitment to a managerial

[19]When the junta decided to assume complete economic control over Egypt, private enterprise died. The years 1952 to 1957 had been marked by efforts to aid Egyptian industrialists and private entrepreneurs in the hope that private enterprise could demonstrate enough vigor and initiative to spur Egypt's development. These efforts were of no avail; Egyptian entrepreneurs were incapable of handling the assignment. The wheel now had turned full circle to where the government, pressed by its ideological and nationalist commitments, was forced to adopt a socialist economy. James Heaphey, "The Organization of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-political Model for Nation-Building," *World Politics*, January 1966, pp. 177-193. Also, see Chapter 7 of my forthcoming (1969) book, *Egypt, the Praetorian State: The Politics of Anti-politics.*

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rather than a radical revolutionary position; it is a socialism adapted to traditional Egyptian bureaucratic practices. But, as in the case of the UAR, the drive for this exclusive socialist utopia was short-lived; the mistakes made on the international level were repeated on the internal level. In addition, Egypt had not abandoned her international ambitions; they were soon shifted from Syria and the north toward Yemen and the south.

The Ba'th could not recuperate as quickly as Nasser. For one thing, it was never in control of Syria. Although the Ba'th is the only Arab nationalist party that has penetrated the whole of the Arab world, it has never won a majority vote in its homeland. After the failure of the UAR the party was again left at the mercy of the Syrian army, which eventually took complete control of both party and government in 1966. Leonard Binder is correct when he argues that what some authors

> characterize as an ideological Cold War was more likely the dual swan song of both Ba'th socialism and Nasserist nationalism as serious contenders for the hearts and minds of Arab intellectuals.
>
> In recent years, Arab writers in Lebanon, in Egypt, in Syria and in Iraq have written a host of books attempting to describe the nature and content of Arab nationalism. Most of these works have been written by people of substantially lesser talent than that of Michel 'Aflaq, but there are quite a few interesting writers and a good number of these have tended to copy 'Aflaq's style and themes. Nevertheless, none of these works has captured the imagination of the Arab nationalists. None of them has resolved the basic question of what is an Arab and what is Arab nationalism. The search for an ideology goes on and the search for identity continues.[20]

Binder observes that "the tragedy of Syria has been that Syria has given rise to ideologies that have far outrun the realities of Syrian and Arab circumstances. Syrian leaders have harbored glorious visions while still falling short of the simple capacity to govern their own country."[21] He concludes that Arab nationalism waits for a new definition since "neither Nasser's charisma nor 'Aflaq's rhetoric has provided a short cut."

Prospects for 'Aflaq's Ba'th in Syria are dim. Its founding fathers have either fled the country, retired, or been arrested by the army. The Syrian intelligentsia and the Christian Arab intellectuals of Beirut and Damascus have succumbed to the rule of simple nationalists, 'Alawis, Ism'ilis, and Druze, who are identified with the Ba'th Left dominated by the military and supported by the Soviet Union. Elie Kedourie, in a book review of Patrick Seale's *The*

[20]Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 529.
[21]*Ibid.*, p. 549.

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Struggle for Syria, writes: "Mr. Seale accurately describes the PPS (Parti Populaire Syrienne) as 'ex-officers, desperados, fanatical young men, dedicated cadres, bound by the rigid hierarchies of the party and the mumbo-jumbo of Sa'ada's ideas.' Does this not fit the Ba'th to perfection?"[22]

Within two turbulent decades the Syrian army has changed its role from that of a purely military force to that of political guardian for the country. The politicization and radicalization of the army has increased the influence of the military politicians. The army no longer acts as the arbiter of nationalist and progressive forces. Rather, it has been persuaded of its unique historical destiny and political role as the savior of society from corrupt politicians; it considers itself the *only* hope of honest politics and stability, order and progress. The military has taken on this new mission largely because, during the last two decades, the civilian politicians, the progressive forces, the intellectuals and the modernizers have been discredited.

But, interestingly enough, the army has not been consolidated since its political emergence, nor has the officer corps become unified under the intensive process of politicization. The Syrian army, supported by the Soviets, increases its influence and actually dominates Syrian society despite the hostile machinations among its ambitious officers and their espousal of radical political ideologies.

Inter-Arab Rivalry: The Case of Yemen

Yemen is an orthodox Islamic society, governed throughout most of this century by two autocratic Imams dedicated to preserving the traditional system.[23] The Imamate operates under a system of patrimonialism and intrigue in order to keep the various Yemeni tribes under control. The society is ridden by Islamic fundamentalism and economic backwardness surpassing those of any other Middle Eastern country.

After the collapse of the United Arab Republic, Yemen became the new challenge for Egyptian progressivism. To Egypt, Yemen presented a clear-cut case of progressive versus conservative Arabs. It provided the perfect stage for the Egyptians to demonstrate the

[22]Elie Kedourie, "Not So Grand Illusions," *The New York Review of Books,* November 3, 1967.

[23]The best study of modern Yemen and its international politics is Manfred W. Wenner, *Modern Yemen* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). See also Sharaf al-Din, *Al-Yaman 'ibr al-Tarikh* (Cairo, 1963), and several books by H. St. John B. Philby.

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success of their concept of Arab unity. But the failure of Egypt in Yemen turned out to be more profound than in Syria. The case of Yemen, like that of the UAR, disclosed the great gap between aspiration and power in the Egyptian search for hegemony under the guise of Arab unity.

Yemen became the salient problem in the Arab arena during the latter part of Imam Yahya's reign (1904-1948). In early 1957, his successor, Imam Ahmad (1948-1962), started negotiations on military and economic aid with the British as well as with the Soviet bloc, and finally concluded a military alliance with Nasser in early February 1958. However, no love was lost between Nasser and Imam Ahmad, and by 1961 relations between Yemen and Egypt had deteriorated. Yet from all evidence it is clear that the revolution in Yemen, starting with the coup on September 27, 1962 (nine days after the death of Imam Ahmad) and the formation of the Council of the Revolutionary Command headed by 'Abdullah al-Sallal, was not sponsored by the Egyptians, although it is quite possible that they were aware of it. In fact, Radio Cairo forecasted a revolution in Yemen.

The Yemeni Revolutionary Command Council initiated the coup in the belief that the death of Imam Ahmad would create an opportunity to destroy the legitimacy of the Imamate. (Several other palace revolutions had been attempted in the past and failed.) However, the Yemeni heir-apparent, Muhammad al-Badar, succeeded in escaping into Saudi Arabia and soon established a royalist group in exile. The Council, to counter the considerable strength of the exiled royalists, asked for Egyptian support. Nasser invoked the February 1958 Egypt-Yemen alliance and sent Egyptian armed forces to Yemen.

The revolutionaries, progressives, republicans and nationalists in Yemen are not all of the same mind. The republicans and revolutionaries are bitterly divided. There are at least three, and perhaps four, republican groups claiming direction of the revolution. The Egyptians in Yemen, acting as they did in Syria, have supported the faction that linked itself to Nasser's Arab policy.

At first Nasser supported a republican group in Cairo, led by al-Baidani, a pro-Nasserist who was not privy to and did not participate in the 1962 coup. Then he discovered an ally in the army, Colonel 'Abdullah al-Sallal, who had initiated the coup in Yemen, and forced al-Baidani's exit. Nasser's intervention in the Yemeni civil war by opting for al-Sallal compelled the latter to

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become more and more dependent on Egypt. Several other Yemeni army leaders opposed Egyptian intervention. Eventually, Egypt became more committed to al-Sallal and less to the Yemeni revolution.

The contest for power was an internal Yemeni affair until the Egyptians moved in, creating a struggle among the nationalist progressives, the republicans supported by Nasser, and the conservative monarchists, led by the Yemeni royalists and supported by Saudi Arabia. The entrance of Egypt and Saudi Arabia into the conflict internationalized it, making it virtually impossible for the republicans and royalists to arrive at a lasting settlement.

As soon as Yemeni tribesmen allied with the royalists struck heavy blows against the Egyptian expeditionary forces and it was realized that the royalists could not be defeated quickly, Nasser's critics urged Egypt to extricate herself. But al-Sallal's failure to establish a stable government complicated the situation, forcing Nasser to continue his support to the republicans. It became obvious that, if the Egyptians were to get out of Yemen without incurring a total military and political disaster, they would have to reach an understanding with the Saudis. To this end negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt began in the summer of 1965 in Harad.[24] The plans drawn up at the conference came to naught because they were designed by Nasser and Faisal without consulting all the Yemeni factions.

Following the Harad impasse the Egyptian army was not only forced to stay but to increase its troops in Yemen. The republicans became more divided than ever, and the struggle between and within military and civilian groups became more brutal.[25] Reluctantly, the Saudis continued to support the royalists.

The proposition that the sources of instability in the Middle East spring not only from the presence of Israel, the Western

[24]Nasser practically dictated a plan, concluded at the end of August 1965, which called for (1) a national plebiscite to be held in November 1966 to permit the Yemeni to determine the form of their government; (2) a transitional council of fifty members representing all national interests in Yemen to decide on the system of government during the transitional period; (3) a pledge by the UAR and Saudi Arabian governments to support the resolutions of the transitional government; (4) a withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen over a ten-month period beginning in November 1965, along with an immediate withholding of Saudi military assistance; (5) an immediate cease-fire; and (6) a joint peace committee to be established by the UAR and Saudi Arabia to supervise the borders of Yemen. The peace committee was to be established with the authority to operate anywhere in republican or royalist Yemen. King Faisal and President Nasser agreed to maintain constant contact with one another concerning all negotiations.

[25]Wenner, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-228.

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powers, and imperialistic machinations but also from inter-Arab rivalries is demonstrated by the case of Yemen as it was earlier in the UAR. The Arab unity movement which supposedly was to create a millennium of integration and equilibrium in the Middle East has worked against that goal.

Violence and Diplomacy: The Vicious Formula of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

More than a year has passed since the last Arab-Israeli war. The conflict is deeper than ever, the impasse more rigid; both Arabs and Israelis remain intransigent. Another confrontation is possible in the near future.

Rather than suing for peace after suffering a disastrous military defeat, the Arabs are once again seeking to recoup their losses by diplomacy while preparing for the next campaign. Nasser made it perfectly clear in a speech before the Egyptian National Assembly on November 24, 1967 that the Six-Day War was no more than a Dunkirk, and V-Day is yet to come. The Egyptians are fortifying their positions along the western bank of the Suez while the Israelis are digging in on the eastern side.

Arab strategy dictates that the state of Israel must be annihilated or, at the least, squeezed into a tiny ethnic group which can be integrated into the Arab world. The latter solution allots a place for the Jews as an ethnic minority within a future Arab union or federation. Israel's annihilation, however, is the solution preferred by most Arabs.

The Arabs had hoped to contain or annihilate the Jewish community in Palestine long before Israel became a state in 1948. From the 1930's onward they conducted a campaign of diplomacy and political pressure to prevent the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. When this failed, five Arab nations went to war to undo the UN resolution for partition, to gain by violence what they had not accomplished by diplomacy. The 1948-1949 war ended in Arab defeat, the absorption of Arab Palestine by Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and the enlargement of Israeli territory. After their defeat the Arabs returned to political pressure and diplomacy. Their new objective was to isolate Israel.

In the early 1950's, as the United States became aware of the importance of the Middle East to Western security, Washington began to modify its support of Israel and to regard Arab good will as crucial to America's Cold War interests in the area. The Arabs,

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however, regarded the United States with a suspicion and hostility that has kept it at a disadvantage in the Middle East ever since. To woo the Arabs, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles adopted a policy of equal treatment toward the Arab states and Israel. This policy played into the hands of the Arabs, who could demand that the United States, in return for their friendship, pressure Israel for concessions on territory and refugees.

While the United States did not involve itself in the Middle East for the purpose of intensifying the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets entered the scene specifically to exploit it. The Soviet Union came into the arena in reaction to the American initiative in setting up the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and created a bipolar situation which put the Arabs in an excellent position to return to their old formula of using political and diplomatic means to regain what had been lost militarily. The Cold War gave the Arabs the opportunity to play East against West, to exploit international rivalries for the purpose of isolating and weakening Israel.

By 1956 they had been partly successful, when suddenly their strategy was confounded by the devastating Israeli attack on Egypt. The Israelis were suspicious of Arab motives and fearful of another assault on their small domain, especially since this time the Arabs were backed by the Soviet Union. Aware of British and French plans to regain control of the Suez Canal, they decided to launch an onslaught against Egypt to prevent Nasser from striking first. However, Israel's action coincided with the British-French attack, and in view of collusion with the French it was labeled an act of aggression and condemned by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although there are many parallels between the 1956 and the 1967 Israeli-Arab wars, we can cite three major differences. In 1967 Israel fought alone; the United States did not join in the Soviet Union's censure of Israeli aggression; and the Arabs could not muster enough support in the UN to force an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is, like all conflicts, two-sided, yet in one crucial respect it remains one-sided. While the Israelis are willing to modify their position on territories, refugees and economic compensation, the Arabs seek only the annihilation of Israel. When they speak now of a political solution and recession of war, they do not mean that the struggle is over; they are at-

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tempting to undo the 1967 Israeli achievement by political maneuvering. Syrian radicals and the militants still speak openly of a liberation war to restore Palestine. The Egyptians are more sophisticated in exploiting world public opinion: they talk about Israeli concessions and adherence to the November 22, 1967 UN resolution which, as interpreted by Egypt, calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories. But the Arabs are more strongly determined than ever to retake Palestine from the Zionist "bandits." The November 1967 Arab conference in Khartoum presented the real Arab terms: no recognition of Israel, no peace with Israel, and no freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. As long as they insist on the return of Palestine to the Palestinians, the destruction of Israel is clearly implied.

Even Arab moderates like Cecil Hourani talk of the disintegration of Israel, but their approach is different. Hourani writes that from the repeated Arab-Israeli wars, "The conclusions to be drawn are two: in the first place, the resort to military force as a basic element in Arab policy toward Israel is an error. In the second place, our best chance of containing Israel lies in international pressures either within or outside the United Nations."[26] Hourani wants only to "contain" Israel because he believes she can be destroyed by Arab demography. He argues that there are now almost one and a half million Arabs in Palestine. Since the population growth among Arabs is greater than among Israelis, Arabs will "annihilate" the state through assimilation within a decade.

Because of the disastrous defeat of 1967, Arab ideological scribes have stressed more than ever the righteousness of the conflict and the "Arab cause." General Yehoshafat Harkabi states: "They have dealt so much with us [Israel] that we have become a part, however negative, but a part of their national ego."[27]

The amount of anti-Israeli literature in Arabic is immense. A great part of the machinery of Egyptian political propaganda is dedicated to the conflict. The Ministry of National Guidance, headed by the Minister of Information, 'Abd al-Kadr Hatim, from

[26]Cecil Hourani, "An Arab Speaks to the Arab World," *Encounter*, November 1967, pp. 3-14.

[27]Yehoshafat Harkabi's two major studies on the conflict (in Hebrew) are *Between Israel and the Arabs* (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1968), and *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Tel-Aviv: D'vir, 1968). In English the best summary of Harkabi's views was published in "Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six-Day War," ORBIS, Fall 1967, and "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation," *Jerusalem Post*, December 17, 1965.

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1955 to 1965, has published the series *Ikhtarna Lak* (*We Have Chosen for You*) and *Kutub Siyasiyah* (*Political Writings*). Of some 200 pamphlets in these series, half deal with Israel, Zionism and imperialism. A special series, *Israeliyat* (diminutive of Israel), has been published by this Ministry since the Sinai Campaign of 1956. The Egyptian High Command's Division of Information and Indoctrination also issues anti-Israel political propaganda, samples of which were taken by the Israelis in the 1967 war.[28] At the American University of Beirut there is a special division of Palestinian studies headed by Professor Walid al-Khalidi and connected with the Department of Political Science. In the Six-Day War the Israelis captured several vitriolic pamphlets and brochures on the Palestine problem written by this division for Egyptian army officers, as well as several Ba'th and Syrian army pamphlets devoted to anti-Israel subjects.

Harkabi rejects the view of many liberals, both in Israel and in the West, that Arab hatred of Israel amounts merely to a mouthing of lies by Arab leaders which has not infected the masses. On the contrary, he argues, the masses have been fully indoctrinated with this hatred and are now spurring on Arab leaders to destroy Israel. During the last war, when Israeli pilots parachuted into Jordan and especially into Syria and Egypt, they were cruelly tortured and killed by their captors—who were not officials acting on orders but civilians surging with hatred.

Many progressive Arab journalists, scribes and nationalists who write for *al-Ahram* and other Egyptian, Lebanese and Syrian journals draw a romantic analogy between the Arabs and the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. But in a military and political sense the Arabs are more analogous to the South Vietnamese and the Israelis to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Their terrorist offensive in the Israeli-occupied Western Bank is amateurish compared to Viet Cong terrorism. Saboteurs entering Israeli territory are usually either quickly captured or killed by the Israelis. Their successes are sporadic and rare. Records of the escapades of

[28]Harkabi, *The Indoctrination against Israel in the UAR Armed Forces* (Tel-Aviv: Matkal Ministry of Defense, 1967). This is a translation of a UAR army indoctrination pamphlet (restricted to army personnel) captured in Sinai during the 1967 war. The author is Hasan Sabri al-Khuli: the title, *The Palestine Problem*. Al-Khuli is a retired Egyptian army officer and, as director of the President's (Nasser's) Palestine Office, he is in charge of indoctrination in the UAR armed forces. This pamphlet is representative of a literature of over 600 titles on the conflict, many of which emphasize favorite anti-Semitic themes, such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and anti-Jewish Islamic theological themes. For an analysis of Arab anti-Jewish and anti-Israel propaganda, see Harkabi, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict, op. cit.*

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several terrorists give evidence of their maladroit approach and lack of effective guerrilla training and commitment. The Arabs have not learned the real lesson of Viet Nam: a tough, organized and dedicated little nation cannot be easily defeated even by a great power. Arab terror has been conceived, in the past as it is now, as an attritive factor against Israel; however, it has achieved the opposite effect—greater Israeli vigilance and preparedness to fight.

The tragedy of the Arabs is their inability to recognize that their unrealistic treatment of Israel is detrimental to stability in the Middle East and to future Arab unity. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been incorporated into messianic pan-Arabism and has become a source of frustration for Arab ideologues who are unable to relate ideological commitments and capabilities. Hourani writes:

> The greatest source of weakness in the last twenty years has been the introduction into Arab political life of methods of government and of ideological slogans which are unsuitable and irrelevant to the actual conditions of the Arab countries. These methods and slogans have not only poisoned the relations between different Arab countries, they have also blinded some of their regimes to their real problems and their real interests.[29]

Israel has demonstrated three times in twenty years that she can win against great odds. Each successive Israeli victory has been more convincing, and each Arab defeat more bitter. The continuing Arab-Israeli conflict remains one of the major obstacles to the stability of the region.

East-West Rivalry

The United States and the Middle East

John S. Badeau, a former influential adviser to the U.S. government on the Middle East and a former Ambassador to Egypt, recently presented his views on America's primary interests in the Middle East:

> Obviously their strategic location makes the communications facilities of the Middle East an international concern. With the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf penetrating the Eurasian land mass, the land, air and sea routes linking the hemispheres cross here. The Middle East has thus long been the vestibule of east-west communication, particularly for any power having interests or bearing responsibilities in Asia and Africa.

[29]Hourani, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

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Of comparable importance is the interest in access to the petroleum supplies of the area. Middle Eastern petroleum is a principal source of power for the Western European economy . . . and a basic resource in global defense.[30]

Badeau considers the confrontation with Soviet expansion to be of secondary importance. Convinced that the Soviets will not be able to communize the Middle East, he seems unaware that the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is not primarily a matter of sovietization of states but the creation of client philo-Soviet regimes everywhere. Events have demonstrated that the Soviets find it impossible or economically and politically burdensome to communize countries outside their immediate sphere. Since the cost of supporting Cuba, Viet Nam and now Egypt is immense, the sovietization of the Middle East is probably not Moscow's aim. Rather, the Soviet Union wants to dissolve U.S. influence in the area and become the politically dominant power by creating and encouraging revolutionary conditions so that the Middle East can yield several so-called progressive regimes. Thus, the Soviets could secure a strategic and political foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean. Badeau encourages the United States to continue the policies formed long ago: collecting clients; supporting the independence of governments; ameliorating the Arab-Israeli conflict; and supporting a new type of emerging middle class, what Manfred Halpern and others call the "New Middle Class" or the "Middle Sectors."

But the premises underlying U.S. policies for the Middle East are no longer valid. To begin with, the Middle East's strategic location and its oil are no longer vitally important to the West. The West is no longer dealing with the classical Eastern Question. The decline in importance of the Suez Canal, the lessened need for Middle Eastern oil, and the strong dependence of the oil-producing countries on oil-consuming countries, which became clearly evident after 1967, demonstrate that the Middle East is losing its traditional importance. Second, U.S. policies designed to support these alleged interests cause tremors in an already shaky area and interfere with the real American interest—to stop the growth of Soviet influence.

The case of Yemen, which Badeau dealt with as Ambassador to Egypt, demonstrates the folly of guaranteeing the independence of any government in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the Re-

[30]John S. Badeau, *The American Approach to the Arab World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 21.

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public of Yemen are in conflict. Whose independence should be protected, that of Saudi Arabia or Yemen? Is the Imamate of Yemen or the Republic of Yemen losing its independence? Is the destruction of Israel an essential attribute of Arab independence because Egypt considers the liberation of Palestine to be a vital element of its national policy? To Badeau, loss of independence means a Soviet takeover. But would he not consider a Nasserist or a "national liberation movement" takeover of Syria or Yemen a loss of independence for those states? Does he believe that Arab independence cannot be irrevocably compromised?

Middle Eastern countries have been unable to establish stable borders, governments and ideologies. Taking into consideration pan-Arabism and the messianic Ba'thist and Nasserist type of ideologies, how can U.S. policymakers talk about fixed boundaries when the Arab states have not fixed their boundaries?

Badeau contends that Israel is a liability and not an asset, a problem for the United States rather than an interest. He does not advocate U.S. abandonment of the present commitment to Israel, but rather states that the United States will not fulfill this commitment as Israel expects and interprets it. In 1966 General Moshe Dayan essentially agreed with Badeau when he wrote in *Ha-Aretz* that the United States has committed herself to the independence of Israel but not to Israel's interpretation of her independence or to what Israel considers secure and defensible boundaries.[31] Nor has a single Arab country, in particular Egypt, defined its interests, national goals and sovereignty in accordance with the U.S. view of them. In this respect, the Arab countries are as much a liability as Israel. By committing herself to the independence of particular countries that are in great flux, the United States raises expectations in one country which cannot be fulfilled because they are in opposition to expectations, goals and interests of other supported countries. Frustrated expectations aggravate unstable situations. This policy actually contradicts American interests. It imposes on the United States, for instance, recognition of a revolutionary, Soviet-dominated regime in Syria.

Badeau, along with other makers of U.S. policy in the Middle East, continues to support a policy that long since has proved unfeasible: blanket commitment to a variety of contradictory

[31]General Moshe Dayan, "Relations with Arabs without Mediators," *Ha-Aretz*, June 24, 1966, p. 2.

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forces. His definition of independence is based on an anachronistic Wilsonian concept of self-determination—a concept which is irrelevant in this age of Arab revolution and messianic nationalism when boundaries are defined not legalistically but ideologically.

Moreover, one cannot secure clients in an area torn by strife, violence and instability. How can one choose a client government in Syria, which has a record of twenty-two coups in twenty years of independence? How can one say that King Hussein is a long-term client when the Hashemite regime is constantly threatened by internal insurrection? For some time Nasser was considered a U.S. client and the policy of "coming to terms with Nasser" was designed to attract him. But Kedourie warns:

> The doctrine of "coming to terms with Nasser" is neither coherent nor feasible.
>
> Egypt, although it is the most powerful and populous Arabic speaking state, does not have the power permanently to dominate its neighbors. Middle Eastern history since the end of the Second World War has shown this amply. "Coming to terms with Nasser" would, therefore, mean an open-ended commitment to an over-ambitious Egyptian policy which has little chance of success.[32]

There are two episodes in the recent past in which U.S. support of Egypt has worked to the detriment of U.S. interests. After the 1961 disruption of the United Arab Republic, Washington, by disregarding Egyptian susceptibilities, might have been able to support and strengthen the Syrian regime in exchange for some easing of Syrian-Israeli hostility. The second instance was the U.S. recognition of the Republic of Yemen in 1962, which enhanced the Egyptian position in Yemen. The Egyptian presence in Yemen made possible the organization of terrorist activities against Aden, producing a debacle that enormously increased the threat of Soviet penetration in Arabia. In contrast, the landing of U.S. troops in Lebanon in 1958, the opposite of "coming to terms with Nasser," showed immediate and substantial gains and led to no undesirable consequences. Malcolm Kerr suggests that

> What the advocates of "coming to terms with Nasser" have meant is Western acceptance of Nasser's terms, rather than the reverse. But if we consider the question of negotiating a businesslike understanding with him and his partisans on *any* terms, whether by appeasing him or by putting him in his place, then we should recognise that in fact a great deal of

[32]Elie Kedourie, Luncheon Address on "Contemporary Politics in the Middle East," Brookings Institution, March 27, 1968. Quoted by permission of the lecturer.

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direct and indirect bargaining has already occurred since his rise to power, with disappointing results.[33]

This policy of collecting clients is, of course, connected with the arguments of territorial independence and strategic needs—notions that fit an age long since passed. Its output is further instability which aids the Soviets in their penetration of the area.

Although the Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab conflicts have a momentum of their own, they have been intensified and institutionalized by East-West rivalry. Between 1947 and 1950, the Arab-Israeli conflict might have been ameliorated, despite the war of 1948-1949, because there was a temporary confluence of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union favoring the creation of Israel. Both voted for the recognition of Israel despite great Arab opposition. Due to this cooperation, a cease-fire was finally arranged. Neither power sought maliciously to exploit the Arab-Israeli division as the British earlier had exploited Zionist-Arab differences. However, after the Korean War, when competition among Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union grew more intense, the gravity of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts increased as well.

Richard A. Nolte, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt in 1967, argues that "by 1950 . . . as the United States slowly became aware of the Cold War importance of the Middle East to Western security, Arab good will might have been of immense value in furthering American policies."[34] He concedes, however, that the U.S. preoccupation with the Cold War alienated the Arabs instead of enlisting their support. Since he believes that Arab good will is of immense value to the United States (in 1965 he bluntly advocated total American commitment to ideological Arab nationalism),[35] he, like Badeau, asserts that when the United States recognized Israel, she acted in opposition to her best interests.

The policy of support for Israel represented the first major United States excursion into the Arab Middle East. It was not undertaken for considerations of national interest, but rather, as events have shown, in spite of them. In part, this policy has been a projection of U.S. domestic politics, with each party bidding with pro-Zionist attitudes and promises

[33]See Malcolm Kerr, " 'Coming to Terms with Nasser': Attempts and Failures," *International Affairs,* January 1967, p. 65. Several of the following points are borrowed from Kedourie, "Contemporary Politics," *op. cit.*

[34]Richard A. Nolte, "American Policy in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs,* February 1959, p. 114.

[35]Nolte, "United States Policy and the Middle East," in Georgianna G. Stevens, editor, *The United States and the Middle East* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 148-182.

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for the support of an alleged "Jewish vote." But fundamentally, United States policy with respect to Israel has rested on the humanitarian good will of the American people as a whole—who only now are beginning to be aware that "righting the wrongs of Europe" and "making the desert bloom" in Palestine was not done in a vacuum and that other wrongs were committed in the process.[36]

In the 1950's the United States put less emphasis on her support for Israel and sought closer cooperation with the Arabs. The first product of this new policy was the Baghdad military pact and the Northern Tier concept which were intended to make the Middle East an anti-communist bulwark. The result of these two pacts was disappointing for several American "old Middle Eastern hands," who knew that the Arab states were guided by their own, not American, interests. In Iraq, Nuri al-Sa'id used the Baghdad Pact to challenge his rival, Gamal Abdel Nasser—not to ally himself with the Americans to fight communism. Nasser sought closer relations with the Soviets to extend his rule and check Nuri. The Soviets, viewing the pact as a vehicle for U.S. influence in the Middle East, sought an alliance with Nasser. By creating the Baghdad Pact the United States inadvertently issued an invitation to the Soviets to join the scramble for allies in the Middle East and thrust into their embrace a willing partner.

Amid the wave of Arab-American amity, Dulles suddenly decided to abandon the Egyptians, who were unwilling to bend to American interests, and withdrew support for the Aswan Dam.[37] This unexpected turnabout with its ensuing frustration precipitated the Egyptian seizure of the Canal and the resulting Suez crisis. Meanwhile, the Byrode-Nolte-Badeau policy of cooperation with the Arabs (which had been followed except for the Aswan Dam rejection) isolated Israel, made her feel threatened, and eventually led to the Sinai Campaign of 1956 and the simultaneous British-French attack on Egypt. Although it was due only to U.S. pressure that the Israelis withdrew from Sinai, the Arabs did not for long interpret this as U.S. benevolence but insisted that the Soviets had saved them.

"Cordiality" with Egypt did not succeed in pressing the temperamental Nasser into the American Cold War design. Kerr writes:

Nasser was concerned to obtain Western military and economic aid without prejudice to his own desire to promote Egypt's leadership in the

[36]Nolte, "American Policy," *op. cit.*, p. 115.
[37]Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, 1967, pp. 16-39.

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Arab world, and without being drawn into Western strategic plans. After failing to obtain aid on these terms, he sought to establish his ability to get it elsewhere, and to undermine the Anglo-American position in the region to his own advantage.[38]

Thus, the policy constructed to counter communist influence only increased it and sharpened the Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab conflicts by raising and then frustrating the expectations of the several opposing parties.

Progressive and sociologically-oriented U.S. policy advisers not satisfied with the traditionalist interest-strategy approach have now come up with new panaceas. They have invented the New Middle Class of the Middle East, made up of anti-communist progressive elements, as the instrument of socio-economic progress which the U.S. government must support morally and financially. This New Middle Class, as distinct from the old middle class, could and should assume primary responsibility for all phases of development—social, economic and political. Proponents of this thesis argue that the New Middle Class is more numerous than other sectors, possesses superior organizational skills and honesty, and is developing forward-looking leaders.[39]

Badeau and Halpern, a former RAND Corporation Middle East specialist and State Department official, maintain that the United States should consider support for the emerging middle class the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. The remaining problem is to identify these progressive forces and determine which individuals or segments of the New Middle Class deserve to be supported. These authors believe that the military is the only group that can unite the New Middle Class and bring it to power, because the military is the most representative and powerful stratum of this class.[40]

The theory of the New Middle Class fitted perfectly the long-

[38]Kerr, " 'Coming to Terms'," *op. cit.*

[39]Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 51-78, deals with the theory of the New Middle Class. For a critique of Halpern's New Middle Class, see Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* October 1967, pp. 46-65. Also, George I. Blanksten, "In Quest of the Middle Sectors," *World Politics,* January 1960; José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," in *Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies: A Conference Report* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1965), and Liisa North, *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1966).

[40]John J. Johnson, editor, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

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standing, official American interpretation of the situation in the Middle East. The rise of Nasser and the activities of the Syrian and other armies demonstrated that the military was the most representative and powerful group of the middle class. Events in Africa and Latin America have been interpreted in the same light. Support for the Nasserists, the Ba'thists, and other military groups with xenophobic ideologies has been encouraged by American policymakers and university intellectuals: they fail to understand that when the army comes to power, it represents a no longer cohesive New Middle Class but the *ashes* of the middle class.

The political histories of Egypt since 1952, Syria since 1949, Iraq since 1958, and Yemen since 1962, testify that neither the New Middle Class nor the army is even potentially a social, ideological or political class (in the Mosca-Michels sense). The army in each of these countries is fratricidally divided. Whenever an Arab army has secured power, it has failed to demonstrate the ideological cohesion of a new class. In Syria and Iraq the army has been responsible for continuing political instability. In Egypt the recent stability is a product of traditional political apathy and coercion and a dependent bureaucracy. The war of 1967 showed that Egypt depends on one leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to hold her together, and he maintains stability, as Muhammad 'Ali (1805-1849) did, by manipulating a system of palace intrigues, counter-intrigues and permanent political purges.[41] (By 1968 not one original member of the Free Officer club of 1949, except Nasser, was in a position of power or influence.) Since the 1967 war the Arab Socialist Union and the army have become uncertain as sources of support so that Nasser must now depend more than ever upon intrigue and his secret service. Insecurity, make-believe and apathy have characterized Egypt's politics since 1967. The actual situation differs greatly from the one that the progressive, cohesive and capable New Middle Class, invented by the social scientists, should have created.

Hourani, an Arab intellectual, sees no justification for supporting the military regimes in the Middle East:

> The military regimes . . . which have installed themselves in certain Arab countries since 1949 had their only justification in terms of the necessity of meeting external dangers. They have now given a public demonstration of their incompetence in war. What reason do we have to suppose that they are likely to be more successful in economic planning and development, in education, foreign affairs, finance, or culture?

[41]Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Myth," *op. cit.*

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The "progressive" military regimes have not only failed to implement socialist programmes: they have actually lowered gross national products and seriously damaged the economic welfare of some sections of the populations without improving that of others. Nor have they been able, or willing, to take those social and juridical measures which would have given a progressive character to their regimes, at least on paper. Not one of the "progressive" regimes, for example, has abolished polygamy.[42]

The theoretical assumption that the New Middle Class will serve as the integrating and stabilizing force in these countries is denied by an unceasing and brutal competition for power among all the strata of the middle class. Since the New Middle Class is not a valid analytical category, it offers no explanation of the politics of the modern Middle East. How can it be U.S. policy to support a nonexistent class? The result of supporting the middle class represented by the army has been to help Syrian fanatics and Nasser increase their power and promote conflict.

The consequence of outdated U.S. policies is increasing instability that could eventually plunge the United States and the Soviet Union into an undesirable conflict. Is not this too high a price to pay for an area that is becoming less and less important to the West? Badeau himself admits that

In principle, the United States stands for change and progress in the Arab world, but its stance is affected by two factors. One is that however desirable changes may be, the forces of destruction frequently outrun those of construction. . . . The second factor conditioning the American attitude toward regional tranquillity is, again, that violent change, political instability, and national rivalries run the risk of inviting outside forces. This is to say that for the short run, relative quiet may serve American interests better than radical change, although in the long run it seems probable that radical change in some form must take place.[43]

One would think that this perception would lead to different policies since the ones pursued obviously are not profitable.

The Middle East is a crucial arena of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is true that we no longer live in a politically bipolar world, that the process of polycentralization is underway in the West and in the communist sphere. However, Soviet expansion in the Middle East, indirectly aided by outdated U.S. policies, is a hard fact. The United States must keep the Middle East open to all nations with interests there and not permit it to become an arena solely of Soviet influence.

The Soviets apparently do not wish to sovietize the Middle East,

[42]Hourani, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.
[43]Badeau, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

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but they would like to dominate it by taking advantage of the area's instability. The confrontation between the USSR and the United States is likely to arise out of the use of the so-called national liberation forces which President John F. Kennedy argued were the main danger to international stability. Since Israel defeated Soviet-supported national liberation forces in 1967 and thus administered a setback to Soviet plans, the results of the Six-Day War coincided with U.S. interests. It would seem that future Israeli-Arab wars would not be of benefit to any of the major interested parties, Americans, Israelis, Soviets, Arabs—except, perhaps, to the most radical Arabs. However, the Israeli victories in the wars to date have benefited the United States indirectly because they stand as a warning to all "national liberation forces" and their supporters to act with restraint.

The Soviet Union and the Middle East

The Soviets stepped into the Middle East arena in the postwar era with no emotional attachments or political legacies to distort their realistic appraisal of the situation. Because they were historically anti-Zionist and unsympathetic to the bourgeois Arab leaders, they previously had stayed out of the Arab-Zionist conflict. The Soviet Union originally sought to eliminate the imperial power of Great Britain for strategic purposes, and the Palestine conflict served its purpose well by forcing the British to withdraw from the Middle East. Between 1947 and 1952 the Soviets supported Israel militarily because they were primarily interested in British evacuation and sought no other stake in the area. Because of the Cold War, however, they eventually opted for Arab allies, and since 1953 they have deliberately sought to exacerbate Arab-Israeli tensions.

After the death of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev, the Soviets introduced into the Middle East their New Outlook policy for developing countries: support for the bourgeois middle classes which would create the industrial society necessary for a communist revolution. Therefore, they, like the Americans, sought to encourage the progressives and the military, the supposed representatives of this emerging middle class. Both competed for the allegiance of the same classes and political leaders. By negotiating the Czech arms deal and encouraging neutralists in Egypt and Syria, the Soviets were able to gain several allies. But their policies eventually ensnared them in the same vise in which

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the United States had been caught. The failures of the New Middle Class and the military to act as reliable clients challenged the underlying theories and policy assumptions of both rival great powers.

The errors of the Soviet New Outlook policy of supporting "national liberation forces" in anticipation of establishing Cuba-like regimes in Syria, Egypt and Algeria placed Moscow in a dilemma during the existence (1959-1961) of the United Arab Republic. The Soviets had chosen Nasser as their chief client; as long as no other progressive Arabs competed with him, Soviet Egyptian policy was successful and profitable. But when Nasser in 1959 and 1960 clashed with the Ba'th (the supposed emerging New Middle Class of Syria) over the UAR's internal policies, Moscow found itself in a situation common to all imperialist powers in the Middle East, namely, having to decide which party should be chosen as chief client. The Soviets adopted the practice of British imperialism between the wars, i.e., *divide et impera,* but discovered in 1967 that pursuit of this dangerous policy of oscillating between their Egyptian and Syrian clients could catapult them to the brink of war.

Soviet involvement in the Middle East is based on the geopolitical-strategic foundations of historic Russian foreign policy: the security of Russia's southern flank and an open Bosporus passage to the Mediterranean Sea. For these reasons a Soviet rapprochement with Turkey and Iran would seem more important than achievements on the Arab front. But Khrushchev's New Outlook policy plunged Moscow into what has become a costly involvement in inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts.

The Soviet dilemma of whether gradually to abandon, or to become more deeply committed to, Egypt was not decided so much by events in the Middle East as by a bitter Kremlin debate concerning the role of the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power. The old guard and ideologists still argue that capitalism is vulnerable, as proven by American hardships in Viet Nam, and that the Soviet Union as a revolutionary power must continue to support the forces fighting the imperialists and attriting the enemy's strength. Thus, Moscow wanted to support Syria and Egypt and their military in anticipation of the subsequent radicalization of Syria and Egypt after the 1967 disaster. A policy of vigorous support of the Arabs against Israel, the Soviets hope, will *exclude* them from the apparent contradictions between

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Egypt and Syria and will consolidate their interests more successfully in these countries. The Soviets' penetration of the Egyptian army, seeking to dictate any Egyptian military move above a regimental level, forces them to take on responsibilities which more rational policies would eschew. The consequent Soviet operational involvement in inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli feuds does not seem in the long run to benefit Soviet national or regional interests and may even endanger the painful efforts for rapprochement with Iran and Turkey. Certainly conflict over the Persian Gulf jeopardizes Soviet-Iranian relations.

Moscow could, on the other hand, reap a profit from its post-1967 Arab policy of domination and influence over the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. The Suez has become crucial for the Soviets, while its importance to the United States has been declining. Now that the British are evacuating the Persian Gulf, Moscow is preparing to spread its power and influence through the Canal to other lands that have been *terra incognita* to the Soviets. In addition, the Canal, when it is opened, could become the key Soviet communication route to North Viet Nam. The Kremlin is putting enormous pressure on the Egyptians to give ambiguous acceptance to the UN November 1967 resolution so that the Canal can be opened. On the excuse of protecting the Suez, it plans to use the Soviet fleet to dominate the Suez-Persian Gulf route, and in pursuit of this objective it has intensified Soviet revolutionary activities in the South Arabian republics. Only a firm American deterrent diplomacy—based on a willingness to deploy more naval power—can avert the conversion of the Red Sea into a Soviet lake.

In an interview which appeared in *Ha-Aretz* on January 10, 1968, General Dayan contended that in the next campaign the Israelis will probably inflict far greater destruction upon the Arabs. He intended this statement as a thinly veiled warning to the Egyptians and their Soviet advisers that a parallel can be drawn between events in the Middle East and Southeast Asia: Israel can be compared to North Viet Nam, Egypt to South Viet Nam, and the USSR to the United States. Dayan implied that the Soviets should think twice about the price of their growing involvement in Egyptian affairs and concluded that the Arabs will lose the next war as they have lost the last three. Because the Soviets are deeply engaged in the strategic operations of the Egyp-

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tian army, he believes the Egyptians will not go to war without Moscow's consent. However, he does not expect Soviet advisers to play the same role as their American counterparts in Viet Nam; for example, they will not make decisions for Egyptian officers. Until we have more information on Soviet activities in Egypt, Dayan's interpretation must not be accepted uncritically.

General Rabin, former Israeli Army Chief of Staff and currently Ambassador to the United States, offered a slightly different view of the situation in an interview in *Davar* on January 12, 1968. He agreed that the Soviets have penetrated deeply into Egyptian military affairs and that the Egyptians will depend heavily on their advice. But in his estimation the Soviets are not privy to Egyptian political decision-making, and since the decision to go to war is largely a political one, Cairo will make it irrespective of Soviet advice. As the seizure of the *Pueblo* demonstrated, in the nuclear age small powers can force large ones into extremely difficult situations.

Conclusions

Prospects for lasting peace in the Middle East are exceedingly dim. Beirut, Damascus and Cairo still espouse a messianic ideology that has hardened because of the 1967 military disaster. The principles of Khartoum govern Arab policy. The pursuit of the millennium and the Arab world state has not ceased even though the path has never been laid out in clear and realistic terms. The disaster of 1967 is unreal precisely because Arab unity, as preached and interpreted by the messianics, is not accountable to reason or to the challenge of concrete events. Nasser's spirit of revanchism has been intensified, for his 1967 defeat has shattered the hegemonial aspirations he had assigned to himself and Egypt.

The future as Good is an escape mechanism from the frustrations of the present, but it is incalculably an aspect of the present. The mechanism of dream fulfillment becomes retroactive: the road to the millennium is sown with thorns, the thornier the road the better the chance for redemption. The prophecies concerning *al-Isti'mar* have come true: the foreigners, i.e., Britain and France, have departed. This is interpreted as a partial advance on the road to an Arab renaissance. The transformation of the British lion into a lamb in the Middle East is claimed by Arab messianics as their accomplishment.

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Israel is neither Britain nor France. Israel is in the Middle East to stay and will not fold her flags and send the troops back home. There is already a third generation of native Israelis: those born in 1948 fought in 1967. Israel's military and technological pace has left the Arabs far behind. This stubborn reality has created a most remarkable psychological escape mechanism among the Arabs: with or without war Palestine will be liberated in the end, as Algeria was liberated. Arab messianism prophesies that one day all devils will depart from the Arab holy land. Thus, one can only expect a repetition of old events. While preparing for war the Arabs are employing their old formula of recovering war losses by international political blackmail.

The chances of an American-Soviet concert of power in the Middle East are slim; such cooperation would be at best limited, short-run and governed by other global commitments. The asymmetrical involvement of the great powers in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the past—i.e., Soviet military and political commitments to the Arabs were stronger than U.S. commitments to Israel—resulted in a buttressing of the cherished Arab hopes for the eventual liberation of Palestine by political, diplomatic or military means. The Western powers have been more successful in taming the Israelis than in controlling the Arabs, as the removal of Israeli forces from Sinai in 1956 demonstrated. Because the small powers have learned to exploit the global semi-anarchy resulting from the superpowers' asymmetrical relationships,[44] the breakdown of bipolarity, and the impotence of military threats, there is a real danger of a great-power confrontation in the Mediterranean unless each takes extraordinary measures to disengage itself from the conflict.

If Washington moves unilaterally to restore relations with Cairo without bringing about some reasonable arrangements between Israel and Egypt, the chances are it will again be caught, as it was in 1967, between contradictory commitments to these antagonists. In order to lessen the chances of another Arab-Israeli or Arab-Arab clash, the United States must adopt a realistic and active policy in the Middle East, the underlying objective of which should be to remove or at least weaken the negative sources of instability, division and conflict.

To tame the political expectations of Arab revanchists, the

[44]On the two international systems, moderate and revolutionary, see Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

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United States must make more enduring arrangements for supplying Israel with military deterrent capabilities (especially air power), thus discouraging Arab messianics. To alleviate inter-Arab ideological rivalry Washington should unequivocally give preferential treatment to the nonradical, nonpraetorian Arab regimes, without turning them into clients. Past experience has demonstrated the disastrous effects of the client policy.

To demonstrate U.S. concern for the political independence of Middle Eastern regimes, American naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean must retain strategic superiority over Soviet naval power in this area, and U.S. determination must be spelled out to the Soviets so as to discourage them from direct amphibious intervention on behalf of so-called national liberation forces. A post-Viet Nam American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean must protect the Free World's vital strategic interests between the southern flank of NATO and the Persian Gulf, and enable the United States to face down any Soviet *dictat* in the area.

The Soviet Union is unlikely to act responsibly in the cause of peace but will seek to penetrate more deeply into the Arab world by backing its clients. The price the Soviets will pay is to become caught up in the web of inter-Arab rivalries and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It might be wiser for them to reduce their involvement with so many unstable Arab governments. Legitimate Soviet interests in the Middle East could best be gained by focusing instead on Iran and Turkey. The only seemingly rational explanation for the current policy is that the Kremlin seeks to use its foothold in the Arab world as a steppingstone toward a larger objective—domination over the Persian Gulf and the approaches to India.

Given present Soviet policy and the lack of an adequate U.S. deterrent in the area, the Middle East appears bound for another great disaster. Short of a Soviet-American understanding in the Middle East as I have outlined above, only a limitation of Soviet intervention can insure the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region. Unfortunately, the Soviets show no signs of willingness over the long run to pursue a policy of restraint, and the Americans are deeply committed elsewhere.

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U.S.-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS: STRATEGIC ISSUES*

by John R. Thomas

THE Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has strikingly demonstrated the limits on the United States' ability to expand its influence in Eastern Europe and pursue a policy of "building bridges" to the East. If Washington underestimated these limits prior to the invasion because of misconceptions as to the nature and rapidity of political change within the Soviet Union and in Soviet-East European relations, U.S. policy should now be reviewed so that we can avoid future miscalculations.

The most important limit can be clearly and explicitly stated: U.S.-East European relations must be considered in the context of the dominant Soviet role in these relations. Whatever the validity of the assumption of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe's political and economic spheres, the overriding Soviet role in the strategic context of U.S.-East European relations is beyond argument.

In turn, the key assumption about Soviet dominance requires that several other major points be taken into account. First, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe is governed by parameters of changing political, military and economic factors outside Eastern Europe (i.e., within the Soviet Union and beyond the bloc).

Second, lest there be any confusion about cause and effect in Soviet-East European relations or any tendency to overestimate the degree of Eastern Europe's freedom of action, it should be noted that the Soviets can—if they choose to ignore factors external to Eastern Europe and are willing to pay the price—reimpose their one-time harsh control over these states.

And, third, the United States, in developing an effective policy toward the area, must take into account these broader external factors shaping Soviet policy.

Eastern Europe's Strategic Dependence on the Soviet Union

Eastern Europe today is composed of small and regionally

*This article was originally presented to an American Assembly Conference on Eastern Europe, held at Airlie House in May 1968. It has been adapted for publication at this time to take into account the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August.

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nonintegrated nations caught, as they have been traditionally, between major powers and dominated by two immutable facts: first, because of direct presence or proximity Soviet military influence is decisive; second, this influence is reinforced by the area's overall weakness in relation to its giant eastern neighbor. These factors indicate why changes in Eastern Europe to date have occurred in response to changes in the Soviet Union and within parameters set by the Soviets, rather than as an exercise of initiative in advance of changes in the Soviet Union. It should be recalled that ferment in Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary and Poland, began *after* de-Stalinization was initiated in the Soviet Union by Khrushchev in February 1956.

In the same vein, American economists specializing in Soviet and East European affairs inform us that now it is the Soviets—as much as the East Europeans—who seek to renegotiate bloc trade and aid relations. The days when the Soviets gained significantly by material contributions from their satellites or by unequal economic arrangements, such as the joint stock companies of the 1940's and the 1950's, are gone; today Eastern Europe is a drain on the Soviet economy. Thus, Soviet initiative or permissiveness has enabled Eastern Europe to expand its economic contacts with the West.

Even the current political changes, as in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, are taking place within limits tolerable to the Soviets: for example, neither the Czechoslovaks nor the Rumanians, in asserting greater freedom of action within the bloc, have sought to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and both seem bent on preserving the key role of communist parties internally.

But whatever the possibilities of greater freedom in political and economic affairs, these should not be confused with the almost total lack of East European freedom vis-à-vis the Soviets in national security matters, particularly with regard to meeting a potential German threat or resisting a determined Soviet military effort. The lack of freedom can be illustrated by the following: (1) The negative Polish response to de Gaulle's appeal to Poland in 1967 to loosen its ties with the Soviets.[1] (2) The recognition by the Czechoslovaks this year—even prior to the Soviet invasion—that their country is too small to defend itself and must rely on Soviet assistance (the ease with which the Soviets and other bloc armies occupied Czechoslovakia in August underscored this

[1]Ties that Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki acknowledged most recently in a February 1968 *Réalitiés* interview.

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reliance). (3) Eastern Europe's recognition since 1956 that it cannot rely on others, including the United States, to free it of dependence on the Soviets; this reinforces the feeling, as in the case of the Czechs, that they were sold out by the West in the 1930's and again in the 1940's and should not count on Western support in the future. And (4) a *Realpolitik* view that, in the long run, Eastern Europe can look only to the Soviets for protection against a German threat; the United States may soon weary of its commitments abroad and reduce or withdraw its forces from Europe, whereas the Soviets will remain permanently on the European continent and have a common interest with the East Europeans in preventing the rise of a future West, or even East, German threat.[2]

Furthermore, there is an important unacknowledged consideration that points up Eastern Europe's dependence on the Soviets and illuminates the strategic aspects of the Soviet Union's role there. From a position external to Eastern Europe, the Soviets have provided the cement for whatever regional unity obtains. However regrettable and oppressive the Soviet presence has been, it must be viewed against a historical background that has, over the centuries, seen the forces for disunity in Eastern Europe prove stronger than the forces for unity. This situation has been symbolized by "Balkanization" and the conflicts that have perennially torn Eastern Europe apart. The Soviets have "remedied" this situation insofar as they have diverted the East European nations from intraregional conflict by establishing bilateral or multilateral links among them, e.g., the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet-bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

It may be argued, therefore, that the degree of stability and unity now prevailing in Eastern Europe would be difficult to maintain without the Soviet cement. More important from Eastern Europe's viewpoint is the probability that any attempt to achieve unity independently of the USSR could be frustrated by Soviet exploitation of divisive issues, including such competing territorial claims as the Polish-held German land, Teschen, and Transylvania. Such exploitation would affect the ability of the East European nations to band together against an external threat. Only the Soviets would be strong enough to resolve the territorial

[2]For example, in the spring of 1968, East Germany apparently considered threatening the Czechoslovaks, beginning with economic retaliation, for their liberalization measures which severely hurt Ulbricht's Stalinist regime. See *New York Times*, April 6, 1968.

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disputes or keep them from getting out of hand in open intraregional conflict. For instance, the strong Soviet hand to date has imposed peace between Rumania and Hungary on the Transylvanian issue. Should the Soviets ease their hold, the possibility of intraregional strife might increase and other major powers might intrude into the area, leading to competition and perhaps eventually to a direct confrontation between the great powers. Whether anyone—including the East European nations themselves—would benefit from developments of this sort is at least open to question.

Eastern Europe's dependence on the Soviets and the Kremlin's policy toward Eastern Europe are governed not only by factors directly related to the region but also by factors external to it. Indeed, the latter have primary influence on Soviet-East European relations, as an examination of some of these external factors will show.

First, concern over a potential German threat clearly dominates Soviet thinking, given the devastation suffered by the Russians at the hands of the Germans in two world wars. But this Soviet view of a direct military threat from West Germany may be subject to change because of political developments in West Germany, where some officials are advocating a conciliatory policy toward the Soviets. Even Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, shortly before his death, signaled a radical change in his thinking by noting the Soviet Union's interest in peace in Europe. (This was a drastic departure for the architect of the uncompromising postwar West German policy toward the Soviets, epitomized by his view of West Germany as the European defender of Christianity against atheistic communism.) These tentative changes in Bonn's attitude toward the Soviets may undermine the long-standing Soviet view of the West Germans as revanchists bent on recovering the eastern territories lost in the wake of World War II. However, offsetting this development and compounding the German threat in Soviet eyes has been the Sino-Soviet dispute, which has given the Germans an ally in the East. Together, they have the potential for exerting pressure on the Soviets from both the West and the East.[3]

[3]For objective observers in the West, it may be difficult to envision the depth of Soviet concern over a possible German threat, combined with a hostile China, in view of the current disparity between Soviet military power and West German and Chinese capabilities. But those who have personally sampled Soviet feelings toward the Germans and the Chinese can vouch for their depth, and even their irrationality.

The Soviet attitude toward the Germans may be described—to paraphrase

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Second, the post-Stalin changes in the Soviet Union's economy, its own technological advances and expanding foreign economic obligations (e.g., growing foreign aid programs), have reduced the contribution that the bloc countries can make to the Soviet economy. The East Europeans are currently less capable of contributing effectively to the Soviets' advanced technological requirements; they must borrow technological advances from the Soviets and not vice versa—a situation quite different from the early postwar period. Moreover, the East European economies are slowing down and proving inefficient, thereby retarding rather than aiding Soviet economic progress.

Third, the disunity of the communist world is forcing the Soviet Union to act increasingly like a great power with a pragmatic outlook; it now weighs Eastern Europe's contribution as it affects the Soviet Union's own national interest and not on the basis of common ideology entailing mutual sacrifice for the advancement of world revolution.

Fourth, the U.S. role in Viet Nam has affected the Soviet Union's East European policy. The Soviets have exhibited extreme sensitivity—as reflected by their defensive tone and lame logic in explaining their power play of August 1968—to having their action in Czechoslovakia compared with U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, for they have regularly berated the U.S. government for its "imperialist" behavior in Viet Nam.

Fifth, Soviet policy in the Middle East has increasingly unsettled USSR-East European relations. Moscow seems insensitive to the negative impact on Eastern Europe of its continued backing for "two-time loser" Nasser in the wake of his defeat by Israel in

Walter Laqueur—as one of love-hate, i.e., fear of the Germans combined with admiration for their culture and awe for their technological capabilities and achievements. That this attitude still retains its grip on the current Soviet leadership can be best illustrated by reference to Premier Kosygin. He is considered by most observers to be the most rational of Soviet leaders on many matters; yet he also holds the most vehement attitude toward the Germans. This is explained by the key role he played during the German siege of Leningrad, which saw the starvation of over one million inhabitants. Such an experience could not but affect even the most hardened leader.

Similar Soviet love-hate feelings apply to the Chinese. Soviet concern is inspired by the recent hostility of the Chinese toward the Soviets and the evidence of Chinese spartan sacrifice, which has surpassed even that made by the Soviets themselves. This Chinese sacrifice, in the Soviet view, is the down payment on ultimate Chinese ambitions against others, including the Soviets, and is most menacingly illustrated by the Chinese nuclear-missile program. The Soviets are acutely aware that long before Chinese military power can "span the ocean" against the United States, it could be used against the Soviets by an irrational or miscalculating Chinese leadership.

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June 1967. Not only does the post-June Soviet policy seem questionable—throwing good money after bad—but it runs contrary to the great sympathy in Eastern Europe toward Israel following its successful pre-emption of an Arab threat to its existence. The East European attitude has even surfaced at the official level, symbolized by Rumania's open opposition to the Soviet policy. In June 1968 Rumania refused to join the rousing condemnation of Israel by the Warsaw Pact countries and ostentatiously announced trade agreements with the Jewish state.

External factors exert even greater force in shaping the strategic aspects of Soviet-East European relations than they do in the political-economic sphere. Before addressing these external strategic constraints, it should be noted that if the Soviets chose to ignore them, they could once more—despite the changing climate in Eastern Europe—pursue a harsh policy in the area because they still have tremendous military, political and economic leverage. In brief, this leverage consists of the following: militarily, the USSR, in lieu of an ironclad U.S. guarantee, is the only power that could defend Eastern Europe against a resurgent German threat; economically, the East Europeans have fallen far behind the West and may have trouble fitting back into the world-trade pattern, so that they may have to look to the Soviet Union to bail them out in the event of further economic deterioration; and politically, the East European communist regimes, fearing that the people of Eastern Europe may be driven to dispense with them, depend on the Soviet Union for their survival.

Strategic Problems Shaping Soviet Policy in Europe[4]

One of the most important factors impinging on the USSR's policy in Europe is its geopolitical situation. The Soviet Union, permanently pinned on the Eurasian continent, where U.S. and Soviet interests have their main focus, is saddled by disadvantages as well as advantages of location. In a balance of power context, it lacks the advantage of being able to play an offshore role as the

[4]Many of the USSR's political and strategic problems and opportunities treated in this section and the next have been discussed in greater detail in other studies of mine: "The Role of Missile Defense in Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy," RAC-P-1, Research Analysis Corporation, March 1965; a chapter in John Erickson, editor, *The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966); "Limited Nuclear War in Soviet Strategic Thinking," Orbis, Summer 1966; "The Role of Soviet Military in Soviet Policy in Asia," *Wehrkunde,* January 1967; and "The Impact of Technology and Nationalism on Soviet Policy," *Survey,* October 1967.

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United States has done in the past and can do in the future, e.g., in any future Sino-Soviet armed confrontation. Nor does the Soviet Union have the U.S. option of detaching itself from Europe or Asia. Even in comparison with Western Europe, it suffers disadvantages arising from its two-continent location: whereas Western Europe faces a direct threat only from the East, the Soviet Union must consider a potential challenge from both the East and the West. The magnitude of Soviet capabilities cannot be measured by simply matching them against those of the United States and Western Europe. The capabilities of Western Europe alone (population, economic strength, military potential) are, or will soon be, equal to those of the Soviet Union, and the former's potential advantage may be greater if Soviet strength has to be divided between the West and the East to meet a threat from both sides.

The USSR is disadvantaged also as a landlocked power. Because of geography, Czarist and Soviet Russia have traditionally been bottled up even along their sea perimeter with the exception of the Arctic Ocean, and this is ice-locked for most of the year. The Soviets are at a disadvantage in trying to match U.S. amphibious capabilities and experience. Their performance in the Cuban crisis demonstrated that they are severely limited in carrying out air and naval operations beyond their immediate periphery.

The Soviet Union's geopolitical situation is exacerbated and its freedom of action in Europe is limited by several strategic problems. The Soviets face a traditional continental rival, West Germany, whose strength, in their view, is likely to be enhanced in the future by possession of nuclear weapons and missiles. Even if there is no objective basis for assuming that West Germany will in the future acquire its own nuclear-missile capabilities, the Soviets assume this will, or at least may, occur and they are undoubtedly already using this possibility as the basis for contingency planning. They also assume that West Germany by its size and strategic location alone will dominate any future alliance arrangements in Western Europe.

In the Soviet view, Germany will secure access to nuclear weapons either as an alliance partner or on its own. Soviet leaders consider the current U.S. and West German dual consultative arrangements on the use of nuclear weapons as giving the Germans a finger on the nuclear trigger. Moreover, they believe that the Germans already have the capabilities for independent production

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of missile weapons[5] and are constrained at present only by political expediency. As the Soviets see it, this German attitude is susceptible to change and will change. Yet even in the worst case, namely, national acquisition of nuclear-missile armaments, West Germany would offer relatively little concern to the Soviets if, *alone* and *unaided,* it posed the only threat. They could face down such a threat by virtue of their superior ground forces, nuclear-missile capabilities, and greater resources.[6]

But the potential threat posed by Red China has added another dimension to their strategic problems on the Eurasian continent. With the defeat of Japan in 1945 and the communist victory in China in 1949, the Soviets assumed that they had permanently solved the two-front threat posed before World War II by Germany and Japan. Now, in their contingency planning for the future, they must assume a hostile Red China, either alone or in implicit collusion with West Germany. Indeed, they already view the two to be anti-Soviet allies insofar as both have designs on Soviet-held territory.[7]

On top of the traditional Eurasian threat, the postwar period has brought a gigantic new threat, the United States, which differs as an adversary on three counts: the United States (1) is a non-continental power and hence beyond the reach of Soviet ground forces; (2) currently has a greater nuclear-missile arsenal than the Soviets; and (3) has the resources to enlarge its military capabilities beyond the ability of the Soviets to match them in the foreseeable future—unless the United States deliberately permits the USSR to get the edge. Consequently, the U.S.-USSR confrontation poses almost insoluble problems for the Soviets. Unlike a German attack on the Soviet Union, which at worst could be blunted by the traditional Russian strategy of trading space for time, a U.S. missile attack cannot be met by the space-for-time solution. For the first time Soviet political centers can be threatened without the need to invade Soviet territory.

[5]Even in 1964 the Soviets interpreted West Germany's manufacturing of missiles for meteorological use by non-German consumers as masking capabilities for producing combat missiles. (See the Soviet protest contained in *Pravda,* February 4, 1964.) By implication, the Soviets were suggesting a parallel with German manufacture of weapons in the interwar period in violation of the Versailles Treaty. They conveniently omitted the fact that in the 1920's they gave the Germans a big start by allowing the latter to manufacture tanks, aircraft and other weapons on Soviet soil.

[6]For Soviet confidence in their ability to handle a threat by West Germany *without the United States,* see Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's declaration to the 23rd Party Congress, *Pravda,* March 30, 1966.

[7]See *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (*International Life*), No. 10, 1964.

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The impact of such a possibility must be viewed against the background of the 1941 Nazi attack. Even without the capture of such key centers as Moscow and Leningrad, the German invasion revealed the depth of the people's disloyalty to the Soviet system and almost led to its collapse. The Soviet leadership will not lightly subject the Soviet system to the far graver test of nuclear war. Its apprehension is reflected in discussion of the political and military consequences of nuclear war, especially concern over panic and political immaturity that could affect Soviet capabilities to fight such a war and survive. To avoid such consequences and to meet a U.S. missile threat, the Soviets have devoted great effort to developing a missile defense, an entirely new strategic weapons system with ramifications for escalating the U.S.-Soviet arms race. For the Soviets to deploy missile defense on a massive, area-defense basis, however, will require sizeable resources; this may be beyond the capability of their economy in the near future, unless they abandon other priorities. In the absence of an effective missile defense, the Soviets are likely to be constrained from even low-level probing by their own forces around their periphery if this threatens to involve the United States.

The requirements of support for "national liberation" wars confront the Soviet Union with a third—and another new postwar—strategic problem: how to project its military power beyond its periphery. As in the case of missile defense to meet the U.S. "threat," a capability different from that represented by traditional ground forces is essential. The Soviets are trying to solve the problem by developing airlift and sealift capabilities as well as trained amphibious and airborne forces, but this task adds another burden to the already overheated Soviet economy. Although they may provide equipment, training and advisers to "national liberation" forces, their willingness to use their own military capabilities directly in combat in national liberation wars will depend on the inherent risks to Soviet national security.[8]

In sum, the Soviets face the gigantic problem of developing

[8]Soviet caution in Viet Nam to date regarding the direct employment of Soviet forces suggests they are not eager to meet the United States in direct combat in the underdeveloped world. In this context they exhibit sensitivity to the fact that their forces have not had combat experience since 1945. (Their operations in Hungary in 1956 were primarily "counterinsurgency" and cannot be placed in the category of combat against a modern army such as that of the United States.) In particular they lack the U.S. postwar experience of combined amphibious operations, e.g., Lebanon in 1958. Even in Viet Nam the Soviet military have enviously noted that the United States is acquiring valuable experience in third-area operations and by implication bemoan the increasing gap between U.S. and Soviet experience in this regard.

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separate and relatively noninterchangeable capabilities for countering a U.S. missile attack, stopping a ground attack on the Eurasian continent from the East or the West or both, and supporting nonperipheral national liberation wars. Given the limitation on their resources and the rising demands of domestic needs, they cannot hope to acquire in the near future capabilities adequate to meet all the strategic threats and requirements. Should they opt for the simultaneous development of these capabilities, they could be successful only—if at all—at the expense of other important priorities such as long-term economic growth.[9]

Of these problems, the one most directly relevant to Eastern Europe is the Soviet concern with political-military pressure from the East and West. The Soviets believe that both Red China and West Germany are seeking to enlist Eastern Europe as part of a potential two-front coalition against them. Thus, in the early 1960's Peking attempted to exploit the dissatisfaction of East Germany's leaders with Khrushchev's wavering on the Berlin question and with the Soviet disinclination to push the West to a satisfactory "solution" of the issue. Moreover, it should be recalled that Chou En-lai, during his trip through Eastern Europe in 1956, attempted to play the role of mediator between the East Europeans and the Soviets. With the benefit of hindsight and the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviets now view Chou's efforts in 1956 as the first Chinese effort to secure a foothold in the West in order to apply two-front pressure on the Soviets and advance Chinese interests against them. Albania's role as China's satellite symbolizes for the Kremlin Mao's ambitions in Europe.

At the same time, the Soviets see West Germany pursuing a parallel course. Thus, West Germany's current "opening-to-the-East" policy is viewed as an attempt to recapture the prewar German influence in this politically sensitive and militarily strategic area, particularly in Rumania and Hungary, and to squeeze out Soviet influence, while Bonn expands its contacts with Red China and encourages a "second front" in the East.[10]

Soviet concern over a two-front threat would be confirmed by

[9]For discussion of economic limitations on the development of Soviet military forces, see Joint Economic Committee of Congress, *New Directions in Soviet Economy* (Washington: GPO, 1966).

[10]The most recent confirmation, for the Soviets, of the expanding Sino-German threat is the reported West German contacts with Peking and the assertions by Chancellor Kiesinger's supporters that formal relations between Red China and West Germany should be established to benefit West German economic interests and, implicitly, West Germany's political objectives. *New York Times*, April 12, 1968.

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any Sino-German efforts to encourage the East European nations, at a minimum, to leave the Warsaw Pact, and, at a maximum, to join the Germans and Chinese in pressing their territorial claims against the Soviets. Moscow believes Mao has already started along this path. In 1964 he explicitly included the Germans, the Poles and the Rumanians among those who, along with the Chinese, had unsettled territorial bills to present to the Soviets. The Rumanians, it should be noted, have since then expressed their views on the need to reopen the question of Bessarabia, now occupied by the Soviets. It is these developments that feed Soviet anxiety over a two-front threat and could act as a brake against letting Eastern Europe take "its own road to socialism."

Possible Changes in Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe

The possibility of significant changes in the Soviet Union's policy toward Eastern Europe should not be excluded, although a drastic change in the near future is unlikely. The area may become less important to the Soviets in the long run, because of changing military, political and economic considerations on the Soviet side.

Soviet thinking on the strategic importance of Eastern Europe will certainly be influenced by the rapid changes in military technology (e.g., Soviet acquisition of nuclear-missile weapons and their possible possession by the Germans in the future) which may make ground warfare obsolete or irrelevant to the kind of conflict the Soviets may have to fight. As a result, the need for Eastern Europe as a buffer zone or an area for ground-force operations may be reduced, a possibility that could be reinforced by the current Soviet belief that limited war in Europe is not possible, given the vital interests involved on both sides.[11]

The Soviet need for Eastern Europe as a military buffer zone may also be lessened by enhanced airborne capabilities allowing the Soviets to "leap over" Eastern Europe in the event a possible conflict involving West Germany went beyond a nuclear-missile exchange. Some of these capabilities have been demonstrated dur-

[11]The unlikelihood of limited war in Europe, particularly if it involves nuclear powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States, has been reaffirmed in the latest Soviet appraisals of recent military developments; e.g., see *50 Let Vooruzhennykh sil SSSR* (*Fifty Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR*) (Moscow: Military Publishing House [Voenizdat], 1968). This work, issued with the participation of top-ranking Soviet military leaders, reaffirms the Soviet belief that a local war would escalate into general war if it involved direct conflict between two nuclear powers.

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ing recent Soviet maneuvers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Soviet views on the strategic importance of Eastern Europe might be modified in the future by the younger Soviet military leaders. The latter are more attuned to advancing technology, e.g., nuclear-missile weapons, which makes modern warfare less and less relevant to the World War II ground-combat experience that still dominates the thinking of the older marshals.

The Soviets' evaluation of Eastern Europe's strategic role may also be influenced by their attempts to weaken the U.S. posture in Europe. Thus, they may well consider reduction of their forces in Eastern Europe as a means of exerting pressure on Washington to do the same, in the belief that they could return their forces to Eastern Europe faster than the United States could redeploy its forces to Europe from the American continent.

Soviet views on Eastern Europe might also be changed in response to political and economic considerations. Eastern Europe is already proving to be an economic drain on the Soviets that could be relieved by permitting the area to re-establish some of its economic ties with the West.

Even eventual political change should not be ruled out. The Soviets know that they have paid a heavy price for maintaining control over Eastern Europe, a price driven higher by their occupation of Czechoslovakia. (The strong action taken against Czechoslovakia pointed up the bankruptcy of the USSR's policy in Eastern Europe; further widened the schism within the communist world; demonstrated once again that the Soviet Union is willing to use brute force to ensure the solidarity of the bloc; and ended the fiction that the USSR is that new form of socialist state which deals with its allies on the basis of equality and common ideology.) Moscow is aware that the East European nations have in the past tried to play off others, such as the Chinese, against the Soviets in order to lighten the Soviet grip. In the future, the Soviets, seeking to reduce the incentive to play this game and to spare themselves the embarrassment of using naked force in their relations with their own allies, may agree to limited liberalization within Eastern Europe. Such a policy of accommodation is unlikely to be pursued by the current neo-Stalinist leadership, although the fact that the Soviets did not resort to open force until some eight months after the Czechoslovaks initiated their experiment in "democratizing" socialism indicates that some of the current

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Soviet leaders must have argued for caution in strangling the Czech experiment. A new leadership, with less direct ties with Stalinism, may eventually prove amenable to modifications in Soviet-East European relations, as a reflection of political change within the Soviet Union itself. Such an accommodation, if it occurs, will be due to hardheaded recognition that political repression and use of naked force may be counterproductive in the long run for Soviet interests at home and abroad.

Future political changes in Soviet-East European relations may be motivated by intrabloc military considerations. Warsaw Pact ties today are strained. Relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union are tense in view of the Rumanians' recent protests against Soviet domination of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and their demand for a greater role in the pact's military command. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia over the opposition of General Svoboda, the past symbol of close ties between the Czechoslovak and Soviet military, has raised doubts about the loyalty of the Czech army to the Soviet cause. Despite their participation in the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the reliability of other East European armies may be in question, particularly in any possible moves to advance Soviet interests outside Eastern Europe, e.g., open and unprovoked Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Even a more ambiguous conflict situation, i.e., one in which it was difficult to identify the real aggressor, would still pose problems for the Soviets. Thus, in the event of a conflict involving West Germany, the Czechs and the Poles would undoubtedly fight on the Soviet side, but the same might not be true of the East Germans, the Rumanians and the Hungarians. In the event of a U.S.-Soviet conflict, all East European nations, with the possible exception of Bulgaria, might be suspect from the Soviet viewpoint. As a result, the Soviets might encourage a reduction of East European armies to lessen the political problems that such large forces could pose for them. This might be accompanied by a loosening of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe to inspire greater good will toward the Soviets and span the "reliability gap" in Warsaw Pact relations.

Finally, the Soviets may, in pursuit of their own interests, decide to make a deal with West Germany at the expense of Eastern Europe—as they did in 1939 over Poland. This could be triggered by a Soviet decision to head off West German nuclear acquisition or exploit U.S.-German differences. West Germany's in-

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trinsically greater importance than Eastern Europe would justify concessions to the Germans in order to draw them into the Soviet fold—or at a minimum away from the United States. Conciliatory Soviet moves toward the Germans have been a possibility throughout the postwar years, as witnessed by Beria's apparent moves in 1953 to modify Stalin's policy in Germany, the unsigned Moscow memo to Bonn in 1961, and Khrushchev's moves (through Adjubei's visit to Bonn) in the spring of 1964. All these gestures had the common theme of suggesting to the Germans that they had more to gain by dealing with the Soviets than in maintaining their alliance with the Americans. The theme was most recently repeated in early 1968. Soviet-East European relations would be severely affected by a Moscow-Bonn rapprochement.

East European Leverage on the Soviet Union

In a negative sense, Eastern Europe can limit Soviet policy options. If political ferment continues in these countries, it could undercut the ideological unity which is so important to the Soviet effort to prove that communism is the wave of the future. Conversely, the absence of turmoil in Eastern Europe could enhance Soviet ability to use these countries as proxies to advance Soviet interests. Moreover, by soft-pedalling bloc disunity, Eastern Europe could thwart U.S. efforts to exploit these differences. The primary constraint of East European nations on the Soviets in the near future is their location in the heart of Europe. Soviet leaders continue to be Europe-firsters. In their view, any problem in Europe requires more attention and restraint than problems in any other region of the world, as illustrated by the successive Berlin crises.

The East European nations could also make a positive contribution to a Soviet position of strength. By supporting the Soviet leadership in the communist world, they could help Moscow restore the unity that has been challenged by Red China, Castro and others. In earlier days, Eastern Europe acted as the stalking horse for Soviet plans in Europe, including those measures designed to reduce U.S. influence. For example, the Rapacki Plan to ban the stationing of nuclear weapons in West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany was designed to advance Soviet interests by weakening U.S. deterrence and defense capabilities. The U.S. nuclear presence in the heart of Europe was to be eliminated, while Soviet capabilities were to be pulled back

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only a few hundred miles. When the nuclear ban was first proposed in the late 1950's, the Soviets claimed they were making the greater contribution to European security by denuclearizing three countries on their side as opposed to only one in the West.

These claims have now been undercut by Eastern Europe because it is no longer willing to serve as a proxy for the Soviets. In fact, East European national requirements are disrupting the harmonization of overall Soviet strategy in Europe. For example, the Czechs, Poles and Rumanians have hinted that they want a finger on the Soviet nuclear trigger—a rather strong indication that they do not trust the Soviet Union to meet their security needs. Red China has exploited their distrust by pointing to the fact that the Soviets have not used their own capabilities to deter U.S. military action in Viet Nam, including bombing of the North at will. Aware that the Soviets may some day make a deal with West Germany at the expense of their bloc allies, the East Europeans are unlikely to rely solely on the Soviet Union, especially if they have other alternatives. Nor would they allow themselves to be used by the Soviet Union to advance its interests without requiring it to pay an appropriate price—perhaps an East European finger on the Soviet nuclear trigger. In a related development, the Rumanians have already demurred against the nonproliferation treaty being promoted by the USSR. The East European nations will undoubtedly require a *quid pro quo* for any strategic measures they undertake at Moscow's request.

U.S. Leverage on the Soviet Union: Limits and Opportunities

The strategic problems facing the Soviets offer the United States opportunities for new policy approaches in Eastern Europe, but there are limits on *direct* U.S. action. In a strategic context, the United States cannot totally guarantee Eastern Europe's military security against a German threat, even though Washington can offer some alternatives which would strengthen its security. In the economic field the United States cannot take care of the region's total economic needs, although it can alleviate some problems by increasing trade through an easing of restrictions and tariff discrimination. Politically, the United States cannot massively intrude into Eastern Europe to reduce the Soviet presence or influence or change the communist character of the regimes.

However, the United States can offer an outlet for popular pro-

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Western feeling in Eastern Europe, thereby undermining the Soviet effort to maintain ideological unity in the area and to use it to advance Soviet interests in Europe. Thus the United States should continue to try to erode the remaining elements of the Soviet-imposed closed system by means of trade, cultural exchanges, and the like, especially in the "southern tier" (Hungary and Rumania). It can use its economic, political and military presence in Europe to dilute Eastern Europe's dependence solely on the Soviets.

The continuation of the postwar U.S. presence in Europe can provide the alternative to Eastern Europe that did not exist before 1939. In the prewar period the East European nations depended on France and England for their security and were let down. Therefore they were forced to look primarily to the Soviets for security against the German threat. The United States can alter this outlook. By maintaining its presence in Europe and declaring its intention to preserve the peace against any violator in any part of the continent, it can create the climate for an eventual security arrangement safeguarding all of Europe against a possible German resurgence. In this way it could undermine the USSR's ability to keep the East Europeans in line by exploiting their fears of West Germany, and could knock down the Soviet claim to be the sole or main guarantor of Eastern Europe's security against German resurgence.

Because of the Soviet Union's proximity, the United States cannot expect to become Eastern Europe's sole protector, nor should it seek this role in view of its own commitments elsewhere. It might accord with U.S. interests to get the Soviets to share the burden of preserving peace in Europe rather than to try to displace the Soviet presence; success in riveting the Soviet Union's attention to Europe might divert it from other parts of the world.

The United States has opportunities to gain greater influence in Eastern Europe not only by means of its presence in Europe but also by pursuing certain policies in and beyond Europe of direct concern to the USSR. Thus, if the United States maintains its strategic superiority over the Soviets, it may continue to deter the Soviet Union from trying to advance its interests abroad by the use of its own forces in combat and from initiating new probes and crises in Europe. It may also allow other factors—such as the Soviet concern with a possible German and/or Chinese threat—to come

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into play, thus reducing the Soviet ability to damage U.S. interests. A few years hence, the Soviets may be forced to deal seriously with explicit or implicit Sino-German collusion.

The activation of a two-front political or military threat may drive the Soviets to seek the cooperation of the United States—on a selective basis—as they did in World War II. However, a Soviet move in this direction should not be confused with détente or convergence, for these would require such major internal changes in the USSR as to give rise to common Soviet and American social and political values. Such a qualitative change in the Soviet Union is unlikely because Soviet leadership within the next decade will still be tainted by Stalinism. Rather, a Soviet "opening to the United States" will probably be due to a hardheaded appraisal that greater threats to its national security may be posed by nations other than the United States and that Soviet interests may be better served by cooperating with the ideological adversary. Such a radical reversal in the Soviet attitude toward the capitalist world has occurred on numerous occasions. In World War II, Stalin even went so far as to shut down the Comintern (the Moscow-dominated world communist organization) when this served the Soviet national interest, even though this action placed in abeyance the Soviet commitment to promote world communism.

Although history does not repeat itself precisely, the Soviets see evidence of a possible Sino-German threat.[12] Materialization of this threat could force the Soviets to seek U.S. assistance. Washington would then have to examine, in the light of its own interests, whether and to what extent it should cooperate with the Soviet Union. In recent statements by Soviet political and military leaders, the Kremlin has hinted that a basis for cooperation exists. As far back as 1961, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko indicated that U.S.-Soviet collaboration could enable the two to withstand any challenge. Since this pronouncement was made just as Sino-Soviet differences came to light, it can be inferred that Gromyko had a potential Chinese threat in mind. In June 1967 Kosygin declared that the United States and the Soviet Union, as great powers, had a responsibility to police the world. General Talensky, a Soviet military spokesman, has suggested that, despite their current ideological differences, the U.S.-Soviet World War II military coalition might have to be revived because of common

[12]See, e.g., *Afrika i Aziya Seqodnya* (*Africa and Asia Today*), No. 7 (1967).

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threats facing them. A political spokesman, Yuri Zhukov, has indicated that the Soviets did not want to exclude the United States from a European security conference. In 1967 Soviet Defense Minister Grechko and party boss Brezhnev grudgingly acknowledged the U. S. role in World War II in meeting a common threat and implied that a similar common threat could arise again.[13]

In the context of a Sino-German threat against the USSR, the United States could cooperate with West Germany and/or post-Maoist China against the Soviets, or "selectively" join the Soviets to help them solve their German and/or Chinese problems. In either case Washington may be in a position to extract Soviet concessions that, at the minimum, might include an agreement to cease undermining U.S. interests in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere.

In summary, the United States may be able to exert more influence on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe by relying on factors and forces outside the area than it could by intruding directly into the area; the latter might provoke the Soviets into an irrational response against Eastern Europe and possibly against the West.

Summary and Conclusions: Implications for the United States

U.S.-East European strategic relations are dominated by the Soviet Union's overwhelming military power and proximity to Eastern Europe and the latter's impotence and fragmentation. These factors make it impossible for Eastern Europe to be truly independent of the Soviet Union unless it can rely on another great power. But neither the United States, by virtue of its distance from and periodic flagging interest in Europe, nor Germany, by virtue of its history of attempted conquests, offers Eastern Europe an alternative protector.

If Eastern Europe can find no alternative arrangement for its security and the United States and West Germany refrain from trying to pry the East European nations away from the Warsaw Pact, changes in future Soviet policy may permit Eastern Europe greater freedom of action. The U.S. government should be prepared to encourage—with discretion—such a development. Specifically, Eastern Europe might be encouraged to restore old or develop new economic and diplomatic links with the West but

[13]For a discussion of Soviet views on a U.S.-Soviet "division of the world" to keep Red China (among others) in check, see John R. Thomas, "Sino-Soviet Relations After Mao and Khrushchev," Orbis, Fall 1963.

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not to enter into security arrangements that seem threatening to the Soviets. The United States should not press the East Europeans to break up or leave the Warsaw Pact, for Washington is not prepared to fight the Soviets to secure Eastern Europe's independence and to preserve it thereafter against Soviet influence or control. However, the United States might encourage the East Europeans to reduce their forces and to decrease the defense burden on their people by offering them economic incentives, e.g., greater trade with the West.

Insofar as the Soviets find Eastern Europe to be an economic drain, they may look with favor on a reduction of defense expenditures and forces throughout the area if this will release resources for shoring up East European economies and reducing their dependence on the Soviets. The Soviets might also welcome a reduction in East European forces in view of heightened nationalist feelings in Eastern Europe and the possibility that indigenous forces could create military problems for them. The Kremlin undoubtedly still remembers that Gomulka threatened to use the Polish army to resist Soviet demands in 1956 and that Hungarian army units joined the freedom fighters against Soviet forces in 1956. It is worth noting, in this regard, that in October 1968 the Soviets were reported pressing for a one-third reduction in Czechoslovak armed forces.

Eastern Europe would be unlikely to reduce its defense capabilities unless certain other steps were taken: for example, (1) an explicit or implicit U.S.-Soviet agreement "to keep the peace" in Europe against a potential German threat; (2) a tacit U.S. agreement not to seek strategic advantage from Eastern Europe's reduction of forces, demonstrating this by pressing for a stabilization or reduction of West German forces; and (3) a U.S. indication that it was prepared to scale down its own forces in Europe if the Soviets reciprocated such a move.

A new U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe has to be developed in full knowledge that the key to fundamental change in Europe lies in Moscow. Whenever this fact of Eastern Europe's dependence on the Soviets has been ignored, it has led to problems or embarrassment for Western capitals, e.g., the abortive attempts to undermine the Soviets by "rollback" campaigns and sponsorship of "captive nations' rights." Indeed, the failure of these policies points up the unrealistic nature of the U.S. hope that Eastern Europe can free itself on its own from the Soviet grip. On the con-

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trary, genuine independence for the East European nations can be secured only if the United States or some other great power is willing to help them. The history of 1956 bears witness to this fundamental fact. If Eastern Europe is ever to attain a sizeable degree of political or economic freedom, it will have to come primarily through Soviet acquiescence.

The United States should encourage this acquiescence by a selective and sophisticated policy that exploits new trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe without provoking an irrational Soviet response. These trends offer attractive, even though restricted, opportunities as long as Washington recognizes the limits on its ability to influence directly the events in the area. Should it overstep the limits, the United States could discredit itself by subsequent timidity or create a dangerous conflict situation.

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FINLAND'S 1966 ELECTIONS AND SOVIET RELATIONS

by Kent Forster

WHEN the Finns celebrated their fiftieth anniversary of independence, in December 1967, they marked the achievement of no modest goal. Of all the regimes east of the Rhine and the Gulf of Bothnia, only the Soviet Union and the Republic of Finland could observe such a rite, so endemic has political turmoil been in this part of Europe. That less than five million Finns managed this feat while perched on the rim of the giant Soviet empire is remarkable. Their unique experience, however, has only begun to be recounted by historians laboring self-consciously with still fragmentary and elusive sources. Thanks to the endeavors of Keijo Korhonen, Mauno Kaaskelainen, Juhani Paasivirta and others, Finnish-Russian relations between the collapse of the Romanovs and the crisis of 1939 have commenced to fall into perspective. A second period encompassing World War II has also engaged scholarly attention. But as the reactions elicited by Leonard Lundin's work[1] indicate, this era's recency and relevance for contemporary politics are not conducive to calm examination. To delve, therefore, as does this article, into the even more recent past is admittedly hazardous. Historians, however, are incorrigibly curious, often impatient for the mutation of the immediate into the remote past, and reluctant to leave yesterday as the exclusive preserve of the journalist.

I

Seldom without influence on Finland's domestic affairs and never absent from its external considerations, the Russians—Czarist and Soviet—have loomed large in the lives of the Finns since the days of Peter the Great. Their involvement as antagonists in World War II was but one more conflict in a long and tragic series. But its outcome imparted to Fenno-Soviet relations a new turn, a dogged, twisting, surprising struggle by the Finns

[1]Leonard Lundin, *Finland and the Second World War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957).

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to avoid Soviet satellization. And in this struggle the national elections of 1966 are a benchmark.

The postwar era began with the 1944 armistice and was marked initially by fear among most Finns of a communist takeover, followed by the satellization that was the fate of small nations along the western frontiers of the USSR. At Moscow's insistence, Finland's communists were accorded a freedom of operation denied them in the 1930's. The result was a communist front organization called the Finnish People's Democratic League (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto, abbreviated SKDL) which captured a quarter of the parliamentary seats and entered the government.[2] Emulating their comrades in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague and elsewhere, the Finnish communists even attempted a coup in 1948. But theirs failed. A decline in the SKDL's parliamentary strength and expulsion from the cabinet followed.[3] That Stalin acquiesced in this development is explicable in terms of the Paasikivi Line which sought to assure Moscow that a non-communist government in Helsinki could be counted upon to adhere to the strictest neutrality, fulfill all of its obligations under the peace treaty and the Finnish-Soviet Pact of Friendship of 1948, and thereby satisfy the security-minded Kremlin.[4]

A second phase from 1950 to 1958 established more clearly the limits within which the Finns could move without Soviet interference. At its inception the Paasikivi policy had only generally sketched those limits; subsequent developments demanded their more specific definition. For example, when Finland began to revive its traditional ties with the West, the Soviets did not object to Finnish membership in the Nordic Council, establishment of a Fulbright Program, and expansion of Western markets. On the other hand, they displayed mistrust and hostility toward the Finnish Social Democratic Party. From the birth of Finland's independence this party had successfully won the bulk of the labor vote, had stood by the parliamentary system against both right and left extremists, and under the leadership of such anti-communists as Väinö Tanner and Karl-August Fagerholm had gone on record in 1950 as opposing any future admission of the com-

[2]See John H. Hodgson, *Communism in Finland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Chapter 7.

[3]A reliable treatment of the abortive coup is given in Hans Peter Krosby, "The Communist Power Bid in Finland," *Political Science Quarterly,* June 1960, p. 229 ff.

[4]On postwar Soviet concerns with Finland, see Kalevi J. Holsti, "Strategy and Techniques of Influence in Soviet-Finnish Relations," *Western Political Quarterly,* March 1964, p. 63 ff.

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munists to the government. The prospect, therefore, of Fagerholm becoming President on Juho Paasikivi's retirement in 1956 was more than the Soviets would tolerate. In a series of maneuvers entailing scarcely concealed intervention in Finnish politics, they (and the SKDL) helped Yrho Kaleva Kekkonen, a former Agrarian Premier and outspoken advocate of the Paasikivi Line, to defeat Fagerholm by two votes. Subsequently, by refusing to negotiate trade arrangements with Prime Minister Fagerholm, Nikita Khrushchev brought about the collapse of Fagerholm's ministry. Kekkonen, promptly off to Moscow to confer with Khrushchev, returned to persuade Parliament to endorse a new, all-Agrarian cabinet as the one best able to negotiate with the Kremlin. At once the Soviets became cooperative. Thus Fagerholm and the Social Democrats found themselves as emphatically excluded from ministerial power as were the communists.[5]

This anomalous situation continued for eight years and characterized a third phase in postwar Finnish-Soviet relations. During this time the Agrarians, either alone or in coalition with the bourgeois parties, dominated the ministries. When the Social Democrats challenged the status quo by allying with three of the right-of-center parties behind the presidential candidacy of Olavi Honka in 1961, the Kremlin made a chilling demand for Soviet-Finnish military conversations. Again there was a Kekkonen visit to the USSR, this time to Novosibirsk, where the news arrived from Helsinki that Dr. Honka had withdrawn from the presidential race. Chairman Khrushchev then announced that in accord with "the suggestion of the Finnish president" the military talks were not to be held.[6] In this manner the Soviets cast their silent vote for Kekkonen, who now emerged as the indispensable Finn for coping with Moscow and was re-elected, and the Agrarians continued to dominate the government. For their political opponents this was an increasingly intolerable state of affairs (the Agrarians held only a plurality in Parliament), but how to alter the situation without inviting Soviet reaction was a Gordian knot uncut until the 1966 national elections.

II

Contributing to the political singularity of 1966 were a number of currents that had been at work in Finnish society for some

[5]For details on the fall of the Fagerholm Government, see Kent Forster, "The Finnish-Soviet Crisis of 1958-59," *International Journal*, Spring 1960, pp. 147-150.
[6]Holsti, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-80.

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years. Most fundamental were the growth of urban population and the arrival at voting age of the postwar generation. Both promised changes in party strengths. More immediate was the influence of a downward swing in the economy that began to be felt in 1965. Finland's membership in EFTA and the general liberalization of trade had permitted a great expansion of imports with a consequent growing imbalance of international payments. There followed the inevitable tightening of credit and slowing of business activity. A rash of strikes early in 1966 in the metal trades, construction, shipbuilding and the forest industries signaled worker dissatisfaction with this development. Furthermore, shrinking credits for home construction or purchase and other installment buying were agitating middle class voters as well. No wonder the politicians approached the forthcoming elections nervously.

For the Agrarians the decline in rural population was most serious, and they were obliged to face it much as had their Swedish and Norwegian counterparts. In an extraordinary party congress in October 1965, they adopted the new name of Center Party. Concomitantly, their foremost newspaper, *Maakansa* ("People of the Land"), changed its title to *Suomenmaa* ("Land of the Finns"). This effort to shed a too exclusive identity with the farmers was supplemented with the assertion that the newborn Center offered everyone an alternative to extremists of left and right. Nevertheless, the erstwhile Agrarians faced a difficult task. In power for eight years, they were obliged to stand on a record tarnished by economic troubles and scandal. And while they endeavored to make much of President Kekkonen's Agrarian background on the occasion of his tenth anniversary in office, he, somewhat belatedly in the tradition of Finnish presidents, had largely withdrawn from partisan political battles. Consequently, his name was no longer an Agrarian asset. Much of the ensuing election campaign of the Centrists reflected these problems.

The Communist Party of Finland (SKP) also sought a fresh image that would enable its members to discard their earlier reputation for subservience to Moscow and pose as loyal Finnish Marxists. In 1965, therefore, it elected the noncommunist Ele Alenius General Secretary of the communist front party, SKDL. At the SKP congress in January 1966, a further step was the selection of Aarne Saarinen and Erkki Salomaa as party chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. These men had endorsed an al-

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liance with all socialists, thus making possible the creation, through parliamentary means, of a "socialism" fitted to Finland's own environment. As a start, an election alliance was made with a group of dissident Social Democrats led by Aarre Simonen. The continuance of Ville Pessi as SKP party secretary, however, suggested the survival of more orthodox elements in positions of influence. Moreover, there remained the formidable obstacle of persuading many Finns that the SKP was truly a national party.

The parties to the right of center had no grounds for expecting additional votes. For years these parties had collectively polled 30 per cent of the popular vote but had found it impossible to fuse and make that strength proportionately effective. Now, hard pressed to justify separate roles, always fearful of a coalition of the Left, alert to the possibility of a two-party system as proposed by the independent press, their leaders discussed mergers. While negotiations between Conservatives and Liberal Unionists were fruitless, the latter did merge with the People's Party in December 1965 to form the Liberal People's Party—only to have disgruntled followers splinter off and seek to organize an Independent Party. Thus the bourgeois politicians offered little that was new or calculated to build a larger or more effective following.

The Social Democrats confronted a quite different set of circumstances. Municipal elections in 1964 had revealed a favorable popular trend. In addition, some success had attended efforts in mid-1965 to reunite with the parent party the dissidents who had bolted in the 1950's. Emil Skog and several others accepted reinstatement to full party membership, though Simonen captained a group of irreconcilables. These developments, as well as the difficulties confronting the other parties, augured well for the Social Democrats. Their problem was to convert a probable increase of votes and parliamentary seats into ministerial power in the face of Soviet mistrust and hostility. That some "peace offerings" to Moscow would be necessary was obvious, but how far the party dared go to win Soviet approval without losing the support of Finns who favored a firm stand against the USSR was a major dilemma.

A tentative approach by the Social Democrats to this problem was apparent as early as 1964. In a speech before the Paasikivi Society in Tampere in October, Rafael Paasio, the party chairman, asserted:

We want to emphasize the fact that the Social Democratic Party's atti-

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tude towards vital foreign policy issues and our relations with the East has throughout our independence rested on an objective foundation: the recognition of the necessity of peaceful development, the principle of non-intervention in another State's internal affairs and the creation of an atmosphere of mutual understanding. . . . We support peaceful co-existence, and more than that, we do not want to limp on the borderline of coexistence: we must march constantly forward invoking all possible forces, towards international cooperation.[7]

A few weeks later the socialist *Sosialidemokraatti* reinforced this speech by expressing firm agreement with a pronouncement by Anastas Mikoyan in which he referred to the mutual desires of the Soviet Union and Finland to maintain and develop "positive" relations.[8]

But that such modest statements by Finnish Social Democrats would not satisfy the Kremlin became clearer with the appearance in February 1965 of A. Veber's *Pravda* article, "Communists and Social Democrats." Veber began with the observation that

Social Democracy, developing in an atmosphere of sharp internal contradictions, has undergone a complex evolution. . . . The leaders of Social Democracy have over the years "drifted toward the right," toward compromises with capitalism and toward abandonment of the socialist goal—first in policy and then in ideology.[9]

Having delivered himself of this not invalid observation, he then professed to perceive among Social Democrats "certain new tendencies toward the recovery of political and ideological independence, toward a rebirth of the socialist spirit,"[10] which prepared the way for communists and socialists to cast off old prejudices and cooperate.[11] In essence the article appeared to be calling for resurrection of "popular fronts" wherever socialists were strong.

While Veber at no point mentioned Finland, Finnish editors, inveterate analysts of the Soviet press, responded promptly to this latest Moscow revelation. Said *Sosialidemokraatti*:

We do not consider an ideological unification possible, but this does not rule out collaboration in the social and political field. . . . We agree with *Pravda* that the principle of peaceful coexistence is acceptable from both the idealistic and realistic point of view.[12]

[7]Quoted in *Summary of the Finnish Press,* October 14, 1964, p. 1E. This daily summary, prepared jointly by the Helsinki embassies of Great Britain, Canada and the United States, is hereafter cited as *SFP.*
[8]*SFP,* December 28, 1964, p. 1E.
[9]*Pravda,* February 4, 1965, p. 3.
[10]*Ibid.*
[11]*Ibid.*
[12]*SFP,* February 5, 1965, p. 2E.

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As could be expected, the communist *Kansan Uutiset* accorded Veber's theme a much warmer endorsement:

> There is hardly any essential difference in the Social Democrat and Communist attitudes in Finland to peaceful development towards socialism, to the multiparty system, and to the established forms of democracy and the existing legal order. It is, in fact, only ideological prejudice which needs to be erased.[13]

But the Social Democrats could accept neither this communist embrace nor *Kansan Uutiset's* emphasis on the new look of Finnish communism. They now crisply summoned the SKP to relinquish its doctrinaire views and to adopt the more realistic posture recommended by *Pravda*.[14]

During the spring of 1965 *Sosialidemokraatti* unveiled a stronger bid for Soviet benediction. A Kekkonen speech against the American proposal for a NATO "Multilateral Atomic Force" was endorsed as "fully justified."[15] In May U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam were denounced.[16] Finally, all attempts to distinguish socialist policy from Kekkonen policy were abandoned. According to the *Sosialidemokraatti* editors,

> The Social Democrats support peaceful coexistence, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line if you wish to put it that way, and the Social Democrats hope that good relations between the Finnish and Soviet nations will develop in a constructive way towards the further consolidation of friendship.[17]

In view of the socialists' dogged endeavor over the years to distinguish their version of friendly relations with the USSR from that of President Kekkonen and the Agrarians, this was a shift of significance. It did not, however, touch upon the popular front issue raised by Veber. Accordingly, Paasio announced in June that his party was not averse, in these times when citizens found themselves confronted with the difference between bourgeois and socialist outlooks, to sharing responsibility with other parties in a government, provided that government did not pursue policies contrary to Social Democratic aims.[18] Whether such vagueness would pass muster in Moscow and in noncommunist and communist circles in Helsinki remained to be seen. Meanwhile, the Finnish summer arrived and even politics declared a holiday.

[13] *Ibid.*, February 8, 1965, p. 2E.
[14] *Ibid.*, February 10, 1965, p. 3E.
[15] *Ibid.*, March 12, 1965, p. 1E.
[16] *Ibid.*, May 20, 1965, p. 1E.
[17] *Ibid.* May 15-16, 1965, pp. 1E-2E.
[18] *Ibid.*, June 9, 1965, p. 1E.

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III

The resumption of the campaign in the autumn of 1965 found the socialists still impaled on the stake of Soviet relations. An internal party matter centering on Väinö Leskinen compounded the difficulty. Leskinen had emerged in the 1940's as one of the brightest, most promising of the younger Social Democrats. Vigorous, eloquent and personable, he had adopted a stiff anti-communist position which helped him win impressive majorities in his Helsinki constituency, but also earned him a place along with Väinö Tanner and Fagerholm on the Soviet "blacklist." Such a background seemed to qualify him for the mantle of Party Chairman Tanner, but when the latter retired in 1963 Rafael Paasio and not Leskinen became the party leader. *Maakansa* was probably close to the truth when it observed that Leskinen's defeat within the party leadership was because he was *persona non grata* to Moscow.[19] Certainly Leskinen appeared to be trying to remove this handicap when in the 1966 election campaign he dramatically abandoned his old stance.

In an October speech at Hyvinkää, Leskinen called for a party self-evaluation. How, he asked, had the Soviets arrived at their adverse view of the Finnish socialists? Ought not the latter to rethink their attitude toward the USSR?[20] Moreover, he left no doubt that what he advocated was abandonment of his own earlier position and adoption of a more accommodating approach toward the Soviets. This about-face he explained as a recognition of realities—the old anti-Soviet posture no longer made good political sense.

Such a proposition, however, could hardly have made "good sense" to the Paasio forces which for more than a year had maintained that they fully endorsed good relations with the USSR and that no grounds for Soviet mistrust existed. Now Leskinen had obliged them once more to seize the foreign policy nettle. On November 2 Paasio announced that the Social Democratic Party supported the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line without qualification.[21] He was shortly seconded by his fellow-socialist Pekka Kuusi, who asserted that his party had "ripened and developed into a party which supports President Kekkonen's foreign policy."[22] Something of a climax was achieved in February 1966, when the Social Demo-

[19] *New York Times*, April 14, 1963, p. 31.
[20] *SFP*, October 12, 1965, p. 1E.
[21] *Ibid.*, November 2, 1965, p. 1E.
[22] *Ibid.*, February 2, 1966, p. 2E.

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cratic Party's Central Committee called on all socialists to work for peace in Viet Nam, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, and the fostering of general disarmament—Soviet positions all—and expressed its "delight" with the favorable development of Fenno-Soviet relations.[23] Lest the message still not be clear to the Kremlin, *Sosialidemokraatti* repeated the party's endorsement of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line a few days later.[24]

Following these avowals the Social Democrats were prepared to concentrate on domestic issues, but this was exactly what the incumbent Centrists desired to avoid. In a radio-television interview in December, Prime Minister Johannes Virolainen announced that foreign policy was *the* issue of the forthcoming election.[25] Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen, also a Centrist, observed that what counted was not whether the Social Democrats promised to support Centrist foreign policy, but whether the "foreign country concerned" believed that promise.[26] From *Suomenmaa* (Centrist) came an editorial barrage on the Social Democrats' foreign policy "mistakes" of the past and present inability to conduct Finland's relations with the USSR.[27] To this indictment was added the charge that the socialists, if given the chance, intended to coalesce with the communists.[28]

As noted above, Paasio had already stated that in the event of an election success his party was prepared to cooperate with all parties willing to promote Social Democratic ends, but the *Suomenmaa* charge could not stand unanswered. Accordingly, Kuusi announced that "since we rely on peaceful coexistence with Soviet Communism, honest and logical thinking suggests that a similar relationship should be established with Finnish Communists," though, he cautiously added, the latter had not yet removed all basis for mistrust.[29] Deputy Lauri A. Puntila, on the other hand, opposed a popular front because the communists in his judgment would not support a parliamentary system.[30] Seeking middle ground, Paasio said his party would await indications of communist willingness to operate within the framework of Finnish

[23] *Helsingin Sanomat,* February 16, 1966, p. 3.
[24] *SFP,* February 24, 1966, p. 1E.
[25] *Helsingin Sanomat,* December 20, 1965, p. 5.
[26] *Ibid.,* January 24, 1966, p. 3.
[27] *SFP,* January 18, 1966, p. 1E; January 20, 1966, p. 1E; February 16, 1966, p. 1E; February 21, 1966, p. 1E; February 22, 1966, p. 1E.
[28] *Ibid.,* January 18, 1966, p. 1E.
[29] *Ibid.,* February 2, 1966, p. 2E.
[30] *Helsingin Sanomat,* February 16, 1966, p. 4.

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democracy.[31] Fagerholm's statement that the socialists could not say that the communists would not be accepted in a coalition government contributed to the ambiguity of the party's position.[32] This less than candid exercise concluded with Paasio's radio-TV interview of March 10. While obstacles still existed to a socialist-communist front because of their differing views of parliamentary government, he thought it was possible that such differences might disappear.[33]

Such evasions did not satisfy Moscow. *Pravda* in late January expressed disappointment that Finnish socialists still clung to "blind and prejudiced opinions about Communism and the Soviet Union."[34] On March 12, with the elections eight days away, *Pravda* featured an article by its Scandinavian correspondent, Yuri Yakhontov. Entitled "A Month of Important Decisions," it noted the discontent of Finnish workers, the "constructive" program of the SKP, the Centrist drift toward "Western reactionary circles," and the refusal of the Social Democratic leaders to respond to their followers' desire to cooperate with Finnish communists.[35] Four days later it archly noted that Ville Pessi, SKP secretary-general, had called for a union of all Finnish "democratic forces."[36]

Izvestia, on the other hand, while paying the customary tribute to the communists as advocates of the "fundamental interests of the workers" and of the "deepening of Fenno-Soviet friendly relations,"[37] carried a significant postscript. The Finnish communists, it observed, were prepared not only to work with the socialists but also with the Centrists, whom *Izvestia* complimented as supporters of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.[38] Here was the implication, absent from other Soviet comments, that Moscow would accept a government in Helsinki composed of the SKDL, Social Democrats and Centrists.

Thus the Kremlin appeared to have hedged its bets on the outcome of the Finnish elections. If the right-of-center parties won, the Finns already understood that their formation of a government would be vigorously opposed by Moscow—and no responsible Finn dared risk inviting Soviet ire in such a manner. In the event of an SKDL-Simonist (dissident Social Democratic

[31] *Ibid.,* February 17, 1966, p. 9.
[32] *Ibid.,* March 8, 1966, p. 12.
[33] *Ibid.,* March 11, 1966, p. 10.
[34] *Pravda,* January 25, 1966, p. 5.
[35] *Ibid.,* March 12, 1966, p. 3.
[36] *Ibid.,* March 16, 1966, p. 4.
[37] *Izvestia,* March 15, 1966, p. 2.
[38] *Ibid.,* March 19, 1966, p. 2.

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group led by Simonen) victory, long-standing Soviet hopes would be satisfied, but this was a most unlikely outcome. There remained the probability that Social Democrats and Centrists would win large blocs of seats and together hold a majority with consequent responsibility for the formation of a government. In this contingency, suggested *Izvestia,* the Soviets were ready to lift their ban on the socialists and accept them, as well as the Centrists, in a government which, as a *quid pro quo,* would also include the communists.

IV

Of major concern to Finnish voters going to the polls on March 20-21 were such domestic issues as taxation, agricultural subsidies, public housing and higher education. A youthful preoccupation with ideology was evident in a student presentation on election eve of Arvo Salo's operetta *Lapualaisooppera.*[39] Nevertheless, as the campaign had emphasized, relations with the USSR were once again a consideration, especially to whatever extent the Centrists had managed to convince voters that the Social Democrats were ill-fitted to deal with the Soviets.

That the Centrists failed in this ploy was quickly evident in the returns, for the most striking aspect of the outcome was an unprecedented surge of Social Democratic strength. Totaling 645,000 votes, 27 per cent of the ballots, the socialists had won the largest plurality cast for any party in the country's history. In contrast, the other six parties declined in popular vote, although the Simonists, because of their alliance with the SKDL, increased their small parliamentary representation. The Centrists, in losing only four seats, became the second largest party and with their old rivals, the Social Democrats, controlled 104 of the 200 parliamentary seats. The communist-dominated SKDL, declining only slightly in popular vote, lost six seats but with the Simonists still bulked large in the new Parliament (see Table I).

Soviet press reaction to this outcome was restrained. *Pravda* observed only that there had been an advance of the Finnish Left and a defeat of the Conservatives.[40] *Izvestia* once again implied more between its lines. Hailing the success of the "workers' parties," it noted that they had won a majority of 105 seats in the Parliament.[41] Since this figure could have been the result only

[39]The production satirized the rightist Lapua movement of the 1930's. Its composer was about to win a Social Democratic seat in the new Parliament.
[40]*Pravda,* March 23, 1966, p. 5.
[41]*Izvestia,* March 23, 1966, p. 1.

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TABLE I
THE FINNISH ELECTIONS OF 1966

Party	*Popular Vote (in thousands)*	*Percentage of Popular Vote*	*Parliamentary Seats*
SKDL	503 (507)*	21.3 (22.1)*	41 (47)*
Simonist	61 (100)	2.6 (4.4)	7 (2)
Social Democratic	645 (449)	27.3 (19.6)	55 (38)
Center	505 (531)	21.4 (23.0)	49 (53)
Liberal People's	153 (158)	6.5 (6.9)	9 (14)
Swedish People's	135 (141)	5.7 (6.1)	12 (14)
Conservative	327 (347)	13.8 (15.1)	26 (32)
Others	34 (63)	1.4 (2.8)	1 (0)
	2,363 (2,296)	100 (100)	200 (200)

*Denotes comparable results in 1962 elections.
Source: *Mitä Missä Milloin 1967* (Helsinki: Otava, 1967), pp. 130-131.

of adding together the seats won by the SKDL, Simonists and Social Democrats (although the final count later gave this bloc only 103 seats), *Izvestia* was conceding that the Social Democrats were a "workers' party," a title connoting Soviet approval. Neither paper, however, ventured any further comments until a Finnish government was announced in May.

Meanwhile, President Kekkonen, as precedent provided, summoned Paasio and Fagerholm, leaders of the plurality party, to explore the possibilities of forming a government. Soundings first were made on the creation of an all-party cabinet, though these could not have been undertaken with optimism. Immediately after the election *Suomenmaa* had announced that the Center Party would not participate in any ministry,[42] and so bitter had been feelings between Centrists and Social Democrats that their party chairmen on the day after election had refused to speak to each other on the floor of Parliament or to be photographed together.[43] Moreover, within a week the Conservative, Liberal People's and Swedish parties declined to serve in any cabinet that included communists.[44] Thus the all-party proposal quickly collapsed.

[42] *SFP*, March 23, 1966, p. 2E.
[43] *Helsingin Sanomat*, March 24, 1966, pp. 5, 14.
[44] *Ibid.*, March 30, 1966, pp. 7, 17.

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An alternative, as *Izvestia* had hinted, was a coalition of the Social Democrats with the two parties to their left. But both major independent dailies, *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat,* as well as the rightist press, opposed such an all-left government and called on the Centrists to reconsider their negative decision on participation in a new ministry.[45] As for the Social Democrats, whatever intimations of willingness to cooperate with the communists they had given during the campaign, they had no desire to become the exclusive partners of the Far Left. On April 14 Paasio rejected an all-left coalition.[46]

Leaders of the Conservative and Swedish parties then called for a government representing all except the communists, but so pregnant with Soviet opposition was this proposal that it received no further support.[47] At this point the simplest, and therefore the least plausible possibilities had been discarded. The time had arrived for the deft maneuvering and hard bargaining that could yield a compromise acceptable to all of the interests involved—including those of the Soviet Union.

Significantly, it was the Finnish communists who initiated this process. First, Hertta Kuusinen, communist front-bencher, outspoken antagonist of noncommunist politicians, and daughter of Moscow's Otto Kuusinen, resigned her post as longtime chairman of the SKDL parliamentary group. Second, the SKP endorsed a left-center coalition of the SKDL, Simonists, Social Democrats and Centrists.[48] Here, indeed, was a communist bid to gain acceptance as an orthodox parliamentary party entitled to ministerial office in partnership with both socialists and nonsocialists. *Izvestia's* earlier proposal of the same solution signified approval in the East. Noncommunist Finns, despite deep-rooted fear and mistrust of the SKP, were obliged to ask themselves what were the alternatives. Presumably, Social Democratic assumption of ministerial leadership would be accepted by Moscow, but at a price that included admission of the SKDL to the new government.

If further affirmation of the accuracy of this view was needed, it was forthcoming from Väinö Leskinen. As director of a tourist bureau, Leskinen frequently went to the Soviet Union on business, but his return from such a visit on May 3 had special overtones.

[45] *SFP*, March 23, 1966, p. 1E; April 7, 1966, p. 1E.
[46] *Helsingin Sanomat,* April 15, 1966, p. 9.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] *Ibid.*

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Not only had he talked with B. N. Ponomarev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Committee, while in Moscow, but promptly on his return he had been closeted with Kekkonen and Paasio.[49] Although in a public statement Leskinen was careful only to describe the Soviets as satisfied that Finland's Social Democrats held objective views of the USSR and pleased with the election outcome, Stockholm papers initiated the rumor, which was soon repeated in the Finnish press, that something more had transpired. According to the Swedish papers *Aftonbladet* and *Expressen,* the Soviets had spelled out to Leskinen the specific actions his party could take to win Moscow's confidence and thereby open the way to the organization of a new Finnish government in which the socialists would play a major role. These conditions entailed inclusion of the SKDL in the cabinet, the Social Democrats' recognition that their previous foreign policy had been mistaken, and Social Democratic support of President Kekkonen's re-election in 1968.[50] Devoid of documentation and denied by Leskinen, Paasio and other Social Democrats,[51] this version of Leskinen's "mission to Moscow" gained credibility, if not verification, with the subsequent unfolding of events.

The first weeks of May saw the construction of a left-center coalition. As the communists had indicated, the SKDL proved ready to join, as did its Simonist allies. But when Center Party Chairman Johannes Virolainen and his associates finally talked with the Social Democratic leaders, it became clear that the Centrists would exploit to the full their bargaining position. Ultimately, Virolainen won Paasio's endorsement of a farm subsidy program such as that in the Centrist election platform, and much beyond that desired by the Social Democrats. The latter, already pledged to larger pensions and housing expenditures, saw in these additional agricultural outlays even greater fiscal problems for the new government. Indeed, when Paasio agreed to pay this Centrist price he faced revolt by some of his own followers led by Party Secretary Kaarlo Pitsinki.[52] The threatened schism was prevented when Paasio persuaded his rebellious colleagues that the only feasible road to ministerial power open to the Social Democrats was via this proposed popular front. With scarcely

[49] *Ibid,* May 10, 1966, p. 15.
[50] *SFP,* May 10, 1966, p. 1E.
[51] For the official denials of Leskinen and Paasio, see *Helsingin Sanomat,* May 10, 1966, p. 15. Several other Social Democrats denied personally to the author any knowledge of Soviet conditions having been brought back by Leskinen from Moscow.
[52] *Helsingin Sanomat,* May 4, 1966, p. 7.

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veiled reference to the Soviets, he declared that "for reasons of foreign policy which cannot be disclosed . . . a popular front government by four parties must be found."[53] In yielding to Paasio, Pitsinki stated that he, too, did so "for reasons of foreign policy."[54]

Thus the search for Soviet acquiescence in their return to cabinet responsibility had pressed the Social Democrats toward coalition with the communists, a prospect which led to the inclusion of the Centrists as well. Not only did the Center Party's presence broaden responsibility for the unpopular fiscal measures that lay ahead, but it permitted the assignment of a relatively less influential place to the SKDL in the ministry. This was borne out by the apportionment of ministerial portfolios announced on May 27: in addition to the prime ministership Paasio's party received four ministries, and to the Center went Foreign Affairs and two others, leaving the SKDL with two, the ministries of Social Affairs and of Communications and Public Works, and the Simonists with the Ministry of Justice.[55]

Seemingly, with the investiture of the Paasio Government the Kremlin had accommodated itself to the new look of post-election Finnish politics. Within a month President Kekkonen received a state visit from Premier Kosygin, who appeared to confirm Soviet acceptance of the new government by inviting its head to visit Moscow in November. Meanwhile, noncommunist members of the Helsinki government could take satisfaction in the fact that the SKDL shared the responsibility for the sharp increases in excise and purchase taxes imposed in July and for the further increases provided in the September budget. In mid-November Paasio's reception in the USSR added to the impression that all was satisfactory between the new Finnish government and Moscow. To the Soviets Paasio reiterated his determination to strengthen the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line,[56] and the official communiqué, carried in full by *Izvestia,* expressed

> great satisfaction that relations between the Soviet Union and Finland are good, . . . that the peace-loving neutral policy of Finland . . . makes a valuable contribution to . . . international understanding, . . . and to the further development and strengthening of good-neighbor relations between the Soviet Union and Finland.[57]

[53]*SFP,* May 31, 1966, p. 1E.

[54]*Ibid.*

[55]Four associate ministers were also appointed: two Centrists (in the ministries assigned to the SKDL), one SKDL, and one Social Democrat.

[56]*SFP,* November 16, 1966, p. 2.

[57]*Izvestia,* November 20, 1966, p 1.

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Whatever optimism might have been encouraged in Helsinki by these developments, however, was dispelled one week later. On November 25, the eve of the Social Democratic Party's conference, *Pravda* noted that "rightists" still held important positions in the new ministry and obstructed a more flexible socialist policy.[58] Immediately taking up this theme at the opening session of the Social Democratic congress, Leskinen expressed grave concern over Paasio's failure to adopt a more "active" policy toward the USSR. Specifically, he asked why Paasio had not dissociated his government from the Socialist International's support of NATO, and why there had not been more cooperation with the SKP.[59] He added, "The Finnish Communist Party cannot—and I think it does not even want to—change Finland's institutions by force."[60]

No doubt convinced that his party must make a more emphatic repudiation of its—and his—earlier anti-communist, anti-Kekkonen, and by implication anti-Soviet stance, Leskinen was also challenging Paasio for the party leadership. The outcome of the congress, however, was not decisive for either antagonist. On the one hand, the Social Democrats moved more into line with the Eastern bloc than ever before by endorsing an atom-free zone in Europe, calling for an international conference on European security, and demanding cessation of U.S. bombing in Viet Nam. On the other hand, Paasio was re-elected party chairman while Leskinen had to be satisfied with election to the powerful party council.[61]

Pravda, meanwhile, had maintained close watch and on December 12 rendered judgment. The new planks in the Social Democratic foreign policy resolution were acknowledged, but "surprise" was expressed that the party had neither dissociated itself from the Socialist International nor aligned itself with the "Finnish peace movement." The party was also deemed "inconsistent and contradictory" in its failure to define ways and means of cooperating with its coalition partners and in its avoidance of a stand on the 1968 presidential election. In conclusion, it observed, "the Social Democratic Party of Finland still has a great deal to do so that its policy will enjoy the full confidence of progressive circles and of those forces that invariably stand for the defense of the labor movement and of all working people."[62] If

[58] *Pravda,* November 25, 1966, p. 4.
[59] *SFP,* December 1, 1966, p. 2.
[60] *New York Times,* November 27, 1966, p. 29.
[61] *SFP,* November 29, 1966, p. 2.
[62] *Pravda,* December 12, 1966, p. 4.

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the Kremlin had not earlier given Leskinen a confidential version of its terms for acceptance of the Social Democratic Party's return to power, it now made them unmistakably clear. *Pravda* indicated, moreover, that fulfillment of the first two conditions—closer cooperation with the USSR and admittance of the communists to the ministry—was still less than satisfactory. As for the third—support of President Kekkonen's re-election—Moscow was calling for action.

To recall the enmity many socialists harbored for Yrho Kekkonen is to grasp better the reluctance of their party to meet this demand. Not only would their own presidential aspirants be ruled out, but they would be obliged to oppose any other candidate who sought to block Kekkonen from another six-year term. When Leskinen, shortly after his May visit to Moscow, had urged the party not to oppose a third term for Kekkonen, there had been only silence in the Paasio camp.[63] A November invitation from the Centrists to all parties to discuss the 1968 presidential election also elicited no socialist reply. When former Centrist premier Virolainen, never reluctant to place spokes in Social Democratic wheels, expressed the hope that the socialists would name a candidate of their own Paasio was still silent. In January 1967, a socialist proposal that the customary presidential elections be suspended in favor of parliamentary selection of the President in 1968 was rebuffed. *Pravda's* December 12th article made further evasion impossible. Accordingly, Party Secretary Erkki Raatikainen announced on February 23, 1967 that the Social Democratic Party would support Kekkonen for re-election as proof of its endorsement of the country's foreign policy.[64] Subsequently this pledge was honored.[65] In the meantime its pronouncement appeared to settle Social Democratic accounts with the Soviets and conclude the political maneuvers surrounding the 1966 elections. Thereafter the Paasio Government was freer to concentrate on home affairs and the Soviets adopted a more relaxed attitude toward Finnish politics.

V

While it is too early to discern clearly the direction and form of this latest phase in Finnish politics and in Fenno-Soviet relations, the elections of 1966 bequeathed three alterations which could be

[63] *New York Times*, November 7, 1966, p. 15.
[64] *SFP*, February 24, 1967, p. 2.
[65] President Kekkonen was elected to a third term in January 1968. Since he received 61 per cent of the electoral votes, the support of the Social Democrats proved vital.

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significant in shaping it and which, in any case, mark the end of the postwar era.

First, there is the altered position of the Social Democrats. Their unprecedented showing at the polls recalled them from the political wilderness to resume ministerial power and national leadership. It took two years of costly bargaining, however, to remove Soviet objections to their return to power, at the end of which the party had unequivocally endorsed the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, abandoned resistance to communist officeholding at the cabinet level, and supported a third term for President Kekkonen. Each of these concessions entailed reluctant abandonment of established policy, and the latter two also dictated abetment of old, mistrusted political rivals—the SKDL and President Kekkonen. Moreover, the internal party struggle revolving about Väinö Leskinen was exacerbated by the search for accommodation with the USSR. Coupled with national economic problems, these were ironic results for the Social Democrats, who have traditionally formed a bulwark against the Far Left and a part of the Republic's vital Center, and raised the question, important for all Finns, whether the Social Democratic Party could continue to perform those functions.

As for the communists, they, too, had arrived at a crossroads. The emergence in Finland of the first popular front coalition in Europe since 1950 opened the way for SKP moderates like Erkki Salomaa to perform as responsible parliamentarians, in accordance with their professed desire. Certainly communist behavior throughout the elections and to the end of 1967 indicated a determination to win a place in a broadened parliamentary left, which hopefully would then become the vehicle for Finland's transformation, by democratic means, into a Marxist "workers' society." To the extent that this was the SKP strategy, the Finnish communists had reached the point at which their democratic socialist comrades all over Europe had arrived sixty-five years earlier—proletarian revolution was deemed unlikely and parliamentary politics were seen as a more feasible road to political power. For the democratic socialists, that conclusion had been the beginning of a pragmatic revision—and even abandonment—of Marxism in general: if the Finnish communists became part of the political establishment, they faced the possibility of a similar experience.

But much more concrete and immediate an issue in 1966 was the popular front's fiscal situation. The Paasio Government's ma-

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jority saw no alternative to increased taxes and devaluation. The communists were thus confronted with the difficult choice of identifying themselves with the imposition of these burdens, some of which fell on the SKP's own constituents, or resigning. In the latter instance they would surrender their recently won re-entry into the ministry, lose potential appeal to elements on their right, and possibly toss the party leadership back into the hands of the less flexible group who in the past had earned for the SKP suspicion, isolation and static membership. In this context the Communist Party of Finland faced decisions of crucial importance to itself, to all Finns, to the Soviets, and conceivably to the world communist movement.

Finally, 1966 had led to a new accommodation between the USSR and Finland. In return for lifting their ban on the Social Democrats, the Soviets had demanded and received establishment of a popular front in Helsinki, strong assurances of President Kekkonen's re-election in 1968, and Social Democratic adherence to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. But each of these gains entailed limitations. If the political fortunes of the SKP prospered as a result of its new experiment, there was every reason to anticipate the party's increased nationalism and independence; if the SKP decided it could not remain in the coalition, resigned, and brought down the government, Moscow would once more face reappraisal of its Finnish policy—never an easy or pleasant task despite the Soviet preponderance of power. With regard to Kekkonen, he could be counted on to maintain his country's "associate membership" in the Eastern camp so far as foreign policy was concerned, but he was no communist. As for the socialists, their return to full participation in the government strengthened the Finnish parliamentary system for which Moscow had never held any great sympathy.

In a word, the Soviets had revealed again that their concern with Finland had principally to do with its place and part in Moscow's national defense considerations. If the Finns continued to give no cause for uneasiness on this score, the Kremlin seemed disposed to leave the communization of Finland to historical determinism. To the vast majority of Finns who are not devotees of Marxism-Leninism, this was an acceptable bargain. The alteration in the terms of that bargain in 1966 mark the Finnish national elections of that year as another milestone in the unique, pragmatically contrived coexistence of Finland with its giant eastern neighbor.

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PLOWSHARE AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY*

by Jacob Koop

IN the long and often tortuous negotiations leading to U.S.-Soviet agreement on the terms of a nonproliferation treaty, a consistently disturbing element (sometimes characterized as a "festering concern") has been the realization that nuclear explosive devices may some day prove to be economically useful in a variety of major peaceful applications. To permit a country to develop or acquire national control of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, a possibility advanced from time to time by various Indian spokesmen and more recently by the Brazilian member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), would clearly nullify the basic purpose of the treaty. Regardless of the sincerity of a country's original intention, such explosives could obviously be used for military purposes if circumstances changed or an emergency arose. In any event, their development would be regarded with suspicion, particularly by fearful neighbors, as a transparent guise for the development of nuclear weapons.

Basic design technology is identical, in large measure, for both military and peaceful applications. For a device to be acceptable for peaceful purposes, it is essential that the production of radioactive fission products in the explosion be kept to a minimum. The development of reasonably "clean" devices, in which most of the explosive yield comes from fusion rather than fission reactions, would almost certainly require several years of design, development and testing of a series of devices of increasing sophistication. Thus a country in possession of a stockpile of domestically-developed "peaceful" nuclear explosives would have acquired a sophisticated technology directly applicable to the design of

*The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views, policies or opinions of the Defence Research Board or of any other agency or department of the Government of Canada. The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and support of the staff and associates of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, where he spent the academic year 1967-1968 on sabbatical leave.

Plowshare is the name given by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to its program for the development and use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. It is derived from the Biblical quotation "and they shall beat their swords into plowshares."

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thermonuclear weapons. For this reason, it has always been recognized that a nonproliferation treaty, to be effective at all, would have to prohibit the development, production and acquisition of *all* nuclear explosives by countries not presently possessing them.

Many nonnuclear states are reluctant to renounce in perpetuity their right to develop and produce nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. The growing vocal concern on the part of several nations in this regard led the United States and the USSR to agree on the insertion of the following declaration of intent in their draft treaty of August 24, 1967:

> . . . that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosives should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear weapon states party to this treaty on a non-discriminating basis and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used shall be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

In the final version of the treaty, signed by the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and fifty-three other states on July 1, 1968, this declaration took the form of a separate Article V, as follows:

> Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosives will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives

If we were to accept literally the words of Andrei Vishinsky to the United Nations in November 1949, it would appear that the USSR may have been the first nation in the world to consider and explore seriously the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. After acknowledging publicly the first Soviet nuclear test, which had been detected by the United States in August

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1949, Vishinsky said: ". . . the Soviet Union is now using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, not to stockpile bombs. . . . we are now raising mountains; we are irrigating deserts; we are cutting through the jungle and the tundra. . . ." All available evidence indicates that he was indulging in political rhetoric and that until recently the USSR had little, if any, interest or experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Official Soviet statements in the ENDC and elsewhere still show no concrete indication of such interest,[1] but there is increasing speculation that during the past several years the USSR, like the United States, may have used some of its underground nuclear tests for the development of specialized nuclear devices and to demonstrate or investigate Plowshare-type applications.[2] The Soviets have carried out a number of large chemical explosions for a variety of industrial, engineering and research purposes, including several sizeable detonations (up to 9,200 tons in yield) in China in the mid-1950's.[3] Data of interest to a nuclear cratering program could have been derived from these explosions.

In the United States, although some theoretical consideration was given to the possibility of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes during the days of the Manhattan Project, and again in the early 1950's, a serious and sustained effort in this regard was not started by the Atomic Energy Commission until 1957.[4] At that time, two technical factors contributed to a revival of interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives: (1) the successful development of explosives deriving a substantial fraction of their yield from thermonuclear or fusion reactions, thus reducing the radioactivity hazard and also the cost relative to the yield obtained;

[1]Although J. A. McCone, then Chairman of the AEC, stated in 1960: ". . . there has been an agreement in principle between the Soviets and our negotiators that the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be permitted." U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Frontiers in Atomic Energy Research*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, March 22-25, 1960, p. 10. (Hereafter cited as *Frontiers in Atomic Energy Research.*)

[2]In an unpublished paper prepared for the Canadian-American Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Scarborough, Ontario, June 1967, Dr. Klaus Knorr of Princeton University stated: "According to available evidence, the Soviet Union has pursued the same kind of program, in recent years at an accelerating pace." Also the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in expressing its concern recently that no cratering experiments had been carried out by the United States since early 1965, implied that the USSR might in fact have conducted such experiments during this time.

[3]*Frontiers in Atomic Energy Research*, pp. 70-82.

[4]In late 1956, following the Suez crisis and the nationalization by the UAR of the Suez Canal, Dr. Harold Brown, then Deputy Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, proposed the use of nuclear explosives to excavate an alternative shipping route from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aqaba via Israel.

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and (2) the development of a better understanding of the phenomenology of underground nuclear explosions.[5] With the prospect of continued improvement in these areas, it was felt that nuclear explosives might prove to be uniquely useful in a number of specific applications arising from their ability to move large masses of earth at or near the surface and to fracture and break up masses of rock underground much quicker, and hopefully at much lower cost, than conventional explosives.

In underground engineering and mining, deeply-buried and hence completely-contained explosions might stimulate oil and gas recovery, fracture mineral deposits for chemical or bacterial leaching, and create underground reservoirs for the storage of natural gas, water, and industrial and radioactive wastes. In excavation engineering, shallow or cratering explosions might create deepwater harbors, mountain passes for highway and rail travel, and deep interoceanic canals. In scientific applications, contained explosions might be used to create extremely high neutron fluxes for the production of new trans-plutonium elements and for other neutron physics research. Monitoring and studying the resulting seismic signals from all types of underground nuclear explosions might result in a more accurate understanding of the earth's interior and produce new information permitting the improved prediction of earthquakes.

The United States realized at the outset that the problem of reducing the radioactivity hazard associated with nuclear explosives would be the most important single factor in determining their usefulness in most proposed peaceful applications, particularly those involving cratering. Thus research and development work on Plowshare devices during the past decade has concentrated largely on reducing the fission component of thermonuclear explosives. Advanced thermonuclear designs using extremely low-yield fission initiators have been tested, and it is felt that reliable explosives of this type can now be constructed for a wide range of total yields.[6] If work continues in this area, pure fusion devices requiring no fission initiators should eventually be developed.

The absence of a fission component (and hence of fission products) in Plowshare explosives, if and when it is achieved, will be

[5] *Frontiers in Atomic Energy Research*, p. 19. Testimony of Dr. Brown.

[6] U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *AEC Authorizing Legislation—1968*, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1795. (Hereafter cited as *AEC Authorizing Legislation.*)

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a major breakthrough in promoting their usefulness in a variety of applications, in regard to both reduced hazard and reduced cost. However, even with completely "clean" thermonuclear explosives, there will still remain the problem of induced radioactivity created by the fusion neutrons interacting with, and rendering radioactive, the matter in the soil, water and atmosphere surrounding the explosion. By emplacing the device properly and surrounding it with a boron-containing neutron-absorbent "blanket," it has been found possible to reduce this additional hazard, while at the same time minimizing the liberation of any fission products created in the explosion. Based on an optimum combination of the above techniques and developments, it is now predicted that in cratering explosions of "useful" yields (presumably tens or hundreds of kilotons up to the low megaton range), the aggregate radioactivity in the airborne cloud and in the close-in fallout should be less than 0.1 per cent of the total radioactivity that would be released from unshielded, all-fission devices of similar yield.[7]

Along with progress in reducing radioactivity hazards associated with Plowshare, the AEC has reported a significant reduction in the cost of nuclear explosives and the services it would have to provide for them, such as arming and firing. In 1958 the Commission estimated that these charges (including the cost of safety studies) might range from $500,000 for fabricating and firing an all-fission device of a few KT, to $750,000 for a few tens of KT, to about $1,000,000 for a thermonuclear device up to 5 MT in yield. In 1964 it released new estimates (not including safety study costs) for Plowshare explosives, which ranged from about $350,000 for 10 KT to about $600,000 for 2 MT, approximately half the previous charges (see Table I).[8] These lower costs undoubtedly reflect the success in reducing the fission component of Plowshare devices and the additional operating experience gained since 1958. In addition, reductions in the diameter of nuclear explosives achieved as a result of advanced design work in recent years will decrease costs to prospective users in applications involving extensive underground drilling (see Table II). Further significant reductions in both the cost and the diameter of nuclear explosives can be anticipated as the technology advances and production techniques improve.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 1796.
[8] AEC Press Release G-106, dated May 6, 1964.

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TABLE I

PROJECTED AEC CHARGES FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES*

Yield (KT)	*Cost ($1000's)*
10	350
50	400
100	460
250	500
500	535
1,000	570
2,000	600

*Derived from AEC Press Release G-106. The charges cover nuclear materials, fabrication and assembly, and arming and firing services but do not include safety studies, site preparation, transportation and emplacement of devices, and other support services.

TABLE II

SIZE OF PLOWSHARE EXPLOSIVES*

Yield (KT)	*Diameter (ft.)*	*Length (ft.)*
up to 10	1	2-4
up to 100	1.5	3-6
up to 1,000	2	4-8
up to 10,000	3	6-12

*Approximate canister dimensions, derived from AEC announcements.

PROJECT PLOWSHARE: PROGRAMS, PLANS AND FUNDING

To date the U.S. AEC has announced the conduct of over 200 underground nuclear tests, most of which have provided data useful to the Plowshare program. Although the bulk of these tests were carried out for military purposes, some twenty were stated to have been conducted specifically for Plowshare. They have been preceded and supplemented, particularly in the area of excavation engineering, by a considerable number of detonations using conventional high-explosive charges of a variety of yields. Each Plowshare test has, in general, included one or more of the following: (1) trials or demonstrations of specific applications in the fields of underground engineering, excavation, or heavy element production; (2) trials or demonstrations of new or different device emplacement techniques for such applications, with a view to decreasing the radioactivity hazard; and (3) proof tests of new or improved designs of devices to be used in the program.

In support of future excavation and underground engineering applications, the AEC has now accumulated extensive data (from both military and Plowshare underground tests) on crater and cavity formation as a result of nuclear explosions conducted at

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various depths in a variety of soil and rock media, typical of those that would be encountered in Plowshare projects. Extensive data are also available on such related phenomena as rock cracking radii and permeability changes, "chimney" heights and dimensions, nearby ground shock and seismic effects, and the disposition of radioactivity in the cavity or crater, all of which contribute to a meaningful assessment of the hazards and the usefulness of proposed Plowshare applications.

One of the most widely-publicized Plowshare projects is the proposed construction of a new sea-level Atlantic-Pacific canal to replace or supplement the present Panama Canal. A series of cratering experiments has been carried out by the AEC using both single and row-charge chemical and nuclear explosives in hard dry-rock and in wet clay shale, in order to determine optimum cratering depths, radioactivity distribution, surface motion and other data relevant to the development and proper assessment of canal excavation techniques. Safety surveys, including field studies of meteorological, bio-environmental and acoustic factors, are now under way along two possible routes.[9] Data from these surveys, together with the results of the AEC nuclear cratering program, will be furnished to the Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission for its use in evaluating the safety and cost of using nuclear explosives to excavate a new sea-level passageway, as compared to the cost of using chemical explosives either to build a new canal or enlarge the existing one. Tentative cost estimates prepared by the AEC indicate that a new sea-level canal along Route 17 (Sasardi-Morti) could be constructed using nuclear explosives at about one-third the cost and in about half the time it would take to convert the existing Panama Canal to a sea-level route using conventional explosives (see Table III).

Another active AEC program in the Plowshare category is the series of experiments and studies under way on the use of completely-contained nuclear explosions to increase the productivity of natural gas in rock formations of low permeability, whose gas content is "locked-in" and not extractable with ordinary drilling methods. The U.S. Bureau of Mines has estimated that, if this technique should prove to be successful, recoverable gas reserves in the United States would more than triple, from under 200 trillion (10^{12}) to about 600 trillion cubic feet.[10]

[9]Route 17 from Sasardi to Morti in the Dairen region of Panama, and Route 25 in northwestern Colombia.

[10]*AEC Authorizing Legislation,* p. 1797.

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TABLE III*

PROPOSED ATLANTIC-PACIFIC CANAL

	Conversion of existing canal to sea-level route using conventional HE	*Construction of Sasardi-Morti canal using nuclear explosives*
Estimated cost	$2.3 billion	$0.8 billion
Excavation time	10 years	6 years
Channel size	600′ wide, 60′ deep**	1,000′ wide, 250′ deep

*Taken from *Nuclear Industry, 1966,* prepared by the AEC Division of Industrial Participation.

**Japanese shipbuilders have recently proposed construction of 400,000-ton oil tankers, double the size of the largest built to date, which will require an 80-foot operating draft. (*New York Times,* January 3, 1968.) This would make nuclear excavation look even more promising.

The first major experiment in natural gas stimulation was the detonation of a 26 KT device at a depth of 4,200 feet in the San Juan Basin in northwestern New Mexico. This project (Gasbuggy) is a joint government-industry venture involving the AEC, the Bureau of Mines and the El Paso Natural Gas Company. After some delay, the explosion was finally carried out in early December 1967. Although detailed analytical results are not yet available, a modest increase in gas flow from the fractured zone has been observed. Some long-lived radioactive contamination in the form of tritium has also been observed and it is not yet certain how much of a problem, if any, this will pose to the continued exploitation of this technique by the oil and gas industry. Two follow-on experiments are now under active consideration: (1) Project Dragon Trail, proposed by the Continental Oil Company, would be a 40 KT detonation at 2,700 feet in western Colorado in a low-permeability, gas-bearing formation of different geological characteristics than the formation in which Gasbuggy was detonated. (2) Project Rulison, proposed by the Austral Oil Company, would undertake two simultaneous nuclear detonations, one above the other at depths of 7,500 and 8,500 feet in another gas-bearing stratum in western Colorado, in order to create a broken-rock "chimney" extending vertically almost the entire height of the stratum. Success in the latter experiment, it is believed, could lead directly to the commercial use of nuclear explosives in gas stimulation.

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A joint government-industry feasibility study (Project Ketch) is evaluating the proposed use of nuclear explosives to create large underground broken-rock "chimneys" for natural gas storage. In recent years naturally-occurring underground storage areas, such as caverns and depleted gas wells, have had to be used to supplement aboveground facilities for the storage of liquefied natural gas. However, such areas are either absent or becoming scarce in those regions of the country with the most rapidly growing consumer markets. With the demand for additional storage capacity expected to grow by at least 175 billion (10^9) cubic feet per year, nuclear explosives may be able to provide storage areas where they are most needed, i.e., near the consumer end of gas-transmission pipelines. It is estimated that underground storage areas could be created with nuclear explosives at one-third to one-sixth the cost of constructing aboveground facilities.[11] For study purposes and as a possible initial experiment, Project Ketch proposes detonating a 20-30 KT device at about the 3,000-foot depth at a site in central Pennsylvania. Preliminary data indicate that such an explosion might create a "chimney" capable of storing at least several hundred million cubic feet of natural gas under pressure.

A second joint government-industry feasibility study (Project Bronco) is concerned with the use of nuclear explosives to break up underground oil shale deposits in such a way that the oil can subsequently be "retorted"[12] to the surface. Its estimate is that twelve to eighteen months would be required to retort completely the broken oil shale in a "chimney" formed by a 100 KT contained nuclear explosion, with recovery of 50-70 per cent of the oil expected. If this technique proves successful, it could be the means of recovering an estimated 160 billion barrels of oil from shale formations in western Colorado. Plans call for a simulated nuclear experiment in oil shale, followed possibly by an actual detonation in the near future. It has been suggested that one or more small nuclear explosions in or near the "chimney" of broken shale might act as a heat source for the retorting process.

A third government-industry feasibility study (Project Sloop) has recently been completed on the use of nuclear explosives for breaking up copper ore bodies to prepare them for *in situ* leaching and direct recovery of the copper. The Kennecott Copper Company has proposed a joint industry-government experiment, using

[11]U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, *Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs*, January-December 1966, p. 244, and *AEC Authorizing Legislation*, p. 1800.
[12]"Boiled off" from the heated broken shale.

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a 20-30 KT nuclear device emplaced at a depth of 1,200 feet, in a low-grade copper-bearing deposit located near Safford, Arizona. This deposit, estimated at several million tons of recoverable copper, cannot be economically mined and treated by presently proved methods. Once the ore body is broken up by the explosion, a leaching solution will be passed through the ore to dissolve the copper and bring it to the surface for subsequent recovery treatment. If approved, the experiment may be conducted shortly.

In the area of scientific research, several experiments have been conducted with specially designed neutron-rich nuclear explosives in order to observe and study the enhanced production of heavy, trans-plutonium elements. Although initial results were encouraging, more recent trials indicate that increased neutron fluxes do not produce increasingly heavy nuclei as easily as was originally believed. Existing theoretical models of heavy nuclides may need to be revised, particularly regarding their stability, and additional experiments are planned with nuclear explosives delivering even higher neutron fluxes.

AEC expenditures on Project Plowshare are expected to total somewhat over $20,000,000 in FY 1968, about double the amount spent in FY 1965. The increase has resulted primarily from greater emphasis on the nuclear excavation program and the effort on Project Gasbuggy, with funding for research and development remaining essentially unchanged over the past several years (see Table IV). Expenditures to date total somewhat less than $100,000,000.

TABLE IV

AEC EXPENDITURES ON PLOWSHARE (10^6)

	FY65	*FY66*	*FY67*	*FY68*
R&D	5.4	6.3	6.3	6.6
Excavation	3.0	6.6	5.8	12.2
Scientific	2.3	1.7	0.3	1.5
Natural Resources	0	0	1.0	1.5
Total	10.7	14.6	13.4	21.8

Note:

1. Figures for FY65 and FY66 are actual expenditures, for FY67 and FY68 estimated expenditures.
2. The decrease in FY67 compared with FY66 reflects the postponement, for political reasons, of Project Cabriolet (a proposed nuclear cratering experiment) from FY67 to FY68.

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As evidence of the growing public and industrial interest in Plowshare, Stanford University is now offering a graduate-level course in civil engineering on the use of nuclear explosives. This course was given for the first time during the winter quarter of 1966.[13] A consortium of three firms—Continental Oil Company; Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier (EG&G); and Reynolds Electric Company—has created a new organization called CER Geonuclear which is specializing in the provision of "Plowshare services" to interested firms. In addition, several Plowshare symposia, sponsored by the AEC, have attracted widespread participation and interest from both government and industry in the United States and abroad.

Although the AEC is at present not actively studying or funding any other specific Plowshare applications, detailed consideration has been given at one time or another to a number of additional possible uses of nuclear explosives, including:

(1) Excavation of a mountain pass through the Bristol Mountains in southern California for both rail and highway traffic.
(2) Excavation of a portion of a 250-mile waterway between the Tennessee and Tombigbee rivers, which would directly link the mid-continent U.S. inland waterway system with the southeastern Gulf area.
(3) Production, quickly and economically, of large quantities of crushed-rock aggregate for major road and dam construction projects.
(4) Creation of large surface reservoirs of water for hydroelectric or irrigation purposes.
(5) Creation of underground storage areas for water and for the disposal of industrial and radioactive wastes.
(6) Creation of broken-rock "chimneys" in massive, deeply-buried mineral deposits, in order to facilitate the recovery of ore by using "caving" methods directly beneath the broken ore zone.

Worldwide Interest in Plowshare

Stimulated by the progress achieved by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in its Plowshare program, which has been widely publicized, a number of countries now evince considerable interest in the peaceful applications of nuclear explosives. Although this interest could certainly be used to disguise a desire to acquire nuclear weapons, there appears to be a genuine and widespread feeling that nuclear explosives could in time provide a significant contribution to the development of the natural resources of South America, Africa, Asia and Australia. This contribution, it is felt, could result from one or more of the projects mentioned above,

[13]AEC TID 23748, Nuclear Civil Engineering, Outline Syllabus for Course CE 277, Department of Civil Engineering, Stanford University.

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i.e., the excavation of canals or mountain passes, the creation of water reservoirs for flood control and irrigation, the development of otherwise unexploitable mineral resources, and the stimulation of low-productivity oil and gas deposits.

Brazil was in the forefront of those nations urging—in vain—that the nonproliferation treaty make explicit allowance for the unfettered pursuit of peaceful applications of nuclear explosives by any country wishing to undertake them. The insertion of an article, permitting the explosion of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, into the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ) Treaty is believed to have resulted largely from Brazilian (and possibly Argentinian) pressure.[14] At ENDC sessions during the past few years, the Brazilian representative on several occasions demanded that all states must be free to stage peaceful nuclear explosions, and from time to time the Brazilian press and radio have stated that the country must, will and can embark soon on the development of devices for this purpose. The leader of the Indian delegation at the ENDC asserted early in 1968 that he found "disturbing" the fact that the draft treaty prohibits non-nuclear-weapon states from developing nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, and suggested that a clause similar to Article 18 of the LANFZ Treaty might be incorporated into the nonproliferation treaty.[15] Even a Japanese commentator stated recently that "all agree" that a treaty which would deprive Japan of the use of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes should not be signed.[16]

The Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) has maintained a close interest in Plowshare developments for a number of years[17] and appears to be convinced that the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives could find a specialized but important role in the development of Australia's natural resources.[18] A number of

[14]Article 18 of the LANFZ Treaty states that "contracting parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose." It can be plausibly argued that this article is in contradiction to, and hence is overridden by, the treaty itself which bans the explosion of any device that "has a group of characteristics appropriate for warlike purposes." See Richard Hudson in *Disarmament,* March 1967.

[15]Press Release, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, "Ambassador Azim Husain's Speech on the Question of Nonproliferation Treaty—February 27, 1968."

[16]Kiyoaki Murata in *Japan Times Weekly,* June 10, 1967, reprinted in *Survival,* August 1967.

[17]This interest may have been initiated by the visit of Dr. Edward Teller to Australia some four years ago, and probably received an additional stimulus from the more recent visit of Dr. Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. AEC.

[18]AAEC—*Fourteenth Annual Report 1965-66.*

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groups engaged in major resources development programs, both in government and in industry, have indicated an increasing interest in the possibilities of Plowshare. Applications that have been or are being considered include the following:

(1) To ameliorate problems arising from the low annual rainfall accompanied in some cases by the wastage of water in the short but heavy wet season, nuclear explosives might be used to form deep craters, underground "chimneys," or dams and reservoirs to assist in water storage and conservation.

(2) In the rapidly-increasing development of Australia's mineral resources, nuclear explosives could be used to advantage in some areas to remove overburden, fracture large masses of ore, and prepare ore for *in situ* leaching.

(3) Nuclear explosives could be used to excavate the deepwater harbors that will be required in the near future, particularly in western Australia, to ship out increasing tonnages of mineral ores.[19]

(4) To meet the demand for natural gas in the growing industrial areas along the coast, nuclear explosives could be used to create large, underground storage caverns nearby, thus permitting the installation of smaller-diameter transmission lines to the gas deposits in the interior.

(5) Nuclear explosives could assist materially in the diversion of rivers and the creation of dams, tunnels and reservoirs required for such huge, combined irrigation and electrical power projects as the current Snowy Mountains development scheme.

In Canada, there was active interest in the late 1950's in the possibility of using nuclear explosives to assist in the extraction of petroleum from the Athabasca tar sands, a deeply-buried (for the most part), highly viscous potential source of several hundred billion barrels of oil. An exploratory proposal, involving an initial 9 KT underground explosion, was discussed with Canadian authorities by the Richfield Oil Company and the U.S. AEC, but the virtual lack of data on the radioactivity hazards that might be associated with such an application, coupled with the possibility that thousands of nuclear devices might have to be used to exploit the tar sands deposit fully, resulted in a decision to take no action on the matter. Because of the subsequent development and use of commercially-feasible nonnuclear methods of extracting oil from the Athabasca tar sands, it is unlikely that this particular application will be seriously considered again. Canada appears to have no present requirement for massive excavation or underground engineering projects, hence her interest in the peaceful

[19]At the time of his visit to Australia in January 1967, Dr. Seaborg discussed with the AAEC the possibility of using nuclear explosives to excavate a deepwater port for the Tilbara iron-ore region in western Australia.

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uses of nuclear explosives is at a low level and will probably remain so for a number of years to come.

At the 1964 Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the U.S. presentation on Plowshare elicited keen interest and favorable comment from the delegates of a number of countries, including the USSR, India, Australia, Rumania, the UAR, France and Israel.[20] This was in marked contrast to the 1958 Conference at which a U.S. paper on Plowshare evoked hostile questions from the floor and a denunciation from the rostrum. A Soviet delegate to the 1964 Conference mentioned an interest in the possible uses of nuclear explosives to accomplish several specific excavation, irrigation and gas stimulation projects in the USSR and suggested the possibility of joint U.S.-Soviet study of these projects. The UAR and Israeli interest centered on the possible use of nuclear devices in developing a new major source of hydroelectric power, i.e., the excavation of canals or "ditches" to permit ocean water to enter large natural depressions in each country, the Qattara in Egypt from the Mediterranean, and the Dead Sea in Israel from the Gulf of Aqaba.

Plowshare and Arms Control

Although Project Plowshare has on occasion been referred to as "perhaps the most dramatic example of the useful application of the atom not initially foreseen,"[21] it has also been recognized for years as having within it the "seeds of controversy,"[22] in that it introduces serious complications at both the national and international level into the attempt to control and inhibit nuclear weapons development and testing. Continued improvement of designs and techniques, accompanied by reductions in the cost and size of nuclear explosives and the radioactive hazards associated with their use, will give nonnuclear countries an increasing incentive to develop or acquire nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, whether or not they renounce the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Thus the basic intent of the nonproliferation treaty could be eroded and eventually nullified by Plowshare aspirations. In addition, the vigorous promotion of Plowshare programs requires the continued testing of nuclear

[20]U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosives—Plowshare,* 89th Congress, 1st Session, January 5, 1965, pp. 42, 49.

[21]*Frontiers in Atomic Energy Research,* p. 8. Testimony of AEC Chairman J. A. McCone.

[22]*Ibid.,* p. 14. Testimony of Dr. H. D. Smyth, Princeton University.

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devices in a variety of environmental conditions, not only to gather data applicable to proposed engineering and scientific experiments but also to develop devices of increasing "cleanness," reduced diameter and less cost. Thus the advocates of Plowshare, in the United States and elsewhere, can be expected to oppose any attempt to extend the limited test ban treaty to cover nuclear testing in all environments and, meanwhile, to press for a less rigid interpretation of the present treaty, in order to permit the more active pursuit of Plowshare projects.

For these and other reasons, many proponents of arms control remain consistently hostile to the Plowshare program. Their general premise is that the promotion of technological developments must be considered and decided in the total context of existing and foreseen political and social needs and, if necessary, subordinated to these needs rather than being decided primarily on the basis of technological feasibility or merit. This view was well represented by Dr. H. D. Smyth in testimony at a Congressional hearing in 1960.[23] In essence, Smyth argued that the potential (but still highly uncertain) economic benefits of Plowshare were of negligible importance compared with the possibility of achieving meaningful agreements to limit and control the development and testing of nuclear weapons. Even if the use of nuclear explosives showed firm promise of being able to contribute significantly to the material welfare of mankind, he would still question the political advisability of continuing with Plowshare and would in fact recommend "holding back" or indefinitely halting all experimentation in this regard. He went so far as to urge forgoing all of the peacetime uses of atomic energy, including nuclear power, if such self-denial would make it substantially easier to achieve international control of nuclear weapons.

Although few proponents of arms control would seriously suggest "turning the clock back" to this extent, some among them appear to be strongly convinced that the possible benefits of Plowshare have been greatly oversold, the as yet largely unknown problems and hazards of commercial applications seriously underestimated, and the economic and technical data deliberately fudged to show Plowshare technology in the best light. Thus in assessing the validity of the attacks on Plowshare, as well as the enthusiastic support for it, it becomes difficult at times to separate

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 11-18.

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fact from fiction, serious criticism or support from emotional bias, and impersonal analysis from intuitive or subjective judgment.

There is no question that notable advances have been made since 1960 in reducing the costs and hazards associated with Plowshare applications and that even more rapid progress could be made if the political inhibitions on this program were relaxed, particularly those related to cratering experiments. A number of nonnuclear countries, genuinely convinced that nuclear explosives could improve their material welfare by making possible massive engineering works and the exploitation of natural resources, feel that the two nuclear superpowers have a responsibility to ensure that the fruits of this technology are not denied to the world.

Plowshare is only one of several developments in nuclear technology which conflict in one way or another with the objectives and requirements of nuclear arms control. There are inherent risks and dangers, in the sense of physical hazards as well as undesirable political implications, associated with all applications of nuclear energy. For example, it is generally agreed that the rapid dissemination of nuclear reactor technology, accompanied by the provision or sale of nuclear reactors or assistance in their construction, has been the largest single factor contributing to the creation of the Nth country problem, i.e., the technical capability of a growing number of nations to develop and produce nuclear weapons. As more and more nuclear power reactors come into operation throughout the world, and in particular as advanced breeder technology comes to the fore, the dramatic accumulation of fissile material in the spent fuel from power reactors and the incentive this will provide in many countries for the construction of fuel rod reprocessing and plutonium separation facilities, will undoubtedly pose a highly intractable problem in the nuclear control field.[24] Nevertheless, few people would take the stand that the advanced nuclear nations acted irresponsibly in declassifying nonmilitary nuclear technology and in assisting other nations to benefit from it, or that a moratorium should now be declared on the construction of nuclear power stations or on the further development and applications of breeder reactor technology.

On purely technical grounds, it is sometimes claimed that there are only a few "isolated corners of the earth" where nuclear explosives could be used to advantage (i.e., economically and with

[24]G. H. Quester of Harvard University discussed some of the implications of this problem in "Is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Enough?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1967, pp. 35-36.

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reasonable safety) in massive excavation projects, just as there are only a few (if any) highly specialized "corners of pure science" which might be illuminated to some degree by the use of the greatly enhanced neutron fluxes nuclear explosions can provide.[25] In both cases, according to this reasoning, there is nothing of real importance that cannot be done by other means; in the case of excavation, by nonnuclear digging, and in the case of pure science, by high-flux reactors or other nonexplosive methods of generating intense neutron fluxes.[26] The somewhat higher cost and increased time factors in the use of nonnuclear methods would be more than offset by the absence of radioactive contamination and the complications resulting therefrom. The proposed sea-level Atlantic-Pacific canal, for example, could be excavated by conventional means at a cost and over a time period not more than two to three times that calculated for the use of nuclear excavation. In any event, merely enlarging the existing lock canal (by conventional means) to accommodate the largest ships would, it is claimed, be cheaper than any proposed scheme, nuclear or otherwise, for a sea-level canal and might be adequate for decades to come.

The validity of the foregoing arguments is of course a function of the cost and "cleanness" of the nuclear devices and the effectiveness of the emplacement and shielding techniques used. The situation in all of these areas should continue to improve if Plowshare research and development is not severely curtailed or abrogated. Also the fact that several countries, in addition to the United States, are seriously considering a number of nuclear excavation and resource management projects suggests that the "isolated corners of the earth" may not be as few as implied by Plowshare's critics. What is more to the point, the proposed applications may be of such overwhelming economic or political significance to the countries concerned that the actual number may be irrelevant. Brazilians, for example, have spoken of using nuclear explosives to link the waterways of the Amazon and the Rio de la Plata and have referred to their proposal as a matter of the "greatest" economic importance.

Some critics of Plowshare, while decrying excavation and neutron flux applications, do concede that oil and gas recovery

[25]D. R. Inglis, "Nuclear-Explosive Engineering and the Proliferation Problem," paper prepared for the 17th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held at Ronneby, Sweden, September 3-8, 1967.

[26]Such as the proposed Canadian Intense Neutron Generator, a sophisticated combination of a particle accelerator and the "spallation" principle by means of which it is hoped to generate intense beams of neutrons at relatively low cost.

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might benefit substantially (and uniquely) from the use of completely-contained underground nuclear explosions and that this might therefore be one area (possibly the only one) justifying a continuation of Plowshare experimentation. This viewpoint appears to have considerable support within the U.S. Administration; of all the proposed Plowshare applications, Gasbuggy (the gas stimulation experiment) is the only one in the past two years for which an actual nuclear trial was authorized and carried out.

However, two novel counterarguments to this view have been put forward recently by D. R. Inglis of the Argonne National Laboratory.[27] He suggests that the enhanced exploitation of fossil fuels resulting from the successful development of gas and oil stimulation techniques could be a "tragic mistake" in the long run because of the need to conserve the world's "limited supply" of fossil fuels for use as lubricants and as raw materials for the petrochemical industry in the decades and centuries to come. Inglis goes on to suggest that the contamination of the atmosphere which would inevitably result from the enhanced exploitation or burning of fossil fuels might gradually "close the infrared window" of the earth's atmosphere, thus leading to a greater retention of heat near the earth's surface and ultimately a radical alteration of the world's climate. On both counts, he believes that the growing power needs of humanity would be much better served by accelerating the development and construction of advanced nuclear reactors for both heating and electrical power purposes, rather than by increasing oil and gas recovery.

Although interesting and plausible, both of these arguments are debatable on technical and conservationist, as well as political, grounds. As already indicated, the presently planned development of nuclear power throughout the world will soon create a grave problem in regard to the rapid accumulation of stockpiles of fissile material in many countries (as well as in the hands of private and semi-public utilities), and this would only be exacerbated by accelerating this development. In addition, there will be the increasingly serious problem of processing and then storing or otherwise disposing of the vast quantities of highly radioactive nuclear fuel wastes produced by the nuclear power industry. The accumulation of fissile material and the disposal of radioactive wastes are such formidable considerations that some people have

[27]Inglis, *op. cit.;* also, "Special Report on Plowshare," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* December 1967.

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recommended curtailing the spread of nuclear power pending the development of controlled fusion or thermonuclear power.

Apart from technical and political considerations, social scientists have on occasion pointed out that the widely accepted use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes might tend to remove or at least dilute present inhibitions toward using nuclear weapons in warfare. This is a serious concern, since any erosion of the psychological "firebreak" between the use of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons in the minds of the general public would have the inevitable consequence of "making it easier" to decide to resort to nuclear weapons in a given military situation, in spite of the escalation toward higher levels of violence that such a decision might beget. However, a direct causal relationship of this type has not been noted in other areas of technology: the acceptability for peaceful uses of high explosives, rockets, aircraft and poison gases has had no demonstrable effect on the stigma attached to their use for military purposes.

Conclusions and Recommendations

There is an inherent conflict between the aims and requirements of Project Plowshare and those of such arms control measures as the nonproliferation treaty and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The overriding importance of arms control for world peace and stability would suggest, in this case, that the former be sacrificed in the interests of the latter, if it could be shown (1) that Plowshare was the only or even a major difficulty bedeviling the arms control problem, and (2) that Plowshare held little or no economic promise for the nations of the world. My judgment, based on an extensive evaluation of available material, is that both of these premises are wrong and hence that ways and means should be found to eliminate, or at least minimize, the conflict.

The attempt to achieve meaningful measures of arms control is beset by political, economic and technological obstacles. By any reasonable standard of comparison, the difficulties created by Plowshare appear to be less significant and probably more easily soluble in a framework of foreseeable arms control agreements than most of the other impediments. On the technological side, for example, the rapid accumulation of fissile material resulting from the worldwide expansion of nuclear power undoubtedly poses far more sensitive problems for nonproliferation than does Plowshare. In spite of this growing concern, however, no one has yet seriously

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suggested an abandonment, or even a drastic curtailment, of nuclear power programs in the interests of nonproliferation.

My survey of Plowshare plans, programs and progress suggests that the peaceful application of nuclear explosives holds the promise of substantial economic benefits for a number of interested countries, initially in the area of resources management and eventually in the area of large-scale excavation and other engineering projects. Even under the restrictions applying to Plowshare experimentation, significant progress in improving devices and techniques and in reducing the hazards and costs associated with their use has been and can continue to be made by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Proposals to curtail Plowshare experimentation, minimize its potential economic benefits, or abandon it altogether—in an effort to remove one impediment to a nonproliferation treaty—are therefore believed to be undesirable and unnecessary. An announced U.S. moratorium on Plowshare would probably have the reverse effect to that desired, in that it would engender suspicion of U.S. motives and almost certainly increase the determination of interested nonnuclear nations to develop or acquire this technology themselves.

Any attempt to minimize the conflict between Plowshare and nonproliferation would have to start with acceptable assurances to the nonnuclear nations that, in promising to forgo the development and acquisition of nuclear devices, they would still be able to share in all of the future benefits of Plowshare technology. The preamble to the August 1967 version of the U.S.-Soviet draft nonproliferation treaty, which offered nuclear explosive services to interested signatory nations on a "non-discriminating basis," was a step in this direction, albeit a limited and unsatisfactory one. Some nations immediately expressed dissatisfaction because the preamble spoke of the intention of the nuclear-weapons powers to provide these services but did not explicitly affirm their obligation to do so. This draft treaty also neglected to define the "appropriate international procedures" under which such services would be made available. Article V of the final treaty states that all signatory powers "obligate" themselves to ensure that nuclear explosive services are made available on a nondiscriminatory basis at minimum cost. It also permits the provision of such services to be arranged on a bilateral basis or through an international agency, although it does not spell out any organizational or procedural details.

Nevertheless, there still remains the basic problem that at

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present, and for a considerable time to come, only the United States and the USSR are in a position to provide appropriate nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. In the final analysis, the attitude and the good will of one or both of the superpowers will govern any arrangements or procedures, and these will be affected critically not only by the identity of the requesting party, but also by the international situation prevailing at the time. Thus political factors, rather than technical or economic assessments, will inevitably dominate the superpowers' decisions regarding proposed applications. It remains to be seen whether the nonnuclear nations professing a serious interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives will submit to this kind of limitation or uncertainty on something they presumably consider to be of vital economic and technological importance. Brazilian and Indian comment to date would lead one to think they will not submit.

Although the nonproliferation treaty has been signed, the United States and the USSR should make a serious attempt to meet the stated objections of the nonnuclear nations to the wording of the treaty on the provision of nuclear explosive services. At the least, the two superpowers should put into a separate agreement specific suggestions on the organization and facilities that might provide nuclear explosive services. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will undoubtedly be asked to administer the nuclear materials safeguard and control functions required by the treaty, it would appear reasonable to expect the Agency also to exercise the basic administrative responsibility for the conduct of approved peaceful nuclear explosions. A special unit or center of the IAEA might be set up to coordinate requests from nonnuclear nations for such explosions, evaluate the political, economic and technical feasibility of the proposals, undertake the necessary site and safety surveys, and then make the necessary arrangements with the United States or the USSR (or both) for the conduct of the explosions. It would be essential that this unit receive all available U.S. and Soviet data on Plowshare-type experimentation, including the parameters (size, weight, yield, "cleanness") of the various types of devices developed for this purpose, and that it have adequate numbers of technical and scientific personnel as well as supporting equipment and facilities to utilize the data properly in its evaluations. Special measures would have to be devised to ensure that vital nuclear weapons design information was not inadvertently released or

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otherwise compromised during the provision by the United States or the USSR of the explosive services. The devices themselves would have to remain in the physical custody of representatives of the supplying power up to the time of detonation. Similarly, the exercising or initiation of any special controls or firing procedures would have to remain the prerogative of the supplying power.

Although the United States could undoubtedly supply enough nuclear devices for all foreseeable Plowshare-type requirements for years and even decades to come, it would be politically desirable to share this responsibility with the USSR. Ideally, this would entail a mutual sharing between the two nations of all relevant information developed as a result of their respective programs, and possibly the formation of a joint team which would be available upon request from the IAEA to carry out the required services. In practice, however, this might be difficult, if not impossible, to arrange. Hence it would probably be necessary for the IAEA to make specific arrangements with one or the other of the superpowers. From such undertakings the Western world might receive valuable information on how far the Soviet Union has progressed in this field; to date, little or no information and few indications of interest are available from the USSR, whereas the United States has published extensively on the subject.

Security difficulties could be decreased and nuclear explosive services made more acceptable to potential recipient nations if a partial or full disclosure could be made of the design of nuclear devices developed specifically for peaceful purposes.[28] Although it is not certain that this could be done without divulging vital weapons design information, it should at least be carefully considered as another possible way to overcome the objections of nonnuclear nations to the nonproliferation treaty. The basic principles of nuclear explosive design are more or less independent of the intended application (peaceful or military) and are in any case fairly well known by now. However, the ways in which these principles are translated into actual hardware are certainly not public knowledge and may, in practice, differ considerably according to intent: military applications place a heavy premium on reduced size and weight, whereas these parameters are relatively unimportant in peaceful applications. For this and other reasons, it might be possible to "choose" the design of Plowshare devices in

[28] See the testimony of Dr. Edward Teller, then Director of the Livermore Branch of Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, on this point in *Frontiers in Atomic Energy Research*, pp. 52-55.

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such a way as to divulge little or no information vital to the design of deliverable nuclear weapons.

Whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union have consciously attempted to follow separate lines of development as between peaceful and military nuclear devices is not known, but it would appear to be in their best interests (and in the interest of reconciling Plowshare and nonproliferation) to do so. A partial or complete declassification of the design of Plowshare devices would also greatly improve the assurance that authorized detonations were not being used covertly, by either of the superpowers, to advance the state-of-the-art in nuclear weaponry. On balance, the advantages of declassification, if judiciously carried out, probably outweigh the risk that a nonnuclear nation might seek to manufacture such devices and misuse them for military purposes.

To ensure that the maximum potential of Plowshare (and its Soviet equivalent) is developed and made available to all interested nations, it is essential that such programs be specifically exempted from the limited test ban treaty and also from any comprehensive test ban that may be negotiated in the future. This exemption should include nuclear cratering trials, as well as the development and testing of improved Plowshare devices. Specific safeguards should be written into the agreement to ensure that (1) the release of radioactivity to the atmosphere and the radioactive contamination of the surrounding environment is kept below a certain "permissible level"; and (2) the detonations are not used by the nuclear-weapons powers to test new or improved weapons designs or to obtain information of military value. The permissible level of radioactivity would obviously depend on a variety of factors, such as the local geology and ecology, the proximity to inhabited areas, and prevailing wind directions, and would have to be determined separately for each proposed application. Measures to deter the nuclear-weapons powers from using Plowshare detonations for military purposes might include the requirement that a multinational team, including technical personnel from both the superpowers as well as other interested nations, observe and participate not only in the conduct of each such detonation but also in the preparations for it. Within these two restrictions, however—minimal release of radiation and nonuse for military purposes—both the United States and the USSR should be encouraged to advance the state-of-the-art with respect to Plowshare applications as rapidly as possible.

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CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY*

by Victor Gilinsky and Bruce L. R. Smith

THE debate on the joint U.S.-Soviet drafts of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),[1] following their unenthusiastic reception by the principal nonnuclear industrial countries, on the grounds that the treaty would discriminate against their civilian nuclear programs, has served to focus attention on the economic implications of measures designed to control the spread of nuclear weapons. It has made clear that even where there is agreement in principle on preventing diversion of civilian nuclear facilities and materials to military purposes, considerable disagreement can exist over where to strike the balance between the increasing dangers and the increasing benefits of nuclear power.

The signing of a compromise treaty[2] by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and at least sixty-five other countries[3] is not an indication that the principal issues relating to civilian power have been resolved. Even if, as expected, at least some of the major nonnuclear industrial countries that have so far held back—for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland—eventually sign the treaty, it is doubtful whether they will ratify it before a number of issues are settled through future negotiation.[4]

The most prominent of these issues is the matter of inspection of civilian facilities to make sure they are not being

*The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and not of any organizations with which they are affiliated. The authors wish to thank Dr. James Schlesinger of The RAND Corporation and Professor Ciro Zoppo of the University of California at Los Angeles for their very useful comments and criticism.

[1]In August 1967, the U.S. and Soviet delegations submitted identical but separate drafts to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva, each leaving blank Article III, the section dealing with inspection. (See *New York Times,* August 24, 1967, p. 1.) A complete version which filled in the hitherto blank Article III was released January 18, 1968 and published in the *New York Times* of that date.

[2]See Raymond H. Anderson, "Ban on Atom Arms Spread Signed," *New York Times,* July 2, 1968, p. 1.

[3]None of the latter (as of August 1968) has any significant nuclear facilities in operation, with the possible exception of one small power reactor in East Germany.

[4]Among the nonsigners are, of course, other countries whose objections are frankly strategic and to some extent all the hold-outs have mixed motives. Even

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used for military purposes. The NPT incorporates the inspection safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a curious way. The treaty requires each nonnuclear signatory to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement *to be negotiated* with the IAEA.[5] But a number of nonnuclear countries planning large civilian programs have objected that application of the present IAEA inspection system may put them at a disadvantage in the future development of nuclear power. In particular, it has been charged that the IAEA inspection system does not adequately protect commercial interests in civilian nuclear power, that is, it reflects a precommercial phase of development. Indeed, whether the IAEA system is appropriate during the current commercial stage of nuclear development is a question that is receiving serious attention abroad. Therefore, signing of the NPT by a significant number of the nonnuclear industrial countries will only accentuate negotiation over the specific issue of inspection.

In addition, a whole range of issues relates to the degree of future technological dependence on the superpowers. The nonnuclear countries are especially unhappy with the nuclear powers' monopoly of the still secret technology of uranium enrichment. The United States has generally discouraged foreign uranium enrichment facilities because of their possible use for military purposes. Any discussion of the construction of such facilities in nonnuclear countries immediately raises complicated political problems. But a number of these countries have insisted that there should be no artificial technological barriers between countries that have agreed to adhere to the NPT.

It is easy to ascribe reluctance to sign the NPT to military aspirations that are beset with inhibitions. But the rapidly increasing commercial importance of civilian nuclear power suggests that we should not dismiss the professed objections as a mere smokescreen. Although at first poorly expressed by political spokesmen, who were only beginning to understand the subject themselves, the objections nevertheless represent the serious con-

before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic indicated that the possibility of its adherence to the NPT was contingent on an improved Soviet attitude toward Germany. It is now an interesting question what the Soviet action will do to the chances of a West German signature, and ultimately to the entire NPT.

[5]Article III, paragraph 1. Also see *Department of State Bulletin,* May 20, 1968, p. 644. For a thorough analysis of the NPT, see Mason Willrich, "The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World Politics," *The Yale Law Journal,* July 1968, pp. 1447-1519.

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cern of important economic and technical groups about the future industrial growth of their countries.

Events of the past three years have so greatly enhanced the prospects for widespread commercial use of large nuclear plants that, for the first time, it has become a practical matter for the major industrial countries to plan for the transition of their economies to substantial dependence on nuclear fuels. Clearly this shift in the economics of civilian nuclear power must have far-reaching implications for the task of devising acceptable means of controlling the more dangerous aspects of nuclear fission.

Balancing the dangers and benefits of nuclear power is made difficult by the lag between the assumptions guiding public debate on nuclear issues and events taking place in industrial laboratories, fabricating plants and financial houses. Past developments are hardly assimilated before new technical advances again demand sharp modification of prevailing assumptions. For example, only recently it was widely assumed outside the nuclear industry that nuclear power would not be commercially important in the near future.[6] This attitude arose in part from a healthy skepticism toward the overly optimistic claims of nuclear-power enthusiasts made in the early 1950's. But intelligent skepticism too often hardened into dogma, particularly among those whose concern over the dangers of proliferation exceeded their interest in the generation of electrical power. As a result, sweeping "toughminded" proposals were put forth which envisioned the feasibility of strict control and even curtailment of civilian nuclear technology in the interests of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Then, as events developed, the toughminded position became increasingly untenable.

In short, the signing of the NPT does not alter the necessity for a re-evaluation of some of the policies the United States has adopted in an effort to ensure that civilian nuclear programs do not contribute to foreign weapons programs. The emergence of strong commercial interests in nuclear power means that a greater effort than before will now have to be made to assure equal opportunity to exploit nuclear energy to at least the advanced countries. Otherwise, we are unlikely to obtain their cooperation. They may have been willing in the past to give up intangible

[6]As late as 1963 an experienced writer on the subject stated: "It is impossible to say whether the inherent promise of nuclear fuels—abundance, mobility, and economy—will begin to be realized within the 40 year time span of this analysis." Sam H. Schurr, "Energy," *Scientific American*, September 1963, p. 124.

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benefits in order to ward off intangible dangers, but they do not appear willing now to give up a disproportionate share of tangible benefits for the same purpose.

The Growth of Civilian Nuclear Power and the Need for Safeguards

A comprehensive review of the evolution of civilian nuclear power is out of place here, but a brief consideration of its current and projected status is much to the point. The fact that dominates any discussion of nuclear power today is the tremendous backlog of reactor orders in the United States: over 70,000 megawatts of nuclear electrical generating capacity is under construction, on order, or definitely planned.[7] Since the start of the buying wave at the end of 1965 more than half of the new power capacity ordered has been nuclear,[8] and the percentage of nuclear orders will probably rise still further over the next decade. As a result of this startling increase, the Atomic Energy Commission forecast for installed nuclear capacity in the United States *in 1980* has risen from a 1962 estimate of 40,000 megawatts of electrical power to the present 1968 estimate of about 150,000 megawatts, or about 30 per cent of the expected 1980 total for U.S. electrical generating capacity.[9] Other organizations have produced comparable estimates.[10]

A similar commercial acceptance of nuclear power is anticipated in other advanced countries, though on a reduced scale. Generally speaking, as experience with nuclear plants has accumulated, forecasts of the growth of nuclear power in a number of industrial countries have been revised upward over the past few years. Projections to the year 1980 envision a total nuclear electrical generating capacity in the Western countries and Japan about double the figure for the United States alone.

The reasons why the issue of safeguards has become so important are clear from the projections of the large amounts of plutonium (produced as a by-product by all uranium-fueled reactors)

[7]Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) News Release L-162, July 10, 1968. Only about 3,000 megawatts of nuclear power are in operation. Total U.S. electrical generating capacity is about 250,000 megawatts.

[8]See, for example, *Nuclear Industry*, July 1967, p. 15.

[9]The AEC estimates 120,000-170,000 megawatts, with a most probable value of about 150,000 megawatts. *Nuclear Industry*, June 1967, p. 33.

[10]On the low side, the estimate of a RAND economist, Dr. W. Hoehn, is 110,000-130,000 megawatts. W. R. Hoehn, *The Economics of Nuclear Reactors for Power and Desalting* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-5227-1-PR/ISA, November 1967).

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that will soon be available in the civilian economy. For example, 150,000 megawatts of installed nuclear electrical generating capacity, equal to the amount expected in the United States in 1980, and roughly equal to the amount expected abroad, corresponds to an *annual* production of about 35,000 kilograms of plutonium. This provides a vast potential for weapons production, since the amount of plutonium required for a nuclear weapon is about five to ten kilograms. The German Federal Republic and Japan, the two most prominent industrial countries without nuclear weapons, are each expected to produce their first 1,000 kilograms of plutonium in the early 1970's. By 1980 they should have nuclear electrical generating capacities of about 20,000 megawatts.[11] That is, they will be producing almost 5,000 kilograms (or, in a sense, the equivalent of 500-1,000 weapons) [12] of plutonium *per year* soon after 1980.

This is not to suggest that there is now any significant likelihood that this initial plutonium will be used for weapons. Instead, plans in these and other countries call for the use of large quantities of plutonium for the development of advanced reactors. It is for this purpose that they are now organizing plutonium separation and processing industries. Nevertheless, the potential for harm is so great that one would like to eliminate, insofar as practical, even the possibility of misuse.

But the problem of control can be appreciated in its full complexity only when one considers that plutonium, besides being valuable commercially, is expected eventually to replace uranium as the main fuel for the generation of power by nuclear energy. For the distant future, control of plutonium implies control of electrical power, which implies control of industry. This fact is central to any understanding of national attitudes toward plutonium.

The basic reason for the coming switch to plutonium fuel is that the present generation of thermal reactors, which burn

[11]The present forecast for the Federal Republic in 1980 is about 20,000-25,000 megawatts (W. Hafele, private conversation). The new Japanese Long Range Program forecasts "at least" 30,000-40,000 megawatts in 1985. See V. Gilinsky and P. Langer, *The Japanese Civilian Nuclear Program* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-5366-PR, August 1967).

[12]Some care needs to be exercised in translating kilograms of plutonium into bomb equivalents. Most commercial plutonium, as a result of heavy irradiation, will contain substantial quantities of the isotope plutonium-240, which will render the plutonium much less useful, though not useless, for military purposes. However, the above production capacities also correspond roughly to the capacities for producing relatively pure plutonium-239 under noncommercial conditions—that is, rapid replacement of fuel elements.

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mainly uranium-235, still use uranium fuel rather inefficiently. The logic of nuclear development, therefore, leads to the plutonium-fueled "fast breeder" reactor, which first converts all the cheap uranium-238 into plutonium before burning it.[13] Some countries lacking uranium also find these reactors especially attractive because they greatly reduce uranium intake (by about a factor of 50); and since breeders would usually replace reactors using slightly enriched uranium, they would lessen the user's dependence on foreign enrichment facilities.

In a number of industrial countries plans now call for the large-scale installation of fast breeders starting around 1980. From then on the generation of electricity in advanced economies will become increasingly dependent on plutonium fuel. Looking far ahead, one can say that considerable quantities of plutonium will eventually be present wherever electrical power is generated.[14] But even in the next ten or fifteen years, before commercial fast breeders become important, the anticipation of their advent will determine the value of plutonium.[15]

Another area of major concern is the possible increase in the number of uranium enrichment facilities around the world. Growing nuclear power means growing fuel requirements and hence a need for enrichment facilities of very large capacities. The prognosis is that in about ten years the demand will outstrip the present capacity of the huge U.S. diffusion plants at Oak Ridge, Portsmouth and Paducah.[16] More capacity will then have to be added to satisfy U.S. needs, not to speak of greatly increased foreign needs. This may lead to the construction of new foreign enrichment facilities despite the U.S. commitment to provide enrichment services at reasonable prices.

It is not now anticipated that nuclear reactors will utilize the

[13]See, for example, V. Gilinsky, *Fast Breeder Reactors and the Spread of Plutonium* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-5148-PR, March 1967).

[14]A 1,000-megawatt (electric) fast breeder reactor, large enough to supply power to a city of about one million, is expected to require an inventory of about 3,000 kilograms of plutonium.

[15]The decision whether or not to stockpile plutonium for future use will depend on the expected value of plutonium in breeders and on the cost, so that it may be different in the various countries.

[16]As recently disclosed by the AEC, this is about 17 million "kilograms of separative work" per year, or enough to produce each year over 4,000 tons of 3 per cent uranium-235. A typical 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor consumes about 40 tons of such fuel per year. The units of separative work often cause confusion. For an explanation (which Senator Pastore called "clear as mud"), see U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria and Related Matters,* 89th Congress, 2nd Session, August 2-17, 1966. A great deal of information is provided in the recent AEC publication, "AEC Gaseous Diffusion Plant Operation," ORO-658, February 1968.

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highly enriched uranium (perhaps 90 per cent uranium-235) needed in nuclear weapons, and the slightly enriched uranium (about 3 per cent uranium-235) commonly used in reactors cannot be exploded. But the facilities used to produce slightly enriched uranium might be adaptable to the production of highly enriched uranium. Whether this is possible would depend on the type of facility, but at any rate the technology would be transferable to military use. This is the reason for the strict secrecy surrounding the U.S. diffusion plants and also for the recent AEC policy of discouraging alternative enrichment developments.

In the light of such trends, we can reasonably assume that the explosive material needed for nuclear weapons, or the capacity to produce it rapidly, will be available within the next decade in a number of advanced industrial, presently nonnuclear nations. Whether the technical potential could be exploited for military purposes is another matter. In addition to fissile material, a fairly sizeable development program, military laboratories, and a testing program are required to produce useful weapons. Nevertheless, because obtaining the fissile material is such an important step toward a military capability, we need international safeguards or tacit agreements to prevent the diversion of the fissile material to military uses. The problem is a difficult one precisely because the coming wide availability of fissile material makes it difficult to obtain wide agreement on safeguards in view of the central role this material is expected to play in industrial countries.

Unilateral U.S. Attempts to Control Foreign Nuclear Technology

At one time the United States had a virtual monopoly on civilian nuclear technology. The present period of civilian nuclear development around the world began, generally speaking, with the "Atoms for Peace" Program launched in 1954, under which the United States released technical data and supplied aid to a large number of countries. During the subsequent years most noncommunist countries had no choice but to submit to AEC requirements in the form of bilateral safeguards, resale restrictions, and the like, in order to obtain assistance in nuclear technology. This early U.S.-dominated period has left its traces in Washington's continued paternalistic attitude toward foreign nuclear development.

But, as other countries developed their own nuclear programs,

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and thereby acquired a larger degree of technological independence and confidence, the ability of the United States to direct the course of events diminished. There is now a danger that, on behalf of established policy, short-range, manipulatory tactics may be difficult to resist for those charged with "doing something" about nuclear proliferation. In a number of instances the United States has probably acted too rigidly against foreign civilian nuclear programs on grounds related to proliferation. This has only served to increase suspicion of U.S. motives. While Washington has done and is still doing a great deal to assist foreign programs, there now is a feeling abroad that U.S. policy in this area is ambiguous.

Implicit in a policy that seeks to exercise some control over foreign nuclear programs is also a considerable degree of administrative coercion over U.S. industry. For as the United States operates with increasingly reduced leverage on foreign programs, it may become necessary to take extensive measures at home in order to produce small effects abroad.

In this connection the recent U.S. attempt to discourage foreign gas-centrifuge development is interesting. The targets of this action were presumably a number of active and potential foreign centrifuge development programs, especially the active programs in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands and Japan. The gas-centrifuge method of isotope separation is a potential competitor to gaseous diffusion for commercial enrichment of uranium. But whereas gaseous diffusion plants must be large to be economical, the economics of gas-centrifuge facilities are relatively independent of size. Thus, if centrifuge technology were sufficiently improved for large-scale commercial enrichment, it might also become fairly cheap to produce small quantities of highly enriched uranium for weapons in small plants that might be difficult to locate.

In March 1967 the AEC announced that "national security interests would best be served if privately sponsored work [in the United States] on the gas-centrifuge process for separation of isotopes were discontinued."[17] The AEC seems to have reasoned that discontinuation of (the already secret) private centrifuge development in the United States would lessen the incentive for other countries to continue their programs. It could also be argued, of

[17]U.S. AEC Press Release K-70, March 21, 1967. See also Jerry E. Bishop, "AEC Plans to Halt Four Firms' Research on Techniques to Obtain Enriched Uranium," *Wall Street Journal*, March 23, 1967, p. 7.

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course, that the AEC action may itself have provided a strong incentive for the continuation of foreign programs. To strengthen its hand, the AEC subsequently proposed additions to the Commission's Regulations[18] in order to give it wide authority to classify scientific and technical data in some areas of nuclear energy even if developed free of any connection with the government. The proposed rules were strongly criticized on legal and technical grounds[19] and have not yet been adopted, but private U.S. development of centrifuge technology has been terminated.

In early 1968, there were a number of reports that the Dutch centrifuge program had reached the point justifying construction of a pilot plant.[20] And in Japan a Nuclear Fuel Committee led by the Acting Chairman of the Japan AEC recently recommended a fairly substantial centrifuge research and development program (as well as a gaseous diffusion program) in order to make a determination, around 1972, whether to proceed with a full-scale plant.[21] The present American policy may therefore be based on an underestimate of foreign technological potential to act independently of the United States. When asked about the possible effect of the unclassified Japanese program on the usefulness of the proposed new AEC secrecy regulations, a member of the AEC commented that it would take the Japanese about fifteen years to reach the level of centrifuge technology now considered classified in the United States.[22] It is doubtful whether this confidence is warranted. While the ultimate effect of the AEC's action cannot yet be assessed, it would be especially unfortunate if the present course led to stifling U.S. technology without significantly affecting foreign technology.

This case displays the inherent difficulty in unilaterally attempting to frustrate foreign technology which might lead to future dangers but which at the same time has obvious major commer-

[18]The original version of the proposed changes was published in the *Federal Register* on May 2, 1967. A revised version was published for comment on December 28, 1967. (32 *Federal Register* 20868-80.)

[19]See, especially, the statements of the Committee on Atomic Energy, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, of June 14, 1967 and March 26, 1968. See also V. Gilinsky, *Proposed AEC Rules on Private Restricted Data* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, P-3787, February 1968).

[20]"Dutch Indicate Possibility of Building Centrifuge Plant," *Nuclear Industry*, March 1968, p. 24. See also J. A. Redeker, "Cut-price Nuclear Fuel," *New Scientists*, March 21, 1968.

[21]*Atoms in Japan*, April 1968, p. 10. The original report released on March 27, 1968 is in Japanese.

[22]U.S. AEC, transcript of proceedings, Industry Conference on Restricted Data, under Parts 25, 26 and 95, February 21, 1968 (Washington: Alderson Reporting Company).

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cial applications. The point is not that the spread of nuclear technology is essentially beyond political control[23]—only that *it is unwise to pursue political goals sharply at odds with technical realities.*

To what extent, then, can the United States affect the tempo, direction and size of foreign nuclear programs? Despite the fact that its technology greatly influences the *general* development of technology abroad, and especially nuclear technology, the United States has only a limited ability to control this development in detail. The influence that can be exercised will lessen in the near future and decrease decidedly over the long run. The United States has a commercial advantage because of its dominant position as supplier of nuclear technology and as supplier of enrichment services at low cost. There are, however, alternative sources of technology. Even the advantage of being able to supply technology at a lower cost disappears if the availability is undependable. And while our enrichment services are essential to the operation of most light-water reactors abroad, it must be noted that these are usually U.S.-built or U.S.-licensed reactors. To cut them off would (1) end the prospect of further reactor sales, (2) improve the prospects of natural uranium heavy-water reactors (such as those sold by the Canadians), and (3) speed the construction of independent enrichment facilities.

If other nations believe that stable, economical service is assured, they may continue to rely on the enrichment facilities of the United States. But if uncertainties were to arise about U.S. intentions, or if one-sided controls and concessions were asked for, present inducements to construct their own facilities could become decisive for a number of advanced countries. In short, if the United States sought to exploit its ability to provide cheap nuclear fuel beyond what were considered reasonable and acceptable limits, the reaction almost surely would be intensified efforts to develop alternative sources of fuel. Furthermore, once former customers had adjusted to the U.S.-imposed setbacks, nuclear technology would spread under conditions of sharply diminished U.S. influence.

The United States cannot use the possession of low-cost nuclear fuels to gain direct political advantages over countries at a fairly advanced level of industrial development without running the risk of setting in motion forces undermining the basic intent of

[23]For example, we are not in sympathy with efforts that whet appetites abroad for nuclear explosives.

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its policy. Effective influence in a specific context is not so great as it may appear. It dissipates rapidly if exercised too strongly.

IAEA Inspection?

But civilian nuclear technology could present opportunities for diversion to military purposes. Notwithstanding the many difficulties in the way of such diversion, the potential harm is so great that the need to reduce the opportunities for it should not be minimized. To this end, informal mechanisms may be effective. For example, the idea of diverting civilian materials to military purposes will be powerfully affected by the conditions under which civilian nuclear power is introduced. In many ways potential military programs endanger the civilian programs—among others, by threatening to compete for the same resources and upset orderly development, and by creating political problems. If the countries now on the threshold of developing substantial civilian nuclear programs also develop strong forces opposed to military applications, the political difficulties in the way of weapons programs could become considerable. This initial pattern might then extend to other countries and thus contribute to the formation of firm ground rules shaping the future.

Still, informal arrangements would be made more effective if reinforced with a formal scheme of international safeguards. In any such scheme, the non-nuclear-weapon states which are at a fairly advanced level of development must be included. The difficulty with the NPT is that it is these countries that object most strenuously to the provision of IAEA inspection; they have balked at signing the treaty, and have given many indications that they will not ratify it without some satisfactory interpretation of Article III.

Advocates of the NPT often suggest that the strong opposition to IAEA inspection on the grounds of economic discrimination has no basis in fact, that it is a smokescreen to cancel other motives. There is some truth in the latter contention. But if the matter is examined on its merits, it cannot be denied that the IAEA inspection system is insensitive to commercial interests. The IAEA Statute gives extraordinarily sweeping rights to its inspectors. In addition to checking the flow of fissile material, the Agency has the right to examine the design of facilities and to approve them only if it is sure that they will not serve any military purpose and will permit the effective application of safe-

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guards. Its inspectors are to "have access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of this occupation deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded. . . ."[24] German observers, especially, have pointed out that even if the net commercial effect[25] on the nuclear industries subjected to such inspections was small, say one per cent of export prices, this would still be significant since the difference between high and low bids for large capital orders is often only a few per cent. Because the possible effects are unpredictable, it is natural that industrial countries should not want to be subjected to such inspection on a discriminatory basis. At the very least, they insist, the United States must be inspected on the same basis. They hope a "hostage" United States may help revise the system to make it more compatible with commercial activity. (There was never any expectation that the Soviet Union would tolerate inspection.)

The United States has now accepted this condition. On December 2, 1967, President Johnson stated, "I want to make clear to the world that the United States is not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves."[26] The United Kingdom has also agreed to it. Whether this move will have the desired effect remains to be seen. While it was certainly essential for the general acceptance of the treaty, it now does not appear to have been sufficient. Many details remain to be worked out in future negotiations. For example, the President excluded facilities "with direct national security significance," which presumably include U.S. uranium enrichment facilities. In that case are such facilities or research projects in nonnuclear countries to be inspected?

Moreover, for the United States to be inspected on the same basis as the nonnuclear countries would require about half the effort of the IAEA, since U.S. facilities will constitute about half of the world inventory. We wonder whether such an effort devoted to "preventing" clandestine military programs in the United States, which already has a large military program, might

[24]Article XII of the IAEA Statute.

[25]Not necessarily the direct costs of inspection itself, but all tangible and intangible costs resulting from inspection. Intangible costs could reflect, for example, doubts in the minds of customers about whether an inspected producer could meet a deadline as well as an uninspected producer.

[26]Walter Sullivan, "Johnson Invites World Inspection of Atomic Plants," *New York Times,* December 3, 1967, p. 1. Text of President's statement is on p. 78.

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not also have a demoralizing effect on the IAEA staff, which would be performing a pointless task.

Two Proposals

Presented here are two proposals for the areas where present policy has been criticized. The first concerns international inspection of civilian nuclear power reactors; the second deals with the question of foreign enrichment facilities. Neither is entirely new, but neither has received the attention it deserves.

Inspection

As indicated, one of the major stumbling blocks to NPT ratification is disagreement over the application of Article III, the inspection clause. The Euratom countries have insisted on retaining the Euratom inspection system. But any concessions granted to Euratom in this respect would likely be demanded by other countries, especially Japan. There is also the serious question whether application of inspection procedures can ever be equal as between the nuclear and nonnuclear countries (unless, of course, it is perfunctory everywhere). A further question is whether the inspection system for countries that might decide to make one or a few nuclear weapons ought to be applied to those advanced industrial countries for which such a course is almost inconceivable.

A satisfactory compromise solution to these problems may arise from coming worldwide negotiations along the present lines of IAEA inspection. But it may not. To consider alternatives that could still fit into the framework of the NPT is therefore useful. A natural alternative to comprehensive IAEA inspection could be IAEA *certification* of multinational, perhaps regional, inspection systems. In such a scheme the IAEA would standardize inspection procedures, train inspectors and check on procedures, but it would not itself carry out inspections. All non-nuclear-weapon states that wished to adhere to the NPT might group themselves into associations of not less than, say, four countries, which would then perform the actual inspections. These groupings could also serve as basic international units for technical cooperation and, in the case of undeveloped countries, could function as channels for receiving technical assistance from the more developed nations. This feature would serve as an inducement for many states.

Certain associations suggest themselves immediately: the Euratom countries, the East European countries, the Scandinavian

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countries. Others would have to be arrived at through negotiations. They need not be regional and could also include nuclear powers. Japan, for example, could perhaps join with Britain in making up an association with other countries.

The scheme is by no means foolproof and would probably not allay everyone's fears about his neighbors to the same extent that a comprehensive IAEA inspection would. But the flexibility of the proposed system might permit more effective inspection. There would remain the possibility that an entire association might conspire to evade inspection, but this is most unlikely. The many conflicting interests would rule it out.

An inspection scheme of this sort would permit a greater degree of technological and industrial autonomy and yet, through the feature of overall IAEA surveillance, would retain an international character. The IAEA would not mushroom into a huge international police force, half of which would be required to inspect the United States—a task for which it does not seem to be suited anyway. But most important, the objections raised by the Euratom countries would disappear.

Enrichment Facilities

The second proposal addresses the problem facing the industrial countries without domestic enrichment facilities, which includes all except those that have produced nuclear weapons. The rapid growth of nuclear power and the accompanying enormous demand for enriched uranium, at least before breeder reactors come into wide use, will require the construction of extensive new enrichment facilities. The huge U.S. gaseous-diffusion plants will have to increase their capacity in the late 1970's merely to keep pace with U.S. demand.[27] Britain and France will probably have enough enrichment capacity for domestic needs, but no significant excess capacity. Therefore the Federal Republic, other West European countries and Japan will have to choose between being totally dependent on the United States for enriched uranium and constructing their own enrichment facilities, either on a national or multinational basis. The United States has repeatedly asserted that it will be able to meet the demand for enriched uranium at low prices. Countries choosing to construct their own facilities would, of course, be faced with many technical,

[27]Detailed estimates are presented in the report of an Atomic Industrial Forum Study Committee: *Private Ownership and Operation of Uranium Enrichment Facilities,* Atomic Industrial Forum, June 1968.

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economic and political problems. Even so, there is an understandable reluctance in Europe and Japan to remain dependent on the United States for enriched uranium indefinitely.

At the present time these countries lack enrichment technology and sufficiently large nuclear programs to permit economic enrichment on a national scale. But by the late 1970's this situation will probably change, and the Federal Republic and Japan may each have enough demand for enriched uranium to support economic gaseous-diffusion plants. If gas centrifuges, now under development in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands and Japan, are substantially improved, even smaller countries could support domestic enrichment plants. Hence, despite U.S. opposition, events seem to be drifting toward the construction of foreign enrichment facilities in the 1970's.

Instead of opposing these developments and tightly restricting foreign access to our enrichment technology, the United States should perhaps support such efforts *provided that they are organized on a multinational basis* and are economically justified. The associations suggested as inspection media would serve as useful channels for receiving technical assistance in the area of enrichment. In practice, the only groupings eligible to receive such assistance in the foreseeable future would be those involving Western Europe and Japan. But an orderly cooperative development of civilian nuclear power in these countries might influence a similar development in others.

To have an enrichment plant operating before 1980, its construction would probably have to start around 1975. The technology and engineering would accordingly have to be ready in the early 1970's. In these circumstances the Federal Republic and Japan will soon have to make major investment decisions on a stepped-up R&D program in enrichment technology. For both of them, a decision to go ahead on a national basis may not be easy to reverse. The United States therefore has little time left to take the initiative toward multinational, or regional, development.

There are no easy prescriptions for defusing the military potential of civilian nuclear programs. While the NPT could become an important step in this direction, it has become clear in the past year that it will be impossible to provide useful guarantees against the spread of nuclear weapons without also satisfying the reasonable aspirations of the industrialized nations for vigorous development of civilian nuclear power.

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NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A STUDY IN FRUSTRATION*

by Jaroslav G. Polach

WHEN in 1955 the Soviet Union suddenly modified its prohibitive policies in the nuclear field and promised to aid non-military nuclear developments in the communist bloc, Czechoslovakia greeted this announcement with unbounded optimism and faith in Soviet generosity. To Czech economic planners, anxious about future supplies of indigenous energy, nuclear power signified a welcome alternative to the prospect of ominously rising real costs of domestic coal. Enthused over the promised Soviet aid, they wishfully imagined numerous atomic power stations in operation throughout Czechoslovakia shortly after 1965. The first nuclear power station, the so-called A-1, was to become operational in 1960.

As of now, the A-1 is still not ready and certainly will not be operational before 1970. In the meantime, plans for producing atomic electricity on a larger—i.e., industrial—scale have been quietly shifted to the 1980's, and to the second half of the decade, at that; in other words, twenty years later than planned.

Of course, optimism that was not compatible with the then prevailing state of atomic science and technology led to the postponement of many of the early atomic power programs. This was a common experience as much in the USSR or the United States as in Great Britain and the Euratom countries. A delay of a few years in the execution of the Czechoslovak nuclear program might therefore have had no particular significance were it not for the procrastination attending the realization of the A-1 project, the forced abandonment of important nuclear R&D programs, and the general feeling of frustration noticeable among Czech nuclear experts. In the words of V. Pekarek, of the Czechoslovak Nuclear Research Institute, "Only the developmental cost of the heavy-water reactor Czechoslovakia is building amounted to more than one billion Czechoslovak crowns. . . . The results of the Czechoslovak atomic programs are tragic."[1]

*The author is indebted to Professor José-Ramon Lasuén, of Resources for the Future, Inc. and the University of Madrid, for valuable comments on this article.

[1]*Prace* (Prague), May 21, 1968.

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To illustrate the far-reaching ramifications of the Czechoslovak failure, this article will outline the fundamentals of the Soviet nuclear aid policy, analyze the Czechoslovak energy resource-base and pattern of energy flows to show how atomic power fits into the economy, evaluate the results of Czechoslovakia's power program and the impact of the Czechoslovak experience on the bloc's nuclear cooperation, and conclude with an attempt to assay Soviet policy objectives in this field.

Soviet Nuclear and Technical Aid

On January 17, 1955, the USSR Council of Ministers announced its willingness to furnish nuclear aid to friendly (i.e., mostly communist bloc) countries for the "peaceful development of atomic science, technology and national economy."[2] In sequence to this offer, Czechoslovakia participated in a Moscow conference in April which outlined the details of the Soviet nuclear assistance. However, she was not to be the primary beneficiary of the USSR's new nuclear policy. This place was reserved for China, which received a research reactor of 6.5 megawatts (MW) thermal capacity.[3] All other bloc members, including Czechoslovakia, had to be satisfied with a reactor of only 2 MW.[4]

The individual bloc countries were also given Soviet cyclotrons[5] and certain other nuclear hardware, besides a promise of technical assistance in construction of their respective national nuclear research centers. Czechoslovakia was accorded special treatment in at least one respect: she was the first to which the USSR delivered a research reactor and then supplied aid in its construction. The Nuclear Research Center in Rez near Prague, completed in

[2] *Izvestia*, January 18, 1955.

[3] In an obvious effort to mend fences in the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship, Yugoslavia was the only other country to receive a research reactor of equal capacity, and this was at a later date.

[4] This so-called swimming-pool research reactor of Soviet design was described by Iu. G. Nikolajeiv at the First International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva, 1955, Paper 622). In brief, it is a heterogeneous reactor, using as fuel uranium enriched to 10 per cent with U235, of which the initial core was 4.5 kg. Fuel elements are in the form of aluminum-clad rods of 10 mm. diameter and 500 cm. length. Critical mass is 3 kg. of enriched uranium. Maximum flux is 2 x 10^{13} and the average flux is 1 x 10^{13} neutrons per cm^2, respectively. Light water serves as moderator and coolant.

[5] The cyclotrons delivered to Czechoslovakia and other bloc countries, with the exception of Rumania, are of a type that can accelerate alpha particles to 25 Mega-electron-volts (Mev) energy and deuteron particles to 12.5 Mev energy. Their magnetic field intensity is 14,000 oersteds in the center, the amplitude of high frequency between the poles is 140 to 150 kilovolts (kv), and the deflecting potential 70 kv. Total weight of the electromagnet is 120 tons. The cyclotron is cooled with water flowing through copper ducts simultaneously serving as winding.

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September 1957, was for about one year the only reactor in the bloc outside the Soviet Union.

This preferential treatment may have been due to the fact that since the end of World War II the USSR has enjoyed the exclusive privilege of exploiting the well-known Czech uranium deposits in Jachymov. For the same reason, it is believed, the Soviets were willing to supply Czechoslovakia with some nuclear information and radioisotopes during the last years of the prohibitive phase of their nuclear policy.

Perhaps the most important facet of Soviet aid has been the training and schooling of the bloc countries' nuclear scientists and technicians in the USSR's nuclear establishments. In 1957 about 120 Czechoslovakians were trained under this program in the Soviet Union, and by now almost all nuclear scientists and technicians of some standing in Czechoslovakia have spent some time in Soviet nuclear institutes, especially the (Communist) Joint Nuclear Research Institute in Dubna, near Moscow.

Undoubtedly Soviet scientific, technical and material aid has been indispensable to the renewed Czechoslovak nuclear R&D effort. Nevertheless, it seems to be small and belated compensation for interruption of the earlier Czech nuclear endeavors and for the isolation of the Czechoslovak scientific community imposed by the prevailing regime after 1948. A little-known fact that the communists never mention is that Czechoslovakia's present Nuclear Research Institute developed from policy and institutional arrangements laid down by the late President Benes after World War II. In response to his urging, the Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts created, on August 14, 1946, a Committee for Establishing an Institute for Nuclear Physics. The committee, headed by Professor Augustin Zacek,[6] Chairman of the Charles University Institute of Experimental Physics, was given a subsidy of ten million crowns by the Ministry of Technology in 1947 for the purchase of a Van Graaf accelerator and other nuclear hardware in the West. But all that came to nought because of the communist *putsch*. Soon afterward, C. Simane, an ardent communist, replaced Zacek, and also became head of the first nuclear research laboratory established at the Czech Academy.[7]

It would be unwise to exaggerate the significance of the

[6]There were only two other members, Professors F. Reznicek and V. Trkal.

[7]Simane was later replaced by Professor V. Petrzilka, whom Zacek had sent to Cambridge shortly before World War II to study nuclear physics. In 1955, Petrzilka became the first chairman of the Faculty for Nuclear Physics at Charles University. The faculty was later transferred to Prague's Polytechnic University.

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Czechoslovak nuclear efforts before 1948. As later developments showed, meaningful achievements in nuclear science, and notably technology, require human, technical and financial capabilities far exceeding those of a small country like Czechoslovakia. But had Czechoslovakia been left free to manage her own affairs, she might have realized much earlier her true potential in the nuclear field. She might have been able to obtain a nuclear power reactor from, say, Great Britain.[8] Her reliance on Soviet assistance in acquiring nuclear power has proved unavailing, and her own efforts to develop a nuclear energy program resulted in a considerable misallocation of her scarce scientific and financial resources and technical capacity.

Assistance in the development of nuclear power was the other facet of the new Soviet policy. The USSR concluded only three agreements of this type, the first one with Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1955.[9] Under this agreement, the first Czechoslovak power station,[10] the so-called A-1, was to have a reactor of 150 megawatts of electric capacity (MWe)[11] in operation by 1960. As the agreement was interpreted then, it also meant that the USSR was to deliver the reactor and supply all technical assistance required to have the A-1 operating on time.[12] The size of the station compared favorably even with U.S. nuclear ventures of those days and, if completed as originally planned, it would have been the only industrial atomic power plant outside the territory of the three established nuclear powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Undoubtedly, this would have greatly increased the prestige attached to Soviet nuclear aid. Furthermore, the early development of atomic power in Czechoslovakia would have given tangible proof of that country's technical prowess, simultaneously helping to meet her targets for electricity output

[8]In 1965, Czechoslovakia made the first tentative inquiries about the possibility of buying a British power reactor.

[9]It was followed in 1956 by similar agreements concerning the delivery of power reactors of substantially less capacity to East Germany and Hungary.

[10]At the beginning some uncertainty prevailed as to a location for the reactor. First mentioned was Ziar nad Hronom (*Lidova Demokracie*, October 3, 1956). Later, probably after the Hron water flow was found insufficient for a nuclear power station, the decision went in favor of Bohunice, near the River Vah.

[11]This is a Soviet-design reactor using CO_2 as coolant, heavy water as moderator, and natural uranium in the form of metal as fuel. See Second International Conference on Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (1958), Paper 2053 by P. I. Christenko *et al.*, and Paper 2092 by A. Sevcik.

[12]G. A. Modelski in *Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1959) states (pp. 172-173), in effect, that the Soviets did deliver such a reactor to Czechoslovakia before 1960. This error is less a reflection on Modelski's scholarly work than on the secretive and ambiguous terms of the Soviet agreement.

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set for 1970,[13] while relieving her dependence on indigenous coal for the generation of electricity. This would have been a decisive factor in averting the energy crisis expected in the 1970's.

Energy Economy and Atomic Power

For some time, energy statistics gave little clue to the reasons for the Czechoslovak preoccupation with energy. After all, overall coal production (on the ton-per-ton basis) more than doubled in Czechoslovakia between 1950 and 1964, increasing from about 46 million to approximately 104 million tons,[14] while total energy consumption grew from approximately 37 million to an estimated 80 million metric tons in the same period.[15] The situation seems even more impressive when considered from the point of per capita energy consumption, a yardstick the economists frequently employ for comparing economic development and standards of living.[16] As shown in Table I, Czechoslovakia stood fifth on the world scale with her per-head energy consumption of 3,886 kilograms hard coal equivalent (HCE) in 1955, but moved ahead of Belgium and Great Britain to rank third, exceeded only by the United States and Canada, as this rose to 5,789 kg HCE in 1964. By 1963, Czechoslovakia had attained to two-thirds of the U.S. per capita energy consumption level and, in effect, recorded among the industrialized countries the world's highest annual rate of growth: 4.8 per cent from 1955 through 1963. In 1964, her growth slackened so that the annual rate for the entire ten-year period declined to 3.9 per cent. This clearly indicates that Czechoslovakia's economy has been experiencing difficulties in recent years, although her growth rate in per capita energy consumption remains among the highest in the world.

The favorable impression made by the statistical record is effaced when recent output and consumption figures are considered in connection with the insufficient long-term supply of energy

[13]Interview with Dr. F. Vlasak, then the Minister of Power, in *Rude Pravo*, January 21, 1957. Cf. also *Praca* (Bratislava), May 30, 1957.

[14]See *Statisticka Rocenka Ceskoslovenske Socialisticke Republiky* (Praha: SNTL, 1963 and 1965). (Hereafter cited as *Stat. Rocenka CSSR.*)

[15]Based on the United Nations' *World Energy Supplies*, Statistical Papers Series J, Nos. 8 and 10 (New York: United Nations Statistical Office, 1965, 1967). (Hereafter cited as *WES.*) Hydropower is converted at the level of coal thermal efficiency in central stations.

[16]Former chief energy economist with the United Nations, N. B. Guyol, has used the per capita energy consumption of 1,500 kg HCE in 1949 as a dividing line between the developed and underdeveloped countries. (See *WES*, No. 1, p. 3, note 2.) Czechoslovakia's per capita energy consumption was then about 2,800 kg hard coal equivalents (HCE); *ibid.*, Table 4.

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TABLE I

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION[a] COMPARED WITH THE WORLD AVERAGE AND SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 1955, 1960, 1964 AND 1965

	1955		*1960*		*1964*		*1965*		*1955-1965*
Country	*kg HCE*[a]	*World Rank*[b]	*kg HCE*[a]	*World Rank*[b]	*kg HCE*[a]	*World Rank*[b]	*kg HCE*[a]	*World Rank*[b]	*Growth Rate*
Czechoslovakia	3,886	5	4,755	4	5,789	3	5,667	3	3.9
East Germany	3,878	6	4,660	5	5,570	4	5,459	4	3.5
USSR[c,d]	2,240	13	2,832	12	3,430	13	3,611	12	4.9
Poland[e]	2,621	10	3,097	11	3,517	12	3,504	14	2.9
The World Average	1,201	—	1,403	—	1,541	—	1,594	—	2.9
United States	7,768	1	8,047	1	8,772	1	9,201	1	1.3
Canada	5,279	2	5,663	2	7,133	2	7,655	2	3.8
United Kingdom	4,993	3	4,907	3	5,079	5	5,153	5	0.3
Belgium[e]	4,084	4	3,958	6	4,571	6	4,724	7	1.5

[a]Based on UN *World Energy Supplies*, Nos. 3, 8 and 10, Table 2. Hydropower is converted at the rate of 0.125 kg HCE/kwh throughout the years. HCE stands for hard coal equivalent of calorific value of about 28 million British Thermal Units per one metric ton.

[b]Bahrain, Guam, New Caledonia, and similar countries have not been considered. Their consumption of energy is predominantly determined by particular activity concentrated in a small area, so that their data are not meaningful for international comparison.

[c]Ranking is approximate, plus or minus two positions from the quoted rank.

[d]The USSR may be somewhat better placed if its hydropower is converted with a factor corresponding to thermal coal efficiency in central stations.

[e]Includes Luxembourg.

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from indigenous resources and with a trend in the flow-pattern of energy mix toward liquid fuels which has been developing in all industrial countries. Roughly characterized, Czech energy supply problems are of two kinds. On the one hand, the so-called hard (bituminous) coal, the mainstay of Czechoslovakia's fuel economy for more than a century—solid fuels still cover about 90 per cent of the country's overall energy consumption[17]—is being displaced by liquid fuels, chiefly petroleum products. This is due partly to structural changes in the economy and partly to the rising real cost of hard coal production.[18] On the other hand, the country has not enough indigenous energy resources, not even of coal, to support self-sustained growth of its modern industrial economy in the long run—which, in the circumstances, means the 1980's.

Taken at face value, Czechoslovakia's proven and probable reserves of hard coals are estimated to be in the neighborhood of 3 billion metric tons. With an additional 3 billion tons of possible reserves and 12 billion tons of brown coal and lignite, they would seem to be adequate, at the present rate of output, for at least another 100 years. But these figures include reserves to a depth of 1,500 meters,[19] so that their mining may not be economically feasible under the prevailing technology. Already half of the exploited seams in the Ostrava region, which supplies 80 per cent of Czechoslovak hard coal, are less than one meter thick, and the mines are going deeper, to 1,000 meters and more. Consequently, underground productivity has lessened. Labor productivity, which was rising until 1960, when it reached a peak of 421 tons per worker per year, declined to 394 in 1962.[20] Although new

[17]Based on the UN data. If the conversion factors used for hydropower are the thermal efficiency rates in central power stations, the solid fuel percentage is somewhat lower but not substantially so.

[18]This, however, has not been reflected in the managed prices of coal and other energy resources in Czechoslovakia. The retail price—wholesale prices and/or energy production costs are not available—for one metric ton of hard coal equivalent delivered to the storage bins of a residential customer in Prague has held steady throughout the years at about 220 crowns per 1,000 kg, that is, about $31.00 at the official rate of 7 crowns to $1.00, and about $16.00 at the tourist rate for Czechoslovak crowns. The price of one kwh of electricity delivered to a customer would correspond to about 11 to 13 cents on the basis of the first rate, and 5.5 to 6.5 cents per kwh when the tourist exchange rate is considered. No matter which rate is used, retail energy prices do not reflect the decline in the productivity of coal mines and the corresponding increase in real production costs.

[19]In addition to reserves in already exploited and/or easily accessible fields, another billion metric tons of hard coal is estimated to be in "blocked" areas.

[20]*Stat. Rocenka CSSR*, 1963 and 1965, Tables 7-32 and 7-33. The corresponding U.S. figure for bituminous coal was 2,700 metric tons in 1962, though it must be noted that this figure includes open-pit production. Compared with results in the West European mines of the ECSC, Czechoslovakia's underground productivity per man per shift (approximately 1,780 kg) up to 1962 was on the level of the French

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statistical series published since then do not permit comparing absolute figures for the later years, they still show clearly that productivity per worker in the hard coal mines has remained below the 1960 peak.

In view of the worsening mining conditions, the government launched a campaign to preserve hard coal chiefly for metallurgical and other chemical purposes, and replace it by domestic brown coal in thermal uses, particularly in electricity generation. Brown coal has a relatively high calorific value.[21] This, combined with labor productivity twice as high as that in the hard coal mines (expressed in hard coal equivalents per man per year), makes its production an economically efficient operation. As a consequence, the output of brown coal and lignite has risen rapidly during the last ten years, reaching a peak of approximately 75 million tons in 1964. Yet, the high ash and sulphur content of brown coal causes serious air pollution, the dangers of which impose a limit on the size of power plants. Hence full benefits cannot be reaped from economies of scale. These problems have constrained the further expansion of brown coal production. Since 1964 it has been stabilized at around 70 million tons, while the output of lignite increased slightly to 4.25 million tons in 1966. Evidently the original plans for vigorous expansion of brown coal production through the mid-1970's—when 100 million tons a year could have been anticipated—were given up. This is reflected in the smaller annual additions to production capacity in brown coal mining; the average was about 4.5 million tons annually between 1956 and 1964, but the 1966 figure was only 1.5 million.[22] Even though the output of brown coal and lignite may still increase slowly, it will probably not exceed 80 million tons in any year, that is, about 45 million tons of hard coal equivalents. This, with a decreasing output of hard coal, will certainly not suffice to cover industrial requirements for solid fuels and chemical feedstock.

An even less favorable situation exists with respect to in-

and Dutch average and quite above that of Belgium. Since then, however, Czechoslovakia's competitive position has worsened considerably. In the United States, productivity per man per shift, keeping in mind the open-pit inclusion, was 12 metric tons in 1960. See Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Coal/Prod./Working Paper No. 10/Addendum I (April 24, 1963); European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), *10th Report* (1962), pp. 138 and 521; U.S. *Statistical Abstract,* 1965, p. 718, Table 1029.

[21]In the UN evaluation, its calorific value is 60 per cent of hard coal, i.e., about 4,200 cal/kg. See *WES,* No. 8. See also Jaroslav Holubec, "Rozvoj Energetiky v CSSR," *Energetika* (1964), No. 9, pp. 417-420.

[22]All figures on production of fuels and hydropower are from *Stat. Rocenka CSSR,* 1967.

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digenous crude petroleum and natural gas. Czechoslovak resources of these fuels are minimal, not permitting an output large enough to satisfy the present domestic demand. Moreover, since 1964, production of crude petroleum shows a declining tendency; the output in 1966 was about 190 thousand tons. The figures on natural gas, of which about one billion cubic meters were produced in 1964, are no longer published, but it is known that output is now becoming insignificant as some of the old natural gas fields are being closed and no new ones have been discovered. In the meantime consumption of liquid fuels reached approximately 5 million tons (in crude equivalents), and that of manufactured gas exceeded 5.9 billion cubic meters in 1966. Because of the high capital investment and operating cost connected with the manufactured gas facilities, Czech planners see no alternative but to import natural gas from the Soviet Union and Hungary.

At present, hydropower generates 11.5 per cent of all electricity—4.3 billion kilowatt-hours of an approximate total of 37 billion—so that it is a far more significant domestic source of energy than either the liquid or gaseous fuels. This is the result of vigorous growth during a sixteen-year period, when about 1,250-MWe additional hydropower capacity was installed. After 1964, however, investment in other sectors of the economy was given higher priority, and hydropower expansion came practically to a halt. Only 44-MWe capacity was added in 1965 and 1966. There remains some hydroenergy potential that can be economically harnessed, but unless this is done quickly and multipurpose dams are constructed, the prospects of the Czechoslovak energy economy will be still bleaker. More than that, as some point out, the country will face a severe water shortage within a few years.[23] On the other hand, there is little doubt that even if additional hydroenergy is harnessed, the relative share of hydropower in electricity generation will necessarily decline because of the limited nature of hydro-resources.

The best indicators of the critical tendencies developing in the Czechoslovak energy economy are (1) an increasing dependence on foreign fuels and (2) the decreasing efficiency of capital and investment in the energy sectors. During 1966, imports of crude petroleum and its products exceeded 6.3 million tons (compared with 1.1 million tons in 1955), and imports of coal and coal products reached 3 million tons, for a total bill of about $175

[23]See A. Kraus, "Vyvoj vystavby vodnich prehrad ve svete a v CSSR," *Vodni hospodarstvi* (1965), No. 8, pp. 365-375, at p. 373.

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million.[24] The country has now become a net importer of solid fuels. Moreover, as the substitution of liquid for solid fuels accelerates, the imports of crude petroleum and products will increase even faster in the future. In the five years from 1966 through 1970, the annual average imports of crude petroleum from the Soviet Union will rise to 8 million tons, so that during the entire period more than 40 million tons of liquid fuels[25]—or 55 million tons in HCE—will be imported to sustain the Czechoslovak economy. By 1975, crude imports from the USSR will approximate 14.5 million tons. Also, in 1970 natural gas deliveries from the Dashava fields in Western Ukraine will reach 2.22 billion cubic meters in manufactured gas equivalents. The bill for crude shipments alone will be about $245 million (in 1966 prices) in 1975. What imports of energy on this scale will do to the Republic's balance of payments, the structure of her export industries, and their competitive position is a matter of serious concern.[26]

That the inadequacy of the Czechoslovak energy industries is not a temporary phenomenon is attested to by the steadily decreasing efficiency of the capital stock and new investment of the fuel industries. As seen from Table II, showing the value of gross output produced per 1,000-crown unit of the capital stock in these industries, capital efficiency in 1966 had declined by 20 per cent as compared to 1960 and was even below that of 1950. Table III indicates the efficiency of new investment by comparing its relative growth with that of output (with a one-year lag). Because a breakdown of investment by energy subsectors is lacking, the analysis could not be carried out beyond 1962. Yet, the figures in Table III make it clear that efficiency of new investment in the energy sectors followed the trend noticed in Table II, and was lower in the 1960's than in 1950. In view of the general economic decline in Czechoslovakia after 1963, we may assume that the slight upward turn registered in 1962 was of short duration. These data demonstrate that the fuel industries are the weakest link in Czechoslovakia's economy. The main reason for this is the country's narrow energy-resource base.

[24]Based on the contract prices f.o.b. Czechoslovak borders; see USSR *Vneshniaia Torgovlia* (Foreign Trade) (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1966).

[25]See *Oil and Gas Journal*, November 8, 1965, p. 90.

[26]I have dealt with this and related problems in my lecture, "Outlook for Energy in the Communist World," prepared in cooperation with The George Washington University's Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies. The lecture was broadcast over WTOP, Washington, D.C., November 13, 1966, and published in *Revue de l'energie francaise*, October 1967, and *Gaiko Jiho* (Japan), July 1967.

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Nuclear Power: Expectations and Reality

At this point it is well to remember that Lenin's teachings identify economic progress and communist victory with the rate of electrification of a country. Following his dictum, electricity generation has been given the highest priority in the communist bloc's economic planning and investment; for a while the per-head electricity output was the most frequently used indicator of

Table II

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: GROSS EFFICIENCY[a] OF FIXED CAPITAL STOCK IN INDUSTRY AND ENERGY SECTORS

Industry and Energy Sectors	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1963*[b]	*1965*[b]	*1966*[b]
All Industries	669	820	978	920	889	896
Fuel Producing & Processing Industry	413	466	465	428	388	373
Electricity & Steam Production	185	198	230	228	227	227

[a]A ratio of gross output to a unit (worth 1,000 crowns) of the capital stock in comparable prices of 1955.

[b]For the years 1963-1966, gross output adjusted to the 1955 prices by the author.

Source: *Stat. Rocenka CSSR,* 1967. Table 7-47.

Table III

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: RATIOS OF OUTPUT TO INVESTMENT[a] IN TOTAL INDUSTRY AND ENERGY SECTORS IN SELECTED YEARS

Industry and Energy Sectors	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1962*
Total Industry	1.01	1.17	0.86	0.82
Electric and Steam Producing Industry	1.25	1.12	1.39	1.64
Primary Energy Sources Production	1.11	0.74	0.74	0.84
Energy Processing Industry	1.24	0.69	0.40	0.42

[a]Computed with a one-year lag, i.e., the 1950 ratio compares the 1950 output with the 1949 investment.

Sources: *Stat. Rocenka CSR,* 1957, and *Stat. Rocenka CSSR,* 1963.

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economic development in these nations. Therefore, they have considered the arrival of atomic power as a decisive factor in their efforts toward rapid industrialization and achievement of socio-economic goals.[27] Atomic power was also counted on to help those countries whose energy-resource base is inadequate to sustain large-scale industrial development, such as Czechoslovakia.

Consequently, the Czechs put all their hopes into nuclear electricity and anticipated that they would have something like 3,000 MW nuclear capacity in operation by 1970 (their 1965 total installed capacity was 8,000 MW). The then Minister of Power, Dr. Vlasak, flatly stated in 1955 that "in our Third Five-Year Plan one-third of all new electricity production will have to be provided by atomic power stations. . . ."[28] Obviously, this would have been possible only if the much-heralded Soviet assistance had enabled Czechoslovakia to gain industrial experience in developing, constructing and operating nuclear power stations without going through the usual preliminary stages in nuclear research, prototype development and material testing. In effect, these were the benefits Czechoslovak officials expected from their nuclear power development agreement with the Soviet Union. Their hopes were unequivocally expressed in 1958 by Augustin Sevcik,[29] a prominent nuclear economist who headed the newly established Nuclear Energy Administration in the Ministry of Power which then was primarily responsible for completing the A-1 on time. The government, believing itself to be relieved of the immediate problems connected with the A-1 type stations, embarked on a broadly conceived program of nuclear education, training, R&D and industrial technology.

A new faculty for nuclear physics, chemistry, and reactor engineering was organized at Charles University in 1955, and later transferred to the Czech Polytechnic University at Prague. A four-year specialized industrial college for nuclear technicians was also

[27]On the economic ramifications of nuclear electricity in the communist framework of analysis, see D. S. Fel'd, *Edinyj energeticeskij balans narodnogo chozajstva* (Moscow, 1964), p. 149 ff.

[28]*Pravda* (Bratislava), May 9, 1955. The most optimistic expectations were, however, expressed in the army newspaper *Obrana Lidu,* August 23, 1955. According to this source, atomic power plants in Czechoslovakia were to produce 60 billion kwh annually by 1975. As the paper further stated, to achieve so much in such a short time was possible only in a country that had adopted a socialist system as Czechoslovakia had done. In view of later developments, one must wonder whether the socialist system failed the country, or the army expert failed in economics; probably it was a case of both.

[29]See Augustin Sevcik, "Technologicke a ekonomicke aspekty vystavby atomove elektrarny v CSR," *Jaderna energie* (1958), No. 10, pp. 278-283, at p. 283.

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established. In 1958-1959, these schools produced the first graduates, and by 1966 Czechoslovakia listed in her labor force approximately 450 university and 304 college graduates in nuclear sciences and technology.[30] In the 1966-1967 school year, 534 students were enrolled at the university and 277 at the college.[31] While the first graduates have not been able to contribute much toward hastening the advent of nuclear power because of their lack of practical experience, the program was both ambitious and diversified. It aimed at developing a Czechoslovak design for industrial power reactors of three types: (1) a standard heavy-water, natural-uranium reactor; (2) a homogeneous reactor with two variants, one using heavy water and natural uranium, the other using light water and enriched uranium; (3) a breeder. In addition, plans were made for the production of heavy water and fuel elements in Czechoslovakia.[32]

Although actual appropriations and expenses for these projects are not known, Table IV, which shows investment in selected sectors of the economy, indicates a big rise in investment in sciences and R&D between 1955 and 1956—on the order of 130 million crowns. This would have coincided with the announcement of the Czechoslovak nuclear programs. It seems hardly accidental that investment in scientific activity reached a relative peak in 1956, when it amounted to 3.2 per cent of all industrial investment, and declined to 1.8 per cent of all industrial investment in 1961, when some nuclear projects were dropped because of lack of funds or unfavorable prospects for their successful conclusion in the foreseeable future. This was openly acknowledged with respect to a 60-million-crown program for the development of a homogeneous reactor.[33] Other projects, including those for a breeder and heavy-water reactor, were dropped less ceremoniously.

The development of nuclear technology was left to industry and soon ran into difficulties. In 1955, under the stimulus of the new nuclear policy, a number of departments for the development of nuclear techniques were organized either in a particular industry's research centers—for instance, the Research Institute for Inorganic

[30]*Stat. Rocenka CSSR*, 1964, Tables 4-9, 4-10.
[31]*Ibid.*, 1967, Tables 20-11, 20-15.
[32]For more on this subject, see my "Czechoslovak-Polish Nuclear Cooperation," in M. Rechcigl, editor, *Czechoslovakia, Past and Present* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 473-502.
[33]Vladimir Zajic, "Stav vyvoje homogennich reaktoru a zkusenosti z ceskoslovenskeho projektu," *Jaderna energie* (1961), No. 9, pp. 296-298. Note that R&D investment in this project, if fully carried out, would have been higher than investment for all R&D in 1950.

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TABLE IV

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: INVESTMENT IN NATIONAL ECONOMY, SELECTED SECTORS AND SELECTED YEARS

(in millions of crowns, 1962)

Economy Sector	*1950*	*1955*	*1956*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*[a]	*1965*[a]	*1966*[a]
Total Investment	14,311	22,401	25,451	42,419	45,465	44,268	39,413	39,715	42,821	42,004
Investment by the State[b]	12,920	18,269	20,646	34,463	37,201	36,939	32,503	32,710	35,133	38,478
State Investment in Industry[c]	6,764	8,173	9,550	17,637	19,009	19,967	18,119	17,601	18,623	20,631
State Contribution to Science, Research and Development	52	174	302	364	356	389	386	446	528	607
Science, R&D as a Percentage of State Investment in Industry	0.8%	2.1%	3.2%	2.1%	1.8%	1.9%	2.0%	2.5%	2.8%	2.9%

[a]Starting with 1964, all data in prices as of April 1, 1964; for prior years, in prices of 1962.

[b]These figures form a part of Total Investment.

[c]In addition to industrial investment by the state, the municipal and cooperative bodies still make small investments in some industrial sectors. The latter are not included here.

Source: Based on *Stat. Rocenka CSSR,* 1963, Table 6-1; 1966, 7-3; 1967, 1-1, 7-1, 7-3.

Chemistry[34]—or in separate developmental divisions of the large manufacturing enterprises, such as the Skoda Works, Vitkovice Steel Works, and Tesla. But these had no nuclear experimental equipment or technicians, and there were only a few nuclear scientists capable of devising and directing a meaningful program for them. No wonder, therefore, that as late as September 1963, *Nucleonics* reported[35] that the Czechoslovak industries were still unable to master the basic, though intricate, nuclear techniques. Those who were in charge of the industrial program put some of the blame for this failure on the government, asserting that because of strong governmental pressure they had to concentrate on tasks connected with completing the A-1, once the limited scope of Soviet aid in this direction became obvious. As a result, they neglected other aspects of nuclear science necessary for balanced progress in nuclear technology—and, in the last analysis, for faster progress on the A-1 project.

Czechoslovakia was paying dearly for her misplaced confidence in Soviet technological aid to her nuclear power program. Left to herself, she had to start belatedly, and her experimenting and testing of designs and materials was done in a wasteful way, on the scale of an industrial plant which, besides having become a symbol of her resolve, had progressed too far to be abandoned. There can be little doubt that had she proceeded in the usual way, from research to material testing and experimenting to industrial prototype reactor, she could have managed her scarce resources more efficiently and, ultimately, have advanced the completion of her A-1.

Of course, some of the technological problems Czechoslovakia encountered were a by-product of her particular, especially her topographical, situation. For example, there is no translateral water transportation in the Republic, and no overland carrier could transport in one piece from the Skoda Works in Bohemia to Bohunice in Slovakia a pressurized reactor vessel twenty meters high and five meters in diameter. It was necessary to manufacture this vessel in several parts, which were then transported from Skoda[36] to Bohunice and there welded together. The welding proved to be another problem. The technology for it had to be

[34]Another center of this type is the Research Institute for Technology of Rubber and Plastics (VUGPT) in Zlin-Gottwaldov. Note that R&D funds for such industrial programs are not included in the state-sponsored research shown in Table IV.

[35]*Nucleonics* (1963), No. 9, p. 27.

[36]The Skoda Works is primarily responsible for manufacturing the reactors and their major components.

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first invented and tested, because it involved plates as thick as one to one-and-a-half meters and had to be of such quality as to sustain prolonged exposure to radiation without leaks or deterioration. Only in 1964 did Skoda's technicians and other nuclear engineers report that they had finally mastered the process.[37]

Many other technical problems snarled progress in construction of the A-1. Among them were the brittle fracture of metals exposed to radiation; fastening a lid on the reactor vessel so that it would close tightly without radiation leaks; setting the fuel element rods in the bottom of a reactor so as not to cause undue stress and fissure in the bottom; deciding on the proper design and materials for pipes, fittings, and so forth. It was also left to the Czechoslovak industries to design and develop a fueling device and exhaust system. One begins to wonder, when reading about the stumbling blocks Czechoslovak scientists and engineers had to overcome on their own while building the A-1 plant, what Soviet technical aid amounted to.

In this regard a Soviet account of USSR-Czechoslovakia cooperation on the A-1 is interesting. According to E. Korobeiinikov's recent article in the official publication of the USSR Academy of Sciences and State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy in the USSR,[38] Soviet scientists and technicians have been closely associated with all the "preparatory, design and construction work" pertaining to the Czechoslovak A-1. Korobeiinikov takes credit for solving such technological problems as the constructing of fuel elements and the welding of the reactor vessel, in direct contradiction of the claim made by the Skoda Works' technicians in 1964. At one point he admits that the lack of an experimental reactor of the same type added to the difficulties with the A-1, but seems to intimate that this was a Czech rather than a Soviet error, since it was fast corrected by establishing an appropriate experimental facility in the USSR. Ambiguity as to how much of a Czechoslovak venture the construction of the A-1 really is, is heightened in the concluding paragraphs, where Korobeiinikov states that the USSR exerts an "author's control over the design, its execution and construction as well as loading and putting into operation of the reactor."[39]

[37]Based chiefly on Arnost Komarek, "Das erste Kernkraftwerk der CSSR," *Kernenergie* (1964), No. 11, pp. 782-785; Komarek and others, "Problemy vyvoje a vystavby prvni ceskoslovenske jaderne elektrarny," and Josef Hauser and others, "Tlakova nadoba 1 ceskoslovenske jaderne elektrarny," both in *Jaderna energie* (1964), No. 9, pp. 312-323, 323 ff.

[38]*Atomnaia Energia* (1967), No. 5, pp. 479-481.

[39]*Ibid.*, p. 481.

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No matter what interpretation is given to the Soviet "assistance" in nuclear power development, the fact remains that early in 1965 Czechoslovakia made inquiries in Great Britain about the possibility of buying an industrial power reactor of the British type.[40] This was an open admission of the failure of her own efforts to develop a viable nuclear power system. It also compromised the Soviets' claims about the effectiveness of their nuclear assistance to Czechoslovakia.

As already noted, Czechoslovakia had to construct many models of the respective nuclear and other equipment on a one-to-one scale in various manufacturing works before the power station was built in Bohunice. And since Bohunice, a rather isolated place, lacked the mechanical facilities available in a modern factory like Skoda for assembling all the heavy equipment, this had to be manufactured in parts and brought to the site of the A-1. There was therefore good reason for the Czechoslovak nuclear technicians and engineers, when they finally reported mastering the necessary nuclear techniques in 1964, to add a few words of warning about a delay still to be anticipated before the A-1 could be put into full operation. Moreover, when they assured the public that during this period preparations would be made to start constructing an A-2 nuclear power station of 200 to 300 MWe on completion of the A-1, their words sounded more like an attempt to soothe ruffled national pride than a definite assurance of better performance in the future.[41] The delay has also become a painful problem for the Czechoslovak government, as is obvious from its decision of November 30, 1967 renewing the pledge to undertake extraordinary efforts on all levels so that the A-1 could be completed by 1968. In contradistinction to Soviet claims, the government has evinced little faith in Soviet aid: its decision failed to mention Soviet assistance, placing reliance only on Czechoslovak scientists, technicians and workers for the work to be done.[42]

In the meantime feelings of frustration pervaded all those who worked on the Czech atomic projects and had an opportunity to compare their own progress with achievements abroad. This is best reflected in the comments made by S. Medonos following his participation in the Third International Conference on Atomic

[40]See *Nucleonics* (1965), No. 2, p. 28.

[41]See Komarek and others, "Problemy . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 322, and *Lidova Demokracie*, February 8, 1966. Interestingly, the Italian *Atomo e Industra* reported on May 1, 1965 that four new industrial nuclear power plants are to be started after the A-1 is completed.

[42]CETEKA (official Czechoslovak Press Agency) communiqué in *Rude Pravo*, December 1, 1967, p. 1.

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Energy for Peaceful Purposes in Geneva in 1964. Medonos said:

> . . . Our overall impressions were, however, depressing. When compared to efforts in the nuclear field elsewhere, our endeavors appear to be on a considerably lesser scale and they are unsatisfactorily organized. The nuclear developments abroad progressed much farther and at a faster rate in many other countries, even in such which are smaller and less industrialized than Czechoslovakia. . . .[43]

If Medonos' comments in 1964 were taken as indirect criticism of institutional arrangements and unsatisfactory socialist nuclear cooperation, censure of the government for relying on Soviet nuclear assistance became far more pronounced after Czechoslovakia's move toward liberalization in January 1968. The attack centered on the government's having given exclusive rights to the rich Czechoslovak uranium deposits to the USSR without getting a commensurate return either in money or effective nuclear assistance. In May, for the first time, we learned that Czechoslovak deliveries of uranium oxide to the USSR may be on the order of 10,000 metric tons—a tremendously valuable contribution to the Soviet nuclear program considering that the U.S. capability for producing uranium oxide is presently about 12,000 to 13,000 metric tons.[44] Further, the Czech governments preceding that of Cernik and Dubcek have been accused of submitting to pressure (by implication, from the Soviet Union) to discourage rather than support the development of atomic sciences and technology, application of which to power generation is seen as the only solution to the country's energy ailments. A declaration in July 1968 signed by C. Simane, now Dean of the Faculty of Technical and Nuclear Physics at Prague's Technical University, and two other professors,[45] leaves little doubt that it is the Soviet Union which is to be blamed for the "hopeless" and "tragic" state of nuclear power development in Czechoslovakia. Their call for importing a power reactor from abroad again points up the ineffectiveness of Soviet assistance.

By the summer of 1968, Czechoslovak nuclear experts no longer entertained hopes that the program announced in connection with the new (1966) treaty of cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia—envisioning construction of one 300-MWe and another 500-MWe heavy-water moderated, gas-cooled nuclear power station in Czechoslovakia by 1975—can be realized.

[43]S. Medonos, in an editorial in *Jaderna energie* (1964), No. 10, p. 356. (Translation supplied.)

[44]See *Prace,* May 21, 1968 and U.S. AEC, *The Nuclear Industry* (Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 26.

[45]*Rude Pravo,* July 12, 1968.

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Evidently, the lessons of the Czech experience became apparent to other bloc countries long before 1968. In 1964 Rumania initiated inquiries about the possibility of purchasing a natural uranium reactor and either a graphite or heavy-water moderated reactor—which would make her independent of Soviet-enriched fuels—from France or the United Kingdom.[46] Later she turned to Canada. None of these approaches led to concrete results, partly because of U.S. nuclear policy which bans the export of reactors from NATO countries to the communist world. In the last analysis, though, it is the strategic objectives of the Soviet Union's nuclear policy—rather than the scope, technological requirements and ultimate success of their individual nuclear programs—that determine the bloc countries' nuclear ties to extra-bloc powers. The USSR's sensitivity to nuclear activities in nearby countries has recently been manifested in her pressure on Finland to drop plans to buy a heavy-water reactor from England. There is little reason to believe that Rumania may fare better than Finland.[47]

Soviet Nuclear Policy: Speculations and Conclusions

An attempt to assay the causes for the Soviet-Czechoslovak failure in nuclear power development must necessarily rest, in view of the scarcity of information, on a number of speculative premises and hypotheses not completely free of contradictions and ambiguity. Also, we cannot ignore recent events in Czechoslovakia, for these are likely to affect the future of Soviet-Czechoslovak nuclear power cooperation.

In balancing the poor results of Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia from 1956 through 1967 against Soviet prowess in nuclear technology, it seems reasonable to assume that if the USSR had wanted to make her aid more effective, she could have done so. At the least, she could have made available the fundamental technical knowledge required to hurdle Czechoslovak engineering roadblocks. Yet, except for periodically renewing their aid agreement, the Soviets seemed primarily interested in controlling, rather than helping to complete, the A-1 station.

Strange as it may be, Soviet behavior toward Czechoslovakia in this regard is not unique. In spite of all her promises to aid friend-

[46]See *Washington Post,* May 26, 1964; *The Economist* (London), June 13, 1964, pp. 1215-1216.

[47]Characteristically, the Polish nuclear R&D and power projects calling for a heavy-water industrial reactor to be in operation by 1965 were scaled down on Soviet "advice" in 1959; see more on this in Polach, "Nuclear R&D in Poland and Polish Millennium on November 26, 1966, and published in *Central European* Czechoslovakia," a lecture delivered at Columbia University on the occasion of the *Federalist,* December 1966, and *Gaiko Jiho* (Japan), July 1967.

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ly countries in the development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, the USSR has sidestepped opportunities to export her nuclear hardware. Except for deliveries under the original nuclear R&D agreements of small research reactors and cyclotrons, which are useful and necessary for carrying out basic nuclear research but of limited use for developing full-scale industrial power reactors, she has exported only one 70-MWe light-water pressurized reactor to East Germany. This certainly cannot be due to a lack of business acumen, because we know that the Soviet Union pushes export sales in other fields, for instance, petroleum. As of 1966, Soviet oil exports to the bloc were in the neighborhood of 30 million tons annually, representing a revenue of about half a billion dollars, and they will probably exceed 50 million tons within a decade. The majority of Eastern Europe's industries, with some exception in the cases of Rumania and Albania, now depend on an increasing flow of Soviet oil. The economic and political leverage this gives the USSR is of the first magnitude. But the abundance of Soviet oil supplies has a no less meaningful indirect consequence: it makes economic justification of a rapid development of nuclear power a much more difficult proposition. For example, since the capital cost per one kilowatt of nuclear capacity is currently more than $1,000, electricity generated from the Czechoslovak A-1 could hardly be competitive with fuel-oil-burning central power stations, notwithstanding the fact that a million BTU's (in the form of Soviet oil) cost Czechoslovakia about 44 cents in 1966.[48]

Viewed from another angle, the availability of atomic power in Czechoslovakia would release domestic fuels from electricity generation for other industrial purposes now served by imported Soviet oil. Ultimately, this would decrease Czechoslovakia's economic and perhaps political dependence on the Soviet Union,[49] a development which, as we know now, the USSR is not ready to tolerate.

Our assumption about Soviet prowess in nuclear technology should not be accepted uncritically. Up to now, the USSR has no heavy-water moderated, gas-cooled reactor in operation and consequently lacks clinical experience in technological exigencies connected with such reactors of industrial size. We may even hypothesize that the Soviet Union found it advantageous to let

[48]The figures on volume and value have been derived from the USSR *Vneshniaia Torgovlia*, 1966.
[49]See Polach, "Outlook . . . ," *op. cit.*

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Czechoslovakia pioneer with this difficult type of reactor and foot the bill for all the efforts connected with the A-1 station, while Soviet scientists and technicians used the "cooperation agreement" to further the development and testing of their own designs. East Germany's first atomic station (AKW-1) was built with USSR aid on a similar basis. The indications are that the AKW-1 served more or less as a developmental prototype for the Soviets' own Novo-Vornezh reactor, VVER-1.[50]

Putting aside hypothetical explanations, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that the most important single cause for Soviet reluctance to permit the bloc countries access to advanced nuclear technology is the fact that power reactors, even when genuinely used for peaceful purposes, still represent a potential source of atomic weaponry. The heavy-water reactor of the Czechoslovak type is one of the most powerful converters and can possibly produce enough plutonium for six to seven bombs of minimal size. This consideration, in view of the present situation in Eastern Europe, may militate against Czechoslovakia's further development of nuclear power based on her own heavy-water reactors. In fact, it is now questionable whether the USSR will ever permit the A-1 to become operational. As in the case of the originally planned Hungarian nuclear power station, the A-1 may become a casualty of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.

There is a remote possibility that the USSR may look more favorably on the Czechoslovak nuclear program (assuming the present strained relations between the two countries improve), once the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are effectively applied by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). Such a change of attitude would depend on whether the Soviets believe the NPT safeguards are adequate to protect their strategic interests. However, the process of ratification and the subsequent negotiations on providing funds for the IAEA's new responsibilities will take more time than originally anticipated. An additional transition period of one to two years will be needed, according to Dr. Sigvard Eklund, the IAEA Director General, for training a larger staff to implement these safeguards. All this may delay and frustrate the present Czechoslovak nuclear power program still further—beyond hope of fulfillment.

[50]See Polach, "Nuclear Energy in East Europe," *East Europe*, May 1968, pp. 3-12.

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THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP: ISSUES, POLICIES AND TRADE-OFFS

by T. F. Schaerf

NATION-STATES of the 1960's measure their security and defense capabilities not only by the size of their military forces-in-being but also by the dynamism of their scientific and technological establishments. The military power, prestige and political-diplomatic standing of nations are determined in large part by their technological achievements and the size of their R&D budgets. For these reasons West Europeans voice concern at being on the wrong end of the trans-Atlantic technological imbalance and "brain-drain." They are embarrassed, fearful and resentful of U.S. predominance, and show increasing determination to upgrade their second-rate status in the postwar technological race.

Areas of Concern to Western Europe

There are six major areas of science and technology in which Europeans are particularly concerned about U.S. predominance.

(1) *U.S. "Gigantism."* To West Europeans the sheer size of U.S. corporations operating in Europe is dismaying. In 1953, U.S. direct investment in the six nations that would later form the Common Market was $1 billion; in 1964, $4.7 billion. For all of Western Europe, the total in 1966 was $20 billion. In the period 1957-1963, U.S. firms in Europe increased the value of their production from $4.5 billion to $10.1 billion, while U.S. exports to this area increased from $1.3 billion to $2.7 billion. Thus, by 1963 the value of goods produced by U.S. firms in Western Europe was nearly four times that of U.S. exports to the area; the latter consisted mostly of capital goods for machine-building and electronic industries.[1] Also, U.S. companies are large, technology-oriented, and capable of servicing sizeable shares of the market. Forty per cent of the oil industry in Great Britain and 50 per cent of West Germany's are U.S.-owned. In recent years, 40 per cent of German automobiles and the same proportion of France's farm machinery have been made by U.S. subsidiaries. IBM builds 55 per cent of all computers used in Europe; U.S. companies make 65 per cent of all

[1]K. H. Standke. *Amerikanische Investierungspolitik in der E.W.G.* (Frankfurt/M: R.K.W., 1965).

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computer sales.[2] The host of American consumer goods made in or exported to Europe—from refrigerators and other household appliances to foods and cosmetics—influences European consumer tastes and style of living.

(2) *Technologically Advanced Products.* The tremendous U.S. efforts and achievements in the fields of nuclear energy, aerospace, electronics and telecommunications inspire in West Europeans respect mingled with a feeling of despair. They realize that research and development organized on a gigantic scale by government agencies such as NASA or large corporations such as IBM or Dupont has made rapid technological progress possible; that the United States spends ten times as much for R&D as the several West European countries taken together; and that Soviet achievements in space and weapons systems are based on efforts similar to those of the United States. The fears that surround the technological gap issue clearly are connected with the idea that a nation's economic and political power depends on its technological development. Robert Marjolin, former Commissioner and Vice-President of the EEC Commission, said: "We are gradually condemning ourselves to a cumulative underdevelopment." West Germany's Franz-Josef Strauss, Minister of Finance and a former Minister of Defense, describes the situation in this way: "Every year the gap in the scientific and technological fields widens between the two world powers, the U.S. and the USSR, on the one hand and the European nations on the other."

(3) *Technological Balance of Payments.* The fact that the United States sells five and a half times more technology to Western Europe than it buys is not the most disturbing point. That area, after all, has overall export surpluses, and the technology thus acquired is generally profitable. What is disturbing is that the lopsidedness in the technological balance of payments reflects a superior-inferior relationship: no European country by itself can hope to catch up with the Big Two. The $23 billion that America spends for R&D amounts to about 25 per cent of the GNP of one of the largest European countries.

(4) *Corporate Organization and Strategy.* More visibly than by the sale of its technology, the United States is represented in Western Europe by U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries. By

[2] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), quoted in *Atlas,* December 1965; J. Gervais, *La France Face aux Investissements Etrangers* (Paris: Editions de l'Enterprise Moderne, 1963), p. 141.

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and large, the U.S. corporation was more successful than its European counterpart in adjusting to, and taking advantage of, the Common Market, a market of 180 million people living in one-sixth the area of the United States. As a unit under unified managerial policy, the U.S. corporation is both more effective and more flexible than the European company or the European national cartel based on more or less binding agreements among separate units. In 1957, 2,050 out of 2,696 U.S. direct investment companies in Europe were more than 95 per cent U.S.-owned. To allay European fears, U.S. corporations gave proof of their flexibility: by 1964 almost half of the new U.S. ventures in Europe were in the form of partnerships with local firms.[3] Another aspect of the flexibility and adaptability of the corporate form of organization is the emergence of the so-called international corporation whose subsidiaries are national companies in the country in which they operate. With growing investments and sales abroad (in some cases as high as 50 per cent), the U.S. corporation has adjusted its structure and management and adopted what might be called a global corporate strategy.

(5) *Capital and Finance.* In the sometimes acrimonious debate over the desirability of U.S. direct investment in Europe, the balance of payments deficit, and European purchases of U.S. bullion, two items are given little attention. Out of every dollar invested in Europe by U.S. firms only about thirty cents is U.S. capital; the remainder is earned or borrowed abroad. In mobilizing these capital resources, U.S. companies show superior skill, while the Europeans lag behind in exploiting this vital component of economic growth. The substantial U.S. investment in Western Europe was made in a period of rapidly growing economies and, until recently, under conditions of full employment. Under these circumstances, pressure on the several currencies occurred, and it is possible to view gold purchases as attempts to shore up these currencies.[4]

(6) *Consumption of Scientific Talent.* The movement of scientists and technologists from Europe—particularly from the United Kingdom—to America is called the "brain-drain." Obviously the quality of scientific higher education in Western Europe is good enough to encourage U.S. firms to employ its "products" either in

[3]Christopher Layton, *Transatlantic Investments* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1966), p. 118.

[4]Gervais, *op. cit.*, cites this explanation of the decision of the French Ministry of Finance to transfer bullion from the United States to France.

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the home country or in the United States. The fact that many of these scientists do not become integrated into their own national economies leads one to suspect that there may be disparities between the "technology of scientific education" and the other national technologies—especially research and development and the management of science and technology, which are the means for linking scientists and technologists, seen as resource inputs, with the process of production. If they want to have a technologically advanced economy, industrialized countries must view research and development, science and technology, as part of the economic process rather than as a university or government activity. This viewpoint is well established in the United States, where the research-oriented business firm pulls together the various scientific and technological inputs. The relatively new U.S. government agencies engaging in research and development emphasize that their advanced technology spin-offs are valuable to the business community and help to strengthen the linkage between the public and private sectors.

West European scientists and technologists are not emigrating en masse. Rather, they have used the "brain-drain," the "technological gap," and the successes of the U.S. economy as effective arguments to speed the reorganization of the linkages among university, government and industry in their own countries. Every West European state now has a ministry of science and technology or a science policy council through which scientists and technologists can participate in strengthening the ties among these sectors. West Europeans must now go beyond the national framework to plan and organize the pooling of resources and the distribution of activities within the larger EEC and OECD frameworks.

On the Transferability of Technology

To judge by the number of recommendations for a technological Marshall Plan, one might assume that if the United States made available its store of technological know-how, the European nations would be ready and able to undertake the production of advanced-technology goods in the areas where they are lagging: aerospace, aircraft, electronics, communications and nuclear energy. Yet, there are limitations to the possibilities of transfer, because the less developed partner operates within certain limits. The lower limit is determined by the level of his know-how and efficiency, and the upper by his capacity to absorb the

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new quantum of technology.[5] Conceivably, the technology might be too expensive or too advanced and thus out of the less developed partner's reach. The lower limit also is determined by his ability to make the most efficient and profitable use of it, for the holder of the technology seeks to maximize his income. The latter may decide to establish a branch or subsidiary or to stay out of the region or country, depending on his evaluation of the market and the availability of a suitable partner.

The ability of high-technology and especially defense-related industries to diversify and thus be of benefit to the civilian economy is highly questionable, even in the United States. In 1966, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency published a study which concluded that "There is a discouraging history of failure in commercial diversification efforts by defense firms."[6] Among the reasons given by the study for this inability to diversify are an absence of a pattern of successful transfer of military technology; limited commitment of capital and people to diversification; limited knowledge of nondefense markets and marketing; limited experience in producing at higher volume and low unit cost; and special relationship to a few government agencies which require high-quality, research-and-development-oriented, problem-solving, and innovating engineering in the complex framework of weapons or space systems.

The aerospace industry and its ties with government is an example of a special relationship often requiring the research capabilities of universities and a complex and specialized organization. With some variations of form, such a pattern will be found in any country making a national aerospace effort. While authorities in the field assert that defense-related aerospace technology is difficult or impossible to transfer to nondefense applications, it can be duplicated by other nations. Despite the secrecy and strenuous efforts of Washington and Moscow to keep other nations from entering the field, they can at best impose a "time gap," while the "quantity or size gap" is determined by the economic capacity and commitment of their challengers. Inasmuch as none of the larger West European countries is without a nucleus of advanced

[5]"Among others, a condition to carry it [transfer of technology] out successfully is the existence of compatible levels of development and organization among the countries concerned." Aurelio Peccei, in *Technology and World Trade* (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1967), p. 127.

[6]John S. Gilmore and Dean C. Coddington, *Defense Industry Diversification: An Analysis with 12 Case Studies* (Washington: GPO, 1966), p. vii. Also in this volume, see M. L. Weidenbaum, "The Defense-Space Complex: Impact on Whom?," p. 316, and "Defense Cutbacks and the Aerospace Industry," p. 310.

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technology, whether in some business firm, university or government laboratory, we must expect that a national effort over a ten-year period could mobilize capital, organization and staff—including its education—for almost any technology of its choice. This, however, does not imply that an individual West European nation, even one that achieves a spectacular breakthrough and takes the scientific lead in some field, will be able to match the capacity or range of U.S. technology.

Aerospace technology is transferable to any nation able to create the capital, organizational, scientific and technological infrastructure that this technology requires. Every advanced technology requires an infrastructure that can provide the range of transferability or receptivity. It has to provide a required minimum of know-how and efficiency at one end and the capacity to absorb the technology in question at the other. Thus, when General Electric bought into Machines Bull (France) and Olivetti (Italy), it operated within this range; it found present the necessary minimum of expertise and efficiency, and it was able to operate at the upper limit of the range by providing additional capital and know-how so that the combined operation could absorb the technology. Aurelio Peccei, Director of Olivetti, has warned that the dialogue between two nations separated by too wide a technological and development gap tends to become extremely difficult, for such a gap can be a dangerously divisive force. Transfer of technology enterprise-to-enterprise or otherwise is feasible only in a general framework of compatible levels of development. The host country must be able to absorb the given technology; if the gap is too wide, technology cannot be transferred.[7]

Another recent example, that of Soviet military aid to Egypt, shows that the USSR operated outside the range of transferability and reaped unexpected consequences. There was neither adequate know-how, nor the minimum efficiency, nor the capability on Egypt's part to absorb advanced military technology. The infrastructure for it did not exist and had not been provided. Western aid efforts also have encountered, and been frustrated by, the absence of a range of transferability. This does not mean that the development efforts of the two power systems have failed and should be discarded. If the Egyptian experience holds any lesson, it is that more, not less, effort to modernize the socio-economic fabric of underdeveloped countries is required.

[7]Peccei, *op. cit.*, p. 126 f.

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Governments have an interest in maximizing the technological and time gaps achieved by their defense technology. Business firms with patent-protected technologies embodied in products or processes likewise have an incentive to maximize their advantage in order to recoup the high expenses of research and development and to maximize profits. In Western Europe this U.S. time advantage proved marketable. But in order not to be completely dependent on the importation of advanced technology and in order not to let the time gap grow so wide that it would be tantamount to a reduction of the range of receptivity, Western Europe permitted U.S. companies or their affiliates to establish plants on its territory. In general, the business firm, particularly the large U.S. corporation, can defend its technology as well as any nation-state. In selling its product, it sells the right to own and use the product, not its know-how and capability to bring together the factors of production, organization, management and marketing.

These, then, are the major constraints on the transfer of technology: governments, not only the American, seek to protect their technologies, especially those that are defense-related; private owners exercising their legal proprietary rights seek to protect and profit from theirs; and the receiving country must have a physical and organizational infrastructure adequate to receive a given technology. Providing the necessary infrastructure is itself part of an ongoing development process which builds one technological level of sophistication upon another. Infrastructure is not a separate sector but is itself a level of technology.

Although there is no satisfactory single method of measuring the relative levels of technology, the question raised by the debate on the technological gap is whether and how Western Europe might approach U.S. levels. Size, structure and organization of the business firm and of industry sectors are the constituent elements of the level of technology; the appropriate size must not only be attained but its management must be mastered. To achieve the required result, governments must give guidance and support to industry and educational institutions. Beyond that, political and economic cooperation and the pooling of limited national resources within EEC or a larger West European regional system would help to narrow the gap. Western Europe's objectives in this drive to bridge the technological gap may be summarized as follows:

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(1) To raise its level of technology to that of the United States by self-help and/or outside (U.S.) help.
(2) To maintain its position as an advanced, industrialized area and to avoid falling into a permanent position somewhere between the economic-technological level of the United States and that of the less developed countries.
(3) To achieve approximate equality of economic and technological level among all the nations of Western Europe.
(4) To maintain and establish access to fuels and raw materials without which the desired economic and technological levels cannot be attained (e.g., not only oil and natural gas but also uranium).
(5) To maintain or develop markets in the less developed countries, in order to expand the economic base at home.
(6) To develop the domestic market and increase the level of consumption without jeopardizing the balance of payments.
(7) To reduce or eliminate any negative technological balance of payments, i.e., payments to foreign interests operating in one's country.
(8) To establish favorable, or at least equal, terms of trade within the Atlantic Community.
(9) To build a technology-based defense posture that will gain the respect of the United States and the Soviet Union, e.g., the *force de frappe*.

We must keep in mind that Western Europe experiences the technological gap as a power gap. Most of the advanced technology it seeks will increase its capability to defend itself, to resist integration into one or the other power system, or to assume a Third Force stance, all of which have the potential to affect U.S. objectives in Europe and throughout the world. In order to advance toward their technological objectives, the nations of Western Europe may have to compromise on such sensitive issues as national sovereignty and membership in a system under U.S. hegemony. To give some examples, we shall hypothesize that Western Europe has the following trade-offs to offer the United States:

(1) International cooperation, including the transfer of sovereign powers to supranational organs, initially, e.g., in space or ocean exploration.
(2) Admission of Great Britain and other countries to the EEC, thus strengthening the regional sub-system within the U.S. power system.
(3) Establishment of an international authority empowered to purchase —or have transferred to it—national technologies (including American) which could be used by all countries, under a supervised agreement, for research purposes only.
(4) Support of the stability of the U.S. dollar, or another system currency, by granting regulatory powers over national banks to the IMF or another U.S. system bank.
(5) Agreement to a common defense system under U.S. hegemony, conceding that the United States must maintain its lead in defense

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technology, even if the gap is maintained and spin-off benefits accrue primarily to the U.S. economy.

The Cost of Creating a Technological Infrastructure: The French Plans

We will use the case history of the five French economic plans in an attempt to assess the effort and the cost of acquiring a modern technological infrastructure. Over the last twenty years, France has attempted to create an up-to-date technological infrastructure, and her Fifth Plan extends this effort from 1966 to 1970. France has achieved success in some areas where the technological gap has seemed most disturbing, e.g., in aircraft, nuclear energy and defense-related technology. From this record and economic planning we can infer that in France progress from one level to the next is taking place rather than the "dualistic" development which occurs when an industrial nucleus is implanted in a backward economy.

The First Plan (Monnet Plan) for 1947-1950 was called a modernization plan. In 1947 the industrial production index was at the 1938 level, or only 80 per cent of the 1929 level. Consumption and investment in 1949 were 10 per cent below the 1929

Table I

PROJECTED CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, FIRST PLAN, 1947-1950
(billions of francs)

	Construction & Public Works	*Raw Materials & New Equipment*	*Total*
Coal Mining	33	23.5	56.5
Power	98	100.0	198.0
Steel Industry	9	24.0	33.0
Cement	7	11.5	18.5
Farm	1	6.0	7.0
Transportation	75	148.0	223.0
Agriculture	60	290.0	350.0
Housing	660	0.0	660.0
Industry and Commerce	76	264.0	340.0
Transportation, Communications	120	170.0	290.0
Other	70	10.0	80.0
TOTAL	1,209	1,047.0	2,256.0

Source: Seymour E. Harris, *Economic Planning* (New York: Knopf, 1949), p. 411.

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level.[8] The breakdown of projected investments for the First Plan period is given in Table I.

This plan, partly financed by Marshall Plan aid and a balance of payments deficit of $4.36 billion, laid the basic industry foundation. By 1951, a total of $7.6 billion had been invested, of which $1.5 billion came from counterpart funds. By the end of that period, industrial production had passed the interwar peak of 1929.

The period 1951-1957 was covered by several shorter plans as well as the more sophisticated Second Plan (1954-1957), whose aim was the modernization of equipment and the economy's structure to increase productivity. The investment program emphasized modernization and replacement of obsolescent plant, more than expansion of capacity, as well as concentration and regrouping within sectors of industry. Its target was to raise the GNP by 25 per cent over the 1952 level. Although gross investment was held to an annual growth of 6 per cent to curb inflation, GNP grew by 30 per cent over the plan period.[9] The investment data for the Second Plan are contained in Table II.

TABLE II

MAJOR CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, SECOND PLAN, 1954-1957
(billions of francs; 1954 prices)

	Projected	*Actual*	*Percentage of Target*
Agriculture	1,135	1,170	103
Energy	1,262	1,315	107
Steel	267	265	99
Chemicals	165	195	118
Manufacturing	775	730	94
Transport, Communications and Tourism	870	805	92
Housing	1,896	2,435	128
Health and Education	352	450	135
TOTAL	6,722	7,365	110

Sources: *Troisieme Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipment, Journal Officiel,* March 22, 1959.
Fonds de Developpement Economique et Social, *VIIe Rapport* (Paris, 1961).

[8]R. Ruggles, "The French Investment Program and Its Relation to Resource Allocation," in E. M. Earle, editor, *Modern France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 370 f.

[9]Fonds de Developpement Economique et Social, *Rapport annuel sur l'execution du plan, 1952* (Paris: Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, 1954). It also made provisions for the support of scientific research.

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Under the Second Plan actual investment totaled about $14 billion. The balance of trade deficit during this four-year period was $2.6 billion, offset in part by U.S. aid and offshore purchases totaling $1.69 billion.

The Third Plan (1958-1961), which came into effect after the currency reform of 1958, sought to bring the balance of payments into equilibrium, but its major target remained to increase productivity and "grow into" the Common Market. The engineering goods sector which had shown weakness under the Second Plan was given special emphasis. The Third Plan had to be revised in 1960 and an Intermediate Plan operated through 1961. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew slower than planned, but the target of a 20 per cent growth over the plan period was met within six months after the period closed. The Third and Fourth Plans were geared to permit real wages to increase proportionately with growth in productivity, 5.2 to 5.5 per cent respectively, allowing for a 1 to 2 per cent price inflation.

TABLE III

CAPITAL FORMATION AND INVESTMENTS, FOURTH PLAN (1961-1965) AND FIFTH PLAN (1966-1970)
(in billions of U.S. dollars)

	Fourth Plan	*Fifth Plan*
Gross Domestic Product	73.4	93.6
Gross Fixed Capital Formation	17.8	22.6
Government	2.3	3.3
Housing	5.4	6.3
Production	10.1	12.9

Sources: "Quatrieme Plan de Developpement Economique et Social (1962-5)," *Journal Officiel,* August 4, 1962, p. 19. *Cinquieme Plan de Developpement Economique et Social (1966-70)* (Paris, Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, 1965), Vol. 1, p. 167.

The figures in Table IV show that the French economy grew rapidly once it received the impetus of orderly development. The rate of growth is even more evident if we look at the average annual increment of the gross fixed capital formation. At the end of the Fifth Plan in 1970 the annual average for the twenty-four-year period will have reached $11.8 billion. If we refer to Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's comparison of French and U.S. economic power,[10] we see that the U.S. private sector, with $29 billion an-

[10]Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *L'Express* (Paris), quoted in *Atlas,* December 1966.

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TABLE IV

GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, 1947-1970
(in billions of U.S. dollars)

Year	*Annual*	*Plan Total*
Plan I		
1947	3.4	
1948	3.5	
1949	4.2	
1950	4.6	15.7
1951	4.0	
1952	5.5	
1953	7.0	16.5
Plan II		
1954	7.9	
1955	8.7	
1956	9.6	
1957	10.5	
		36.7
Plan III		
1958	10.7	
1959	11.0	
1960	11.6	
1961	12.4	
		45.7
Plan IV		
1962	14.4	
1963	15.4	
1964	16.5	
1965	17.8	
		64.1
Plan V		
1966	19.0	
1967	20.0	
1968	21.0	
1969	22.0	
1970	22.7	
		104.7
		283.4

Plans I-V

Sources: Compiled from various French government publications.

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nually available for reinvestment, could have done the job of the five French plans in about ten years or 40 per cent of the time. If we add to this private sector figure a U.S. government financial contribution in the same proportion as that made by the French government (30 per cent), the time required would be reduced from about ten to about seven and a half years.

In French terms, the achievement is significant if we consider that in 1947 industrial production was at the 1913 level and did not pass the 1929 level until 1951. In France and other West European nations the technological or productivity gap developed a long time ago and resulted from the psychological, behavioral and institutional infrastructure these societies adopted for themselves.[11] Today, these states are creating the technological infrastructure for advancement to the next higher level. They are tightening the linkages among government, industry and the universities. Evidence of this determination is found in the French Fifth Plan which increases by 160 per cent (from 1.5 to 3.9 billion francs) the funds available to carry out the research and development strategy.[12]

Technology and Capital: The Balance of Payments

The relationship between technology and capital is perhaps the most sensitive area of the technological gap complex and encompasses the principal U.S. problem, the balance of payments deficit. The United States played a significant part in Western Europe's recovery after World War II. When American equipment flowed into the area, no one complained that it was technologically superior to European products. U.S. firms invested in productive plants abroad, in Canada first and then more substantially in Western Europe, from about the mid-1950's onward.

The notion that the technological gap is some sort of West European claim on U.S. governmental and private technology stems from a form of reasoning that links technology with capital, capital with U.S. dollars, and a U.S. dollar surplus with a European claim on the public and private assets of the United States. This reasoning is not entirely illogical. Dollars held by the several European central banks are claims against the United States that

[11]See R. Jochimsen, *Theorie der Infrastruktur* (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1966), *passim.*

[12]For a detailed description of these policies and programs, see *Ve Plan de Developpement Economique et Social 1966-70,* Vols. I and II (Paris: Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, 1965).

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are not covered by any demand for U.S. goods. These surplus funds could be, and often are, reinvested, since U.S. long-term investments in Western Europe and European long-term investments in the United States are about equal at $20 billion; or they could be converted into gold which might upset the stability of other currencies.

What effect did U.S. firms and their dollar investments have on the European capital market? A glance at the statistics describing the investment activities of U.S. firms operating in Western Europe shows that they managed to finance abroad from two-thirds to one-half of their investment.[13] In view of the difficulty European firms encounter when seeking credit, this record is impressive, and perhaps due to a superior knowledge of capital market operations. The 1957 breakdown of U.S. private direct investment is given in Table V.

The United States mobilizes European money resources in still another way, as shown in Table VI.

Thus, the ratio of European to U.S. indirect or portfolio investment is almost 2:1. The effect of U.S. borrowing, on the whole, has been beneficial and has led to a modernization of European capital markets. There have been some difficulties because Americans will pay more for money and are bidding against Europeans for scarce funds.[14] Even so, the Eurobond market in 1966

TABLE V

U.S. PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1957
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	Amount	*Percentage*
Depreciation	1,616	21
Funds Raised Abroad	1,718	24
Income Retained	1,758	24
Other	167	2
New U.S. Funds	2,023	29
Income Paid Out	—1,891	—20.6
	7,282	100

Source: Layton, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[13]See U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *Survey of Current Business*, March and September 1966; Layton, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[14]U.S. firms will pay interest rates of 8 or 9 per cent while French industry refuses to pay more than 3 or 4 per cent. (Michael Bosquet in *Le Nouvel Observateur* [Paris], reprinted in *Atlas*, March 1967.) In recent years, profits ranged from 10 to 13 per cent. *Survey of Current Business*, September 1966, p. 13.

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TABLE VI

CAPITAL FLOWS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Type of Investment	*West European Investments in the U.S.*	*U.S. Investments in Western Europe*
Total Investments	34,149	29,594
Long Term	18,342	19,101
Direct	6,105	13,894
Portfolio	12,237	6,207
Short Term Obligations	15,807	2,063

Source: *Survey of Current Business*, September 1966, Table 14.

reached $1.3 billion—almost three times its 1962 volume—of which Americans took about 40 per cent, or $500 million. Efforts to mobilize savings, for example, the recent reorganization of French banking, and the introduction of types of securities not in usage heretofore are further evidence that West European economies have been stimulated. The figures do not suggest that Western Europe as a whole is too poor to afford costly technology or to engage in R&D on the necessary scale. There are a number of cases where European firms avoid direct competition, especially with the large U.S. firms, and seek areas of specialization without necessarily sacrificing technological progress (e.g., European computer manufacturers or the Berliet STOL aircraft licensed to McDonnell).[15] By and large a *modus vivendi* is being worked out in the private sector—a kind of "European-American financial partnership," according to the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, linking the business firm, an international capital market, and the U.S. dollar.

Yet, from 1963 to 1966, critics of the U.S. balance of payments deficit flooded the newspapers and magazines with complaints such as these: (1) U.S. firms in Europe, because they are bearers of new products and technology, are able to shift and concentrate scarce resources, capital as well as labor, at the expense of domestic firms. (2) Americans easily obtain capital simply by paying higher interest. Thus European capital contributes to the growth of the U.S. economy while denying resources to capital-hungry European

[15]There is evidence that West European firms have improved on the design or quality of U.S. products such as typewriters, computers, automation control equipment, machine tools, automobiles. Emile Benoit, *Europe at Sixes and Sevens: The Common Market, the Free Trade Association and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 158 f.

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firms. (3) European indirect investment in the United States and in U.S. firms in Europe is made at the expense of European industrial growth. Countries such as Great Britain and France cannot support their role as international bankers when they lend to an expanding U.S. economy instead of borrowing to expand their own capital plant. (4) Large U.S. firms with their gigantic resources pre-empt the European market. The decisive factor in this pre-emption is not the size of the market but the size of U.S. firms. (5) U.S. investments are tightly controlled by the parent company, while European investments buy at best interest-bearing paper. (6) The U.S. interest equalization tax on foreign borrowing denies Europeans access to the American capital market.

The general tone of these complaints seems to be that European profits and accumulated surpluses are largely paper. Another theme of concern is the fate of national economies. Figures for the growth rates of European economies contradict that they are being stunted. However, many find it difficult to understand a situation where the profitable capital plant of U.S. firms in Europe is a deficit entry on the books that nations keep, and an asset on the books that private parties keep. "It is paradoxical," writes Raymond Aron, "for a country to export capital while it has a deficit in its foreign balance of payments."[16] Even the manner in which the U.S. balance of payments is computed has been challenged by such experts as Charles Kindleberger, Walter Salant and Emile Depres. In 1964 the U.S. Department of Commerce set the deficit at $3.6 billion, the Treasury set it at $1.5 billion.[17] The following is a partial list of these "paradoxes."

(1) U.S. investments are private transactions as long as they can be paid for with U.S. products. Otherwise, they become a claim against the United States, a deficit, or a gold drain.

(2) The United States, with its deficit, continues to create capital plant abroad. Newly created capital plant adds to the deficit and puts each host country in a token surplus position, not because it received an increment to its national capital plant but because it accumulates the dollars spent to create capital plant and businesses.

(3) Because Western Europe experienced overemployment for a long time, it had to use more machinery, pay higher wages, and import labor and more consumer goods. Yet it managed to salvage

[16]Raymond Aron, in *Le Figaro* (Paris), reprinted in *Atlas*, June 1967.
[17]Layton, *op. cit.*, p. 126 ff. In its *Annual Report* for 1966 (p. 95), the International Monetary Fund gives three figures for the deficit.

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enough of the structure of its export-oriented economies, based on low labor cost, to maintain a surplus position.[18]

(4) When a nation buys gold (except when it is acquired as a hedge against inflation), its currency appreciates and its ability to create money increases: both consequences, obviously, are undesirable.[19] It would be desirable to buy U.S. firms with dollars. But if this becomes a contest on the national plane, U.S. firms are strong enough to withstand the pressure to sell; European firms, with notable exceptions, are not.[20]

(5) The balance of payments deficit would amount merely to a relocation of U.S. production to Western Europe to take advantage of location and other favorable factors, were it not for national boundaries, central banks, and accounting systems using national currencies, foreign exchange and gold.

(6) The time-honored accounting system which has served international trade and commerce so well is now being applied to the transfer of capital-embodied technology between nations. In the process, its defects have become apparent and it is being circumvented by the "international" corporation: perhaps it will soon be obsolete.[21] Technology, embodied in a productive combination of capital, labor and know-how, regardless of the nationality of its components, is the real currency, the real capital, of our time. International corporations have understood this fact and use the dollar to meet their needs. Their ability to borrow was not based on what they had, but on what they could produce.[22]

[18]This raises the question why the United States is able to export and borrow additional capital abroad for direct investment, whereas the West European nations can do this only on a far smaller scale and are left with foreign exchange surpluses or gold hoards. The West Europeans with their "nation-size" firms see U.S. firms come in and set up "EEC-size" firms but are unable to do likewise. This is one of the sorest points of the technological gap crisis.

[19]"Not one European country will agree to the revaluation of its own currency in relation to the dollar if the Americans allow the worth of the dollar to decline in relation to gold." (Aron, *op. cit.*) In 1965-1966 the Germans felt the dollar was worth DM 2.60 instead of the official DM 3.90.

[20]The dilemma the surplus countries and the protagonists of a balance of payments equilibrium face is that both economic power and technological progress are no longer measured in bullion or monetary reserves but in capital plant and R&D spending. While it is possible to convert paper into gold and vice versa, their conversion into a technological infrastructure is not quite as simple as buying and selling among nations.

[21]"In a number of other industrial countries, fiscal and, even more, monetary policies were made more restrictive—either on balance of payments considerations, or to contain upward pressures on wages and prices, or for both reasons. This divergence influenced both interest rates and credit availabilities . . . . it may even have stimulated direct investment in that some companies in countries with restrictive monetary policies appear to have been induced by these policies to invite participation by U.S. or other foreign organizations." International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report, 1965,* p. 80 f.

[22]"They got loans for factories which still had to prove that they could be prof-

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(7) The technological gap appears as a political-economic problem in that the structure, the technological and financial organization, of U.S. firms causes them to operate on a supranational level while their official monetary counterparts think and act in terms of national economies—even in the Common Market. The national accounting systems already are being split: Direct investments are debited to the United States but foreign exchange earnings of the U.S. company's European plant are credited to the host country.[23]

(8) Raymond Aron asserts that U.S. balance of payments difficulties stem from two sources: spending more than earning abroad, and the gold standard. In his opinion, there could be, some day, a "revolt against dollar imperialism and the gold standard."[24] This statement contradicts his earlier quoted statement (footnote 19) that no European country would agree to a revaluation of its currency. Yet this would be the result of a dollar devaluation. His main argument is, however, that the international monetary system is out of step with the growth of techno-capital and cannot regulate the activities of U.S. firms in Western Europe, for which a new set of operating rules is needed. The gold standard is an artificial standard; but as the world economy is growing much faster than the additions to the world's hoard of bullion, the several monetary systems would be unable to expand without depreciation if they were in reality tied to it.[25] The gold standard helps to maintain order but does not necessarily help to achieve national policy objectives or affect the decisions of private enterprises.

Neither the devaluation of the dollar nor a total cutback of U.S. foreign aid seems feasible. West European nations cannot be told how to spend their surpluses—for example, for armaments, especially not while disarmament talks are in progress at Geneva, or for imports, at a cost to their economies. Nor does it seem

itable. These loans were usually larger than the capital amounts most European industries would have been able to get." C. F. Karsten, "Should Europe Restrict U.S. Investments?," *Harvard Business Review,* September-October 1965.

[23]If the sales of U.S.-owned companies were credited to the United States (some $18 billion in 1966) instead of repatriated earnings only, the balance of payments would be somewhat different.

[24]Aron, *op. cit.*

[25]"If there is too little international liquidity in the world, deficit countries will have too little time to adjust in a desirable way to the disequilibria which develop, and will be forced to adopt unduly restrictive financial policies as well as to impose restrictions on trade and capital movements. As a result, the growth in world production may be hampered and the prices of primary products depressed." IMF, *Annual Report, 1965,* p. 14.

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possible that U.S. investors in Europe will sell out—or even refrain from making additional investments—as this may open up the possibility of a transfer of ownership and technology in one package.[26] The difficult choice, then, is whether to keep one's assets in capital plant and be bedeviled by creditors, or in gold and foreign exchange. The West European nations seem to want to reverse the roles and let the United States be the lender, this being the "proper function" of a reserve currency. What emerges is the fact that the United States and the West European economies have outgrown the framework in which they transact their affairs as well as the rules of operation. When a particular form of banking no longer fits a new set of conditions, it should be overhauled or replaced.

Conclusion

Western Europe knows that it is part of the U.S. system and that its productive capacity is needed within this system. On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, there is an interest in the adequate growth, productivity, wage levels, consumption, and savings of all participating economies.[27] The technological gap issue is closely related to the question of how the U.S. system is to be organized politically, militarily and economically.

It is evident from the long list of complaints issued by the West Europeans against the Americans and vice versa since the early 1950's, e.g., about a U.S. trade surplus, the technological gap, the balance of payments problems, and the veto of Great Britain's application for Common Market membership, that there are some unresolved disagreements in the Atlantic world. The near-demise of NATO and the French attempt to create a substitute pose other difficulties. Europeans still see the United States as the predominant world power, and they realize that the realities of power and size preclude any other Western nation from ever becoming the equal of the United States. But within the U.S. system it is possible to compensate in part for a subordinate power position by stressing economic growth. The European concern

[26]"The trend of big research-oriented U.S. companies to try to operate as multinational companies with wholly-owned subsidiaries has the consequence, it seems to me, that technology may not be as readily available to European firms as hitherto. There will be a tendency to exploit their technology first in their own organization, and to consider licensing or transfer of know-how on a later date. This trend is presently underestimated." A. T. Knoppers, *The Role of Science and Technology in Atlantic Economic Relationships* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, February 1967).

[27]Thus, a slow rate of growth of the U.S. economy is considered to have a depressing effect on world commodity prices and on some of the less developed economies. See Benoit, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

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with increasing the size of the business firm, the chronic shortage of labor, and other statistical indicators point to the continuing growth of capital plant and the more intensive use of capital equipment in Western Europe. With increasing use of capital, Western Europe can advance from one level of technological infrastructure to the next. In the process the problem of optimal size of plants and firms must be solved and the management of the appropriate technology must be mastered.

This development could take two main directions, depending on the organization of the U.S. system and the relationships of its components. There could be one economic system or there could be at least two competing sub-systems under U.S. hegemony. The location of U.S. capital plant in Western Europe proceeds on the assumption that there is a single system. The U.S. balance of payments deficit and the tight U.S. control of European subsidiaries, on the other hand, reflect the competitive relationships of national economies. From the European viewpoint, the attitude of the United States as the core of its power system is ambivalent. Participation of U.S. firms in Western Europe's economic growth takes place as if there were a single system without national boundaries. But, although some of these firms seem to take the form of international firms, the manner in which they are controlled, protect their technology, and handle their finances gives them the appearance of foreign enclaves. Thus, until recently, they preferred to borrow funds by selling Eurobonds rather than issuing stock which represents equity. Because the interest equalization tax limits European access to U.S. capital markets and the U.S. economy does not attract European direct investment of a reciprocal volume, American policy and attitudes have a tendency to arouse European nationalistic feelings.

As long as a nation exports more than it imports and lends rather than borrows, its account is in good shape. But after World War II, the relatively slower growth of the U.S. and British economies reversed the roles of borrower and lender. The role of the dollar as a reserve currency benefits the United States as long as it is a lender country, but it is a liability to a borrower who ties up his money in long-term (even though more profitable) direct investment in capital plant. It is questionable whether Washington can motivate the West European capitals to take payment in frozen chicken or to wait until U.S. firms earn back their investment. U.S. Treasury paper at higher yield to foreign central

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banks is one such enticement, but it does not eliminate the fact that private transactions have turned into claims of other nations against the United States. As Christopher Layton points out, Western Europe is earning a share of the dollars the United States is spending elsewhere in the world.[28]

Apparently, then, the international system malfunctions when the dollars spent abroad by the United States reach Western Europe and are presented by it as claims or demand for gold rather than for U.S. goods. Under this set-up, it is doubtful whether the United States can effectively play the role of core power in organizing its system. The present system does not operate satisfactorily to permit even the transfer of simple unprotected technology because the concomitant capital transaction may bring the United States and Western Europe face to face as debtor and creditor, respectively; yet the demands made upon this monetary system will tend to grow.

How might it be possible to create the additional capital needed without further burdening the United States? If private direct investment really is the gremlin in the U.S. balance of payments deficit, then one solution, the orthodox one, is to curtail it. But that is not satisfactory or practical. What is needed is a source of capital not tied to the dollar, or any other national currency for that matter, yet one that can keep pace with the requirements of growing economies. Within the U.S. system, the American and European economies are growing toward one another. This raises new adjustment problems, especially the confrontation of the more advanced economic sectors with the institutions of the nation-state system. At some future point in time, an *assignat* or *Rentenmark* scheme might replace the gold and paper standard with one based on technology-embodying capital plant and economic growth. Before this transition can be made, however, adjustments will have to be made in the control, national identity and distribution of income of firms. By raising the technological gap issue Western Europe sought greater participation in a single economic system and its technology. My analysis of this problem reveals two major deficiencies in the U.S. system: its defense organization and its international capital transactions. The technological gap issue in reality represents a challenge to the old economic and political nationalism that still dominates the U.S. system.

[28]Layton, *op. cit.*, p. 114 (Appendix Table).

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ISOLATING THE GUERRILLA: SOME LATIN AMERICAN EXAMPLES*

by Edward Bernard Glick

IN guerrilla warfare, the most politicalized type of conflict so far developed, an initially small and weak group of insurgents tries to grow larger and stronger by winning internal and external support away from the incumbent government. The government reacts, if it is wise and alert enough, by endeavoring to isolate the guerrillas from these sources of support. There is a direct correlation between successful counterinsurgency and successful guerrilla isolation, the latter often being a good measure of the former. Since Latin America has over the last 150 years incurred an international reputation for unrest—including guerrilla warfare—lessons learned there in the past may serve those who must deal with the guerrilla problem in the present and the future.

Latin American unrest has been characterized variously by civil war (often the provinces against the capital), urban street violence, rural squatter invasions, military coups and countercoups, banditry, *caudillaje* (highly personalist and at times charismatic leadership) and guerrilla warfare, so termed because it moved first from Spain to Latin America and then from Latin America elsewhere. In this context, one must pay particular attention to the banditry and *caudillo* traditions in Latin America and to the psychological conditioning they have occasioned over the years among the bandits themselves, the governments and the general population. Even when the only goal of the bandits is plunder, they often exhibit the tactical characteristics of the most politically or socially sophisticated guerrillas. Thus, if we use T. N. Dupuy's excellent four-pronged description of the guerrilla—(1) preference for hit-and-run engagement, (2) indistinguishability and/or inaccessibility, (3) uninhibited, irresponsible destructiveness against law and order, and (4) capability to produce apathy, sympathy or a kind of immobilized

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fear in the local population[1]—we find that the first three points and possibly the fourth fit the nonpolitical bandit as well as the political insurgent.

History discloses no shortage of insurgency in Latin America; there is a plethora of examples from which to choose. One could discuss Nicaragua's General Augusto Cesar Sandino, whose 1,800 men vigorously defied the Conservative government and the U.S. Marines for seven years. Or recall Luiz Carlos Prestes, whose column of insurgents in the 1920's wandered through every Brazilian state for two years, fighting "hundreds of skirmishes and scores of pitched battles." Prestes gave up the fight largely because he could not gain the support of the rural workers, who fought against him at the behest of the cattle ranchers and coffee plantation owners.[2] Or one could dwell at length on the continuing guerrilla activity in Venezuela, the successes and failures there of the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation, the alleged role of Cuba, and the reaction of the Betancourt and Leoni governments to this insurgency.[3] But out of the many examples of guerrilla and counterguerrilla activity in Latin America, the three chosen here for detailed analysis are the French intervention in Mexico from 1861 to 1867, "la Violencia" in Colombia from 1948 to the present, and the Castro insurgency against the Batista government from 1956 to 1959. The stress in all of these cases is on the extent to which the counterinsurgents sought and were able to isolate the guerrilla from his internal and external support.

The French Intervention in Mexico[4]

The French Army invaded Mexico in October 1861 and withdrew in March 1867. In the interim, there were respectively the regency for more than two and a half years (while an emperor was being sought), Maximilian's short-lived empire, the disintegration of that empire, and the return to a republic under

[1]T. N. Dupuy, "Some Thoughts on the Nature of Guerrilla Warfare" (Washington: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Memorandum 2416/100665, 1965), p. 1.

[2]Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 100-101.

[3]The best study of the Venezuelan insurgency is Thomas L. Lalley, *Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela: A Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations and Techniques in Venezuela, 1960-1964* (Alexandria, Va.: Georgetown Research Project of Atlantic Research Corporation, ARPA Project No. 4860, Contract No. SD-215, 1965).

[4]The facts on which this account is based come from Jack Autrey Dabbs, *The French Army in Mexico, 1861-1867: A Study in Military Government* (The Hague: Mouton & Company, 1963).

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Benito Juarez. Throughout this period there was also incessant Juarist and/or bandit guerrilla war against the French and the Conservative Mexican military forces allied to the regency and the empire.

What did the French Expeditionary Force find when it entered Mexico? Geographically, it first encountered the low, moist, unhealthful *tierra caliente* in and around Veracruz. Then, as it fanned out from the invasion port, it found that two-thirds of the country is rugged highland, half of it more than 3,000 feet above sea level. In short, the terrain and climate lent themselves to the hit-and-run tactics and inaccessibility so desired by guerrillas, and the latter did not hesitate to take optimum advantage of these benefits.

The military consequence of this geographical situation was that while many of the cities and towns in time surrendered and adhered formally to the empire, guerrilla warfare in the countryside began immediately upon the start of the invasion and continued until its termination.

The Guerrilla Movement

From the outset at Veracruz the French could not move quickly inland to healthier, higher ground because mules and supplies became scarce and Juarist guerrillas blockaded the port and harassed the roads and trails. Jean Jacques Jules Lafont, a French participant in the invasion, writes:

> The wooded areas which abound along the road that we had to travel were infested with numerous guerrilla bands, who waited in the best ambushes for a favorable moment to fall upon the mired teams and pepper us with bullets and then disappear into a terrain so difficult that it was impossible for us to reconnoiter it in advance. They then could continue their attack on another part of a long column, disappearing as if by magic as soon as our men started out in pursuit.[5]

Nominally, Benito Juarez controlled all the forces arrayed against the French. But since he was forced to retreat to El Paso del Norte relatively early, he actually controlled only the Army of the East, operating in the States of Veracruz and Tamaulipas. Vicente Riva Palacio's Army of the West, operating in Michoacan, was virtually independent, as were many of the irregular bands, which were more bandit than guerrilla. Some of the latter included foreign officers and men, among them Californians and Foreign Legionnaires and other deserters from the French Army.

[5]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 38.

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These irregular forces had almost no doctrine, training or ideology as these terms are defined today. The main tactic was to execute hit-and-run attacks on French military columns, interspersed with acts of terror especially against their Mexican allies. That the terror was successful is confirmed by Marshal François Achille Bazaine, the French military commander in Mexico. In letters to Napoleon III he speaks of "savage barbarism toward the people who have accepted the Empire" and complains:

> The only difficulty that I find it hard to overcome at present is the timidity of the people, who welcome us with open arms but who do not choose their municipal authorities for fear of Juarist violence; and if you do appoint a person to an office, he does not accept.[6]

But regardless of the considerable local support rendered to the Juarists out of conviction, fear or apathy, they could not have prevailed against the enemy without the geographical proximity and the political, military and logistical support of the United States. Because of the American Civil War, that support was slow and late. But by mid-1865 it mushroomed and took various forms. For example, Juarez was allowed to buy uniforms and horses in Texas. The federal government in Washington prohibited the export of forage from California at the very time that a French admiral was in San Francisco trying to buy some. While a Mexican general in New York enrolled "immigrants," American filibusterers on the West Coast signed contracts with another Mexican general for service in Mexico. And ships like the *Merrimac,* the *Mississippi,* the *Ajax* and the *Elizabeth Owens* ran guns from San Francisco to Acapulco.

The Counterinsurgent Response

French forces in Mexico were never stronger than 25,000 men; the Imperial Mexican Army eventually reached 20,000—a total of 45,000 troops to invade and hold an area of some 760,000 square miles. In the beginning at least, Napoleon III obviously thought the forces were sufficient. By 1865 his troops had occupied three-quarters of the country, including the capital and the principal cities and towns. But, contrary to experience in nineteenth-century Europe, popular resistance did *not* cease with the fall of the capital and other major population centers. The French had to use other means to end guerrilla warfare and separate the guerrilla from his internal and external support. Since they could not effect

[6]Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 77, 232.

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this separation by purely military means, they tried political and psychological techniques.

Politically, one isolates guerrillas from their internal support by removing the political basis for their movement. As foreigners, however, the French could not escape the stigma of being "alien occupiers" in league with Conservative Mexican "traitors." Therefore, what they and Maximilian tried to do quickly was to embrace some of the former Liberal government's more popular policies. In particular, the emperor confirmed the sale of church property accomplished under Juarez, established religious freedom, and put the clergy under civil jurisdiction. But more Conservatives were repelled than Liberals attracted by these measures.

As regards isolation from external support, the French suffered a fatal handicap: for most of the period under discussion, they were unable to prevent American diplomatic and material support of the Juarists. And in the time between Napoleon III's decision to recall his army and the implementation of the decision, the fear of an American military invasion of Mexico made the French *unwilling* as well. In any case, they could not control the northern frontier and their willingness and ability to blockade the two coasts was spotty.

Psychologically, one isolates guerrillas by lenient treatment of prisoners and lukewarm guerrilla supporters, amnesties, cash payments for defection, and the like. If this fails, the next step is to try to secure popular support, or at least apathy, by injecting into the people a fear of government retribution that transcends their fear of the guerrillas. Eventually, the empire was forced to this extreme.

Collective fines and the *corvée* were levied against towns that aided Juarist guerrillas. Occasionally, such towns were ordered burned to the ground. An imperial law of October 3, 1865 ended any ambiguity in the public's mind about the legal status of guerrillas and their supporters. They were henceforth subjected to the death penalty, under Mexican court-martial, with almost no appeal, and with execution twenty-four hours after sentence. By 1866 even the French courts-martial were losing some of their earlier justice and impartiality. When the president of one French court was asked about a clearly unjust death sentence passed against two Mexicans, he answered: "Bah! Every Mexican is a *guerrillero*; either he has been or he will be. You don't take any

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risk of being wrong when you shoot the ones you catch."[7] Such measures, together with the haughtiness of the average French soldier, who looked down upon Mexicans, and whose misdeeds toward them were out of reach of Mexican administration or justice, added further to the French failure to wean the population away from the guerrillas. (If Maximilian had catered to the Indians of Mexico, many of whom welcomed his arrival hopefully, he might have successfully isolated them from the white and *mestizo* elements of the population and thus possibly have saved himself and his empire.) [8]

In structuring counterguerrilla warfare, the French reintroduced an earlier Mexican practice and added a new one of their own. During the days of Santa Ana, the *hacendados* had been forced to arm their most trusted servants and tenants because large estate owners were held personally responsible for any banditry committed on their properties. Marshal Bazaine adopted this practice, punishing by fine those landlords who failed to control guerrilla activity in their localities. The system worked fairly well for a year or so. Bazaine also conceived the *Guardias Rurales*. These were groups of civilians who lived and worked at home and responded upon call to local guerrilla attacks.

The outcome of the French Expedition to Mexico is known to history. The French left, the empire collapsed, Maximilian was shot, and Juarez returned. From the standpoint of guerrilla isolation, the Juarist guerrillas were unable to vanquish the Conservative Mexicans because of the support the latter got from France. But neither could the French isolate and beat the Juarist guerrillas because of terrorism and the support of the United States. Though pressure within France and the external threat posed by Prussia had their effects, in the end it was principally foreign support—the unwillingness of the French to go on supplying it and the willingness of the Americans to increase it—that made the difference.

"La Violencia" in Colombia

Sparked by the near-sacking of Bogota while the Inter-American foreign ministers were meeting there in 1948, "la Violencia" began as a feud between the traditional political enemies in Colombia, the Liberals and the Conservatives. Soon, however, it degenerated into an insurgency that has cost at least 200,000 lives.

[7]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 237.
[8]This is a point strongly argued in *ibid.*, p. 283 ff.

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The Guerrilla Movement

Colombian insurgency is a mixture of highly political civil war and nonpolitical banditry, mostly the latter. This has made it unique among the insurgencies of the recent past. As former Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin stressed, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "[This] violence is not primarily Communist-inspired or directed, although there is reason to believe they are trying to take advantage of the situation. Violence in Colombia is basically banditry rather than insurgency."[9] The communists have not had an easy time trying to turn the situation to their advantage. When, for example, the founder of the Castroite *Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino* tried to ally himself with some bandits "posing as guerrillas," he was killed by the bandits.[10]

Geography also has its influence on the violence. Most Colombians live in a part of the country composed of high mountains, forested slopes, torrential rivers, and intermountain basins and valleys. Moreover, they live in about fourteen concentrated clusters, each cluster separated from the others by sparsely-settled land. These patterns of geography and settlement have greatly aided Colombian guerrilla activity, especially in such places as the so-called Independent Republic of Marquetalia.

Carved out of approximately 2,500 square miles in the Departments of Tolima and Northern Huila, the Marquetalia region became the home in the 1950's of Liberal guerrillas, who split into two factions, the pro-Marxist *Comuneros* and the *Limpios*. But the area was already under the control of the bandit chieftain Pedro Antonio Marin. Marin proclaimed and more or less ruled the Independent Republic of Marquetalia, whose 7,000 inhabitants live a mile and a half above sea level in isolated, precipitously located places with little connection to the rest of the country. He got his passive local support through force, and his active support from the discontent generated by poverty, disease and deprivation.

As for help from outside the immediate locality, some Col-

[9]U.S. Department of State, *Statement by Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin before the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Subject of Communist Subversion in the Hemisphere, February 18, 1963,* p. 31.

[10]According to an article in *World Marxist Review*, quoted in Georgetown Research Project, *A Historical Survey of Patterns and Techniques of Insurgency Conflicts in Post-1900 Latin America* (Alexandria, Va.: Atlantic Research Corporation, ARPA Project No. 4860; Contract No. SD-215, 1964), p. 92.

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ombians believe that the "long immunity of the region from armed intervention could be charged to leftist support in Bogota."[11] Periodically, groups in the capital circulate propaganda accusing the army of military brutality and the butchering of peaceful peasants. Signs have appeared saying "We Shall Defend Marquetalia." It is probable, too, that Castro sent Marin some arms and ammunition, the relative importance of which seems slight.

The Counterinsurgent Response

Just as Colombia's insurgency is unique in that it manifests itself largely in banditry, so is the government's response unique because of its heavier than usual emphasis on military civic action, i.e., the noncombat use of military forces in social and economic projects of a developmental nature.[12] Thus, some years ago, the representatives of CARE in Colombia reported this episode:

> Belen de Umbria is located in the rich coffee highlands of western Caldas. Its population of 28,000 severely felt the ravages of the violence during the years of Colombian civil strife. . . . In Belen de Umbria lived several score of "violence widows," women with children to support whose husbands had been slain during the war years. They lacked roof and home, a place of their own. Colonel [Alvaro] Valencia [chief of Battalion Ayacucho], visited them, asked them what their greatest needs were. All of them answered, "a home." With that in mind, the military garrison in Belen de Umbria was ordered to start helping these widows build their own homes. Local municipal and church authorities pitched in, too, and the CARE Mission in Colombia was asked to supply construction tools and Cinva-Ram block-making presses.
>
> That was over a year ago. Today, more than twenty houses have been constructed in urban Belen de Umbria, and the Church and a private philanthropic group have been able to take over the house construction project. This leaves the soldiers and officers of Battalion Ayacucho free to work in the rural veredas, where the campesino has begun to organize himself to reconstruct school and home.[13]

[11] *New York Times* May 31, 1964, p. 29.

[12] Military civic action is defined officially by the United States as "the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* (Washington: GPO, 1964), pp. 90-91. For a fuller and more eloquently worded definition by Lieutenant General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, the former War Minister of Colombia, see U.S. Army, *Final Report: Fourth Conference of the American Armies* (Fort Amador, Canal Zone: Southern Command Headquarters, 1963), p. 70.

[13] Quoted in Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, "Civic Action," lecture given at Counter-Guerrilla School, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., February 24, 1961, pp. 6-7.

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More recently, early in 1964, Colombia began a $30 million program in Marquetalia involving some 3,000 combat and civic action troops as well as personnel from such civilian ministries as Public Works, Health, Education, and Agriculture. The key elements are the army engineers who, with backing from the United States Agency for International Development, are putting roads into the area to connect it for the first time with other sections of the country. Marin's response was immediately to seize and slay a police inspector. At the same time, however, he issued a communiqué from the "Revolutionary Command of Marquetalia," saying that while *military* actions would not be tolerated, civic action would. This was an unavoidable concession to the favorable reputation civic action was beginning to enjoy in Marquetalia and other parts of rural Colombia.

In addition to deploying civic action units, the Colombian Army divided its forces into smaller "hunter-killer" groups. It hoped that this tactic, together with increased support and information from the peasants as a result of civic action in their behalf, would isolate and then eliminate the guerrillas. The initial military contact with the insurgents was almost nil. But both Washington and Bogota believe that the army has begun to win the peasants' confidence and to decrease guerrilla activity. This feeling was expressed to the American Congress by General Andrew O'Meara, then Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command, when he testified that "only after the Colombian Army civic action program convinced the campesinos that the soldiers were their friends and that they meant business in their campaign to protect the campesinos from the bandits did the campesinos start providing the necessary intelligence to make the campaign effective."[14]

The Castro-Batista Confrontation, 1956-1959

Cuba was the last of the American colonies to separate herself from Spain. She was able to do so ultimately only because of the U.S. military intervention in 1898. But before that, the island had experienced bitter cycles of revolt and repression, which included guerrilla warfare. The savage Ten Years War (1868-1878), for instance, was almost pure guerrilla fighting laced with terror. That war seeded the unsuccessful revolt of 1895, which was also

[14]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1964: Hearings,* 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1964), p. 402.

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characterized by guerrilla warfare that the Spaniards could not effectively stop. They resorted a year later to a system of nineteenth-century concentration camps, the *reconcentrados*. These were garrisoned towns into which the rural population was herded. Thus when Castro and Batista began their confrontation, they were able to draw upon techniques of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare that were already part of Cuba's "incapsulated past."

The Guerrilla Movement

The political arm of the guerrilla forces was the 26th of July Movement, led by Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and the late Ernesto (Che) Guevara. It was composed mostly of young, not yet established, alienated members of the *urban* middle class. Initially at least, it was not the peasants but the middle class—sons and daughters of wealthier families, students, intellectuals and professionals—who defied Batista's secret police, battled troops and tanks, contributed their own funds, and collected money abroad for Castro's 26th of July Movement. Only later did Castro base his main support on the rural, Afro-Cuban peasantry.[15] Only later was Castro joined by the communists, the Civic Resistance Movement, many of whose members were established professionals and well-known citizens, and the M-26 Movement which conducted sabotage and propaganda in the cities.

On the matter of propaganda and psychological warfare, Che[16] and Fidel insisted that the guerrillas themselves be given constant indoctrination in campside discussions and at special training centers. In order to reach Batista's army and the general population, Castro regularly broadcast over the hidden "Radio Rebelde," and his noncombatant adherents spread his point of view in newspapers, magazines, leaflets and conversations.

Harsh treatment and terror were seldom used—except against betrayers of the guerrillas. Personal contacts between guerrillas and uncommitted civilians were in the main polite, even respectful. Also, the Castroites did not mind taking prisoners in encounters with Batista's uniformed forces, which is rare in this type of warfare. They subjected them to pep talks urging adherence to the revolution, but if the soldiers refused adherence,

[15]"But like the French Revolution before it, the Cuban Revolution has now started to . . . devour its own." Edward Bernard Glick, "The Cuban Cauldron," *Midstream,* Winter 1961, p. 87.

[16]I have relied heavily on Che Guevara's *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961) for my discussion of the techniques used by the *Fidelistas.*

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they were usually released unharmed. An observer described one of the prisoner indoctrination talks as follows:

> That same evening, I watched the surrender of hundreds of *Batistianos* from a small town garrison. They were gathered within a hollow square of rebel Tommy gunners and harangued by Raul Castro.
>
> "We hope that you will stay with us and fight against the master who so ill-used you. If you decide to refuse this invitation—and I am not going to repeat it—you will be delivered to the custody of the Cuban Red Cross tomorrow. Once you are under Batista's orders again, we hope that you will not take up arms against us. But, if you do, remember this—
>
> "We took you this time. We can take you again. And when we do, we will not frighten or torture or kill you, any more than we are doing to you at this moment. If you are captured a second time or even a third by us, we will again return you exactly as we are doing now."
>
> This expression of utter contempt for the fighting potential of the defeated had an almost physical impact on them. Some actually flinched as they listened.
>
> The following day, I could not question that these men were returned unharmed. I counted 242 across a border check-point marked by two burned-out car wrecks overlooking Santiago de Cuba.[17]

This lenient treatment of prisoners had several rewarding effects. First, some of the government troops did join the insurgency, thus isolating Batista from his support; second, the fear and consequences of rebel capture were minimized in the minds of the soldiers, so that they did not always have to fight hard or well; and third, the publicized humane treatment of the soldiers paid the insurgents rich propaganda dividends throughout the land.

Militarily, the guerrilla hierarchy rose from squad to platoon to column, composed respectively of 8 to 12, 30 to 40, or 100 to 150 men, headed overall by regional chiefs reporting to the top. The guerrillas captured about 85 per cent of their arms from government forces.[18] The rest they got from abroad, mainly from the United States but also from countries like Costa Rica and Mexico. Regardless of the source, probably 90 per cent of their foreign supplies were paid for by funds raised in the United States.

The Cuban guerrillas established civil administration in the areas they controlled. This included organizations for public health, law, industry, supply, commerce, agrarian reform, mail, propaganda, finance, taxation, and so on. Tax collections were conducted clandestinely by province, state, city or village finance committees. Guerrilla industries were also established. Shoes,

[17]Dickey Chapelle, "How Castro Won," in Franklin Mark Osanka, editor *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 329.

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 334.

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harnesses, packs and improvised weapons and ammunition were among the more important items manufactured.

The Counterinsurgent Response

One of the earliest things Batista did to isolate the guerrillas was to try to conceal their existence. He imposed strict news blackouts and travel curbs, and he countered rumors. The trick worked well for the first year or so. By 1957, however, Castro had grown too strong to be fictional. Besides, the government forfeited its credibility by swearing that he had been killed just before the *New York Times* published an interview with him, complete with a picture of the rebel leader in an undoubtedly mortal state.

Batista then tried terror, which backfired. Both he and Castro publicized this terror—the one to repel guerrilla support, the other to attract it—but it was Castro who benefited more. Victims and nonvictims alike joined Castro's ranks as the government's terror grew more cruel, irrational and random, and as it was directed more against the students, the poor and the unimportant than against the rich and the influential. Batista soon realized that, since he could not isolate the guerrillas by drawing away their popular support, he would have to rely on breaking their external support and upon effective military action. He succeeded in the first objective and failed in the second.

It has already been mentioned that Castro received supplies from the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica and elsewhere. At least half of these were intercepted or captured at some point. Batista's rather good contraband control had relatively little impact, however; Castro relied mostly on materials he captured from government forces or procured from sympathizers within Cuba. As for Batista's support from abroad, he received U.S. arms and equipment under the Military Assistance Program until the spring of 1958. But these were of no avail because his overall military response to the insurgency was so bad.

Batista was saddled with a number of problems in the military arena. First, even before the advent of Castro, the Cuban people generally hated their army. This made the collection of intelligence next to impossible. Second, neither by training, equipment, attitude nor administration were the army or the paramilitary forces fitted to the task of finding and fighting guerrillas. Third, many professional officers, offended by the atrocities of the *Servicio Inteligencia Militar,* were reluctant to take part in counterguerrilla operations. Fourth, the army's counterinsurgent

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tactics and morale were bad. For example, Batista tried bombing rebel areas with B-26's, fragmentation bombs, napalm and artillery shells. The bombing did little actual damage to the guerrillas, but it filled the affected civilians with anger and hatred and pushed them closer to the rebels. Large, slow-sweeping patrols worked no better. These were not fast enough for the guerrillas, whose intelligence and knowledge of the terrain were always excellent. Cordoning off the Sierra Maestra and other known guerrilla areas likewise failed. Batista's military forces were generally afraid to penetrate Castro's redoubts or to leave their own, while the guerrillas were both willing and able to harass the army and to slip through its cordons. At times, the ratio of government forces to guerrillas ranged from 40 to 1 to 100 to 1. Still, the guerrillas could not be militarily beaten or isolated.

Conclusions

From the viewpoint of guerrilla isolation, the Franco-Maximilian and Batista experiences were utter failures; the Colombian experience is an increasing success. What general conclusions can be drawn from these and other Latin American episodes that have been discussed?

First, terror is a dangerous, two-sided weapon and often a bad isolating technique. If it works quickly, it can produce the desired counterinsurgent effect: fear and nonsupport of the guerrilla. If it does not, it will produce resentment and, in time, active or passive support for the guerrillas. In Cuba, probably ten times as many people were killed by Batista's terrorism as by his military operations in the field. This caused great public alienation; toward the end of the 1956-1959 insurgency, the bulk of the Cubans found Batista as repulsive as they found Fidel Castro attractive.

Second, charisma and effective propaganda are crucial. All things being equal, whichever side has these qualities, has popular support. Maximilian could not match the charisma of Juarez, and Batista was a pathetic failure in the personalist contest with Castro. In Latin America especially, the counterinsurgent incumbent must equal or excel the insurgent leader in dash. People want their leaders to be handsome, masculine-appearing (*muy macho*), articulate and forensic. Batista was none of these things.

Third, external support is not as imperative for guerrilla success as is often thought. It is true that Juarez benefited from the

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moral, political and material support of the United States. But neither the Colombian nor the Cuban guerrillas depended on outside sources, particularly for material support. Even though the Venezuelan guerrillas today are receiving help from Castro, they are not doing at all well. Counterinsurgency should, therefore, aim first at isolating the guerrilla from internal rather than external support—though this does not mean that steps to patrol long coastlines or to improve spotty border control should not be taken.

Fourth, in the past, if Latin American insurgents could be isolated from support by the government's army, or a portion thereof, they could not hope to succeed. But Castro has shown that a successful insurgency in Latin America need not now have the support of the national army. He has shown, too, that an overthrow can be realized by stressing rural insurgency first, then fanning out toward the capital city. In the typical Latin American situation of earlier days, the insurgents tried for the capital first, and if they prevailed in that effort, they usually won the rest of the country as well.

Finally, since successful counterinsurgency depends ultimately on the ability to orchestrate political, military, psychological and socio-economic techniques, a campaign against guerrillas should put major emphasis on military civic action projects. Civic action has worked in Colombia and may well be one of the most important guerrilla isolation instruments available in underdeveloped areas like Latin America.[19]

[19]For a fuller discussion of civic action, see my *Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military Use of the Military* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1967), especially Chapter 5.

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MILITIAS EAST OF SUEZ: FILLING THE POWER VACUUM

by Frederick Martin Stern

ON July 18, 1967, the British government announced its intention to call back its military forces stationed east of Suez. This decision, affecting some 75,000 men, was expected to be carried out by 1975, with one-half of the withdrawal to be completed by 1970-1971. Six months later, on January 16, 1968, Prime Minister Wilson announced that the entire operation would be completed by the end of 1970. Although this date was soon postponed by one year, the acceleration of the planned pullback caused consternation among the nations that would lose British protection. British forces had given decisive aid in defeating the communist insurgency in Malaya, helped to fight off the Indonesian intruders on Borneo, and saved the independence of Kuwait. Thanks to their presence, many countries have enjoyed a reasonable measure of safety and tranquillity.

About the time Wilson made his January 1968 announcement, North Viet Nam stepped up its belligerent activities in South Viet Nam (the TET offensive) and Thailand, and North Korea pressed with greater vigor its infiltration of South Korea and attempted to assassinate President Park. This combination of developments pointed up the security problems confronting the nations of mainland Southeast Asia and Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. And, after our own experiences with Korea and Viet Nam, every American shudders at the thought that his country will soon be the only Western guardian of peace in the entire area south of China. With only three years left before the British evacuation, the task of closing the threatening power gap has assumed great urgency.

One of the smallest states in that region was the first to come up with a promising program. Almost immediately after the announcement of Britain's decision, the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, announced that his government would create a citizen army of the type developed by Israel. Soon thereafter, South Korea began to improve the readiness potential of its army reserves and establish a large home guard.

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While these governments were impressed by Israel's spectacular victory over the Arabs in June 1967, Singapore was influenced also by her colonial experience. Like other British dominions and colonies, the Straits Settlements had followed Britain's centuries-old militia tradition which, in Australia and New Zealand, had led to the creation of true citizen armies based on universal training. This tradition is now being revived because it seems to offer the best answer to the new demands of military strategy and tactics.

Since the Second World War, most cases of aggression have been sponsored or supported in some way by one of the communist powers. So the victims have naturally looked to Britain and the United States for help. But unexpected difficulties have plagued these Western states. Communists prefer to combine ideological warfare with various—usually low—levels of violence rather than employ the classical strategy based on concentrated firepower. John Foster Dulles first thought that communist strategy could be thwarted by the threat of "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons, but by 1957 he had to abandon this policy because the Soviet Union, with its newly acquired nuclear weapons, could retaliate in kind. Once nuclear war was recognized as suicidal, the West was forced to eschew conventional strategies that might bring about escalation to nuclear warfare. This called for new military doctrines to counter communist post-atomic warfare, diffused in space and time.

To keep their opponents, especially the United States, off balance, communist strategists strive to spread their aggressive activities all over the world by means of violent demonstrations, riots and assassinations. They do not attack a country at its frontiers but at many internal points. Instead of employing airborne and naval forces, or even a regular army, they rely primarily on infiltrators and their indigenous collaborators. This kind of war is costly and enervating for the victim, but relatively safe and cheap for the aggressor, especially if he regards the lives of his men as expendable.

The communist concept of war embraces diffusion in time as well, with the same lack of concern about human suffering and lives. The representatives of North Viet Nam, for instance, in the "negotiations" in Paris, show no concern for the lives of their countrymen in the South, or even of their own soldiers. The North Koreans performed in a similar fashion at Panmunjom, when, hoping to gain a negotiating advantage by wearing out the

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patience of their opponents, they sacrificed the lives of many thousands of their soldiers in senseless offensives.

The Western powers are gradually learning the countermeasures that are most effective. To apply a combination of revolutionary and guerrilla warfare, an aggressor must be able to count on the sympathy and cooperation of a considerable segment of the nation he means to subdue; he therefore tries to prepare the ground for his conquest by mobilizing support in many ways or terrorizing people into apathy and connivance. The logical defense against such diffused warfare is the conversion of the entire population into one resolute security force. The members of such a force, normally not recognizable as such, must be ready to spring to action everywhere in a minimum of time. In other words, diffused aggression calls for diffused, ubiquitous defense, the ideal instrument for which is a citizenry in arms.

II

There are two basic types of citizen forces, both often called "militias," the citizen army and the home guard. The main features of a typical citizen army are:

(1) Universal training and service. Each man has reserve duties for one or more decades: in Switzerland up to age 32 in the First Line, 42 in the First Reserve, and 50 in the Second Reserve; in Israel, for men up to age 49, women to age 34. This obligation includes in Switzerland unquestioned acceptance of promotions, with much additional training; in Sweden only promotions in the noncommissioned ranks need be accepted.

(2) A short initial training period, intensive and realistic, followed, if required by current defense needs, by a period of active service.

(3) Within the initial training period, individualized instruction designed to utilize a man's special aptitudes and prepare capable men from the start for promotion.

(4) Evening and weekend courses.

(5) "Refresher courses" lasting several weeks, to be taken every year or every other year, tapering off with age; these preserve a man's military usefulness and provide him advanced training.

(6) Additional courses preparing men for further promotion or specialization.

(7) Leadership cadres consisting, even into high ranks, mainly of citizen soldiers, backed up by professional soldiers as instructors, administrators, technical specialists, and higher staff and command officers.

(8) No unorganized "reserve pools"; only permanent tactical units, preferably locally organized, at all times ready for rapid mobilization.

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The citizen army may be generally characterized as a "utility army," economical in time and cost, without frills and inducements, and also without "spit and polish"; but strictly disciplined and rigorously trained, uniting all ranks in friendly comradeship. This system secures the largest possible number of capable, trained soldiers with the greatest readiness potential.

The need for large armies has been denied every time new weapons have become available, whether it was gunpowder or the machine gun, airpower or nuclear weapons. Nations have always convinced themselves that the next war would be won in a short time without deploying huge land forces. Yet, even in limited conflicts such as Korea and Viet Nam, the United States, with all its weapons and superweapons, suffered large manpower losses and had to call up reserve units and increase draft quotas. The only brief wars of our time have been those won by Israel's citizen army, because it was able to deploy its maximum strength from the start. Where practically all reserves are kept in a high state of readiness, there is no need to train new recruits at the beginning of a war; should combat requirements not call for total mobilization, many reservists can be permitted to stay in their civilian pursuits or shifted into war production. In some countries, universal training in a popular citizen army offers the added advantage that its members, who make up a large proportion of the population, are unlikely to succumb to the recruiting efforts of enemy infiltrators.

Individualization of training from the start gives citizen soldiers a strong incentive to excel and reduces boredom, as it appeals to their special aptitudes, interests and ambitions. It facilitates the training of specialists and the preparation of soldiers for promotions, and makes it possible to raise the bulk of the cadres from rank and file conscripts.[1] A citizen army is free to choose for every job the best man available from the nation's large pool of talents, while semi-professional armies are limited in the choice of candidates for higher promotion to the relatively few who make the army their career. This wider choice explains the high quality of the citizen army's cadre personnel: they are men of high intelligence who learn quickly, and are more likely to do the right thing in unforeseen battlefield situations.

The replacement of "reserve pools" by local units improves

[1]In Israel the army discharges about 50 per cent of all soldiers after their first thirty months of service (for women, twenty months) with the rank of corporal or higher.

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readiness; men can reach their assembly places or armories more speedily. They feel at home with their comrades and commanders and go into action as closely-knit teams. Moreover, they are ubiquitous—ready and available in every town and village, at any time, even without mobilization—and thus more effective in the kind of warfare which the communist powers prefer.

In almost all countries, most people are physically and mentally suited for service in citizen forces. The people of Korea and Viet Nam, both in guerrilla and regular warfare, have shown themselves fully capable of defensive and offensive action. However, civilians cannot be welded into an effective fighting force overnight. They need thorough, realistic training and retraining over a number of years. Many defeats suffered by the armed forces of modern, industrialized countries can be attributed to their one-sided reliance on professional or semi-professional forces and the consequent lack of large, carefully organized and continuously trained citizen reserves.

An important type of force that falls in between citizen and regular armies is to be found in the trained reserves of the latter. Though these men may suddenly be needed for service, many countries leave them for the most part unorganized or with insufficient or unrealistic training. One reason for this wasteful practice is the high cost of the necessary armaments, munitions and equipment. This need could be met partly by utilizing obsolescent matériel which now is often sold as surplus or destroyed. Weapons are never worth more than the men who handle them; armies supplied with partly obsolescent hardware have often defeated their better equipped adversaries. Sometimes citizens armed with primitive weapons have routed well armed forces. For instance, the Prussian *Landwehr* of 1813, a militia improvised to fight Napoleon's victorious armies, did not even have adequate clothing, and its front ranks carried pikes until they captured firearms from the enemy. Yet, a Prussian general—in a book published in 1918 to discredit the citizen army system—had to concede that even in their early battles these men "stood the great test with high distinction."[2] The performance of the Viet Cong in the early stages of the Vietnamese war tells a similar story.

Another difficulty in upgrading the reserves lies in the insufficient supply of competent cadre personnel. This shortcoming

[2]Lt. General Johann Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, *A Nation in Arms or a Militia?* (New York, 1918), pp. 93, 102.

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could be partly overcome by having the regular army train capable draftees for the reserves as "non-coms" and for promotion as commissioned officers up to field rank. The training courses of these reserve cadres, if patterned after those of the citizen armies of Switzerland or Israel and scheduled over a number of years, would not disrupt the civilian pursuits of participants too severely. But such a program must be carried out in peacetime, not when war is threatened. A country which maintains both a semi-professional and a citizen army enjoys a great advantage, inasmuch as the latter, once it has grown to full maturity, can raise enough cadres to furnish some for the reserves of the regular army. This has been suggested by Major General Paul A. Cullen, a distinguished Australian citizen soldier. He writes:

> Perhaps one of the most important and typical attitudes of Australians at war is their initiative and independence. These are traits perhaps attracted by, and developed in, the CMF [Citizen Militia Force] rather more than in the ARA [Australian Regular Army]. . . . Many CMF officers hold down big civil jobs. The ability to translate painlessly their capacity and experience in the CMF to our defence is a priceless asset that must be cultivated and encouraged, rather than discouraged and destroyed.[3]

III

It is indicative of the modernization of strategy that not only the citizen army, but even the older, somewhat primitive institution of the home guard is receiving more and more attention. Probably the best modern home guards for territorial defense have been organized since World War II by Sweden, Denmark and Norway.[4] Because of their ubiquity and intimate knowledge of the local terrain and population, they are ideally equipped to identify and arrest infiltrators and their domestic collaborators. Home guards comprise men who have completed their service in the regular armed forces, others who have not been drafted, and often women as well as men. Although they generally rely on voluntary enlistment, participation is widespread in Scandinavia.

Finland used the home guard in 1917 and again in 1939 for defense against the Soviet Union. During World War II Sweden established a large home guard force, and in the aftermath of the

[3] *Sydney Morning Herald,* June 3, 1968.

[4] For the information and quotations in this section on the Scandinavian home guards I am indebted to C. E. Riggert, *Mobilmachung ohne Befehl, Skandinavische Heimwehren* (*Mobilization without Command, Scandinavian Home Guards*) (Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen, 1965).

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war the Norwegians and Danes, mindful of Germany's rapid victory and the sufferings experienced under Nazi occupation, followed the Swedish example.

The Swedish home guard is now part of the nation's defense forces. Although it remains a volunteer force, every application for membership depends upon acceptance by the home guard authorities; local leaders and members carefully check all applicants and keep out people suspected of being communists or fascists.[5] Another important feature, announced on January 15, 1943 by Prime Minister Hansson, are the contingency plans in the event of an attack on the country in which the government and military command are paralyzed:

> In such a case the military commanders as well as all soldiers, the civil government officials as well as the entire population, must act independently and on their own initiative. . . . No one should wait for orders. Every announcement that resistance has been given up would be false. Independent action and all-out resistance would be required under any circumstances. All government officials and citizens would be obliged to act in this spirit.

Sweden's home guards can be mobilized within four hours, but most members are able to reach their units within one hour.[6] Many of them have received voluntary pre-military training as "Home Guard Youngsters" at age 15-16, and as "Home Guard Men" at age 17-19. After this initial training, they serve fifty hours every year. To avoid serious interference in the civilian occupations of members, peacetime training and instruction are scheduled as much as possible during evenings and weekends, except for combat training which is given approximately every third year in a two-weeks course. Especially fit and capable men are trained as "commandos" and for guerrilla war. No home guard member can refuse to accept a promotion and the training required for it.

Home guard members need permission to travel abroad. If there is danger of war, they must have their arms, ammunition and personal equipment ready for immediate action, may not leave their home or place of work without permission, and must keep their superiors informed of their whereabouts. Important

[5]This policy was formalized by Defense Minister Skoeld on May 29, 1940. In the discussion of the Home Guard Law in the Swedish Parliament he referred expressly to the paramilitary organizations of other countries which, escaping governmental control, had become states within the state.

[6]In Sweden the home guard is the first force ready for action, because at the outbreak of a war the army mobilizes only the reserves, not the men who are still in their first year's training.

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Swedish factories select their guards from employees who are home guard members.

For specialized and intensive training, Scandinavian home guard installations use professional military men as teachers; professionals are also in charge of the planning and supervision of the training. Leaders of platoons and companies are home guard volunteers, except in Norway where army and home guard officers serve alternately for a few years in one and then in the other service.

A nation that has created an effective militia possesses a deterrent far stronger than its actual military might. Because almost all its citizens are soldiers, such a nation would remain a formidable foe even for an invader who initially succeeded in overrunning the country. Civil disobedience, slowdowns, strikes, sabotage, riots and guerrilla warfare would deprive the aggressor of the fruits of victory.

IV

A militia, be it a citizen army or a home guard, is democracy in arms—the instrument of citizens created to defend their liberties. At the same time, it reinforces the democratic spirit. In a study of the impact of the Swiss peasants' militia and the Netherlands burghers' militia upon the political life of their nations, the Swiss historian Adolf Gasser concluded:

> Under the militia system, governments and political leaders had to make constant efforts to give careful consideration to the vital interests, the sense of justice, and the human dignity of the armed citizenry. This bond between the political leadership and the people created a condition of confidence in all quarters that made it possible to base the life of the political community primarily upon elements of moral power. . . . The general possession of arms promoted above all the creation of a feeling of equality between the different strata of the population. This feeling, in turn, enhanced the mutual regard for the vital rights of others. Fellow citizens, feeling all equally strong, were the more ready to concede to each other political equality. A man demanding respect for his own personal freedom and his own moral convictions could not easily deny this respect to the other owners of arms. Thus, in the old democracies, toleration of the most diverse ideologies was gradually achieved without damage to the feeling of national unity. As the insistence upon personal freedom became closely combined with the feeling of equality, it was tempered by a spirit of conciliation. And from this spirit grew a psychological readiness to compromise, especially among the masses of the people.[7]

[7]Adolf Gasser, *Geschichte der Volksfreiheit und der Demokratie* (*History of Popular Freedom and Democracy*) (Aarau, Switzerland, 1939), pp. 134-135.

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Britain's militias spread a similar spirit, especially during the seventeenth century,[8] as did the militias of Britain's American colonies which fought King George's mercenary troops for eight years.

In our day, many nations menaced by the Soviet Union and Communist China are beginning to realize that they must constantly be prepared to defend their freedom; they are learning at the same time that the freedom of their nation may be worthless without freedom for the individual. Political democracy and citizen militias belong together and strengthen each other in many ways. The spirit that has been the prime force in the political and economic rise of the Western democracies has strengthened their fighting forces as well, and it can do the same for the newer countries. One reason for the strength of the citizen militias is the replacement of blind obedience, on which other types of armed forces usually rely, with a fraternal, democratic kind of discipline. Substituting for the soldier's fear of his superiors the bonds of comradeship and esteem, militias can remove the distaste for army service common under other military systems. No matter how strenuous and frequent training of the citizen army may be, the men—and even the girls—like it. It makes optimal use of their time and talents, and appeals to their natural ambitions by giving them ample opportunity for promotion. It produces soldiers who can be trusted to act on their own initiative, even if they are out of sight of their superiors. The old, sometimes brutal kind of discipline fosters resentment and works as a brake on independent thinking and action.

For a better understanding of the kind of discipline a democratic militia fosters, it may be helpful to read Liddell Hart's description of his experience with the Australian citizen army in the First World War:

> These were the forces in which discipline, while it grew, remained most free; where it was normal to hear a foolish or unjust order soundly criticized. The result was that their commanders took the most care to reconcile their orders with common sense and justice, with the further result that their orders obtained the most willing and effective execution. . . . A critical habit of mind is the foundation of efficiency. It leads men to recognize the necessity of discipline while acquiring it in a form which does not cramp self-reliance and initiative.[9]

Communist rulers understand the value of militias. Wherever

[8]See Macaulay, *History of England,* I, 291-293.
[9]Basil Liddell Hart, *The Defense of Britain* (New York, 1939), p. 435.

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they instigate a rebellion or civil war abroad, they build militias and fire their enthusiasm through ideological indoctrination and intensive, though unscrupulous, propaganda. The communists often attract followers by offering them a role that elevates them above the humble surroundings of family, village, or working place, and by entrusting them with weapons and confidential tasks such as espionage or sabotage. In addition, the political and paramilitary forces of the communists offer prospects of rapid promotion, irrespective of education or social background.

At home, however, the emphasis is different. Even though the Soviets seek to inspire their soldiers with a spirit like that of a democratic citizen army, they are more concerned to keep them in a state of absolute, unquestioning subservience. They have restored the old caste distinctions between officers and enlisted men, and employ the harshest kind of discipline that often causes the soldiers to fear their superiors more than the enemy.[10]

Attractions similar to those which communists offer to guerrilla forces abroad are offered by the militia of a democracy as well. It, too, appeals to a person's sense of importance and dignity by giving him the opportunity for promotion according to merit and eliminating the pre-democratic, humiliating emphasis on "drill," "spit and polish" and blind obedience. But to compete effectively, the militia must be backed up by the development of democratic conditions in other spheres of life.

In a country whose social conditions and political institutions are still undemocratic or relatively primitive, the government may have to take drastic steps, such as removing obvious vestiges of caste and feudalism, granting freedom of speech, press and assembly, improving economic conditions, modernizing labor laws, redistributing land,[11] or providing a system of rural credit and abolishing usury. If people believe their government is trying to improve their economic lot and is treating them with dignity, membership in a citizen army or home guard will become a matter of pride. If called up in an hour of danger, their performance will surpass that of mercenaries, for they defend a land that is really theirs.

The fighting spirit and discipline of a military force depend on

[10]When the Soviet leaders first established their rule in 1917, they created true militias. As soon as their power was secure, they abolished them out of fear that these forces might turn against them some day. What they now call a "militia" is a special kind of uniformed police.

[11]See Karl Brandt, "Economic Development: Lessons of Statecraft in Taiwan," ORBIS, Winter 1968, pp. 1072-1074.

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the country's political and socio-economic conditions. Order and discipline are vitally needed in every society and every army, but where they are based on caste and privilege and upheld mainly by coercion, they weaken the spirit of civic responsibility. Democracy, despite its shortcomings, strengthens man's dignity and makes him the ideal defender of his country.

V

Several nations in the region south of China possess militias or are about to create or reinforce them. They are Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, all members of the British Commonwealth, and South Korea, living under steady danger from the North.

The Federation of Malaysia (population 9,400,000) has a cadre-conscript army of 27,600 men, with 40,000 reserves. In addition, 23,000 men serve in the militia, called the Territorial Army. Under the colonial regime of the Straits Settlements, the latter attracted mainly men with a better education, government officials, businessmen and clerks. Its infantry units were organized along racial lines (Europeans, Malays, Chinese, Indians and Eurasians), commanded at first by British civilians with some military background, while transport, signal and other technical units were racially mixed. Later, Asians were commissioned, too, and some of these men fought as volunteers in World War I.

During the Japanese occupation, the Allies organized Force 136 for guerrilla operations. Many Malayans and Borneans were attracted to it; food and medicines were supplied by local civilians. There was also the secret Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, made up mostly of Chinese, which fell under communist control.

The Malayan emergency period of communist insurrection (1948-1960) necessitated the expansion of the Malayan armed forces and of local defense and security units—the Special Constabulary, Home Guards, Vigilante Corps. Dayak jungle trackers, recruited from Sarawak for jungle operations, served with distinction. The local security forces made a significant contribution to the elimination of the communist threat.

Malaysia's integrated citizen force, the Territorial Army, raised in 1959, has absorbed the earlier militia units. Designed to reinforce the regular army in emergencies, it operates alongside the Local Defense Corps, a type of home guard trained for protection

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of vital areas. Together with the Naval Volunteer Reserve, it did an important job during the Indonesian "confrontation," both in territorial defense and in seashore patrols. In sensitive areas the Territorial Army furnishes village guards who are organized for self-defense, provide basic intelligence, and patrol the border. In East Malaysia (Borneo), the Border Scouts fulfill similar tasks.

Some of the major secondary schools administer cadet corps schools, and the country has many voluntary organizations to assist in times of emergency, such as the Malaysian Red Cross and the St. John Ambulance Brigade.

Singapore (population 2 million) still has two regular infantry battalions of professional soldiers. This entrepôt's militia tradition dates back to the Singapore Volunteer Corps, founded in 1854. In 1965, when Singapore became an independent state, it began to build a strong citizen army on the pattern of Israel, employing Israeli advisers. Planned for an eventual strength of 150,000 men and women, it is based on the National Service (Amendment) Bill of February 27, 1967. Eventually, every fit man and woman in the age group 18 to 45 will be available for defense, trained and skilled in the techniques of modern weaponry. In 1967 all able-bodied men born between January 1, 1949 and December 31, 1951, as well as certain other categories, were obliged to register for service. Students are generally permitted to complete their studies before entering service. Persons liable for national service are not permitted to leave Singapore without an exit permit.

Young men have a choice of two years full-time service in the citizen army, which furnishes the bulk of the armed forces, or part-time service in several auxiliary forces. Training in the full-time service stresses the technical skills needed to support a modern defense organization, especially in electronics and mechanical engineering. National servicemen are assured by the government that they will be given civilian employment either in the public or the private sector. After completion of their two-year service, they remain in the National Service Reserve for ten years or up to the age of forty, whichever is later, and have to report for up to forty days of retraining each year. Employers are required to pay reservists the difference between army pay and their civilian wages.

In addition, Singapore has three auxiliary forces, based on part-time service: the Vigilante Corps, the People's Defense Force, and the Special Constabulary. In each of them a man enrolls for twelve

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years or until the age of forty, whichever is later. Training and service take place normally after working hours or during weekends; during the first six months there are two periods of duty a week, thereafter one a week. The Special Constabulary receives police training. The Vigilante Corps has the special task of patrolling the island's streets and shores, to assist in the maintenance of law and order.[12]

The cadres of the citizen army consist partly of professional and partly of citizen soldiers. Singapore's "Sandhurst," the Armed Forces Training Institute, was established in 1966 and its first 114 officer cadets received their commissions in July 1967; the first artillery officers were commissioned in January 1968. Voluntary pre-military training at school age is given in four cadet corps comprising 13,000 boys and girls.

This small but relatively prosperous and important nation seeks to become a dependable partner in Commonwealth defense arrangements. As a contribution to the five-nation defense system (comprising Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand), Singapore bought twenty Hawker Hunter jets and sixteen BAC jet trainers in July 1968; pilots and crews are being trained in Singapore and the United Kingdom.

The Commonwealth of Australia (population 11,675,000) has a regular cadre-conscript army of 43,300 men. Its Citizen Militia Force (CMF), which succeeded the old volunteer militias of the member states, was established in 1909 with the help of Lord Kitchener. Until 1929 it was based on universal obligation, whereas today its 37,000 men serve as volunteers. There is a strong incentive to be a volunteer in order to avoid being drafted into the regular army.

During their first year members of the CMF train for two weeks at a military base; following this they receive two hours of training each week, and one weekend each month. For the next five years, members train for two weeks each year, including one week at a camp. In an emergency they may be called up for duty until the age of forty-seven; for officers the age limit is higher. Pre-military training is given in a cadet corps.

Australia's citizen army reaped its greatest laurels in World War I at Gallipoli, and later in France. On August 8, 1918, the Anzac Corps, comprising the citizen armies of Australia, New Zealand

[12]For additional information, see *Facts on National Service*, a Ministry of Defence Publication (Singapore: Government Printing Office).

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and Canada, and some British contingents, won a decisive battle at Amiens, under the Australian citizen general, Sir John Monash. This victory has often been ascribed to British forces or to the primitive Maori natives—without any credit being given to the white Australians or Sir John.

The announcement of the withdrawal of Britain's forces from east of Suez by the end of 1971 has caused Australia to reappraise her defense needs. Though invading forces landing in the north would hardly have a chance, Australians remember that Japanese forces were able to establish themselves at the doorstep of their continent, and that its vast empty spaces are an inviting goal for some of the overpopulated, land-hungry countries of Asia. They realize that they cannot fill Britain's shoes, but they are trying to strengthen their friendship with the United States, Malaysia, Singapore, and other countries so that an aggressor can be thwarted before reaching their shores. In October 1967, Australia increased its military support of South Viet Nam by 2,000 men, while New Zealand sent a second infantry company.

Australia's increasing concern with its security, manifested by its role in SEATO and Viet Nam and its June 1967 defense discussions with Japan, will probably lead to a strengthening of the CMF. General Cullen has suggested a doubling of CMF forces.[13] Prime Minister John Gorton, who took office on January 10, 1968, is said to be interested in this proposal as well as an intensification of CMF training by adopting some features of the Israeli army.[14]

Meanwhile, the air force has been strengthened by the purchase of twenty-one American-made F-111C attack bombers. The navy operates three U.S.-made guided-missile destroyers, a fleet air arm with an aircraft carrier, a submarine, and other combat and transport craft.[15]

New Zealand (population 2,700,000), which in defense and foreign relations generally cooperates closely with Australia, has a small regular army, amounting to 5,500 men, based on voluntary enlistment. Main reliance is placed on the territorial force of 11,400 men, maintained by a selective National Service Scheme. Its members serve longer than those of the Australian CMF; after reaching twenty years of age, they train in the first year for four-

[13]*Sydney Morning Herald,* June 3, 1968.
[14]Maximilian Walsh, "Canberra Observed," *The Australian Financial Revue,* May 10, 1968.
[15]Tillmann Durbin, *New York Times,* August 8, 1968.

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teen consecutive weeks, and after that they serve three years on a part-time basis. Finally, they serve for three years in the army reserve, training twenty days yearly, of which fourteen must be served at a military camp. For promotion to captain, major or lieutenant colonel, special courses are required. In addition, there exists pre-military training in the cadet corps for 20,000 boys.

The Republic of Korea (population 30,000,000) is the first country east of Suez, but outside the British tradition, to introduce a militia in recent years. The ROK army of twenty front-line infantry divisions totals 540,000 men who, after two and a half years of service, remain in the reserve until the age of forty. These reserves are now being brought to a higher state of readiness and can furnish at least ten divisions. In addition, there are a large number of well-armed combat police detachments.

For territorial defense, Korea is now organizing volunteer "homeland guards," expected to reach a strength of 2.5 million men and women. Consisting of civilians, including many army veterans, and commanded by former army officers, they fall under the jurisdiction of the county police chiefs. They have two short training periods a month without pay, and the best platoons in the competitions which are held in every county receive awards.

Eventually all home guard members will be armed. Every village has a platoon on guard to round up North Korean infiltrators. Villages in exposed locations are to be manned like those in Israel, where *Nahal* volunteers from the citizen army combine military duties with agricultural work.

VI

The impending evacuation of Britain's forces, the revolt of the American public against the Viet Nam conflict, and the continuing belligerence of many governments make it obvious that a nation which does not prepare its entire manpower for possible defense emergencies raises doubts about its determination to defend its independence. It can hardly expect other nations to do for it what it could do for itself.[16]

This is especially the case because communist war is total war,

[16]In his address at Pomona College on May 7, 1968, Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, said: "We cannot rightly ask our own people to sacrifice if the people under direct attack are not doing their share. . . . Our efforts cannot succeed unless the local forces are assuming the primary burden. Insurgency cannot be checked by an American effort." News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, May 7, 1968.

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waged not only on the military or paramilitary level, but on all levels. A citizen army or home guard, if it is to develop the proper spirit, cannot be built in a political and social vacuum. That is why part of the answer to the threats of communism and other dictatorships must lie in the strengthening of democracy and in social reform. Without such efforts, no nation can deprive subversive elements and guerrillas of the favorable human environment they need for success. Countries with strong ideological and military defenses will figure low on the list of targets for foreign aggressors, even if they are relatively small. Such countries are not only worthy of military and economic aid from the United States and other democracies but are welcome as reliable allies. If the trend toward militias outlined in this article should ultimately spread to other countries of Asia, especially such great and powerful nations as Japan, Indonesia and India, the time may come when this vast part of the globe could stand safely on its own feet without any foreign assistance.

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Reviews

The Cyprus Question*

by Stephen Barber

A couple of years ago I had occasion to take a visiting editor to see George Ball at the State Department. The Under Secretary, as he then was, startled us by characterizing Viet Nam as a "peripheral" problem in relation to America's concerns with NATO, de Gaulle and the Middle East. We had naturally expected that he would argue that the Orient was somewhat more pressing at that time. But he absolutely rejected the thought.

Within moments of leaving him, we had an appointment with Assistant Secretary William Bundy. And here we had our second surprise. When my friend remarked that he had been impressed to observe how, despite the manifest demands of the Viet Nam war upon their time, America's policymakers were so deeply persuaded that the concerns of Europe were central, Bundy fairly exploded. Asia was the central problem area, he informed us flatly. Europe was decidedly peripheral, and the sooner we—as Europeans—grasped this, the better it would be for us.

The moral of this tale is that priorities, like beauty, lie in the eye of the beholder. Ball and Bundy were both right, even if the vehemence with which they expressed their viewpoints did take us aback at the time.

Viet Nam, in short, is not the only troublespot in the world. Nor, so far as the United States is concerned, will it be the last. It may be true that the American people are tired of foreign entanglements and that we are about to witness a new wave of isolationism sweeping the land, but the hard truth is that there is no easy escape from the responsibilities of power—other than to abandon the power and all that goes with it.

Thus it behooves thoughtful U.S. citizens to be concerned. The happy notion that they can turn their backs on a pesky world and retreat into Fortress America in the Western Hemisphere is nothing more than a beguilement. Modern weapons and communications, physical and ideological, are too far advanced to permit such retreats. One cannot ignore that a flanking move against the redoubt has already opened to the south. Granted that the richest nation the world has ever seen has no desire to be a new Rome, it surely cannot allow itself to become another Carthage.

It requires no great effort of imagination to forecast that after Viet Nam—perhaps even before the Southeast Asian imbroglio has finally been unraveled—the next world conflict to move to center stage will be the unfinished business between Israel and the Arabs. But coincidentally, if events run

**Cyprus Between East and West.* By Thomas W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 92 pp. $2.25 (paper).

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true to form, we can expect another round in the Cyprus affair. Peace between Greek and Turk in that unhappy island has not been made: there is merely an absence of fighting for the moment. A trivial incident could explode the primed powder keg at any time.

Simply because less emotionalism exists about the Cyprus question than over the too-much-Promised Land, it is easier to sidestep thinking about it. Neither the Greeks nor the Turks operate as effective a Washington lobby as do the Arabs, thanks to oil interests, or the Israelis. But this tendency to ignore an inflammatory situation until it gets beyond you, while understandable, is as dangerous as defusing a bomb by blithely painting over the manufacturer's markings on its casing. For those who would prefer not to be taken unawares by the latest developments on Cyprus, Dr. Thomas Adams and Professor Alvin Cottrell have performed a valuable service by preparing a compact study, *Cyprus Between East and West,* undertaken for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University.

A good many Americans tend to feel that rows between the Greek majority and Turkish minority of the half-million or so who make up the Cypriot population must somehow be a legacy from the nasty old colonial days when the imperialist British practiced divide-and-rule tactics to subjugate the "natives." There is a vague belief that, since it is "all their fault," it should be up to the British to do whatever is needed to douse the intercommunal blazes. This was Senator Wayne Morse's position: he persistently opposed any sort of U.S. involvement on the succinct grounds that it amounted to "pulling the English' chestnuts out of the fire for them."

While it is true that the British have a relatively large military base on the island and an airfield from which the RAF can operate its primitive nuclear delivery system—the V-bombers — within handy range of southern Russia, no one in Washington needs delude himself that Whitehall is eager to carry on with this charade much longer. The whole concept of Empire and even of Commonwealth Mother Country has gone out of style in Britain. The Wilson Government is under constant pressure from the Left to cut back overseas defense commitments rapidly.

The plain fact of the matter is that the British garrison is in Cyprus today largely because the island makes a convenient staging area in the rollback from the Far East and the Persian Gulf. To be fair, what some in Washington nowadays regard as a shabby scuttle is no more than what the late President Roosevelt hoped for, as did most U.S. liberal idealists of his generation. But now the wheel of time has turned and, ironically enough, nobody is keener to see the British garrison remain in Cyprus than Archbishop Makarios, the Republic's President, who was for so many years a thorn in London's side.

For America, the brutal reality is that if the British do not stay on in Cyprus, the island will become ex-

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tremely vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Moscow is already maneuvering to turn the Mediterranean into a Red lake. The U.S. Sixth Fleet no longer rules the waves there undisputed. The Soviet fleet, which is particularly strong in nuclear submarines, is rapidly overhauling it. And Cyprus, as a glance at the map confirms, lies strategically athwart the eastern end of this historic sea.

By virtue of its location and certain technical considerations to do with the ionosphere, Cyprus also provides an important site for U.S. electronic eavesdropping—a link in the so-called Big Ear network directed toward European Russia and west-central Asia. The intelligence agencies do not dilate on the subject of these installations in the Kyrenia mountain range on Cyprus' north coast, but their existence is scarcely a secret.

Obviously, then, quite apart from the embarrassing prospect of NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, getting into a shooting war over Cyprus in support of kinfolk and co-religionists among the population, there are practical reasons from Washington's standpoint for preserving the island's independence and internal peace. Thus far U.S. efforts in this regard have been successful to the extent that it has been possible to patch together an agreement to disagree—a tacit standoff.

The Soviets are not letting it go at that. For a time they wooed the Archbishop. More recently they have given closer attention to the possible advantages of encouraging the activities of the communist-led Cypriot trades union movement, AKEL. They have also been currying favor with the Turks in Ankara. They do not find it necessary to appear consistent as they work several different angles at once to fish troubled waters.

This book by Adams and Cottrell outlines the progress of action and counteraction in the strictly post-British colonial phase of the Cyprus story with admirable coolness and clarity. It did strike me, however, that a footnote might be added about Russia's long-range policy in the area, which antedates the 1917 Revolution—although perhaps this would go beyond the scope of a study designed as an introduction to more detailed reading.

Students of the rise of modern Greece since 1821, when Archbishop Germanos hoisted the flag of revolt at Kalavryta in the Peloponnese against the Ottoman Turk, should note that the movement was more religious than nationalistic. While such European romantics as the poet Byron rallied to the cause in the fond belief that "the glory that was Greece" was to be revived once the Hellenes were freed from Moslem rule, it has to be faced that they were thinking in terms of a civilization that spawned Plato, Socrates, Demosthenes and the rest, while the priestly band under Germanos sought merely the restoration of Byzantium.

The Russian and Greek Orthodox churches are and always have been in close communion. Tsarist Russia found this fact highly exploitable in furtherance of its policies in this region, the aim of which was to gain access to the world's oceans by the warm sea route

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through the Dardanelles. It is worth noting, therefore, as a sign of the times, that Moscow has quietly dusted off some of its surviving Orthodox prelates and dispatched them to interfaith conferences around the world. They appear in berobed splendor at ecumenical councils, for example, and make pilgrimages to Jerusalem. It is hardly likely that the Kremlin's interest in such peregrinations is related to religion. Nor is it unduly sinister, I suppose, for the Soviets to employ these bearded *pappas* as contact men to keep a finger on the pulse of latent Pan-Slavism, linked with Orthodoxy. The end, as Lenin put it, justifies the means.

The ultra-nationalist extreme Right in metropolitan Greece, which is closely linked with the Orthodox Church and shares its revindicationary dreams, has long demanded not only the union of Cyprus with the motherland (*enosis*), but also the "return" of Smyrna, Eastern Thrace and Constantinople (Istanbul) from Turkey. General George Grivas, the underground leader of the Greek Cypriotes against the British prior to independence, happens to have been the leader of an ultra-right-wing band in Greece during the Nazi occupation, which called itself "X" and whose proclaimed objective was: "On to Constantinople!"

Grivas, of course, is a stout anti-communist. But his demand for Greater Greece—the "Great Idea," as it is known among Athenians—brought up to date and carried out, could be of great interest to long-term planners in the Kremlin. It contains superb potential for creating chaos between Greece and Turkey that the USSR could profit from by stepping in as a mediator —and consolidating her grip on the Dardanelles passage into the bargain.

The Bolshevik Revolution and the Noncommunist World*

by Kurt L. London

On the dust jacket of *The Impact of the Russian Revolution 1917-1967* we read that "remarkably little has been done, in the past 50 years, in the way of a careful, systematic examination of how the revolution's programs and policies have influenced thought and action outside Russia." This is inaccurate. The impact of the Russian Revolution throughout the world has resulted in such a deluge of books and articles over the past decades that it is difficult, if not impossible, for the student of communist affairs to keep up with the enormous output on this subject.

The present work is a valuable contribution to existing literature. Neil McInnes, an Australian journalist now working in Paris, has written a discerning account of why Russian communism has had so little influence on Western socialists and labor movements. Hugh Seton-Watson, the distinguished professor of Russian history at the University of London, has turned his attention to a favorite subject of his, nationalism and imperialism, which he

**The Impact of the Russian Revolution 1917-1967: The Influence of Bolshevism on the World Outside Russia.* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967. 357 pp. $7.50.

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treats on a global scale but with particular emphasis on East Central Europe since 1917. Professor Peter Wiles, whose scholarly interests cover a wide range of the Soviet Union's socio-economic problems, has dealt with the lack of influence of Soviet economic policies on the noncommunist world. Professor Richard Lowenthal of the Free University of Berlin has analyzed the model of the totalitarian state and its effect outside the Soviet Union.

It is regrettable that the Royal Institute of International Affairs found it necessary to ask Arnold Toynbee for an Introduction to these four expertly written papers. In the first place, Professor Toynbee, though he may think of himself as a man of Aristotelian universality, does not approach the expertise of the four scholars. In the second place, I seriously question Toynbee's judgment in matters of communist history. His Introduction, entitled "Looking Back Fifty Years," is full of misrepresentations, incorrect statements and naive speculations.

McInnes brings both knowledge and wisdom to his analysis of the blunted impact of Soviet communism on socialist and labor movements in the West. Carefully distinguishing between developments within the USSR and those beyond its frontiers, he makes it clear that the Soviet regime and its agents all over the world "have remained faithful to the revolutionary mythology which froze, almost fifty years ago, into a conservative force and a blindness to historical change." He explains the negative influence of communism in most trade unions as the result of the Soviet leaders' disregard for the living conditions of their workers, and correctly adds that Soviet political oppression, doing away with all liberty, spurred socialist leaders and labor union chiefs to maintain their freedom of movement. Thus it was only the labor extremists who became followers of Moscow and with whose help the Soviets tried to infiltrate the ranks of "revisionists."

Socialism—or social democracy—had the reputation of being internationalist prior to the outbreak of World War I. But in August 1914 the labor parties followed their national colors into the war, causing a virtual breakdown of the movement as an international force. Obviously, the noncommunist left had never been as internationally-minded as Lenin and the Russian communists themselves. But, as Stalin demonstrated, even they were concerned with building a strong home base without which, they believed, progress toward communism and a classless society could not be achieved.

McInnes thinks anti-colonialism is the one issue on which the communists and socialists can agree. But the time when colonialism was fostered as "the white man's burden" has long since passed. Few nations (such as Portugal) still adhere to the concept. The noncommunist labor groups and socialists have come to realize that "imperialism" no longer exists as a world political force; that this communist bogeyman now has substance only in communist propaganda.

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Seton-Watson's essay on "Nationalism and Imperialism" presents a lucid review of events from the October Revolution of 1917 until 1967, a period during which the great empires disintegrated. Perhaps the most valuable pages are those concerning nationalism within communist states; here the author concentrates on Europe, specifically East Central Europe, and analyzes the conflicts between communist states, including the Sino-Soviet conflict. He points out that "conflicts between communist states are . . . likely to become more serious than conflicts between capitalist states, simply because all disagreements tend to acquire an ideological character, and all conflicts turn into total conflict." This may well be true for the quarrel between Moscow and Peking, but we have to keep in mind that this situation had its primary origin in Mao's policies. After his demise, a new working arrangement between Peking and Moscow, perhaps even without a satisfactory ideological compromise, cannot be discounted. "Traditional" disagreements such as territorial questions are negotiable.

Seton-Watson correctly complains that Russian nationality policies remain largely unmentioned by those who are quick to attack U.S. "imperialism." He concludes that the balance of power has profoundly affected the world "to the advantage of nationalist forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" and that the influence of Lenin's concept of imperialism has been "enormous" on the peoples of the former metropolitan countries. While these are acceptable points, I believe there is much more to it. As an aggressive force, communism, armed with ideology and modern technology, has thoroughly shaken the concepts of international relations. Too few political scientists have listed these changes and analyzed their nature and effect; the basic book dealing with the theory and practice of international relations since mid-century remains to be written.

Wiles' "Power Without Influence" is an interesting beginning for a study that should investigate the direct and indirect effects of Soviet economic policies on capitalist, mixed and noncommunist socialist economies. However, the complexities of such a study are tremendous, and even to a noneconomist Wiles' approach appears somewhat simplistic. We cannot deal only with the Soviet Union's influence outside its borders but also must register those Western trends which may have affected Soviet economic thinking. In this respect I feel that Wiles has been far too optimistic in analyzing Soviet reactions. His belief that production of more consumer goods, decentralization in principle, and measures to improve the peasantry's living conditions have been "a more sincere flattery of the capitalist West than the latter has ever shown in reverse" is, to say the least, an overstatement. I would simply regard it as the result of a maturing economy combined with a more pragmatic approach; the Soviets are not necessarily tearing down ideological obstructions. Nor would I overestimate what Wiles calls the "new freedom of the social sciences." The fact is, the var-

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ious academies of sciences, which remain party-directed, are implementing the Politbureau's priorities of political and military planning. That this is now achieved in a less objectionable way should not cloud the hard-line policies in force.

Finally, whether or not Soviet economic concepts are transferable to "African socialism" or "Arab socialism" remains to be seen but is questionable. Wiles is quite right in saying that in these cases the Soviets have "power without influence."

Lowenthal's "Model of the Totalitarian State" reviews the development of the Bolshevik Revolution into a one-party totalitarian state (1917-1921) and analyzes Stalin's brand of totalitarianism, which had been set in motion by Lenin regardless of the needs of the working class in an advanced industrial society. Lowenthal submits that the one-party totalitarian state of Leninist-Stalinist character has been imitated by such leaders as Kemal Ataturk, Sun Yat-sen and Nkrumah and, as we know, shows similarities to those founded on Hitler's national socialism and Mussolini's Italian fascism. He believes the Bolshevik model was most successful where leaders could emancipate themselves from traditional ideological beliefs in their own countries. This certainly is true of Hitler and perhaps of Nkrumah, but I do not think it applies to Kemal Ataturk or Sun Yat-sen.

I cannot follow Lowenthal when he proposes that the similarities between Leninist and Hitlerite demagoguery originated from the Okhrana-invented "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," a forgery designed to create scapegoats for the diversion of the populace into controllable channels. Hitler was irrational enough to believe in the "Protocols" and used them as ammunition for his obsession. Lenin, however, surely was familiar with Tsarist police methods. A realist who grew up in a country where terror and conspiracy were the order of the day, he was not the man to be influenced by such a stratagem. He did not need the inspiration of the Okhrana to formulate his principles of revolutionary organization.

Altogether this book, whose editor remains anonymous, is an interesting, controversial and important work. It seeks new avenues of analysis and interpretation, and will surely be consulted for a long time to come.

French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle's First Presidency*

by George W. Baer

From August 1944 to January 1946, from the time his leadership of liberated France was accepted by the allies until he resigned from the presidency of the provisional government, Charles de Gaulle's basic foreign policy objective was to assert, and have recognized, France's claim to be a great power. This policy was based on weak foundations. France's diplomatic position had been in decline since the artificiality of the Versailles settlement had been exposed, her mil-

**De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, 1944-1946.* By A. W. De Porte. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 327 pp. $7.95.

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itary establishment had been proven bankrupt at the time of the German invasion of 1940, and Frenchmen themselves, both before and after the Vichy period, were divided and uncertain as to the role France could or should play in European affairs. Whether they felt that she might best concede leadership of the Continent to Germany and simply hope to act as a civilizing influence on the Germans, or that she should become a follower of democratic Britain, most Frenchmen saw France as a second-rate power unable any longer to play a truly independent role in Europe. The Second World War confirmed this opinion for many, including now the leaders of the Big Three, on whom the burden of defeating Germany had fallen and who were preparing to settle questions about postwar Europe in their own councils, to the exclusion of a weak and uncertain France.

Charles de Gaulle stood firm against these views. For him the essence of the French nation depended upon an assertion of French grandeur, upon France's own capacity to act as a great power. Isolated in London during the war, with few political or military resources on which to base his claim that Free France could play a significant and autonomous wartime role, he had to rely on that inflexibility of purpose that so exasperated Roosevelt and Churchill. As Dr. De Porte shows in the first chapters of *De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, 1944-1946,* this was a "calculated response to his situation." De Gaulle had to maintain a rigid pose of independence of the Big Three to keep from seeming to be controlled by them then or later; knowing that they would dominate the postwar world, he saw that he must "emphasize on every occasion the independent, Great Power role which [France] expected to play so that they would become accustomed to the idea despite its apparent incongruity with the actual state of France after 1940."

His first problem was to win acceptance as the legitimate spokesman of France. During the war the allies, especially the Americans, maintained relations with the Vichy regime and selected for their purposes pliant Frenchmen such as Darlan or Giraud. But de Gaulle realized that these men had lost touch with the political realities of occupied France, and it was through his connections with the patriotic nationalism of the Resistance movement that he gained legitimacy as leader of the French. In May 1943 he took the initiative to unify resistance groups into the National Council of the Resistance; in March 1944 he created the French Forces of the Interior; and then in June he established the French Committee of National Liberation, which was dominated by Gaullists. Thus when the Germans were driven from French soil, and a provisional government could be established in Paris, de Gaulle's Committee alone represented a pure and broadly based mandate of Frenchmen, and so was recognized by the allies as the *de facto* authority for the civil administration of France.

The story of the internal policies of de Gaulle's government need

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not be discussed here. De Porte sketches them competently and emphasizes the nature and relevance of party programs during this period. But domestic matters were not de Gaulle's forte; his main interest (and De Porte's in this book) was foreign affairs, and these the General conducted without much reference to internal politics. In De Porte's words: "In no case does de Gaulle seem to have changed his foreign policy to any significant respect to accommodate his ministers or their parties."

De Gaulle sought to gain admission for France to the deliberations of the Big Three, and then to win acceptance, or at least a thoughtful hearing, from them for the French position on the postwar settlement, particularly concerning the future of Germany. In neither case was he entirely successful, and the story De Porte details is to a large degree one of failure.

France had not pulled the same weight in the war as any of the Big Three, and she did not now have the strength to back up her demands. The government made efforts to give French policy an enhanced importance: there was much talk, which gradually diminished by the end of 1945 but which is still heard, that France could serve as a bridge between East and West, and, in this intermediary position, be of value to either or both sides. De Porte rightly stresses the development of this "image of a neutral France, linked in the same degree with each of the three Great Powers and conciliating their conflicting interests," for it is a conception interesting not only because of its importance in French thinking in 1945 (and before), but also for what it might tell us of de Gaulle's actions during the Fifth Republic. In the postwar circumstance, however, none of the Big Three considered it seriously. In December 1944, to gain leverage against the indifference or hostility of Great Britain and the United States, whose armies occupied France and whose colonial policies seemed likely to conflict with those of France, de Gaulle concluded a pact with the Soviet government. The French hoped thus to demonstrate their independence of the Western allies, and force the British, who feared American withdrawal from Europe, to listen more sympathetically to their opinions on the German question. But the Soviets were never the friends the French expected; France was excluded from the Yalta conference as she had been earlier from the Dumbarton Oaks talks. The Big Three met alone, and European questions were settled without reference to France.

France's greatest concern was what would happen to Germany, but her ability to assure consideration of her interests was severely limited. The French wanted (1) a prolonged military occupation of the Rhineland, perhaps with the left bank of the Rhine detached from Germany, (2) international control of the industries of the Ruhr basin, and (3) the encouragement of separatism or federalism in Germany to prevent the re-establishment of a strong, centralized state. None of these came to pass. The allies bargained among them-

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selves, or took unilateral actions. France was excluded from Potsdam in the summer of 1945 and from Moscow in December, and again de Gaulle saw his policies ignored. As De Porte writes: the "Big Three at Moscow . . . implicitly decided that [France] was not even to be counted as a European Great Power."

And yet, in his thoughtful concluding remarks De Porte rightly asserts that the matter cannot be judged so simply. What other option had de Gaulle during this period than to maintain that France was entitled to be considered a great power? Unless he was prepared to see her concede any claim to independent national action or influence in a postwar world dominated by the great powers, he had to try to restore her to the ranks of the mighty, on the best terms possible. His stubborn reiteration of France's greatness and insistence on equality of rights for her did in fact lead the allies to grant concessions to the French from time to time, such as a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a zone as one of the four occupying powers in Germany, and participation in the European Advisory Commission and the German Control Council. In some degree, then, de Gaulle did achieve a restoration of France's great-power status and revive French self-confidence and national pride after the collapse of 1940 and the shame of Vichy. In addition, French foreign policy was given some new directions under his leadership. De Gaulle's suspicion of allies led him to the notion of France as an independent power acting as a balancer between East and West, and it was during these years that the idea of a West European organization in which France would play a leading role was brought up for consideration.

All these matters are discussed in De Porte's scholarly and straightforward account. His work is well researched, well organized, and clearly written. One hopes he will take up his suggestion in the Preface and write the sequel to this book when "de Gaulle's second act" is over.

Nation-building in the Third World*

by Roger E. Kanet

In the past few years publications on developing countries have multiplied enormously. Many of these new studies are merely repetitions of earlier works. A few are valuable contributions to an understanding of social, political and economic forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. *Issues of Political Development* belongs to this second category. Professors Anderson, von der Mehden and Young have produced a readable and enlightening treatise on the major problems facing the governments of developing countries. Although they point to problems shared in common, they are well aware of the differences which exist in the Third World and make no claims that all of these countries are following the same

**Issues of Political Development.* By Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden and Crawford Young. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 235 pp. $3.95.

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path toward social, economic and political progress.

A number of authors focusing on the developing nations have tried to present a broad-range theory of developmental politics, only to end with a deductively derived theory that has little relationship to existing political systems. Others have catalogued events in one country, one geographical area or the entire Third World without endeavoring to "get at" their meaning. The authors of *Issues of Political Development* have attempted to develop middle-range theory based on empirical evidence.

Their book, organized around three basic problems common to most developing nations—nation building, sustained domestic violence, and socialism as related to the aspiration for economic advancement—provides a comparative study of developmental politics. They first examine the cultural factors that determine whether national solidarity exists—race, ethnicity and language, religion and caste, regionalism — arguing convincingly that an understanding of cultural pluralism is essential to an evaluation of the problem of national unity. This contention is supported with numerous examples of cultural pluralism throughout the Third World. But by what means have various cultural groups been able to live together harmoniously? It is here that the analysis of Anderson *et al.* is weakest. Some countries are apparently integrating various cultural groups into one nation with success, yet the authors do not give much attention to the examples of relatively successful integration. After a rather detailed treatment of "the activation of cultural conflict," they merely mention that the reader should not be misled into thinking that a heightening of cultural conflict is inevitable.

In dealing with the problem of domestic violence or internal war they evaluate some of the traditional explanations for its prevalence, among them the reaction to the colonial experience and the existence of a national culture of violence, and decide that no single explanation is supported by conclusive evidence. Their discussion includes factors such as political culture, the colonial experience, personal alienation and a quest for meaning in life, as well as "alleged failures of governments to achieve the proclaimed goals of independence and to defend the nation." This is one of the finest treatments of the cause of revolutionary unrest in developing countries, although it could have been more adequately related to the findings concerning cultural pluralism.

One of the most interesting parts of the study is that centering on problems of economic development and the appeal of a socialist model in many of the emerging nations. After examining the various meanings of "revolution" and "socialism," the authors conclude that there is no core meaning for these concepts as used by leaders in the developing countries. In some countries "revolution" is a "continuing and permanent symbol, furnishing legitimacy to an established regime," as in Algeria, Burma and Mexico. Elsewhere "revolution" is a symbol used to indicate

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reformist intent. It also refers to a historical act which has little influence on contemporary politics. A number of questions are then posed concerning the use of the word "revolution"—questions that need answers if we are ever to gain a deeper understanding of developmental politics. For example, why do some groups employ the rhetoric of revolution, while others do not? How do past experiences, political culture, and the like relate to the use or nonuse of revolutionary symbolism?

As for "socialism," anything from the moderate, welfare socialism of Kenyatta to the radical socialism of Sékou Touré fits under the concept. For many leaders of Africa and Asia, capitalism and colonialism are inseparable and, therefore, capitalism is condemned as inapplicable to a nationalist state. For many leaders, the ideas of nationalism, independence, economic development and socialism are interwoven. Yet the important questions concern the effect an ideological commitment to any type of socialism actually has on economic policies. The authors maintain that the only significant difference in economic policy between those countries which are avowedly socialist and those avowedly nonsocialist is that the former are likely to exercise greater control over small business and commerce. In the socialist countries, the role of government in capital formation is somewhat larger, and a moderately higher percentage of the governmental budget is used for socio-economic functions. However, with respect to public entrepreneurship, the two types of states tend to play similar roles—at least in the areas of transportation, power, mineral resources and heavy industry. Accordingly, "it appears that the only real difference between a socialist and nonsocialist policy is that the socialist government will put into ideological context that which the nonsocialist government will also do on purely pragmatic grounds." This does not mean that the developing countries are following a path charted either in the West or the East; most of them seem to be building the type of economy in which both state and private enterprise share in the development of the country's wealth.

The willingness of the authors to explore different approaches to political development without attempting to impose a specific model is refreshing. We are not told that a particular method is "the best" for achieving a particular goal. Socialism and revolution are not dismissed as aberrations from an acceptable model of development, but are examined with regard to the role they can and do play in political and economic development.

Overall, Anderson, von der Mehden and Young have provided us with an excellent introduction to the problems facing the developing countries. They have outlined the different approaches Third World leaders are employing in an attempt to meet these problems. They have made some sense of the terms "revolution" and "socialism" and have shown what they mean in various countries. Yet their study is unsatisfying—as are most studies of comparative developmental politics—

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insofar as they do not supply many answers. They point out the inadequacies of traditional explanations of developments in the Third World, but are unable to present acceptable explanations in their stead. They call attention to problems, ask questions and leave it to others to follow the leads indicated. Nevertheless, merely posing the questions and eliminating some of the answers is an important contribution, given the handicap of inadequate data, the lack of a theory of government stability, and the generally underdeveloped state of political science as a discipline.

Oceania in World Politics*

by John J. Tierney, Jr.

American and other Western scholars have given close analytical scrutiny to the affairs of South and Southeast Asia in the postwar era, to such topics as the growth of nationalism and independence movements, the prospects for economic development and political stability, the effects of widespread insurgent warfare and civil strife, and the threat of Communist China. Their writings reflect the deep and continued concern of the Atlantic nations with political and strategic matters involving this region. Since the early 1960's the Vietnamese war has been the focus of attention, inducing an overriding preoccupation with the political, military and social complexities of this appendage of the Asian mainland.

Comparatively little has been written about another zone of the Asian-Pacific area, Oceania, even though it, too, has considerable strategic value to the West. Thomas R. Adam's *Western Interests in the Pacific Realm* offers a welcome introduction to Oceania, that broad system of Western-controlled insular and peninsular nations situated in the "basin" of the Pacific Ocean. Their location affords the West access to Asia's land areas and provides a link between the Indian and Pacific oceans and the lands beyond. Most of the island groupings remain non-self-governing territories, thus furnishing a fertile field for the familiar nationalist aspirations and demands so prevalent in mainland Asia two decades ago. In accommodating to these demands without endangering the interests of the guardian powers, Western diplomacy will have the delicate task of balancing political realities with strategic necessities.

The principal Western outposts in this island chain, one of the world's last remnants of colonialism, include the British possessions, the Fiji, Solomon, and Gilbert and Ellice islands; the British-French condominium of New Hebrides; and Polynesia, Tahiti and New Caledonia, which the French control. Despite London's historic decision to withdraw "east of Suez," British interests remain more deeply rooted than those of France, due mainly to the continuity of British guardianship over Malaysia and the political, cultural and economic influence of the Commonwealth in the area. The relationship of Australia and New Zealand to Great

**Western Interests in the Pacific Realm.* By Thomas R. Adam. New York: Random House, 1967. 222 pp. $2.95 (paper).

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Britain assures a continuation of British interests in the South Pacific seas, even if indirectly, because these two Commonwealth members also have colonies in the Pacific basin: Australia administers New Guinea as a UN trust and owns Papua, while New Zealand's possessions include Western Samoa, and the Cook and Tokelau islands.

Professor Adam assesses the various policies of each of the above nations toward its Pacific territories. On several occasions he points out that the West has been unable or unwilling to assume the responsibilities necessary for the overall advancement of the Pacific peoples. Most of the inhabitants have not yet obtained the minimum political and technical training required for modernization. Great Britain, for example, "for her own convenience and out of innate national habit, has imposed order on indigenous societies without providing any clear sense of direction. Once the imperial dream—always a minority fantasy in the homeland—was eclipsed by a shift in power realities, total responsibility for the guidance of alien and distant culture groups became an embarrassment that was unconvincingly cloaked by pious good will." (p. 67.) Yet his admonishment of the controlling powers for allowing the Pacific colonies to remain culturally backward and for the most part on the subsistence level is done constructively, weighing the pros and cons of colonial administration and offering suggestions for the future. These suggestions primarily concern the role of the United States in filling the power vacuum in the Pacific realm, although several chapters deal separately with the policies of Britain and France, Australia and New Zealand, and the "Maphilindo" states, Malaysia Indonesia and the Philippines.

Adam recognizes that the United States has now become the leading Pacific power—"partly because the military power that underlay Europe's dominance is now under American control; but a more important reason is that the United States has been forced to become the guardian of Western interests" (p. 10)—and observes that the area should continue to be led, though not dominated, by outside powers, the United States in particular. The strategic importance of the Pacific realm assures the perpetuation of Western interests despite the possible spread of native nationalism. In making this assertion, Adam has chosen the word "realm" with precision. "Realm" as opposed to "region," he writes, "is a political concept bearing the connotation of a domain that is founded on power and control. Though a historical taint of colonialism clings to the fact of dominion, it does not necessarily vitiate it: dominion existed before it assumed the specific guise of colonial rule and is likely to continue after that particular form of control is forsworn. In practice, it signifies the existence of superior power that is exercised in favor of the will and interests of the power holder but not inevitably against either the consent or advantage of the less powerful." (p. 7.)

The author's main theme is the promotion of Pacific regionalism,

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which, he contends, must be vigorously encouraged through the constructive application of American leadership and power. Only a true U.S.-Pacific partnership will promote the long-term political, military and economic interests of both parties. To neglect this principle will have the ultimate effect of undermining the West's political and strategic influence throughout Asia and, at the same time, will make intra-Pacific conflicts practically unavoidable.

"Strategic regionalism" is probably the best term to describe his recommendation for U.S. policy toward the Pacific area. The necessity for a U.S. presence, he assumes; the best vehicle for continuing a strategic presence is a regional arrangement which would include Western nations with Pacific interests and cultivate the general advancement of the basin's inhabitants. This policy requires much more than a purely military commitment. The application of farsighted social, political and technological programs in support of regionalism by both the European powers and the United States must be realistically implemented if the West is to succeed in establishing a durable partnership with the emerging Pacific nations. This point marks the author's most serious indictment of Western policy for, with the possible exception of New Zealand, none of the controlling states has yet implemented realistic policies aimed at this goal. This is as true for the American territories of Guam, the Trust Islands (the Carolines, Marianas and Marshalls) and Okinawa as it is for Europe's possessions.

The idea of harnessing American power to regional arrangements is not new in international relations, but policies that have been successful in Europe and Latin America have not been emulated in peninsular or insular Asia. The necessity for the U.S. strategic presence in this area and the rapidly increasing requirements of the Pacific peoples for political and economic counsel demand a fresh approach such as the progressive partnership between the Western and Pacific nations that Adam recommends.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

The Changing Law of Nations: Essays on International Law. By Josef L. Kunz. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968. 970 pp. $15.00. A collection of essays written between the early 1930's and the early 1960's by a member of the "Vienna School of International Law." Within the context of the transformation of the international community during this period, the author traces the development of international law and examines a variety of technical legal problems. General topics treated include sources of international law; laws of war; states, persons, minorities; and international organizations.

Democracy in a Revolutionary Era: The Political Order Today. By Harvey Wheeler. New York: Praeger, 1968. 224 pp. $5.95. The world today is going through a period of revolutionary change comparable to that at the time of the rise of the nation-state. Mr. Wheeler, perhaps best known as co-author of the novel *Fail-Safe,* views democracy as one of the most dynamic forces propelling this change. He demonstrates that as development progresses and true political communities are established, democratic institutions inevitably appear. He finds the nation-state system and the old balance of power concept totally inadequate to cope with the realities of the new world order. Looking forward to the next century, he calls upon the nations of the world to seek universal order as an alternative to destruction.

The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. By C. E. Black. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 207 pp. $5.95. A comparative historical analysis of the transformation of societies from the traditional to the modern. The author, Professor of History at Princeton University and a leading authority on the USSR and Eastern Europe, presents seven main patterns of growth and traces the experience of 175 contemporary societies, offering some predictions as to their future. He wrote the book "to clarify my own thinking about the way in which societies change from a traditional to a modern way of life, what is common to all modernizing societies, and in what ways each is distinctive, and with what problems of policy these developments confront a country like ours."

Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response. By Alastair Taylor, David Cox and J. L. Granatstein. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. 211 pp. $4.50. This book is an outgrowth of an early 1967 conference on peacekeeping sponsored by Queen's University and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Two preparatory papers by Professors Taylor and Cox discuss many aspects of peacekeeping, and Professor Granatstein treats Canada's response to the various requests for peacekeeping

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forces made by the UN and the Geneva Conference of 1954. Cox also summarizes the off-the-record discussions of the conference participants.

The Study of Policy Formation. Edited by Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen. New York: The Free Press, 1968. 392 pp. $9.95. Nine original, empirically-oriented papers explore the theories, methodologies and practice of policy formation. Included are materials on public policy and normative economic theory, theories of individual and collective choice, and the ranking of public policy alternatives. Subsequent chapters apply concepts and methodologies to the study of urban mass transportation, the problem of technology transfer, and the role of information in decision-making on foreign aid.

Triumph and Turmoil: A Personal History of Our Times. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968. 454 pp. $10.00. The lively and informative memoirs of one of America's premier news correspondents, who reported on dramatic events and famous personalities in all parts of the globe for more than half a century.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. By Robert S. McNamara. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 176 pp. $4.95. The U.S. Secretary of Defense for more than seven years under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson has compiled his most important policy statements, edited and adapted for clarity and logical sequence by Henry Trewhitt. These are not McNamara's memoirs, personal recollections, or postmortem judgments; they represent rather the philosophies and principles by which he directed the defense establishment and the policies and strategies he enunciated in pursuit of the nation's security.

The Great Air War. By Aaron Norman. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 558 pp. $10.00. The exciting story of the seesaw battle for air supremacy during World War I, complete with accounts of the man-to-man encounters of legendary heroes, descriptions of their war planes, the story of Count Zeppelin's terrifying if vulnerable dirigibles with which Germany hoped to defeat Britain, and 65 photos of planes and air aces.

Unless Peace Comes: A Scientific Forecast of New Weapons. Edited by Nigel Calder. New York: Viking Press, 1968. 243 pp. $5.75 ($1.95, paper). In this collection of essays by 16 scientists from six nations, a chilling glimpse of future warfare is provided. The contributors examine the shape of things to come from the vantage points of their own disciplines. Chapters deal with such subjects as nuclear proliferation (Sir John Cockcroft), chemical and biological weapons (Marcel Fetizon and Carl-Goran Heden), environmental warfare (Gordon MacDonald) and even the use of "robot soldiers" (M. W. Thring). The editor concludes that unless effective steps toward peace are taken soon, these sobering predictions will become part of our reality.

Why the Draft? The Case for a Volunteer Army. Edited by James C. Miller, III. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968. 197 pp. $1.25 (paper). Senator Edward W. Brooke, in his Introduction, praises the fair, reasoned and objective approach taken by the contributors who "have no political or emotional position to argue, nor have they any special interest to defend." They examine the present system of selective service and the alternative proposals for "national" service, a lottery system, and a volunteer army; and the Marshall and Clark reports, requested by President Johnson and the House Committee on Armed Services, respectively. After treating such topics as equity in military service, "cost effectiveness," racial balance, U.S. experience with conscription, the volunteer armed services

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of Canada and Britain, and "mercenary" armies, they argue the case for a volunteer American army.

III. United States

American Foreign Policy in the Making. By Eleanor Lansing Dulles. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 370 pp. $3.95 (paper). An account of foreign policy-making based more on practical experience and personal interviews than on theoretical studies and published sources. The author has used this approach "because crisis management and the gradual evolution of programs are frequently abstracted to a point where they bear little relation to reality." She treats such topics as the public interest, powers of the President, tasks of the Secretary of State, policy formulation and the workings of the State Department and U.S. embassies, restraints on policymakers, and criticism of the State Department. Following a review of U.S. policy in the postwar era, she examines in greater detail six critical situations and decisions: Korea, Guatemala, Lebanon, Berlin, the Congo and the Dominican Republic.

American Governmental Institutions: A Reader in the Political Process. Edited by Aaron Wildavsky and Nelson W. Polsby. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968. 625 pp. $5.95 (paper). A collection of readings about the American political system which explain its organization as well as its actual operation. Readings are included under such headings as Congress, the presidency and the executive, the Supreme Court, parties, voters and interest groups, and state and local politics.

The American Nation. By John A. Garraty. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 920 pp. $15.95. An important new history of the United States which provides a full treatment of the individuals, events and ideas that have shaped the country and its political and economic institutions. The volume, unusually attractive in appearance, contains chapter-by-chapter bibliographies, statistical appendices, more than 60 maps and graphs, and 95 color and over 300 black-and-white illustrations.

George Washington in the American Revolution, 1775-1783. By James Thomas Flexner. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. 599 pp. $10.00. A day-by-day, month-by-month study of the development of George Washington's character and complex personality during the Revolutionary War: his towering rages, pessimism, impulsiveness; his compassion, abiding faith in the American cause, yearning to return to Mount Vernon; his initial setbacks as commander of an amateur and ill-equipped army, and the process by which he became the master of his army and his English foes; and his preparation for political leadership of his country.

Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years. By James L. Sundquist. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968. 560 pp. $3.50 (paper). In this analysis of the response of political and governmental institutions to the major domestic issues between 1953 and 1966, the author tries to explain how the U.S. policymaking processes alternate between spurts of creative energy and longer periods of deadlock and relative inaction. In the first part of the study, he presents the histories of six problem areas and traces the institutional responses to the issues raised. The second part then synthesizes the findings and analyzes the performance of the party system, the electoral process, and the legislative processes in both the executive and Congress.

Student Politics. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. New York: Basic Books, 1967. 403 pp. $8.95. A timely book that deals with student unrest in the United States in an international perspective and seeks to suggest some inferences about its causes, conditions and consequences. Essays treat such issues as the Berkeley

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revolution, the student movements of Latin America, the role of students in underdeveloped countries, students in France, and the general political sociology of student movements throughout the world.

Toward a Democratic Left. By Michael Harrington. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 314 pp. $5.95. According to Harrington, "The American system doesn't seem to work anymore." Following this indictment, the author attempts to identify what he believes are major social deformities within the American society. To solve America's current problems, he proposes not a third party but "a first party which will be the instrument of a new political majority in the United States."

Victory Without Peace: American Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century. By David F. Trask. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968. 201 pp. $5.95. Adding new insights to a familiar subject, Professor Trask takes a new approach to the course of U.S. foreign policy during the late 19th and 20th centuries. He divides his subject into several chronological periods: prologue to empire, imperial expansion, the two phases of the "Twentieth Century War" and the intervening "armistice." He concludes that, while we have become the richest and most powerful of nations, we have too often failed abroad. Calling the nation-state system "pathetically obsolescent," he urges the United States to take the lead in seeking new ways to overcome contemporary problems, specifically by promoting policies of general disarmament and of massive economic aid to the ex-colonial world.

Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution. By N. Gordon Levin, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 340 pp. $7.50. Dr. Levin, Assistant Professor of History at Amherst College, attempts to show that President Wilson threw America's moral and material power against nationalism and imperialism in Europe and against Lenin's revolutionary socialism, and thus set the guidelines for U.S. policy in the post-World War II era. Arguing that Wilson was no visionary idealist but a shrewd defender of U.S. national interests and an advocate of an American national mission, the author traces the development of Wilson's goals and policies and his efforts to establish a world order favorable to liberal, international capitalism.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

Dokumente der Weltrevolution. Volume I: *Die frühen Sozialisten.* Edited by Frits Kool and Werner Krause. Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1967. 686 pp. 32,-DM. Volume II: *Arbeiterdemokratie oder Parteidiktatur.* Edited by Frits Kool and Erwin Oberländer. Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1967. 536 pp. 32,-DM. These volumes are the first of a series in which documents related to the following themes will be published: (1) the philosophical component in communism (communism as the fulfillment of history, man and society after the world revolution); (2) the historical-sociological motivating force of communism (communism as a critique of class-society and as an analysis of historical development laws); (3) the political practice of communism (the technique of revolution and takeover of the state, the import of force, the organization of the party, etc.). *Die frühen Sozialisten* contains a variety of socio-critical, revolutionary and utopian pamphlets and programs by French, English and German authors which have not been collected before in a single volume. The editors have attempted to publish complete texts for the most part, rather than abbreviated versions. *Arbeiterdemokratie oder Parteidiktatur* focuses topically on the early history of the Soviet Union. In addition to Bolshevik policy statements, it presents documents of the left and right-wing opposition within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the years from 1917 to 1923.

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Eclipse. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 319 pp. $6.95. One of the finest correspondents of World War II narrates and comments on the fighting in Sicily and Italy, the Allied landings in Normandy, the advance through northern France and Belgium, the crossing of the Rhine, the collapse and occupation of Germany, the horror of the concentration camps, and the liberation of Denmark and Norway.

Finland. By W. R. Mead. New York: Praeger, 1968. 256 pp. $6.50. In this addition to the Praeger Nations of the Modern World Series, Professor Mead traces the social, political and cultural history of Finland from its earliest origins in the "time before the records" to the present. Placing major emphasis on its geographical location, he concludes that Finland's main political problem has been to maintain its independence and integrity. Surrounded by larger powers and suffering domination by Sweden and Russia for centuries, the nation achieved its independence only in 1917, and even today its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is a delicate one. The author is Professor and Head of the Department of Geography at University College, London.

From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940. By George F. Kennan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 266 pp. $6.50. Composed of the author's diplomatic papers, this study represents an eyewitness account of the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. Included are assessments of the initial impact of the German invasion upon Prague and the outlying regions of Czechoslovakia and the revolution of German policy between 1938 and 1940 in the occupied country.

A History of Modern Italy: Documents, Readings, & Commentary. By Shepard B. Clough and Salvatore Saladino. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 657 pp. $15.00. A valuable synthesis of documents, commentary and interpretive readings on the history of modern Italy. Beginning with the conceptual background of the Risorgimento and its practical evolution up to 1848, the authors trace Italian history to the "opening to the Left."

A History of Sweden. By Ingvar Andersson. New York: Praeger, 1968. 461 pp. $8.50. A broad narrative of Swedish history from Stone Age settlements to 1952, written by a distinguished contemporary Swedish historian who is currently Keeper of the National Archives in Stockholm and member of the Swedish Academy.

L'Europe de Demain et Ses Responsables. Edited by Léo Moulin. Bruges: De Tempel, 1967. 367 pp. n.p. A collection of papers, mostly in French, some in English, originally presented and discussed in April 1966 at the College of Europe, on such topics as the European industrial society of the future, the impact of integration on European society, interest groups and political decision-making, the future of the profession of politics, training of political leaders, and education for civic responsibility.

The Making of British Foreign Policy. By David Vital. New York: Praeger, 1968. 119 pp. $5.50. A concise examination of the domestic and foreign environments in which British foreign policy is made. Included are materials describing both the machinery and practices of foreign policy formation.

The Organization of British Central Government 1914-1964. (Second edition.) By F. M. G. Willson; edited by D. N. Chester. New York: Humanities Press, 1968. 521 pp. $8.25. A detailed account of changes in the role of government in Great Britain resulting from an expansion in governmental functions. In addition to analyzing the changes in the distribution of duties among departments, the book treats each of the major areas of government action—finance,

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trade and industry; justice and public order; social services; external affairs; defense; and scientific research.

Rome. By Maurice Andrieux. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968. 461 pp. $8.95. A fascinating cultural, political, religious and military history of the Eternal City from its origins to 1870, with a brief chapter on Rome as the capital of Italy. Andrieux is a renowned French historian and author of many works including a definitive history of the Medici.

Soft Underbelly: The Anglo-American Controversy over the Italian Campaign 1939-1945. By Trumbull Higgins. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 275 pp. $6.95. This study of the Italian campaign during World War II, by the well-known military historian, offers illuminating insights into the policies and stratagems used by Churchill and the British military to divert the Allied battlefront away from an all-out cross-channel invasion of France in favor of a limited land offensive in the Mediterranean. Trumbull believes Britain's strategy was determined by its overburdened economy, fear of the Somme, and the unwillingness of either the general public or professional military to suffer casualties on the 1916-1918 scale for the sake of their European allies or even to defeat Hitler quickly.

V. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Constitutions of the Communist Party-States. Edited by Jan F. Triska. Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968. 541 pp. $12.50. A collection of the past and present constitutions of the communist party-states. The texts are either official English translations or the most authoritative translations available.

The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. By Robert Conquest. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 633 pp. $9.95. This comprehensive and fully documented history of the purge of the 1930's begins with the murder of Kirov, party leader of Leningrad, and proceeds to examine the "show trials" of Zinoviev and others, efforts to block Stalin, the slaughter of the army command, the fantastic Bukharin trial, and the bloody climax of 1938. Robert Conquest, English poet, political analyst and author of many books and articles on the Soviet Union, deals with the sufferings of ordinary and important victims in labor camps, discusses the theory and practice of the faked confession, investigates casualty figures, and probes Stalin's devious and perverted character.

Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev. Edited by Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 179 pp. $4.95. A collection of seven essays originally presented at a conference at Columbia University on Soviet arms-control and disarmament attitudes since 1964. Wolfgang Leonhard discusses "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era"; Alec Nove discusses "Economic Policy and Economic Trends"; Thomas W. Wolfe assesses "Soviet Military Policy After Khrushchev."

Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics. By John C. Campbell. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 180 pp. $3.95. In tracing the course of American-Yugoslav relations, the author discusses the basis on which U.S. policy has rested and the controversies it has engendered, and makes proposals for the future. He concludes that it remains in the interest of the United States to strengthen the ties between Yugoslavia and the West.

Yugoslavia: Patterns of Economic Activity. By F. E. Ian Hamilton. New York: Praeger, 1968. 384 pp. $8.00. This comprehensive account of Yugoslavia's re-

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source and economic base fills a gap in our knowledge. There are chapters dealing with the physical environment, planning, and economic development in sectors such as agriculture, industry, transport and tourism. In his analysis of decentralization and regionalism, the author demonstrates admirable sensitivity for the cultural complexity of the country.

VI. Middle East and Africa

Africa in Social Change: Changing Traditional Societies in the Modern World. By Peter C. Lloyd. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. 363 pp. $1.65 (paper). Believing that the future of West Africa depends significantly on the development and character of the new elites, the author seeks answers to such questions as the relationship between the new elites and their traditional societies; the extent to which West African societies are copying the patterns of Western industrial society with its stratification into social classes; and the nature of the necessary preconditions for political revolution and rapid economic advancement. In his knowledgeable assessment, he draws upon his extensive personal experience in Western Nigeria and several visits to other West African countries.

The Development of Modern Nigeria. By Okoi Arikpo. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. 176 pp. $1.25 (paper). A brief account by the Secretary of the Nigerian Universities Commission of the political, economic and cultural problems that confront the Nigerian government. The author approves the right of the military regime to end corruption in Nigerian public life and is critical of the existence of a multiplicity of contradictory purposes under the First Republic. He comments: "Since independence, there has not been one national purpose. If the revolution of 15 January 1966 succeeds in infusing a new national purpose in the people of Nigeria, then it will have been worth all the sacrifice it entailed."

The Indians in Uganda. By H. S. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. 230 pp. $8.00. Uganda, like most East African countries, contains a small but significant minority of Indians. The author uses this settlement of South Asians in a black nation as an extended case study to illustrate and analyze the principles which underlie complex plural societies. He goes on to examine the changes in the traditional caste system that occur when Indians are transplanted from the Asian subcontinent. Dr. Morris is Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at the London School of Economics.

Israel Without Zionists. A Plea for Peace in the Middle East. By Uri Avnery. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 215 pp. $5.95. Drawing upon years of experience as a teenage member of the terrorist Irgun group, soldier in the 1948 war, leading Israeli journalist and now an outspoken member of the Parliament (Knesset), Mr. Avnery outlines a set of revolutionary proposals aimed at settling the perpetual state of war between Arab and Jew in the Middle East. While providing numerous background chapters on the history of Zionism, the Arab-Jewish conflict, and the Israeli "Establishment," he concentrates on suggestions for peace. Declaring that Arab and Jew are ethnically similar and that Israel must drop her identification with Zionism and the Jewish religion, he calls for the creation of a federation of Israel and a new Arab Republic of Palestine and the establishment of a Semitic Union, a confederacy of all the states of the Middle East.

The Lightning War. By W. Byford-Jones. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. 229 pp. $5.00. An excellent politico-strategic-military account by a veteran British journalist of the third Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, giving an overview of the contenders, the personalities, the actions, the Soviet role, and the problems yet

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to be solved as a result of this most recent Arab-Israeli confrontation. The chapter on who fired first is one of the most intriguing aspects of the book.

The Long View. By Alan Paton; edited by Edward Callan. New York: Praeger, 1968. 295 pp. $6.95. Alan Paton is probably best known as a novelist. Yet he was also deeply involved in the politics of his country, South Africa, as President of the anti-apartheid Liberal Party and as a frequent contributor to the party's newspaper, *Contact*. In this collection of his essays, speeches and articles, Paton charts the course of liberalism in contemporary South Africa. The two recurrent themes are the author's unyielding opposition to apartheid and his belief in nonracial democracy as the only alternative to forced separation of the races.

The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. By Robert W. July. New York: Praeger, 1968. 512 pp. $10.00. During the heyday of colonialism, European penetration of Africa started a fundamental and far-reaching transformation of the traditional tribal societies. A vital element of this was the Western impact on African thought. Focusing on West Africa, the author traces the development in West African minds of a whole range of questions dealing with man and society: the structure of the state, the shape of the economy, the adequacy of traditional religion, the role of education. He accomplishes this by examining the lives, careers and ideas of some 40 West Africans who were prominent in such fields as law, politics, education and literature during the colonial era.

Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century: Verwoerd. By Alexander Hepple. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968. 253 pp. $1.25 (paper). In this biography a former Labour leader in the South Africa Parliament traces Prime Minister Verwoerd's effort to secure white supremacy by means of the policy of separate racial development, paying particular attention to Verwoerd's leadership of the secret society, the Broederbond, which still exercises an important role in South African politics. Since Verwoerd's successor, Dr. Vorster, is of the same mold as his predecessor, the author believes South Africa will continue along the road it has followed in the past.

Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development. By Henry Bienen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 446 pp. $11.50. The author has as his principal objective to show how the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), seeks to transform the country's economy. He stresses the role of political institutions as a crucial link between politics and economics in studies of development. In treating the army mutiny of January 1964 and the parliamentary elections of 1965, he illustrates difficulties encountered by TANU, and goes on to suggest structural changes which might be needed if the ruling party is to prove capable of effecting social and economic development in Tanzania.

Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation. By Ernest W. Lefever. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 254 pp. $7.50. In this account of the largest, costliest and most controversial peacekeeping mission ever undertaken by an international organization, Professor Lefever demonstrates that the "internationalization" of the crisis, which it was hoped would keep the Cold War out of the Congo, in fact assured the eventual involvement of the great powers. While the intervention did maintain the political integrity of the nation and strengthened the moderates in Leopoldville against the militants, he concludes that such large multistate operations with sweeping objectives should be avoided in the future. The author is a member of the senior Foreign Policy Studies staff of the Brookings Institution.

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VII. East Asia and the Pacific

America's Stake in Asia. By Drew Middleton. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968. 240 pp. $5.95. An intelligent and illuminating discussion of the struggle of the small states of Southeast Asia to remain independent under the constant threat of Communist China. Middleton, one of America's leading foreign correspondents, asserts that this part of Asia is "the scene of a great joint effort between Americans and Asians" and warns that "to talk glibly . . . of 'getting out or staying in' [is] folly. We are in; we can't get out without turning half the world upside down." He also points out that he "did not find that the United States intervention in South Vietnam was resented [by Asians]. On the contrary, it was regarded, except by the Communists and their clients, as a shield."

The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia. By Werner Levi. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 186 pp. $4.95 ($2.95, paper). A fresh examination of the international relations among the states of South and Southeast Asia and between them and outside powers. Dr. Levi, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii and author of many books and articles on the area, treats such topics as nationalist goals, the elitist nature of foreign policy, regional cooperation, tensions and conflicts, the expectations and results of nonalignment, and relations with the UN and major powers.

China and the West. By Wolfgang Franke. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1967. 165 pp. $5.95. An historical account and interpretation of a number of problems which are characteristic of, and still exercise a decisive influence on, China's relations with the West. The book, written for the interested layman, not the specialist, is designed "to help the reader to understand the Chinese point of view and the Chinese attitude towards the West . . . . it is not the intention of the author to judge or to condemn, but to show the heavy burden of mistakes and misunderstandings, some of them going back several centuries."

A Concise History of Southeast Asia. By Nicholas Tarling. New York: Praeger, 1966. 334 pp. $7.50. A colony-by-colony, country-by-country survey of the history of this Asian "frontier area." The author, Professor of History at the University of Auckland, Australia, briefly treats the pre-colonial period, then divides his study into three periods: the coming of the Portuguese to 1760, 1760 to 1942, and 1942 to the present.

The First Vietnam Crisis. By Melvin Gurtov. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 228 pp. $7.00. A scholarly account of the 1953-1954 Vietnamese crisis with emphasis on Chinese communist strategy and U.S. involvement. Dr. Gurtov, a specialist on China and a Staff Member of The RAND Corporation, examines Sino-Vietnamese relations from 1945 to 1954; U.S.-French conflict and cooperation; the increasing U.S. involvement, shifts in strategy, and agonizing reappraisals over whether to intervene massively to strengthen the French position; and communist strategy leading to Dienbienphu and the Geneva Conference.

Four Religions of Asia. By Herbert Stroup. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 212 pp. $6.00. A basic reference work on the major living religions of Asia and the cultural milieu out of which they have grown. Dr. Stroup, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Brooklyn College, has written an introductory chapter on the nature of religion and its relationship to magic, science and morality, and separate essays on Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism. Each chapter contains a glossary of terms and a short bibliography.

The Frontiers of China: A Historical Guide. By Francis Watson. New York: Praeger, 1966. 224 pp. $5.50. A survey of China's long-standing border disputes

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with all of her neighbors, from the Soviet Union and India to Burma and Portuguese Macao, with emphasis on the Maoist era. The author probes the Chinese obsession with "hostile encirclement," the annexation of Tibet and the undeclared border war with India, Peking's pledge at Bandung to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations, and skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border. He concludes that Mao's border policies have been shaped by political considerations and not by legalities, and warns of heightened Chinese pressures against neighbors as soon as the internal turmoil has been brought under control.

The Great Cultural Revolution in China. Compiled and edited by the Asia Research Centre. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1968. 507 pp. $7.50. This reference work is a collection of documents on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from official Communist Chinese sources, presented with a minimum of comment by the editors. They have included materials on the socialist educational and cultural origins of the GPCR, the "anti-Party elements," the role of the army, the birth of the Red Guards, and party policy pronouncements. The treatment does not go beyond the emergence of the Red Guards.

Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967. By Kenneth T. Young. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. 461 pp. $10.95. Another volume in the series, The United States and China in World Affairs, this account traces the course of the more than 130 subministerial conferences which have taken place since the Korean War between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The author assesses their nature and attempts to discover what they augur for future American dealings with the new nuclear power. Thus far, Ambassador Young contends, the talks have been worthwhile even if the results have been meager.

Nehru: The Years of Power. By Geoffrey Tyson. New York: Praeger, 1966. 206 pp. $5.00. A sympathetic examination of the late Indian prime minister's record in the fields of economic development, national unity and the language problem, governmental administration and party leadership, and foreign policy.

Storm Over Asia: China and Southeast Asia—Thrust and Response. By Robert Karr McCabe. New York: New American Library, 1967. 225 pp. $5.50. A valuable analysis of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, Communist China's pressure on her southern neighbors, the broad historical forces that have shaped current regional problems, and the prospects for the survival of independent nations in the area. The author is realistic about China's threat to Southeast Asia and profoundly sympathetic to the U.S. commitment to preserve Southeast Asian independence, but he is candid in criticizing American mistakes and appraising the difficulties of achieving U.S. goals. A former *Newsweek* bureau chief in Hong Kong and associate editor, McCabe became foreign news editor of the Public Broadcast Laboratory in 1967.

Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi. By Donald S. Zagoria. New York: Pegasus, 1967. 286 pp. $6.95 ($1.75, paper). An astute analysis of the complex interactions among the communist protagonists directly involved in the Viet Nam conflict—North Viet Nam, Communist China, the Soviet Union and the People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet Nam. Dr. Zagoria, Associate Professor of Government at Hunter College and Director of its Research Institute on Modern Asia, points out that each party "has its own particular interests and points of view, and these, while ostensibly geared to the common goal of ultimate triumph in South Vietnam, do not necessarily coincide. Indeed, they often conflict." Half of the book is given over to four appendices containing communist documents, North Vietnamese party and government organizational charts, and a chronology of the Sino-Soviet rift since the fall of Khrushchev.

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American Anti-War Movements. By Joseph R. Conlin. Beverly Hills, Cal.: Glencoe Press, 1968. 133 pp. $1.95.

Austria: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, May 1968. 36 pp. 80 cents.

Contradiction and Unanimity of CCP-CPSU Global Strategy. By Ting Chu-yuan. Taipei: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, March 1968. 64 pp. 70 cents.

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Dissent, Democracy and Foreign Policy—A Symposium. By Oscar Handlin, Hans J. Morgenthau, Paul Ramsey, and others. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 190, August 1968. 47 pp. 85 cents.

Documents on Disarmament, 1967. Compiled by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington: GPO, July 1968. 820 pp. $2.50.

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United States Interests in the Middle East. By George Lenczowski, Ralph Magnus, Carl Leiden, and others. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 1968. 129 pp. $3.00.

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World Politics and Free Trade: Britain, USA and the West. By Lionel Gelber. London: The Atlantic Trade Study, July 1968. 86 pp. 7/-.

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